TY - JOUR
AU - Manning, Richard N.
AB - CRITICAL NOTICES RICHARD N. MANNING In this impressive, ambitious, and rigorously argued book, John Gibbons purports to resolve a dilemma between two prima facie binding norms of belief. On the one hand, there is something inherently amiss with a false belief. This suggests an objective standard: (T) Necessarily, for all p, you ought to believe that p only if p. On the other hand, there is something inherently amiss with a belief that is held unreasonably, on poor or no evidence. This suggests a subjective standard: (J) Necessarily, for all p, you ought to believe p iff you’re justified in believing p. According to Gibbons, the dilemma is real, because in cases of false belief reasonably held, the two norms issue contrary imperatives. In his go-to example, you come home, place your keys on the table and go upstairs. Unbeknownst to you, a burglar comes in to your house and takes them. Should you believe the keys are on the table? (T) tells us ‘no’, but (J) says ‘yes’. What we need is an adjudication of the dilemma that shows which horn to grasp and in the light of which we can explain, on the basis of the preferred 
TI - The Norm of Belief
JF - Analysis
DO - 10.1093/analys/anv060
DA - 2016-01-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/the-norm-of-belief-09m7JriAFM
SP - 81
EP - 87
VL - 76
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -