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IV. THE LEGAL REASONING IN A JUDGMENT (CON- TINUED). THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL (1) Introductory remarks In the above the Court's introduction of new legal arguments has been discussed with regard to certain limited groups of cases. As a summary where these groups are concerned, the rule may be inferred that the Court is competent to apply what it considers to be valid international law independently of what the parties choose to base their arguments on. But admittedly this rule loses its force to some extent in the interpretation of treaties, since the will of the parties here has particular significance in settling what is current law. We will now investigate whether the rule that the Court may choose the legal basis for its decisions independently of the parties' argumentation, may also be considered a general principle. For this purpose we will examine below those decisions of the Permanent Court and of the International Court which may be . seen to be relevant. It is difficult to be certain that the material being put forward is complete, as it is sometimes not expressed in the premises themselves that they deviate from the pleadings of the par- ties. But
Nordic Journal of International Law – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1962
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