TY - JOUR
AU - Rosenkranz, Sven
AB -  Sven Rosenkranz According to the epistemic view, vagueness is a case of ignorance. Neither do we know of any given borderline statement that it is true, nor do we know of any such statement that it is false. We are ignorant of which truth-value any given borderline statement has. Some proponents of the epistemic viewthe epistemicistshold that we nonetheless know that there is something we thus are ignorant of: we know that borderline statements are either true or false, although we do not know which truth-value they have. If all borderline statements are either true or false, as epistemicists contend, then vague terms have sharp boundaries. Accordingly, epistemicists claim that we do know that vague terms have sharp boundaries, although we do not know where they lie. That vague terms have sharp boundaries follows from the application, to statements in which these terms occur, of classical logic and its attendant bivalent semantics. Epistemicism thus incorporates classicism as applied to vague discourse. Others who still think that vagueness is at bottom an epistemic phenomenon, object to the epistemicist claim that we know that borderline statements are either true or false. According to these thinkers, we are not only ignorant 
TI - Wright on Vagueness and Agnosticism
JF - Mind
DO - 10.1093/mind/112.447.449
DA - 2003-07-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/wright-on-vagueness-and-agnosticism-1xM95PYCLA
SP - 449
EP - 464
VL - 112
IS - 447
DP - DeepDyve
ER -