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Empty Terms in Aristotle’s Logic

Empty Terms in Aristotle’s Logic PAOLO CRIVELLI Many commentators think that 'empty' 1 terms constitute a problem for Aristotle's logic. In this paper I argue that Aristotle's logic can accommodate 'empty' terms: although the subject as well as the predicate of every genuine affirmation and of every genuine denial must be 'non-empty,' those utterances which have the outward appearance of an affirmation or a denial with an 'empty' subject or predicate are really neither affirmations nor denials, but collections of affirmations or denials. Since a collection of affirmations or denials is a collection of sentences,2 and since it is sentences, not collections of sentences, that are true or false, it follows that those utterances which have the outward appearance of an affirmation or a denial with an 'empty' subject or predicate are neither true nor false. I. Arguments for attributing to Aristotle the view that affirmations and denials have existential import Subjects and predicates cannot be 'empty': (i) affirmations, denials, joining, and separating. Aristotle's remarks on affirmations, denials, joining, and separating strongly suggest that in his view both the subject and the predicate of any affirmation or denial signify items of the appropriate kinds. For: (i.i) Aristotle insists that in every affirmative (negative) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online Brill

Empty Terms in Aristotle’s Logic

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Copyright 2002 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1059-986X
eISSN
2213-4417
DOI
10.1163/22134417-90000033
Publisher site
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Abstract

PAOLO CRIVELLI Many commentators think that 'empty' 1 terms constitute a problem for Aristotle's logic. In this paper I argue that Aristotle's logic can accommodate 'empty' terms: although the subject as well as the predicate of every genuine affirmation and of every genuine denial must be 'non-empty,' those utterances which have the outward appearance of an affirmation or a denial with an 'empty' subject or predicate are really neither affirmations nor denials, but collections of affirmations or denials. Since a collection of affirmations or denials is a collection of sentences,2 and since it is sentences, not collections of sentences, that are true or false, it follows that those utterances which have the outward appearance of an affirmation or a denial with an 'empty' subject or predicate are neither true nor false. I. Arguments for attributing to Aristotle the view that affirmations and denials have existential import Subjects and predicates cannot be 'empty': (i) affirmations, denials, joining, and separating. Aristotle's remarks on affirmations, denials, joining, and separating strongly suggest that in his view both the subject and the predicate of any affirmation or denial signify items of the appropriate kinds. For: (i.i) Aristotle insists that in every affirmative (negative)

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Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2002

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