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Schramm raises many valuable questions; more than I can deal with. I want to draw a distinction between the Tucson skeptic and me. In my book, Theory 0/ Knowledge, I used the skeptic as an explanatory fiction. In the first part of the book, I sought to explain what it was for something to cohere with a background system. A claim coheres with the background system on my account just in case the background system is adequate to meet all objections to the claim. So my claim, "there is a table here," coheres with my background system just in case my background system is adequate to meet all objections to that claim. To explain how objections are met I used the skeptic as a dialectical foil. I put the objections in the voice of the skeptic, and then I answered them. The "skeptic" was just a dialectical device for explaining what coherence iso Now let me just deal with the serious skeptic and consider whether I have an answer to her. It seems to me there are two kinds of skeptics. One is a skeptic who says, "I don't agree that anything is any more justified than anything else."
Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill
Published: Aug 13, 1991
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