Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
John Collins (2006)
Temporal Externalism, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientifically Ignorant Communities, 35
H. Jackman (2005)
TEMPORAL EXTERNALISM, DEFERENCE, AND OUR ORDINARY LINGUISTIC PRACTICEPacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86
according to content externalism, S cannot know at t2 that water is wet, since she has lost her old concept of water
B. Kobes (1996)
Mental Content and Hot Self-KnowledgePhilosophical Topics, 24
If S forgets nothing
K. Kraay (2002)
Externalism, Memory, and Self-KnowledgeErkenntnis, 56
P. Ludlow (1995)
Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memoryAnalysis, 55
John Gibbons (1996)
Externalism and Knowledge of ContentThe Philosophical Review, 105
J. Baillie (1997)
Personal identity and mental contentPhilosophical Psychology, 10
P. Boghossian (1992)
Externalism and InferencePhilosophical Issues, 2
H. Jackman (1999)
We Live Forwards But Understand Backwards: Linguistic Practices and Future BehaviorPacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80
Paul Skokowski (1996)
Naturalizing the MindMind & Language, 11
H. Jackman (2004)
Temporal Externalism and Epistemic Theories of VaguenessPhilosophical Studies, 117
Jessica Brown (2000)
Against temporal externalismAnalysis, 60
grazer philosophische studien 93 (2016) 243–258 301911 Heal, John 1998: “Externalism and Memory”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 Suppl., 95–109.
K. Kraay (2001)
, MEMORY , AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
This article presents a defense of “presentist externalism,” that is, the claim that memory contents are fixed by the environment and by the time at which a recollection takes place rather than by those at which the original mental state occurred. Its case is an instance of an argument to the best explanation. The author argues, firstly, that “presentist externalism” is the only version of content externalism that can stand up to both Boghossian’s memory and fallacy arguments. In slow switching cases, inferences containing memory thoughts as premises are unsound or unsafe, but valid. The author contends, secondly, that the externalist must recognize the existence of wide mismemories besides wide forgetting and that only the presentist externalist can account for their existence. The author maintains, finally, that if the validity of an inference requires that all its premises and conclusion be evaluated in the same context, that in which the inference is made, then it is the present context that fixes the content and the concepts of memory rather than the past.
Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill
Published: May 18, 2016
Keywords: content externalism; externalism about memory; presentist externalism; pastist externalism; slow switching cases
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.