TY - JOUR
AU1 - Mann, Philip
AB - 264 Book Reviews caused by the ineptness of the officers and the men’s lack of training in modem infantry combat. ‘No-one had any idea of combat; they all ran in thick lines into the Russian artillery and machine-gun fire. None of the instructions and orders I issued were followed . . . No sign of any kind of tactics! It drove me crazy!’ In other words, the German army’s renunciation of the massed offensive was only theoretical. Secondly, Schlieffen, described by Storz as a modem military thinker, thought a long war in the age of industry was impossible. Schlieffen’s entire strategy (and that of Moltke, whom Storz terms a realist) was based on a gigantic enveloping movement to ensure victory on the Western Front within six weeks, precisely in order to avoid a long, industrialized war. Schlieffen’s vision of a vast, latter-day Cannae was thus not modem, but truly anachronistic. Thirdly, if there had been such an awareness of the technological and industrial requirements of the coming war, why does Storz not detail the plans? Storz knows that Europe’s military experts ignored the central message of Jean de Bloch, whose widely- read book of 1899 predicted not only that 
TI - Critique of the German Intelligentsia
JF - German History
DO - 10.1093/gh/13.2.264
DA - 1995-04-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/critique-of-the-german-intelligentsia-1yJBgx0ejn
SP - 264
EP - 265
VL - 13
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -