TY - JOUR
AU1 - Biddle, Stephen
AB -  Victory Misunderstood What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict Stephen Biddle tions of the Gulf War‘s outcome are wrong. The orthodox view explains the war’s one-sidedness in terms of the Coalition’s strengths, especially its advanced technology, which is often held to have destroyed the Iraqis’ equipment or broken their will without exposing Coalition forces to extensive close combat on the ground.’ The main rival explanation emphasizes Iraqi shortcomings, such as their weak morale, poor training and leadership, or numerical inferiority in the theater of war.2 Both schools appeared within a few months of the cease-fire, and have changed surprisingly little since then.3 The information Stephen Biddle is a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Alexandria, Virginia. This analysis was supported by the IDA Central Research Program. The views expressed are those of the author, however, and do not necessarily represent positions of IDA, its management, or sponsors. The author would like to thank Richard Betts, Tami Davis Biddle, Eliot Cohen, Steven David, Peter Feaver, Wade Hinkle, Marshall Hoyler, Christopher Jehn, Chaim Kaufmann, Michael Leonard, H.R. McMaster, Jesse Orlansky Brad Roberts, Richard Swain, John Tillson, Robert Turrell, Victor Utgoff, 
TI - Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict
JF - International Security
DO - 10.1162/isec.21.2.139
DA - 1996-10-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/mit-press/victory-misunderstood-what-the-gulf-war-tells-us-about-the-future-of-1HXChz6W9h
SP - 139
EP - 179
VL - 21
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -