TY - JOUR
AU1 - Levey, Geoffrey Brahm
AB - For many liberals, the value of individual autonomy is the foundation of liberal political morality; it underwrites individuals' rights and liberties and liberal notions of justice, marks the limits of liberal toleration, and sets the terms on which a liberal society can also be a multicultural society (e.g., Raz 1986; Kymlicka 1989; 1995; Rawls 1993; Tamir 1993; Habermas 1994). Yet, for many multiculturalists, the liberal value of individual autonomy is an obstacle to building a multicultural democracy; it is seen as too 'sectarian', demanding, or intolerant a value on which to base political morality for a culturally diverse society (e.g., Young 1990; Margalit and Halbertal 1994; Parekh 2000; Galston 2002; Kukathas 2003; Modood 2007). In this essay, I want to argue that autonomy is a much more 'open', democratic, and accommodating value than both these liberal and multi- culturalist accounts suggest. Of course, one might reasonably ask why persevere with liberal autonomy at all. As the multiculturalism literature now abundantly attests, there are, after all, other theoretical and even liberal approaches available that promise to be far more accommodating of cultural difference than any autonomy-based approach is likely to be. If autonomy commands attention, it is because of its 
TI - Liberal Autonomy as a Pluralistic Value
JF - The Monist
DO - 10.5840/monist20129518
DA - 2012-01-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/liberal-autonomy-as-a-pluralistic-value-0JSViZwMR0
SP - 103
EP - 126
VL - 95
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -