Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Iv. the Legal Reasoning in a Judgment (Continued). the Problem in General

Iv. the Legal Reasoning in a Judgment (Continued). the Problem in General IV. THE LEGAL REASONING IN A JUDGMENT (CON- TINUED). THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL (1) Introductory remarks In the above the Court's introduction of new legal arguments has been discussed with regard to certain limited groups of cases. As a summary where these groups are concerned, the rule may be inferred that the Court is competent to apply what it considers to be valid international law independently of what the parties choose to base their arguments on. But admittedly this rule loses its force to some extent in the interpretation of treaties, since the will of the parties here has particular significance in settling what is current law. We will now investigate whether the rule that the Court may choose the legal basis for its decisions independently of the parties' argumentation, may also be considered a general principle. For this purpose we will examine below those decisions of the Permanent Court and of the International Court which may be . seen to be relevant. It is difficult to be certain that the material being put forward is complete, as it is sometimes not expressed in the premises themselves that they deviate from the pleadings of the par- ties. But http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Nordic Journal of International Law Brill

Iv. the Legal Reasoning in a Judgment (Continued). the Problem in General

Nordic Journal of International Law , Volume 32 (1-4): 42 – Jan 1, 1962

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/iv-the-legal-reasoning-in-a-judgment-continued-the-problem-in-general-L5Es0khrkt

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1962 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0902-7351
eISSN
1571-8107
DOI
10.1163/187529362X00061
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

IV. THE LEGAL REASONING IN A JUDGMENT (CON- TINUED). THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL (1) Introductory remarks In the above the Court's introduction of new legal arguments has been discussed with regard to certain limited groups of cases. As a summary where these groups are concerned, the rule may be inferred that the Court is competent to apply what it considers to be valid international law independently of what the parties choose to base their arguments on. But admittedly this rule loses its force to some extent in the interpretation of treaties, since the will of the parties here has particular significance in settling what is current law. We will now investigate whether the rule that the Court may choose the legal basis for its decisions independently of the parties' argumentation, may also be considered a general principle. For this purpose we will examine below those decisions of the Permanent Court and of the International Court which may be . seen to be relevant. It is difficult to be certain that the material being put forward is complete, as it is sometimes not expressed in the premises themselves that they deviate from the pleadings of the par- ties. But

Journal

Nordic Journal of International LawBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1962

There are no references for this article.