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Daniel SCHULTHESS University of Neuchatel Introduction With his recent book on Thomas Reid, Keith Lehrer has contrib uted to draw the Scottish philosopher from the relative negiect he had suffered for many years. One wonders of course about the connections between this contribution to the history of philosophy and Lehrer's own work in epistemology. In this paper, I briefly set the historical stage on which Reid appears - as far as epistemology is concerned. Then, I give a sketch of Reid's view of epistemic justification and try to locate the 'Reidian insight' which has been praised by Lehrer. Two roles of this insight in Lehrer's epistemology will be distinguished. A doubt will be voiced concerning the reality, in Reid's philosophy, ofthe second role this insight plays in Lehrer's epistemology. Some questions will finally be raised concerning an epistemology which integrates the Reidian insight. I. Epistemology before Reid It is often said, with some reason, that in the modern era, episte molo gy plays a determinant role in theoretical philosophy: what is taken as real is determined from the standpoint of what can be known. Hence the central role of the (often largel y i mplici t) concept 1. Thomas
Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill
Published: Aug 13, 1991
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