TY - JOUR
AU - Kinchin, Niamh
AB - ABSTRACT The Global Compact for Refugees describes UNHCR as its ‘supportive and catalytic’ leader. The ability for UNHCR to negotiate and collaborate within a highly political environment is critical to the Refugee Compact’s ongoing success. However, the Refugee Compact is non-binding, which means that there is no call for UNHCR to exercise its supervisory mandate. By removing the impetus for enforcement, which includes submissions to courts and parliaments, and State admonishment, the Refugee Compact diminishes the non-political elements of UNHCR’s work. The consequence of sidelining UNHCR’s supervisory mandate is that State interests are elevated above those of refugees, which risks diluting principles of international law and human rights. Entrenched problems of voluntary funding are ignored, and whilst robust conversations may flourish within this forum, realizable outcomes will be undermined by ‘endless conversations’ and positive optics. UNHCR’s moral authority, which stems from its embodiment of the protector of refugees, will not act as a motivation for State action. A reconsideration of UNHCR’s role is required in order to allow UNHCR to refocus on its supervisory mandate and to ensure the Refugee Compact can strike a balance between being “entirely non‐political in nature” and the reality of international cooperation, which is inherently political. On 19 September 2016, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (“New York Declaration”).1 The New York Declaration represents an agreement by States to enhance the protection of refugees and migrants. Labelled a “minor miracle” and a “glimmer of hope” by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) then Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Volker Türk,2 States acknowledged “a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner”3 and committed to address the root causes of large movements of refugees and migrants. Signatories to the New York Declaration committed to working towards the adoption of two agreements, the Global Compact for Refugees (“the Refugee Compact”) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.4 The Refugee Compact, which is the focus of this article, was spearheaded by UNHCR, and is comprised of a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which is annexed to the New York Declaration, and a Programme of Action, which outlines specific measures to help meet the objectives of the compact, including “arrangements to share burdens and responsibilities through a Global Refugee Forum (every four years), national and regional arrangements for specific situations, and tools for funding, partnerships, and data gathering and sharing”5 as well as focusing upon areas in need of support, such as reception and admission. The Refugee Compact has four objectives, which are to (i) ease pressures on host countries; (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance; (iii) expand access to third country solutions; and (iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. The Refugee Compact describes UNHCR’s role as “supportive and catalytic” and its associated responsibilities indicate that the agency is expected to support States in their practical efforts towards increased burden-sharing and durable solutions. UNHCR is described as being actively involved in facilitative and consultative activities such as ensuring regular reporting on the work of the Support Platforms,6 facilitating the exchange of good practices and information amongst states as well as relevant regional and sub-regional mechanisms (supported by a new “digital platform”),7 and coordinating with concerned States and appropriate partners to assist with measuring the impact arising from hosting, protecting, and assisting refugees.8 UNHCR has also committed to supporting regular reporting and data collection, sharing and analysis, encouraging and supporting research by facilitating a global “academic network on refugee, other forced displacement, and statelessness issues”, coordinating a “technical review” of methodologies to build a broad consensus on approaches to burden and responsibility sharing, and devising a three-year strategy to increase the pool of resettlement places. The Refugee Compact also states that UNHCR will provide resources and expertise to reception activities, security screening and health assessments, individual registration and documentation and to share good practices around statelessness. The Refugee Compact represents an opportunity for greater State collaboration and burden sharing, but it also presents a forum in which old challenges are freshly illuminated. In particular, the challenge to balance UNHCR’s implicit political role with its explicit non-political mandate finds a sharper focus within the Refugee Compact. Despite UNHCR’s position as a statutorily mandated non-political overseer that is tasked with monitoring State compliance with legal obligations,9 its role in the Refugee Compact is the clearest indication yet that the agency increasingly sees itself as a supportive and facilitative leader of the refugee regime, rather than its “watchdog”. In the space of the Refugee Compact, UNHCR is a benevolent leader, working with States to facilitate the implementation of agreements that it initiates10 and mobilizing assistance to address the impact of large-scale refugee movements. Influencing public authorities to protect refugees is an advocacy or lobbying function, and “trying to advance a preferred public policy is a political act”.11 Although the cementing of UNHCR as a supportive and catalytic leader is an implicit acceptance that the agency operates in and must be responsive to the political context in which it operates, UNHCR’s retains a non-political mandate, regardless. While UNHCR’s struggle to be non-political in a political context is by no means new, the Refugee Compact’s failure to create new legal obligations for States tips the balance away from its non-political functions in a way that sidelines UNHCR’s supervisory mandate and could undermine the potential of the Refugee Compact to produce concrete, realizable outcomes, as well as undermine principles of international law and human rights. The first section of this article revisits UNHCR’s ongoing challenge to carry out its non-political work within a regime that is defined by politics, and places it in a contemporary context. In the second section the way that the Refugee Compact has tipped UNHCR’s role away from its non-political, statutory mandate to becoming a more unabashedly political agency is explored. Section three provides a critical analysis of the potential consequences of this “disequilibrium” for international law and human rights, and for realizable outcomes of the Refugee Compact. Finally, in section four, potential alternatives for the way forward are explored, leading to a conclusion that questions the continuing utility of UNHCR’s role as the “supportive and catalytic” leader of the Refugee Compact. 1. BEING NON-POLITICAL IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT: CONTEMPORARY INSIGHTS INTO OLD CHALLENGES The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees.12 Despite its clear non-political mandate, it is widely acknowledged that UNHCR must often act “politically” in order to respond to and be effective within a political context. Without the formal ability to sanction States for non-compliance with their legal obligations, UNHCR often has to rely upon “behind-the-door’ diplomacy, which is by definition, political action.13 Being politically active or “astute”14 means exerting influence on behalf of persons of concern15 rather than directly and explicitly pronouncing on “who governs” or engaging in military coercion to compel policy change.16 As Goodwin-Gill argues; [W]hen states seek to ignore the realities on the ground, to disregard evidence of persecution or torture, to leave refugees without status and unprotected, or to coerce return in unsafe conditions, UNHCR has no choice but to fulfil the responsibility entrusted to it by the international community and to use all available means to prevent the violation of fundamental human rights.17 Acting politically, however, does not mean that UNHCR can abandon the non-political role that was intended for it. According to principles of interpretation of rules,18 the word “non-political” must be read contextually with the whole of the statute and specifically, the whole of Article 2. Words take their meaning from the words around them,19 meaning that the first limb of Article 2, (“[T]he work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character”), must be understood in relation to the second limb, (‘it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees’). Non-political work, therefore, should be interpreted as reflecting a humanitarian and social objective in relation to refugees, which is manifested through UNHCR’s international protection mandate. As Goodwin-Gill argues, the conception of the refugee as an unprotected person can be separated from politics and “located in a space where the refugee in turn can be seen as an individual possessed of dignity, worth, and rights”.20 The question, according to Goodwin-Gill is “whether the politics of protection at any particular moment best serve the refugee – are humanitarian; or whether they serve primarily other purposes, in which the refugee is merely instrumental”.21 Political and non-political can exist coextensively as long as what is political remains what UNHCR must do in order to advocate for refugees. UNHCR has grappled with the difficulty of finding the appropriate balance between political realities and a non-political mandate from its early years. A major contributor to this challenge is the well-documented conundrum of UNHCR’s funding. UNHCR’s budget is funded from a number of sources, the first being the UN regular budget, which in 2018 allocated UNHCR USD 42,954,00 for the purposes of headquarters administration.22 The second source of funding is voluntary cash contributions, which are provided by governmental donors, UN funds and intergovernmental and private donors (corporate and individual). In 2018, UNHCR received USD 3,378,115 in voluntary cash contributions, which amounted to approximately 80 per cent of its total contributions. Other sources of funding include carry over funding from the previous year, voluntary in-kind contributions, programme support costs and “other income”. The top five donors make up approximately 76 per cent of the voluntary contributions and are all either state governments or the European Union. UNHCR’s largest donor in 2018 was the United States (38 per cent), followed the European Union (11 per cent), Germany (9 per cent), Sweden (3 per cent), and Japan (2 per cent).23 The relationship between UNHCR and a voluntary State funder is characterized by the level of contribution by that State, as well as how it has chosen to “earmark” its funding. Earmarking is the ability of a State to choose how its contributions are spent. Earmarked funding, which is classified as “tightly earmarked” (27 per cent in 2018), “earmarked” (40 per cent in 2018) or “softly earmarked” (18 per cent in 2018)24 creates the situation where allocation of resources may be based not on needs, but on the priorities of States. The power of States to “earmark” their funding means some displacement situations will receive more attention, and thus more funding than others, placing UNHCR in the difficult position of having to negotiate in order to secure funding. Although there is an expectation that UNHCR will spend funds in a way that reflects its mandate and objectives, and will do so efficiently, effectively and transparently,25 where the majority of contributors are States, financial and funding concerns become intertwined with political factors, such as diplomacy, domestic policy, and State self-interest. This is a problem that has not abated with time. For example, UNHCR has a history of taking policy decisions that reflect the interests of its largest donor, the US.26 During the Cold War, UNHCR’s decision to award refugee status to individuals fleeing communist regimes was influenced by the anti-communism policies of the West, notably those of the US. Asylum during this period has been described as being “generally used to reaffirm the failures of communism and the benevolence of the West”,27 rather than being based upon actual need and circumstance. More recently, UNHCR has been criticized for meeting the Trump administration’s increasingly restrictive policies on asylum-seekers with a “muted response”. On 8 November 2018, one day before official announcements, the US government issued detailed papers on its new refugee and migration policy (which included significant reductions in the number of refugee and migrant admissions) to the media and relevant organizations. While NGOs Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) released strongly condemnatory responses on the evening on November 8, UNHCR did not release its response until 12 hours later. The delay in UNHCR’s response, in which it declined to criticize the US and committed to “support the United States and all governments and civil society partners working to guarantee that any person fleeing life-threatening violence or persecution is able to reach safe ground and is able to have their claim reviewed”,28 was described as indicative of an “outrageous inability to challenge the Trump administration in areas that are basically UNHCR’s bread and butter”.29 UNHCR has demonstrated a similarly “muted” response to questionable asylum policies of the EU, which is also one of its major donors. Most striking is UNHCR’s silence on the EU’s funding of the Libyan coast guard, which intercepts asylum-seekers in the Mediterranean and returns them to Libyan detention centres. The detention centres, which are reported to be in appalling condition, cannot be considered a safe environment as they are situated amongst increased fighting in and around Tripoli. It was only after a deadly attack in the Tajoura detention centre in July 2019 in which 53 asylum-seekers and migrants were killed and another 130 injured, that UNHCR and the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) publicly condemned the attacks and called for them to be closed.30 UNHCR and IOM did not directly condemn the EU for funding the Libyan coastguard but “appealed to the European Union and African Union to prevent such a tragedy from happening again. The international community should consider the protection of the human rights of migrants and refugees a core element of its engagement in Libya”. In light of the fact that the US withdrew all of its funding for UN Relief and Works Agency in 2018, it may be that UNHCR’s relationship with EU is increasingly influenced by fears of losing more US funding.31 UNHCR is in a sense “hamstrung” by its own funding system. The circumstances in which it operates its humanitarian programmes can rarely, if ever, be removed from the political and military machinations that overshadow or created them. It can appear that the bigger the funder, the more likely that UNHCR’s actions will acquiesce to their policies. The need for UNHCR to be proactive in selling refugee problems as being worthy of State funding compounds the issue. For advocates of UNHCR many of its actions are a choice “between bad and still worse options”32 in obtaining largely discretionary financial support from States. UNHCR may have “a role to play in reminding liberal democracies of their own identity as promoters of international human rights”,33 but if it were to take a “hard line’”, it could risk destabilizing its relationship with non-complying States by provoking negative reactions and risking access to the refugees who reside within their territories. For example, in 2016, Pakistan implemented a policy to encourage, or coerce, the voluntary repatriation of Afghani refugees. Pakistan was widely condemned for creating an environment where police abuse and the threat of deportation caused many Afghani refugees to flee back to Afghanistan, causing refoulement. UNHCR has not only been criticized for remaining publicly silent about Pakistan’s actions, but for actively contributing to them by doubling the financial support to returning refugees to USD 400, and by publicly referring to “voluntary repatriation” instead of refoulement.34 A UNHCR spokesperson emphasized the complexity of the factors driving the situation, which she said included Pakistani security operations, economic hardship and a campaign by the Afghan government to encourage Afghans in Pakistan to return home.35 Difficult as these factors may be, by providing “humanitarian support” to returnees, UNHCR was complicit in their refoulement. According to HRW, a document published by UNHCR in July 2018 shows that the agency partnered with the Syrian Ministry of Interior, Syrian Arab Red Crescent and Syria Trust to raise public awareness about civil documentation and registration. UNHCR was criticized by HRW for risking human rights abuse because the Ministry of Interior has been implicated in abuses against the Syrian population and is formally responsible for the Political Intelligence Directorate, which has reportedly committed abuses, including the arbitrary detention and mistreatment of individuals. Despite the criticism, HRW acknowledged that UNHCR has limited options if they want to obtain physical access to the people in need of protection, or implement relevant projects.36 Similar concerns have arisen around UNHCR’s relationship with Turkey. Although Turkey established a temporary asylum protection regime for Syrians in 2012, more recently it has deported Syrians by force. Some have expressed a concern that UNHCR’s need to maintain a good relationship with the Turkish government has meant that it will not publicly condemn its actions. In a report by the Guardian newspaper, a UN worker was reported as saying: People’s rights are being violated right under the nose of the UN and we’re not doing the right thing because there is a worrying amount of pressure on maintaining good relations with the Turkish government. Another said: The UN has to toe a line while operating in Turkey. If we want to run projects without government restriction then it’s best not to offend them, even if that means not publicly condemning the deportations outright – even if they contravene international humanitarian law.37 The challenge for UNHCR is that it is only able to operate in countries where it has the State’s permission to do so. Its need to gain “on the ground” access to refugees means that it must negotiate with often-recalcitrant States regarding the promotion of the admission of refugees to its territory, the implementation of humanitarian programmes, and voluntary repatriation. As Barnett points out “a UNHCR that fails to challenge states every time they violate refugee rights might be functional for interested governments and even for the organization, which must pick its battles wisely to preserve state support”.38 Unfortunately, the consequences may be outcomes that are detrimental to refugees, such as refoulement, which contradict international protection. Regardless of its motives, UNHCR’s political actions do not always achieve what is in the best interests of refugees, and the creation of the Refugee Compact has not diminished this reality. In fact, while UNHCR retains its non-political mandate, the nature of its leadership role in this new context requires the agency to be more political than ever. Although “politics” is integral to burden sharing, the Refugee Compact has sidelined UNHCR’s supervisory mandate in a way that tips the balance away from UNHCR’s non-political mandate. 2. THE REFUGEE COMPACT: TIPPING THE BALANCE TOWARDS THE POLITICAL 2.1 The importance of politics in burden sharing and the refugee compact UNHCR’s role in the Refugee Compact is described as “consistent with its mandate”, “without prejudice to activities carried out under its mandate” and “in addition to the exercise of its mandate responsibilities”.39 Besides stating that the compact will not modify “UNHCR’s protection and solutions mandate”,40 references to the nature of UNHCR’s mandate are striking for their austerity. Described simply as “mandate”, the Refugee Compact avoids the kind of adjectives such as “international protection”, “core” or “extended” that signal elasticity in its scope. Without descriptors, the meaning of mandate is unclear. On one hand, it could be assumed that the Refugee Compact is referring to UNHCR’s “extended mandate” in the sense that the mandate extends beyond UNHCR’s rationae personae41 to internally displaced people,42 which can be supported by UNHCR’s descriptions of its mandate.43 On the other hand, it could equally be assumed that by not explicitly limiting UNHCR’s mandate to its core protection responsibilities, “mandate” encompasses the shift from its core protection role to an increasingly pragmatic involvement in humanitarianism.44 The only thing that we can truly be sure of, is that the meaning of UNHCR’s mandate is left intentionally ambiguous. The ambiguity in the references to UNHCR’s mandate has given UNHCR latitude to cement its gradual evolution from a supervisor to a more collaborative facilitator with an increased focus on “learning and normative change” in the refugee regime “through deliberative engagement”.45 As early as 1996, UNHCR’s Executive Committee (“the ExCom”) urged “the High Commissioner to continue to play a supportive and catalytic role to mobilize the involvement of international and multilateral organizations as part of the rehabilitation strategy to sustain repatriation in regards to Afghanistan”.46 In 2000, the ExCom “reaffirmed UNHCR’s catalytic role in assisting and supporting countries receiving refugees … and in mobilising assistance from the international community to address the impact of large-scale refugee populations”.47 As Türk and Garlick point out, the ExCom reinforced the idea of support for UNHCR as a form of international cooperation and solidarity, and emphasized UNHCR’s important position in leading and coordinating inter-State cooperation.48 Similarly, in 2002 the UNGA called upon “the High Commissioner to continue to play his catalytic role in mobilizing assistance from the international community to address the root causes as well as the economic, environmental and social impact of large-scale refugee populations”.49 UNHCR’s role in the Refugee Compact has allowed the agency to openly embrace the political element that has implicitly characterized its functions for years. By formalizing UNHCR’s role as “supportive and catalytic” within a formal agreement made by States, the Refugee Compact legitimizes that role. UNHCR no longer has to simply do its “best in bad circumstances” and search for a way to justify political action; it is an acknowledgement that UNHCR is a political body. Harnessing its “organisational capacity for political leadership”, “the ability to identify and understand States’ political interests, and propose principled yet pragmatic agreements based on reciprocity” will be key in ensuring the success of the Refugee Compact.50 As Loescher argues, if UNHCR can do “more by doing less” in order to fulfil its core mandate and is willing to become “more focused and strategic in the advocacy, coordination and facilitation role it plays”, it will become a more politically engaged actor in a highly politicized environment that is largely determined by the interests and capacities of States.51 The Refugee Compact represents an opportunity to avoid political tensions while making a progressive step towards solving the refugee crisis.52 “Being political” in a forum that is focused on burden sharing appears entirely appropriate when it is acknowledged that burden sharing is a relatively weak concept that is reliant upon the discretion of States.53 In bringing States together to recognize ways in which their contributions to asylum and burden sharing can be made compatible with their interests,54 UNHCR’s focus on negotiation and facilitation, not censure and criticism, seems fitting in this context. In fact, some even argue that UNHCR may lack the institutional will or capacity to be political enough. Betts states that it will be key to place political facilitation at the core of the Refugee Compact and that there is some indication that UNHCR is achieving that through special envoys, “CRRF champions”, and appointments from government.55 According to Crisp, however, the Refugee Compact has had little impact on UNHCR’s existing functions and operations. UNHCR staff “in the filed” recognize that the Refugee Compact “represents business as usual: showcasing and systematizing things UNHCR is already doing, while averting external demand for substantive reform”. Crisp asserts that despite the promises of the Refugee Compact, UNHCR’s priorities remain unchanged, which are to provide humanitarian delivery in refugee camps and legal advice to governments. It is, according to Crisp, in economic and political competence where the agency is most lacking: But the competences most needed to yield sustainable responses are economics and politics, and yet fewer than five staff in an organization of 9,000 have been recruited as economists or political analysts.56 By embracing its more political persona, by becoming a truly supportive and catalytic leader, UNHCR rightly hopes to facilitate a shift towards more equal burden sharing amongst States. But in gaining one thing, it loses something else. As will be discussed in the following section, the Refugee Compact sidelines UNHCR’s supervisory mandate, which is the vessel for its non-political work, and this has broader consequences for its supervisory mandate and the Refugee Compact. 2.2 Tipping the balance: sidelining UNHCR’s supervisory mandate UNHCR’s role in the Refugee Compact can be distinguished from its official supervisory mandate, which is the source of its authority to ensure that States are complying with their legal international protection obligations. Supervision, or “international supervision”, refers “to relations between organizations where one organization acts as principal with respect to specified agents”.57 Commonly, the organization is an international organization with oversight over specific international instruments and the “agents” are States. Another way to understand international supervision is to consider it as “a legal process which empowers authorized institutions to apply certain procedures to assure the proper functioning of the legal order by inducing subjects to observe obligations incumbent on them”.58 UNHCR’s supervisory mandate is a part of its core protection mandate. Article 8(a) of UNHCR’s statute requires UNHCR to supervise the application of international conventions for the protection of refugees (and propose any amendments thereto). This responsibility is supported by Article 35 of the Refugee Convention, which requires that contracting States cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions and facilitate its duty of supervising the provisions of the Refugee Convention. Express duties of State cooperation are also found in Article II of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”),59 and Article VIII of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa.60 Other instruments for the protection of refugees express broad support for UNHCR’s supervisory function61 or for UNHCR’s functions generally,62 which can be interpreted as an implied acceptance of UNHCR’s supervisory role.63 UNHCR’s supervisory function also supplements the supervision of international law instruments administered by other international organizations, where those instruments expressly refer to refugees.64 In addition to international instruments, various UNGA resolutions have confirmed States’ obligations to cooperate with UNHCR, by calling “upon governments to co-operate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the performance of his functions concerning refugees falling under the competence of his office”.65 Article 8(a) does not proscribe the content of UNHCR’s supervisory functions, meaning that commentators have looked to UNHCR’s practice in order to clarify what supervision means practically. For example, Kälin summarizes UNHCR’s supervisory functions as comprising the following activities: Monitoring and reporting on the situation of refugees; Cooperation with states in designing operational responses to specific problems; An advisory or consultative role in refugee status determination procedures; Providing amicus curae briefs in judicial proceedings; Access to refugees and asylum-seekers; Advising governments on legislation and administrative decrees that affect refugees and asylum seekers; Provision of training and promotional activities to NGOs, judges and other relevant parties; An advocacy role; Receiving data concerning refugees and asylum-seekers.66 While some of these activities can be considered information gathering and assessment, others are a form of enforcement.67 Enforcement is the prevention and redress of wrongful behaviour by means of either punitive or non-punitive measures.68 As UNHCR does not have a formal treaty compliance monitoring body or any way of officially sanctioning States, “enforcement” in this context means “a wide range of intervention and advocacy activities … to ensure the adherence of States to internationally accepted standards of conduct with regard to refugees and asylum-seekers and to assist in building up the capacity of authorities to do so”.69 For UNHCR, intervention and advocacy means “conducting a constructive dialogue” with governments, relevant regional and local authorities, the parliament, the judiciary, the academic community, and other relevant institutions, including non-State actors.70 More specifically, UNHCR will make formal or informal representations, which, depending on the forum, are communicated in the form of letters, notes verbales, aide-mémoires, public domain positions, amicus curiae briefs or other submissions to the judiciary or written or oral statements to parliamentary committees. In addition, UNHCR engages in standard-setting and promotional activities.71 A “constructive dialogue” must also sometimes be censorious. When States breach their international obligations under the Refugee Convention and other relevant instruments, intervention and advocacy means admonishment and criticism as much as it means facilitation and negotiation. If States have no legal obligations the motivation to remonstrate for non-compliance is removed. Although the Refugee Compact states that UNHCR’s role in the Refugee Compact is to be “consistent with its mandate”, “without prejudice to activities carried out under its mandate” and “in addition to the exercise of its mandate responsibilities”,72 by removing the motivation to censor States for non-compliance with their legal obligations (i.e. enforcement), its supervisory mandate is sidelined, creating a kind of “dormant” supervision. The consequence of the sidelining of UNHCR’s supervisory mandate is that the non-political element of the agency’s work is diminished. This occurs in two ways. First, the most “non-political” of UNHCR’s intervention and advocacy work is providing amicus curiae briefs in judicial proceedings, and advising governments on legislation and administrative decrees that affect refugees and asylum-seekers. Submissions of this nature are directed to institutions that are often (but not always) separate from the political, or executive arm of a government, and which have in-built accountability mechanisms that act as stalwarts against abuse of power and corruption. For example, UNHCR submits its opinions on Australian legislation to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, which is a bipartisan oversight committee that is made up of Senate members from different political parties. Parliamentary oversight committees act as accountability mechanisms in Australia and other common law countries because they operate as part of a responsible government.73 Amicus curiae briefs on the other hand, are received by domestic courts, which in democratic systems act as a check and balance on the executive or legislative branches of government. Amicus curiae briefs and submissions on legislation and administrative decrees are often censorious74 because they are created to comment on gaps, breaches, and misunderstandings of legal principles and obligations. There is little need for placatory language in legal discourse, and criticism hides in plain sight within the rational, technical language common to this context. But such submissions have no relevance or utility where there are no legal obligations to comment upon. Secondly, where traditional supervision is removed, or as in the case of the Refugee Compact, sidelined, there is no motivation for UNHCR to admonish States because criticism could potentially undermine its supportive, facilitative and catalytic role. If there is no structure within the Refugee Compact to address situations where States breach their legal obligations, tighten non-entrée regimes or infringe the human rights of refugees, it is easy to see how the “politics of protection” will no longer best serve the “non-political”, which is, of course, the refugee. The way that the Refugee Compact tips the balance of UNHCR’s work from the non-political to the political through the sidelining of its supervisory mandate has two important ramifications. First, the absence of any need to consider enforcement created an opportunity for the drafters of the Refugee Compact to design the agreement with the interests of States and refugees in mind. Despite incentivizing negotiation, such a “balanced” approach has the potential to undermine principles of international law and human rights. Secondly, a lack of capacity to enforce treaty obligations may result in a lack of concrete outcomes, which is exacerbated by the fact that UNHCR has a vested interest in the representation of its outcomes in a positive light, regardless of reality. 3. THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION VERSUS THE BEST INTERESTS OF REFUGEES 3.1 Elevating State Interests Of the four objectives of the Refugee Compact, two speak to State interests. The first, “to ease pressure on host countries” implicitly couches State interests in the framework of burden-sharing. The second, “to enhance refugee self-reliance” implies a residual economic and social benefit of receiving refugees for the host State. In addition, various benefits to refugees and the host community are mentioned throughout the Refugee Compact, such as fostering inclusive economic growth for host communities and refugees,75 facilitating access to primary, secondary, and tertiary education to refugee and host community children76 and delivering clean energy to support the needs of both refugees and host communities.77 No doubt there is good reason for dual emphasis on benefit. If genuine burden-sharing is to be achieved, host communities must be resilient and UNHCR will do well to “recognize ways in which States’ contributions to asylum and burden sharing can be made compatible with their interests”.78 Borrowing from the implicit logic of international law, “that satisfying State interests is the best way to encourage States to respect legal norms”,79 UNHCR understands that negotiating mutual benefit creates opportunities for actual change. In linking State interests with those of refugees, which is supported by UNHCR’s focus on facilitation and negotiation over enforcement, the Refugee Compact risks diluting principles of international law and infringing the human rights of refugees. Although the Refugee Compact states that it is to be guided by relevant international human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, as well as other international instruments as applicable,80 it makes no substantive mention of international law. Chimni expresses concern that the Refugee Compact’s objectives may actually dilute principles of international law and infringe the human rights of refugees because its focus is on easing pressure on host countries, which he calls a “misplaced priority”, rather than dismantling non entrée regimes.81 Chimni presents the lack of opportunity for the condemnation of breaches of the Refugee Convention as State-centred pragmatism over humanitarianism: But what use is international cooperation if it does not condemn the unfortunate effort of States to deny the right to seek asylum against the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention and, in many instances, its letter? In the final analysis, the Refugee Compact appears to replace humanitarian objectives with those of managing refugee flows on behalf of States already empowered by their sovereignty to keep asylum seekers out.82 By not predicating repatriation on the accomplishment of political solutions in the country of return,83 Chimni argues that voluntary repatriation may be undermined because the conditions conducive to return and rehabilitation cannot be guaranteed.84 Furthermore, the Refugee Compact could lead to the erosion of rights of women and children as there is an absence of specific measures protecting women and a lack of specificity about non-custodial arrangements for children.85 In a similar vein, Maroud and Norman raise concerns about the focus of the Refugee Compact on the economic benefits of hosting refugees.86 They argue that “by furthering the premise that refugees should be accepted because of their potential for self-sufficiency—rather than out of a commitment to upholding international norms and the rights of refugees—the global compact may actually worsen their plight”.87 Maroud and Norman advocate a system of resettlement quotas based on a country’s GDP instead of the ability of States to select refugees based on high economic or integration potential, which are not criteria specified in the Refugee Convention.88 The focus in the CRRF upon specific large movements of refugees89 is important to the realization of pragmatic solutions to ease pressures on host countries, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to resettlement and complementary pathways for admission and to support conditions in countries of origin that enable refugees to return in safety and dignity. There is a risk, however, that the prioritization of State interests and circumstances in the Refugee Compact will come at a cost to broader, systemic issues of displacement, evoking the mistakes of the ill-fated Convention Plus. Convention Plus, which was an UNHCR initiative that began in 2002 with the purpose of adding to States’ obligations regarding burden sharing, failed because the systemic causes of the uneven distribution of burdens were not appropriately addressed. Instead the “piecemeal” approach focused upon specific instances of unduly burdened States on an ad hoc basis. As Zeik points out, “reducing or alleviating the burden of one or two states does not necessarily result in a more equitable, global sharing of burdens among states”.90 Convention Plus aimed at securing responsibility and burden-sharing by “means of promoting a convergence of interests of States parties to the regime”, rather than “proceeding from the significance and consequences of observing the prohibition of refoulement with respect to large numbers of refugees”.91 Although there are distinct differences between Convention Plus and the Refugee Compact, particularly the lack of individual, binding, agreements in the latter, the focus on State interests, which UNHCR’s role supports and facilitates, risks again missing the mark. Finally, by elevating State interests to those of refugees, the Refugee Compact ignores old problems. State contributions under the Refugee Compact are voluntary, with contributions to “be determined by each State and relevant stakeholder, taking into account their national realities, capacities and levels of development, and respecting national policies and priorities”.92 While it is true that States will not be able to earmark their contributions,93 there is nothing preventing them from “cherry picking” the “phrases and formulations” of the Refugee Compact to leverage their contributions in order to reflect their own interests.94 To be colloquial, it seems a case of “same problem, different day”. 3.2 Principled leadership, moral authority and image management Repositioning UNHCR as a supportive and catalytic leader is an acknowledgment of the role and importance of effective leadership understood in a broader sense. Instead of a traditional “command and control” leader that draws upon rules, incentives, threats, contracts, and standards,95 UNHCR manifests attributes that are commonly associated with collaborative leadership. In establishing, facilitating, and protecting the integrity a collaborative process, UNHCR is a “steward”. By helping to arbitrate and nurture relationships between stakeholders (i.e. States), UNHCR is a mediator. And by helping those stakeholders identify and realize “value-creating opportunities”, UNHCR is a catalyst.96 The shift away from legal obligations and enforcement to collaboration and facilitation, however, may come at the expense of realizable, concrete outcomes. According to Hathaway, the Refugee Compact’s “thin approach” will lead to “endless conversations” because every large movement will require a new agreement. He questions UNHCR’s ability to refocus on its core mandate and effect genuine reform:97 Rather than proposing, for example, a binding optional protocol to remedy the operational deficiencies of the Refugee Convention, the refugee agency has instead drafted a highly partial Compact, applying to undefined ‘large’ movements of refugees.98 Hathaway argues that this need for “a robust alternative” to the Refugee Forum would include concrete measures such as a “non-negotiable baseline commitment” that refugees be allowed to access the international protection system in whatever country they can reach.99 Chimni similarly expresses concerns that the arrangements for responsibility sharing are not accompanied by effective measures or obligations.100 While the Refugee Compact will no doubt produce robust and productive conversations, without obligations and as a consequence, international supervision, these conversations may not progress beyond that. What has emerged from the Refugee Compact is a kind of “parallel relationship”. Within the Refugee Compact UNHCR is to work closely, and perhaps politically, with States as a “collaborative leader”. Within the context of its supervisory mandate, however, UNHCR is a statutorily mandated non-political overseer101 tasked with monitoring State compliance with legal obligations. Characterizing UNHCR’s relationships with States via silos in this way ignores the fact that its relationships, regardless of whether they are defined by the Refugee Compact or by its supervisory mandate, are with the same States. Because the Refugee Compact cannot quarantine the difficulties inherent in the relationship between UNHCR and States, it diminishes UNHCR’s moral authority and potentially, the ability of the Refugee Compact to affect real change. As discussed, UNHCR’s system of voluntary funding and earmarking detracts from its ability to supervise international conventions because fears of jeopardizing important funding may compel UNHCR to be reluctant to rebuke States that are non-compliant with their international protection obligations. Exacerbating the issue is the need for UNHCR to maintain relationships with sometimes-recalcitrant States in order to gain access to refugees and implement programmes. The Refugee Compact marks a shift to “diminished moral authority” because UNHCR’s moral authority derives from its embodiment of the protector of refugees102 and as the voice of international refugee law and standards.103 In other words, UNHCR derives its moral authority from its core international protection mandate. The Refugee Compact does not support, clarify nor strengthen UNHCR’s core mandate. UNHCR’s moral authority will not act as a motivation for State action in a forum that accepts a diminished version of UNHCR’s core international protection mandate. Instead, reform of burden sharing and durable solutions will depend entirely on the self-motivation of States, which has proven to be unreliable. The US, at least, has put UNHCR on notice regarding the limitations of its participation: We underscore our understanding that none of the provisions in this document create or affect the rights or obligations of States under international law. In this regard, the United States will continue to take steps to ensure its national security, protect its sovereignty and maintain the health and safety of its people, this includes exercising its rights and responsibilities to prevent illegal migration and secure its borders, consistent with our own domestic laws and international obligations.104 Some States expect a “principled leader” who does “more than facilitate and coordinate”.105 If UNHCR only drives change but does not enforce it, States may perceive the agency as less than authoritative. Indeed, some States have unambiguously called for UNHCR to retain its focus on its core mandate within the context of the Refugee Compact: we call for a comprehensive strategic review of UNHCR…particularly in the context of its indefinite and expanding mandate beyond the 1950 statute’s core mandate, overlapping and multiple reporting and governance mechanisms, potential organizational conflicts of interest, the need and capacity to address the root causes of the problem and the GCR, in order to make UNHCR more universal and effective. UNHCR should become leaner, ‘fit for purpose’ and Member State led and driven.106 Without the need for enforcement, there is a risk that the facilitative, collaborative nature of UNHCR’s relationship with States within the Refugee Compact will act as a motivation for its outcomes to be reported with a “positive spin”. Indeed, this is a tendency that can be observed in the recent Global Refugee Forum, which UNHCR hosted in December 2019. The Forum, which sought to “translate the principle of international responsibility-sharing into concrete action”107 was attended by some 3000 representatives of governments, refugees, NGOs and other civil society actors. The co-convenors of the Forum, which include UNHCR,108 have declared it to be an unequivocal success. Outcomes have been reported in exclusively positive terms, using aspirational language such as “commitment”, “enhanced engagement”, “commendable number of States”, “significant additional funding” and “remarkable progress”. The Forum, according to the co-convenors, was: [A]n opportunity for States and other stakeholders to demonstrate leadership, vision, and their ambition to share burdens and responsibilities by announcing pledges and making contributions to improve refugee protection and to find solutions. Participants also shared good practices that illustrate how host countries and communities are implementing the principles of the Global Compact and how comprehensive responses can make a difference in the lives of refugees and host communities around the world. Impactful pledges and contributions were announced by a wide range of stakeholders at the Forum towards the achievement of ten key outcomes.109 Some observers, however, have been more circumspect. Crisp points out that while the focus on a market orientated approach for developing countries (i.e. self-reliance, host community support, easing pressure off host states) was no doubt positive, the Forum avoided the “big issues”, such as the continuation of exclusionary refugee policies.110 Crisp made the following comments on Twitter directly after the conclusion of the Forum, which reiterate these concerns. 5. It was smart of UNHCR to create a positive atmosphere by focusing on ‘pledges’ and ‘good practices’. But didn't this crowd out a critical examination of the negative refugee policies pursued by some states?' 6. Great to see the new emphasis on education, health, livelihoods, jobs, climate etc. But as I have asked elsewhere, did the focus on social & economic issues deflect attention from refoulement, pushbacks, involuntary returns, border closures, detention and externalization? 9. UNHCR must now avoid the temptation of exaggerating the impact of the Forum and the extent to which it has introduced ‘new’ approaches. In many resepcts (sic) the Forum (like the Global Compact on Refugees) confirmed trends that have been in existence for some time.111 Maroud and Norman also question the concrete outcomes of the Forum, which they say “concentrated on providing support to local host communities and refugees in situ, which does little to fulfill the GCR’s goal of shifting the balance of responsibility-sharing”. As an example they point to the 50,000 new resettlement spots pledged at the forum, which they argue “will not mitigate the trend in countries such as the United States of taking drastic steps to minimize resettlement”.112 While it is true that these issues are broader than UNHCR’s leadership role in the Refugee Compact and reflect entrenched problems of the refugee regime, UNHCR needs to be aware that there is a risk in declaring victory too soon.113 The agency has a vested interest in the representation of the Forum and the Refugee Compact as successes because failure, or at least negative outcomes, casts doubt on its capabilities as a supportive and facilitative leader. Outcomes become about “image management”. Recall that the political and non-political can exist coextensively as long as what is political remains what UNHCR must do in order to advocate for refugees. It must be questioned whether the consequences of a balanced approach that may result in a diminishment in human rights and international law protection, may not produce concrete outcomes and will present a temptation to “sugar coat” outcomes, could ever be considered as advocating for refugees. 4. RECONSIDERING LEADERSHIP OF THE REFUGEE COMPACT As long as UNHCR’s protection mandate remains core to its functions and purpose, the agency must be able to do two things. First, UNHCR must have an unencumbered ability to supervise relevant international law instruments. Secondly, the agency must ensure that the interests of refugees remain non-political, regardless of how political the action to protect those interests must be. A forum which sidelines the former risks destabilizing the latter, leaving UNHCR with the difficult task of trying to avoid compromising protection while achieving positive, actual, and realizable outcomes within the constraints of State self-interest and increasingly restrictive approaches to refugees. If UNHCR sees its true worth as a principled leader that can operate within the political environments created by States, it is not unreasonable to suggest that international supervision needs to either be situated elsewhere. It is, after all, increasingly evident that UNHCR’s developing strengths are in its ability to be facilitative and supportive, and that its wealth of knowledge and expertise of the refugee regime are essential to successful collaborations and negotiations. Recognition of the challenges inherent to UNHCR’s supervisory mandate outside the context of the Refugee Compact has previously invoked suggestions for solutions that focus on mechanisms that would either provide an alternative to UNHCR-led supervision, or a means to support it. One suggested alternative to supervision by UNHCR is an external mechanism of oversight, which would be broadly representative of States and refugees.114 Acknowledging that UNHCR’s work of day-to-day protection and supervision, or even its presence in a particular country might be endangered if UNHCR had to play an active role in new monitoring mechanisms, Kälin suggests that any new supervisory mechanisms should be the responsibility of State parties to the Convention.115 This mechanism, which could be in the form of a “Refugee Rights Committee” or similar, would act as an alternative to UNHCR by operating like a human rights treaty monitoring body.116 Alternatively, it may that UNHCR’s mandate for supervision need not to be removed, but externally supported. When arguing that UNHCR needs to speak out forcefully and publicly on violations of treaty obligations but not fall into a “name-and-shame” practice that is “not necessarily effective and can even be counterproductive”, Türk advocates for a kind of supervision that is characterized by the political version of UNHCR. “We need to remain the voice of reason, work constructively and cooperatively, and be guided by effectiveness, impact and results, as well as deep commitment to accountability towards populations of our concern”.117 As an example, North and Chia propose the creation of a Judicial Commission on International Refugee Law. The Commission would be created under UNHCR’s mandate yet remain independent of it, its purpose to reduce the divergence in interpretation of the Refugee Convention provisions through case reviews from various jurisdictions. The Commission would then issue positions on interpretation, which would inevitably encourage consistency across jurisdictions.118 Another potential option is an “Advisory Committee on International Protection”, which would be made up of governments, NGOs, academia, and civil society119 and would be “representative of different regions of the globe, gender balanced, include representation from various stakeholders and, in particular, refugees”.120 NGOs would have specific utility in an advisory committee for their effectiveness in “naming and shaming” States that do not abide by their treaty obligations.121 Alternatively, it has been suggested that a special committee of the ExCom that exclusively deals with international supervision,122 should be re-established. The ExCom Sub-Committee on International Protection, which was in operation from 1975 to 2004, would consist primarily of those States that host the largest number of refugees and, according to Türk: [C]ould ensure focused and global discussion on international protection matters; assist the UNHCR in exercising its supervisory role; address issues of lack of compliance and operational protection concerns on the ground; act as a forum to design burden-sharing arrangements and regional approaches, as well as to negotiate and conclude substantial Conclusions on international protection matters.123 Such a committee could also include a follow-up mechanism to ensure that ExCom Conclusions are actually observed by States.124 However, considering the relative reluctance for reform, regardless of the efforts of stakeholders such as academics, NGOs, and practitioners,125 changes to the current supervisory framework are unlikely in the foreseeable future. It is prudent, therefore, to consider the potential of more immediate measures. One possible approach might be for UNHCR to rely upon States’ existing obligations as leverage against beneficial outcomes from the Refugee Compact. As the Refugee Compact is to be consistent with UNHCR’s mandate, UNHCR could draw upon its ability to make representations to governments and other relevant actors on protection (i.e. its supervisory function) to negotiate and facilitate positive outcomes, such as fostering inclusive economic growth for host communities126 and facilitating access to primary, secondary, and tertiary education to host community children.127 The Refugee Compact is non-binding but “grounded in the international refugee protection regime” and “is guided by relevant international human rights instruments”,128 meaning State self-interest could be used to incentivise compliance with existing legal obligations. The fundamental flaw with this suggestion, however, is almost immediately evident. Leveraging compliance with obligations against positive, practical outcomes for individual States would disproportionately affect those States who host the largest number of refugees and accordingly, would undermine the Refugee Compact’s emphasis on burden-sharing. In addition, benefits to host communities are tied to the hosting of refugees, meaning that any threat or deprivation to host community benefits will detrimentally impact refugees. While State interests may be an effective tool for compliance, for many largely industrial States participating in the Refugee Compact practical “host community” benefits will not be relevant. Burden-sharing, as important as it is, is not in a State’s self-interest. Unfortunately, it is also unlikely that the dynamic of “persuading, cajoling, and indeed shaming of partner States which has been so critical to the success of the international human rights project”129 could be drawn upon in this context. As Hathaway argues, “states presently take little if any personal responsibility for ensuring that their fellow states live up to international refugee law obligations” and “It is simply too easy to leave the task to UNHCR”.130 While attempting to alter UNHCR’s supervisory framework appears a herculean task, manipulating the Refugee Compact to leverage obligations against outcomes will likely undermine its core objectives. It seems, therefore, wise to consider an alternative model to UNHCR’s role as the leader of the Refugee Compact. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (“Migration Compact”) took a different approach to the Refugee Compact in relation to its leadership framework. Instead of positioning an existing UN agency as the “catalytic and supportive” leader, a United Nations network on migration (“Migration Network”)131 was established to support the implementation of the Migration Compact. The Migration Network consists “of those members of the UN system who wish to be a part of it and for whom migration is of relevance to their mandates”,132 and comprises an Executive Committee, Working Groups, and the IOM, which serves as the coordinator and secretariat. The objectives of the network are to ensure UN system-wide support to Member States, support coherent action by the UN system at country, regional and global levels, act as a source of ideas, tools, reliable data and information, analysis, and policy guidance on migration issues, promote the application of relevant international and regional norms and standards relating to migration and the protection of the human rights of migrants, provide leadership to mobilize coordinated and collaborative action on migration, ensure close collaboration with other UN system coordination mechanisms, establish and provide support to a capacity building mechanism, engage with external partners and report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Migration Compact.133 The distinctions between the roles of the IOM and UNHCR in the respective compacts reflect the different ways that the compacts developed. In the Refugee Compact, UNHCR was asked to implement the CRRF and led the process through the creation of a dedicated bureaucracy and the oversight of numerous consultations, including six thematic discussions that were followed by six rounds of consultations with States. UNHCR’s report on these consultations, labelled an “omnibus resolution”, was presented to the UNGA in November 2018. The Migration Compact was led by the president of the General Assembly, who appointed two co-facilitators, being the ambassadors of Mexico and Switzerland. The process involved extensive regional and multi-stakeholder consultations, which were followed by UN member State negotiations. While IOM was very involved in this process, using its “International Dialogue on Migration” meetings in 2017 and 2018 to bring stakeholders together, it worked alongside other actors, such as the co-facilitators and the special representative for the UN Secretary General Louise Arbour.134 IOM is less a “leader” and more a “coordinator”. Terms like “catalyse”, “support” and “facilitate” are not used as descriptors of IOM, but to clarify the collaborative objectives of the Migration Compact. As IOM is not an official part of the UN, but is classified as a “related organisation”135 it does not have the same relationship with States as UNHCR. IOM has been described as a “non-normative independent institution” in that it does not usually critique governments against normative standards.136 Not only does IOM not have a mandate for international supervision, there is no expectation that it judges or comments upon State actions regarding migration.137 In effect, the “network approach” taken by the Migration Compact, and the fact that, unlike the Refugee Compact, no overarching agreement or instrument already existed, meant that it was able to begin with a “clean plate”, unburdened by the politics of protection, but not the politics of sovereignty.138 An external refugee network, similar to that established for the Migration Compact, may be a more appropriate leadership framework for the Refugee Compact. The network could work closely with UNHCR, which would retain an advisory role but no longer “lead” the process in the current fashion. Drawing upon UNHCR’s experience, knowledge and expertise, the network would support States in their collaborative efforts regarding burden-sharing and could report to the General Assembly on a biennial basis. If such a network was to lead the Refugee Compact, there would be no need to change nor fortify UNHCR’s current supervisory mandate. Although the issues surrounding UNHCR’s supervision and its relationship with States would not disappear, they would no longer affect the objectives and outcomes of the Refugee Compact. UNHCR could return to what it does best; reminding States of their duties and legal obligations through advocacy and representations through its role as “the voice of reason”, which works “constructively and cooperatively” “guided by effectiveness, impact and results, as well as deep commitment to accountability towards populations of … concern”.139 The Refugee Compact was affirmed by the UN General Assembly on 17 December 2018.140 It would be easy to claim that the opportunity for real change has passed, that the agreement has become concretized, and that perhaps it is best to wait until “next time around”. But the “next time around” is uncertain and the Refugee Compact already provides a solid framework for State cooperation towards burden sharing. Without legal obligations, the Refugee Compact is a soft law instrument141 and has been concluded with “a flexibility and freedom to manoeuvre where events or changing circumstances so require”.142 Nowhere in the Refugee Compact does UNHCR describe itself as its leader, despite the clear implication. Accordingly, there is scope to reimagine “supportive and catalytic” as advisory, and for UNHCR to use its role and profile to help establish an external refugee network, which could be comprised of States, the UN, NGOs, and refugees and which would take oversight of the Refugee Compact, leaving oversight of the Refugee Convention where it belongs – with UNHCR. 5. CONCLUSION UNHCR’s role as the catalytic and supportive leader of the Refugee Compact enables it to encourage burden-sharing and support States in achieving durable solutions. The agency’s well-honed ability to negotiate and collaborate within a highly political environment is critical to the compact’s on-going success. But there is a caveat. UNHCR is not entirely free to operate “politically”. UNHCR’s statute states that its work is to be non-political, meaning that the agency must be conscious of retaining a balance between the non-political (i.e. the interests of refugees) and the political (i.e. how it must behave to protect those interests), regardless of the forum it operates within. By making the Refugee Compact non-binding, there is no call for UNHCR to exercise its supervisory mandate within this context. Removing the impetus for enforcement, which is a crucial aspect of international supervision, also removes the most non-political elements of its work, being representations to parliament and amicus curiae briefs regarding legislation, policy, and legal principles, as well as the admonishment of States for breaching their obligations. With UNHCR’s supervisory mandate sidelined and the focus being on facilitation and negotiation, State’s interests have been elevated to those of refugees. Prioritization of State interests risks diluting principles of international law and human rights because criticism of non-entrée regimes and breaches of the Refugee Compact are disregarded in order to avoid compromising collaborative negotiations and outcomes. In a similar vein, old problems regarding voluntary funding and State self-interests do not go away, they are simply ignored. The shift away from UNHCR as a supervisor to a collaborative and facilitative leader may come at the expense of realizable, concrete outcomes for the Refugee Compact. In addition to concerns that the “facilitative format” of the Refugee Compact will produce plenty of robust discourse but few concrete outcomes, the oddly artificial parallel relationship that has emerged between UNHCR and States does not mean that existing relationship challenges will be quarantined from the Refugee Compact. The consequence is that UNHCR loses its moral authority, which it derives from its role as the embodiment of the protector of refugees, and of which supervision is an integral part. Without a need for enforcement this is a risk that UNHCR’s residual supportive and facilitative role will act as a motivator to spin a positive light on the Refugee Compact outcomes, regardless of reality. What is the solution? Prior conversations about the difficulties inherent in UNHCR’s need to operate “non‐politically” in a political context, and the role that its supervisory mandate plays in that quandary, have largely offered options that advocate the transferral of UNHCR’s supervisory role to an external body or the establishment of an external advisory body to support to UNHCR. Despite various well‐thought through solutions, no practical changes have been forthcoming. Attention must focus on the “right now”. Using the practical and beneficial outcomes entrenched in the Refugee Compact as leverage against breaches of the Refugee Convention would disproportionately affect those countries who already host the most refugees and would undermine the burden‐sharing objective of the Refugee Compact. Instead, it may be that the answer already exists in the model established by the Refugee Compact’s “cousin”, the Migration Compact. In this model, UNHCR would be replaced as leader of the Refugee Compact by an external refugee network, similar to that established by the Migration Compact. UNHCR would act in an advisory capacity, offering its expertise and knowledge to the network. While this measure would not “fix” the issues that continue to vex UNHCR’s relationship with States, it would allow the agency to refocus on its supervisory mandate and give the Refugee Compact a real opportunity to strike an appropriate balance between its stated objective of being “entirely non‐political in nature”,143 in the limited sense of prioritizing humanitarian and social objectives in relation to the best interests of refugees, and the reality of international cooperation, which in relying upon the “political will and ambition of the international community … for strengthened cooperation and solidarity with refugees and affected host communities”,144 is inherently political in nature. Footnotes 1 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, A/RES/71/1. 2 Inaugural address on the international protection of refugees, presented by UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Volker Türk, delivered at the University of New South Wales on 18 November 2016. 3 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, A/RES/71/1, 11. 4 Both the Global Compact for Refugees (“the Refugee Compact”) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration were adopted in December 2018. 5 UNHCR, The Global Compact on Refugees available at https://www.unhcr.org/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html (last visited 24 Jan. 2020). 6 The Refugee Compact, 2.2, para. 26. 7 The Refugee Compact, 2.3, para. 30. 8 The Refugee Compact, 3.3, para. 48. 9 The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, contained in the Annex to Resolution on Statute of the High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR Statute”), GA Res 428(V) UN GAOR, 5th sess, 325th plen mtg, Doc/A/Res/428(v) (1950), Art. 2. 10 V. Türk & M. Garlick, “From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees”, International Journal of Refugee Law 28(4), 2016, 656–678, 674. 11 D. Forsythe, UNHCR’s Mandate: The Politics of Being Non-Political UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No.3, Mar. 2001, 1–34, 1. 12 UNHCR Statute, Art. 2. 13 A. Betts, G. Loescher, & J. Milner, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, London, Routledge, 2010, 94. 14 Ibid., 95. 15 Forsyth, UNHCR’s Mandate: The Politics of being Non-Political, 2. 16 Ibid., 1. 17 G. S. Goodwin-Gill, “The Politics of Refugee Protection”, Refugee Survey Quarterly 27(1), 2009, 8–23, 22. 18 Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) states that treaties are to be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context.” Although Art. 31(1) does not strictly apply to UNHCR’s statute because it is not a treaty between States in the traditional sense, the principles of interpretation of rules have authority because they are widely considered a general principle of law. See M. Kohen & B. Schramm, “General Principles of Law”, in T. Carty (ed.), International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. 19 Noscitur a Sociis (“a thing is known by its associates”) means that the interpretation of a word can be gathered from its associated words. 20 Goodwin-Gill, “The Politics of Refugee Protection”, 22. 21 Ibid., 9. 22 UNHCR Global Report 2018, Geneva, UNHCR, 2018, Table 2, 50. (‘UNHCR Global Report 2018’). Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-report-2018 (last visited 18 Oct. 2020). 23 Ibid., Chart 4, 41. 24 UNHCR Global Report 2018, Chart 5, 42. 25 Reinisch argues that one way member states hold international organizations accountable is through disbursing or withholding financial contributions. A. Reinisch, ‘Securing the Accountability of International Organisations’ Global Governance 7, 2001, 131–149, 134. According to the International Law Association, accountability of IOs includes “sound financial management”, which includes an obligation not to approve activities that it considers, in good faith, to be unnecessary or excessive, and a transparent and consistent budgetary process. International Law Association – Committee on Accountability of International Organizations, Third Report Consolidated, Revised and Enlarged Version of Recommended Rules and Practices (RRP’s) New Delhi Conference (‘ILA Report’) 2002, para. 11. 26 In 2017 the United States contributed 1,489,824,121 (USD), which comprised 37 per cent of UNHCR’s funding by donors. UNHCR Global Report 2017, Geneva, UNHCR, 2017, Chart 5, 39. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/publications/fundraising/5b4c89bf17/unhcr-global-report-2017.html (last visited 18 Oct. 2020). 27 G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 202. 28 UNHCR statement on new US regulation on asylum, 9 November 2018 available at https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2018/11/5be5bfac4/unhcr-statement-new-regulation-asylum.html (last visited 6 Feb. 2020). 29 T. Welsh, “UNHCR balances interests in response to Trump asylum policy”, Devex, 16 November 2018 available at https://www.devex.com/news/unhcr-balances-interests-in-response-to-trump-asylum-policy-93849 (last visited 14 Jan. 2020). 30 UNHCR and IOM joint statement: International approach to refugees and migrants in Libya must change (11 July 2019) available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/7/5d2765d04/unhcr-iom-joint-statement-international-approach-refugees-migrants-libya.html (last visited 4 Sep. 2019). 31 J. Crisp, “As the World Abandons Refugees, UNHCR’s Constraints Are Exposed”, Newsdeeply, 3 Sept. 2008 available at https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/09/13/as-the-world-abandons-refugees-unhcrs-constraints-are-exposed (last visited 4 Sep. 2019). 32 N. Morris, Prisons of the Stateless: a Response to New Left Review UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 142, UNHCR, Mar. 2007, 7. 33 G. Loescher, “UNHCR and the Erosion of Refugee Protection”, Forced Migration Review, 2001, 28–30, 30. 34 Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity - The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees”, Human Rights Watch, 13 February, 2017, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-refugees (last visited 20 Aug. 2019). 35 S. E. Rasmussen, “UN accused of failing Afghan refugees ‘forced’ to return home from Pakistan”, The Guardian, 13 Feb. 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/13/un-accused-of-failing-afghan-refugees-forced-to-return-home-from-pakistan (last visited 20 Aug. 2019). 36 Human Rights Watch, “Rigging the System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria” Human Rights Watch, 28 June 2019, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/06/28/rigging-system/government-policies-co-opt-aid-and-reconstruction-funding-syria (last visited 9 Sep. 2019). 37 S. Carrié & A. Al-Omar, “It's not legal': UN stands by as Turkey deports vulnerable Syrians”, The Guardian, 23 Aug. 2019, available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/23/its-not-legal-un-stands-by-as-turkey-deports-vulnerable-syrians (last visited 9 Sep. 2019). 38 M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2012. 39 In addition to the exercise of its mandate responsibilities, UNHCR will play a supportive and catalytic role. Refugee Compact, para. 33. 40 The Global Compact on Refugees: UNHCR Quick Guide available at https://www.unhcr.org/5b6d574a7.pdf (last visited 16 Jan. 2020). 41 To whom (i.e. individuals or groups) that UNHCR’s mandate extends. 42 See UNHCR, Note on the Mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees and his Office, October 2013 available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/5268c9474.html (last visited 16 Jan. 2020). 43 UNHCR states: [O]ver time UNHCR’s mandate has been expanded to cover returnees and stateless persons. Although UNHCR does not have a general mandate for internally displaced people, UNHCR may be involved in certain circumstances to enhance protection and provide humanitarian assistance. Mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees and his Office – Executive Summary available at https://www.unhcr.org/5a1b53607.pdf (last visited 16 Jan. 2020). 44 UNHCR’s current role in humanitarianism is best captured by its “Emergency Handbook” (UNHCR Emergency Handbook, available at https://emergency.unhcr.org/about (last visited 16 Jan. 2020), which it describes as a “tool for UNHCR emergency operations and its workforce”. In the introduction, UNHCR acknowledges that the agency is often faced with large-scale emergencies requiring an immediate response, which “means the agency must be prepared and able to mount an emergency response without delay”. The handbook states that UNHCR has assembled internal “standby teams” with various expertise “who are ready for deployment anywhere in the world at a moment's notice”. The handbook, which addresses coordination and response in both refugee and non-refugee situations, is a clear testament to the level of direct operational involvement that UNHCR now takes in relation to humanitarianism. 45 M. W. Doyle, “Responsibility Sharing: From Principle to Policy”, International Journal of Refugee Law 30(4), 2018, 618–622, 621. 46 Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. General Assembly Official Records · Fiftieth Session Supplement No.12A (A/50/12/Add.1) (emphasis added). 47 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 89 (LI) (2000) (emphasis added). 48 V. Türk & M. Garlick, “From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees” 660. 49 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, GA 56/137 UN GAOR, 56th sess, 88th plen mtg Res UN Doc A/RES/56/137 (15 Feb. 2002) para. 8 (emphasis added). 50 A. Betts, “The Global Compact on Refugees: Towards a Theory of Change?”, International Journal of Refugee Law 30(4), 2018, 623–626, 626. 51 G. Loescher & J. Milner, “UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees” in A. Betts (ed.), Global Migration Governance Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 206–207. 52 H. Mahaseth & D. Koirala, “Embracing the Global Compact for Refugees”, 24 May 2019, Cambridge International Law Journal available at http://cilj.co.uk/2019/05/24/embracing-the-global-compact-on-refugees/ (last visited 4 Sep. 2019). 53 Loescher et al, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 94. 54 Ibid., 95. 55 Betts, “The Global Compact on Refugees: Towards a Theory of Change?”. 56 J. Crisp, “As the World Abandons Refugees, UNHCR’s Constraints Are Exposed” 13 Sep. 2018, Newsdeeply, available at https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/09/13/as-the-world-abandons-refugees-unhcrs-constraints-are-exposed (last visited 19 Sep. 2019). 57 R. W. Grant & R. O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics” IILJ Working Paper 2004/7, Institute for International Law and Justice, 16. 58 T. M.R. Chowdhury, Legal Framework of International Supervision, Stockholm, University of Stockholm, 1986, 7. 59 The Protocol, opened for signature 31 Jan. 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 Oct. 1967) Art. II (“1967 Protocol”). Art. II of the Protocol mirrors the text of Arts 35 and 36 of the Refugee Convention. 60 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa, signed 10 Sept. 1969 1001 UNTS 45 (entered into force 20 Jun. 1974), Art. VIII. 61 Cartagena Declaration, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, at 190–193 (1984–1985) Art. (e); Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen, signed 23 Nov. 1957, 506 UNTS 125, (entered into force 27 Dec. 1961) preamble. 62 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 Jun. 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders (“Schengen Implementation Agreement”) 19 Jun. 1990 (entered into force 1 Sept. 1993), Art. 28; Convention Determining the State Responsible for Determining Application for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities (“The Dublin Convention”), 15 Jun. 1990 Official Journal C 254 (entered into force 1 Sept. 1997), Art. 2. Note, no longer in force, except for Denmark. 63 V. Türk, “UNHCR’s Supervisory Responsibility”, Revue Quebecoise de Droit International, 14(1), 2001, 135–158, 138, 140. 64 Ibid., 145. 65 Resolution on Statute of the High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(V) UN GAOR, 5th sess, 325th plen mtg, Doc/A/Res/428(v) (1950), Annex: Statute of the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, UN Doc. A/1775 (14 Dec. 1950), para. 2. 66 W. Kälin, “Supervising the 1951Convention on the Status of Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond” in E. Feller, V. Türk, & F. Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 613, 623–624. 67 Türk, “UNHCR’s Supervisory Responsibility”, 146. 68 Chowdhury, Legal Framework of International Supervision, 9–10, 258. 69 Türk, “UNHCR’s Supervisory Responsibility”, 148. 70 Ibid., 148. 71 Ibid., 149. 72 In addition to the exercise of its mandate responsibilities, UNHCR will play a supportive and catalytic role. Refugee Compact, para. 33. 73 See J. Bannister, G. Appleby & A. Olijnik, Government Accountability Australian Administrative Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 157–173. 74 See for e.g. Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee: Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Submissions in the High Court of Australia in the case of CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and the Commonwealth of Australia, 15 Sept. 2014, NO S169 OF 2014. 75 Refugee Compact 2.2, 70 Jobs and Livelihood, para. 13. 76 Refugee Compact 2.1 Education, para. 13. 77 Refugee Compact 2.6 Accommodation, energy, and natural resource management, para. 15. 78 Loescher, Betts, & Milner, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 104. 79 M. Barutscki, “The limits to the UNHCR’s supervisory role”, in J.C. Simeon (ed.), The UNHCR and the Supervision of International Refugee Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 69. 80 Para. 5. 81 B.S. Chimni, “Global Compact on Refugees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 30(4), 2018, 630–634, 632. 82 Ibid. 83 “[i]t is recognized that voluntary repatriation is not necessarily conditioned on the accomplishment of political solutions in the country of origin, in order not to impede the exercise of the right of refugees to return to their own country” Refugee Compact, para. 87. 84 Chimni, “Global Compact on Refugees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, 632. 85 Ibid. 86 L. Maroud & K.B. Norman, “The World Is Turning Its Back on Refugees”, The Atlantic, 24 Dec. 2019, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/world-turning-its-back-refugees/604042/ (last visited 28 Jan. 2020). 87 Ibid. 88 In a letter responding to Maroud and Norman's criticism, UNHCR points out that section IB on “guiding principles” “confirms our obligation to protect and assist all people fleeing war and persecution, whether those vulnerable individuals are in a position to boost a society’s economic bottom line or not”, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/letters/archive/2020/01/unhcr-defends-its-global-compact-refugees/604885/ (last visited 4 Feb. 2020). 89 See for e.g. Uganda Refugee Response Plan, January 2019 — December 2020 available at http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Uganda%20Country%20RRP%202019-20%20%28January%202019%29.pdf (last visited 14 Feb. 2020). 90 M. Zieck, “Doomed to Fail from the Outset? UNHCR’s Convention Plus Initiative Revisited”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 21, 2009, 387–420, 410. 91 Ibid., 415. 92 Refugee Compact, para. 4. 93 Para. 4 of the Refugee Compact references unearmarked, and multiyear funding whenever possible. 94 Chimni, “Global Compact on Refugees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, 634. 95 J. Macdonald, Calling a Halt to Mindless Change: A Plea for Common sense Management, Washington D.C., BeardBooks, 1998. 96 C. Ansell & A. Gash, “Stewards, Mediators, and Catalysts: Toward a Model of Collaborative Leadership.” Innovation Journal, 17(1), 2012, 2, 6. 97 Ibid., 602. 98 J. Hathaway, “The Global Cop-Out on Refugees”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 30(4), 2018, 591–604, 598. 99 Ibid., 596–97. 100 Chimni, “Global Compact on Refugees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, 632. 101 UNHCR’s statute requires that the work of the agency (or the High Commissioner) be “entirely non-political in character” The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, contained in the Annex to Resolution on Statute of the High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR Statute”), GA Res 428(V) UN GAOR, 5th sess, 325th plen mtg, Doc/A/Res/428(v) (1950), Art. 2. 102 M. Barnett & M. Finnemore, “The Power in Liberal International Organisation”, in M.N. Barnett & R. Duvall (eds), Power in Global Governance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 161, 173. 103 Loescher, Betts, & Milner, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 74. 104 Global Compact on Refugees Agenda Item 1: The program of action and the principal modalities for burden and responsibility sharing U.S. Statement available at https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/events/conferences/5a8a9ae47/statement-united-states-america-first-formal-consultation-agenda-item.html (last visited 19 Sept. 2019). 105 Project Ploughshares, Delivering on the Global Compact on Refugees: The need for principled leadership from UNHCR 6 Nov. 2018 available at https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/delivering-on-the-global-compact-on-refugees-the-need-for-principled-leadership-from-unhcr/ (last visited 19 Sept. 2019). 106 Statement by India at the General Debate of the 69th Annual Session of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees programme – Delivered by Dr. Sadre Alam, First Secretary on 03 October 2018 available at https://www.pmindiaun.gov.in/pages.php?id=1832 (last visited 19 Sept. 2019). 107 Global Refugee Forum available at https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/global-refugee-forum.html (last visited 28 Feb. 2020). 108 The Republic of Costa Rica, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Federal Republic of Germany, The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, The Republic of Turkey and UNHCR. 109 Summary of the first Global Refugee Forum by the co-convenors available at https://www.unhcr.org/5dfa70e24 (last visited 28 Feb. 2020). 110 J. Crisp, “After the Forum: New Directions in Global Refugee Policy” available at https://trafig.eu/blog/after-the-forum-new-directions-in-global-refugee-policy?mc_cid=bd12f65e35&mc_eid=1b0903757c (last visited 28 Feb. 2020). 111 Twitter, @JeffCrisp, 20 Dec. 2019. 112 Maroud & Norman, “The World Is Turning Its Back on Refugees”. 113 J.P Kotter, “Leading Change - Why transformation efforts fail”, Harvard Business Review, 1995, 101. 114 J.C. Hathaway, “Taking Oversight of Refugee Law Seriously,” Working Paper, International Council for Voluntary Agencies, 2001. 115 Kälin, “Supervising the 1951Convention on the Status of Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond”, 29. 116 Chimni, “Global Compact on Refugees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, 4. 117 V. Türk, “The UNHCR’s Role in Supervising International Protection Standards in the Context of its Mandate”, in J.C. Simeon (ed.), The UNHCR and the Supervision of International Refugee Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 58. 118 A. North & J. Chia, “Towards Convergence in the Interpretation of the Refugee Convention: A Proposal for the Establishment of an International Judicial Commission for Refugees”, in J. McAdam (ed.), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security, London, Hart Publishing, 2008, 225. 119 Türk, “The UNHCR’s Role in Supervising International Protection Standards in the Context of its Mandate”, 58. 120 J.C. Simeon, “Monitoring and Supervising International Refugee Law: Building the Capacity to Enhance International Protection and Democratic Global Governance of the International Refugee Protection Regime”, in J.C. Simeon (ed.), The UNHCR and the Supervision of International Refugee Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 335. 121 Ibid. See also T. Clark, “The NGO role in Supervising the Application of the Convention – and Beyond”, in J.C. Simeon (ed.), The UNHCR and the Supervision of International Refugee Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 313–343. 122 Türk, “The UNHCR’s Role in Supervising International Protection Standards in the Context of its Mandate”, 58. See also Kälin, “Supervising the 1951Convention on the Status of Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond”, 33. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 For example, in 2010 the Centre of Refugee Studies at York University, Toronto hosted the York 2010 International Conference on “Forced Displacement, Protection Standards and the Supervision of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and Other International Instruments”, which was dedicated to examining and considering UNHCR’s “supervisory role under international refugee rights instruments and how the UNHCR’s supervisory role might be enhanced to ensure that States Parties to these international instruments fulfill their obligations to provide international protection to refugees and other forced migrants”. J.C. Simeon (ed.), The UNHCR and the Supervision of International Refugee Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 1. 126 Refugee Compact 2.2, Jobs and Livelihood, para. 13. 127 Refugee Compact 2.1 Education, para. 13. 128 G. Gilbert, “Indicators for the Global Compact on Refugees”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 30(4), 2018, 635–639, 639. As Goldsmith and Posner famously argued, States make decisions to comply with international law not for its “moral command” but for self-interest based on rational choice theory. J.L. Goldsmith & E.A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 129 Hathaway, “Taking Oversight of Refugee Law Seriously”, 8. 130 Ibid. 131 Available at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/ (last visited 17 Mar. 2020). 132 Terms of Reference for the UN Network on Migration [3] available at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/default/files/docs/UN_Network_on_Migration_TOR.PDF (last visited 18 Mar. 2020). 133 Ibid. 134 Overview based on E.G. Ferris & K.M. Donato, Refugees, Migration and Global Governance, Negotiating the Global Compacts, London, Routledge, 2020, 87–88. 135 Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration UNGA 70th sess A/70/976. 136 M. Cullen, The IOM’s New Status and its Role under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Pause for Thought EJIL:Talk! 29 Mar. 2019 available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ioms-new-status-and-its-role-under-the-global-compact-for-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration-pause-for-thought (last visited 18 Mar. 2020). 137 The IOM occasionally makes critical comments on the actions of States. See for example, “International Organization for Migration (IOM) Alarmed by Return of Migrants to Libya from Maltese Waters” available at https://www.africa-newsroom.com/press/international-organization-for-migration-iom-alarmed-by-return-of-migrants-to-libya-from-maltese-waters?lang=en (last visited 18 Mar. 2020). However, IOM has no specific mandate to do so. 138 Ferris and Donato, Refugees, Migration and Global Governance, Negotiating the Global Compacts, 88–89. 139 Türk, “The UNHCR’s role in supervising international protection standards in the context of its mandate”, 57. 140 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: resolution adopted on 17 December 2018, A/RES/73/151, 73rd sess, Agenda item 65 (10 Jan. 2019). 141 In a blog post, Maria Gavouneli claims that the Refugee Compact is “easily recognizable as the product of an internal debate within the UN family, a soft law instrument building upon a solid normative foundation”. M. Gavouneli, “Legislating by Compacts? – The Legal Nature of the Global Compacts”, EJIL:Talk!, 28 Feb. 2019, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/legislating-by-compacts-the-legal-nature-of-the-global-compacts/ (last visited 18 Sept. 2020. 142 C. Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 38(4), 1989, 850–866, 852–853. 143 Refugee Compact, Guiding Principles, para. 5. 144 Refugee Compact, Guiding Principles, para. 4. © Author(s) [2020]. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - A “Supportive and Catalytic” Supervisor? UNHCR’s Role in the Global Compact for Refugees
JO - Refugee Survey Quarterly
DO - 10.1093/rsq/hdaa039
DA - 2020-12-07
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/a-supportive-and-catalytic-supervisor-unhcr-s-role-in-the-global-0s1RHp3LtN
SP - 1
EP - 1
VL - Advance Article
IS - 
DP - DeepDyve
ER -