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A Partial Formalization of Kant's Categorical Imperative An Application of Deontic Logic to Classical Moral Philosophy by Moshe Kroy, Bundoora/Melbourne § l: The problem Kant's criterion of morality, the categorical Imperative, is usually described äs a "formal" criterion -- in contradistinction to other criteria whidi are more "substansive"1. Now, this characterization of Kant's Imperative should be a challenge for philosophical logicians. If this renowned criterion is really "formal" -- why not formalize it? Obviously, a formalization of Kant's Imperative is possible only when an appropriate formal framework is available. Quantification theory is not an appropriate System, since the concepts of "Obligation" and "Permission" which are essential to any formalization of a moral criterion2 are not among its logical constants. On the other hand, a variety of deontic logics have been developed Cf. Gronndwork of the Metapbysics of Morals, ed. H. J. Paton (1964), Cf. 68: "... for between its a-priori principle whidi is formal, and its a-posteriori motive, which is material, the will Stands, so to speak, at a parting of the ways." -- Kant's claim that the principle of the will is formal applies, of course, to his own categorical imperative. What Kant meant by 'formal* cannot
Kant-Studien – de Gruyter
Published: Jan 1, 1976
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