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I. Perception, Mind, and Philosophy of Mind Recent scholarship on Aristotle's philosophy of mind has been guided, to a significant extent, by the issue of whether Aristotle's theory of cognition (advanced some 2,300 years ago) is akin to theories that have now gained favor within contemporary philosophy of mind. In keeping with this trend, scholars have asked whether Aristotle denies that mental states can be reduced to physical states; scholars have asked whether, for Aristotle, token mental states supervene upon token physical states; and they have asked whether, on his view, mental states are in principle realizable upon a variety of material bases. More often than not, scholarly judgment has sided with the view that Aristotle's theory of cognition is substantially like one or another of our contemporary theories. In this respect, Aristotle has been embraced as one of our own. It has been argued that Aristotle is an anti-reductive materialist; it has been argued that, for Aristotle, mental properties supervene on physical properties; and it has been argued that, on his view, mental states are multiply realizable.' (Aristotle is, perhaps, the first functionalist.) It is now somewhat commonplace to view Aristotle's theory of cognition as a theory
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2000
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