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The WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedures

The WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedures 1. INTRODUCTION It is now 10 years since the World Trade Organization was established. The general consensus is that its "integrated" dispute settlement systeml has worked reasonably well during that time.2 As at November 2005, 335 disputes had arisen, with the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DsB) having adopted 95 panel and 69 Appellate Body (AB) reports.3 While this suggests greater legalization and sophistication in the resolution of international trade disputes (which is welcome), the presumed success of pre-adjudication resolution (the system's "clear preference") must also not be forgotten. Developing countries such as India and Brazil have also been active participants, while others have had little or no involvement.4 No doubt statistics of this nature (with some hesitation towards its treatment of developing and least developed countries) give some prima facie support to the argument that the system is working reasonably well and consequently is "a central element in providing security and predictability" to the WTO's trading regime.' While the system may present well statistically, it is not a legal system in the traditional sense, in particular with its laissez faire and decentralized approaches to remedies and enforcement and its bias towards market power, casting doubt on its credibility http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of World Investment and Trade Brill

The WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedures

Journal of World Investment and Trade , Volume 7 (2): 21 – Jan 1, 2006

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1660-7112
eISSN
2211-9000
DOI
10.1163/221190006X00171
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

1. INTRODUCTION It is now 10 years since the World Trade Organization was established. The general consensus is that its "integrated" dispute settlement systeml has worked reasonably well during that time.2 As at November 2005, 335 disputes had arisen, with the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DsB) having adopted 95 panel and 69 Appellate Body (AB) reports.3 While this suggests greater legalization and sophistication in the resolution of international trade disputes (which is welcome), the presumed success of pre-adjudication resolution (the system's "clear preference") must also not be forgotten. Developing countries such as India and Brazil have also been active participants, while others have had little or no involvement.4 No doubt statistics of this nature (with some hesitation towards its treatment of developing and least developed countries) give some prima facie support to the argument that the system is working reasonably well and consequently is "a central element in providing security and predictability" to the WTO's trading regime.' While the system may present well statistically, it is not a legal system in the traditional sense, in particular with its laissez faire and decentralized approaches to remedies and enforcement and its bias towards market power, casting doubt on its credibility

Journal

Journal of World Investment and TradeBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2006

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