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- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- eISSN
- 1875-7413
- DOI
- 10.1163/187574199X00090
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Environmental law has been described as "a cutting-edge laboratory of international law"1 - a metaphor which somehow casts environmental lawyers in the unenviable role of the alchemist who is impatiently ex- pected to find cheap ways of making gold. International environmental law has indeed become a favourite testing ground for innovative policy instruments, including economic incentives (for "positive measures") and financial mechanisms in particular.2 Some of the experiments on- going have drawn fire, from the defenders of more traditional ways of making international law as well as from the defenders of more tradi- tional ways of spending money. I shall begin, therefore, by placing those instruments in the general context of international development assis- tance, then focus on the major new financial "carrots" of global envi- ronmental agreements, and on some of the international legal problems they raise. I. The Limits of Green Aid True, the environment has begun to play a prominent part in overseas development assistance. Most bilateral and multilateral aid projects are now subject to well-established criteria and procedures for the prior as- sessment of their environmental impacts;3 and a standard portion of on- going (bilateral and multilateral) development funding is regularly ear- marked for
Journal
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1999