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TIMOTHY C. POTTS MONTAGUE'S SEMIOTIC: A SYLLABUS OF ERRORS1 Montague's system of categories expounded; a difficulty concerning his basic category E. His debt to Carnap. Carnap's misunderstanding of Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung. Montague's modification of Carnap's extension/intension distinction, and his application of modal logic to propositions containing intensional expressions. A difficulty about his treatment of psychological verbs. Incoherence of the notion of the set of all possible worlds. In order to guarantee the consistency of descriptions of the latter, they must be inhabited by necessary objects. The Carnap/ Montague semantics inside-out, not wrong, but impotent to yield a theory of meaning. I. Function and Argument Wittgenstein, when asked why he devoted so much time and energy to refuting the views of other philosophers, once replied that although clearing the drains was a dirty job, if they were blocked, somebody had to do it. At other times he thought that the best response to an erroneous view was to "leave the bloody thing alone" and get on with one's own work. This is a perennial dilemma, but there are occasions when an ultimately incoherent notion is so attractive as to determine the approach to certain subject-matter for
Theoretical Linguistics – de Gruyter
Published: Jan 1, 1976
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