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Points Don’t Pass – Against the Identity Theory of Passage

Points Don’t Pass – Against the Identity Theory of Passage <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The basic divide in the metaphysics of time is between those who defend a dynamic view and those who defend a static view. Whereas the former hold that time does truly pass, the latter take the passage of time to be some sort of illusion. Recently, however, an alternative minority view developed, according to which passage is identical either with the succession of times in the four-dimensional manifold or with the temporally ordered sequence of events located at these. I want to argue that something is wrong with the identity theory of passage. If passage and time qua part of the manifold are identical, then talk of passage should be translatable into talk about time qua part of the manifold (and vice versa). I show that this is not always possible.</jats:p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Metaphysica CrossRef

Points Don’t Pass – Against the Identity Theory of Passage

Metaphysica , Volume 15 (2) – Jan 28, 2014

Points Don’t Pass – Against the Identity Theory of Passage


Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The basic divide in the metaphysics of time is between those who defend a dynamic view and those who defend a static view. Whereas the former hold that time does truly pass, the latter take the passage of time to be some sort of illusion. Recently, however, an alternative minority view developed, according to which passage is identical either with the succession of times in the four-dimensional manifold or with the temporally ordered sequence of events located at these. I want to argue that something is wrong with the identity theory of passage. If passage and time qua part of the manifold are identical, then talk of passage should be translatable into talk about time qua part of the manifold (and vice versa). I show that this is not always possible.</jats:p>

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Publisher
CrossRef
ISSN
1437-2053
DOI
10.1515/mp-2014-0016
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The basic divide in the metaphysics of time is between those who defend a dynamic view and those who defend a static view. Whereas the former hold that time does truly pass, the latter take the passage of time to be some sort of illusion. Recently, however, an alternative minority view developed, according to which passage is identical either with the succession of times in the four-dimensional manifold or with the temporally ordered sequence of events located at these. I want to argue that something is wrong with the identity theory of passage. If passage and time qua part of the manifold are identical, then talk of passage should be translatable into talk about time qua part of the manifold (and vice versa). I show that this is not always possible.</jats:p>

Journal

MetaphysicaCrossRef

Published: Jan 28, 2014

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