EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS
Abstract
EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS Peter SIMONS Universitat Salzburg Die Frage nach der Moglichkeit von Existenzsiitzen steht nicht in der Mitte sondern am Uran/ang der Logik. (Wittgenstein 1979, to.) 1. Introduction One of the most persistently lively areas of dispute in philosophy for more than two centuries has been the nature and analysis of existential propositions. We may think of Kant's criticism of the ontological argument, and many later essays on the question whether "existence is a predicate"; Brentano's attempt to demonstrate that all categorical propositions have the logical form of affirmations and denials of existence; Frege's and Russell's analyses of existence as a second-level concept, their denials of significance to singular existence propositions, and the later criticism of this view in free logic; Quine's insistence on variables and quantifiers as the harbingers of ontological commitment. Quite a passable cross-section of modem philosophy could be exposed by simply looking at how different philosophers have treated existentials. There have been many attempts to analyse existential propositions made with the aim of exposing their true logical form, and thus revealing exactly what they are stating. The multifarious approaches and the variety of examples thrown up in natural and logical languages have left a