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Neither fox nor hedgehog: NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE's concept of security

Neither fox nor hedgehog: NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE's concept of security Neither fox nor hedgehog: NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE ’s concept of security Antonio Ortiz 1 The great political philosopher and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin, famously categorized human beings as either ‘hedgehogs’ or ‘foxes’ following a verse by the ancient Greek poet Archilochus: ‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’. Hedgehogs' lives are the embodiment of a single, central vision of reality according to which they feel, experience and think; they are ‘system addicts’. On the contrary, foxes pursue many divergent ends and, generally, possess a sense of reality that prevents them from formulating a definite grand system of everything, simply because they realize that life is too complex to be compressed into any scheme. In the post-Cold War security environment of strategic confusion and deep uncertainty, multilateral security institutions are struggling to adjust and evolve from a single vision of reality to a more complex understanding of the strategic risks and challenges. Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE ) have gone through in-depth transformation, with different degrees of success, to be able to address the new threats to the security of their members. The relevance and effectiveness of multilateral security institutions depends more and more on the ability and determination of their members to adapt to and to seize the opportunities of change. This difficult ongoing and continuous process requires innovative doctrines and new mechanisms for which some organizations are conceptually or institutionally better prepared than others. Back in 1975, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSCE ) laid the foundations for what seemed to be a rather avant-garde concept of comprehensive security articulated around the well-known three dimensions. A model apparently well adapted to the present multidimensional strategic environment. However, the OSCE is now facing serious difficulties in operationalizing its unique approach to security. Since the early nineties, the international community has been facing complex conflicts simultaneously involving military engagement, reconstruction and development. In its struggle to successfully resolve these ‘modern wars’ NATO has put forward the idea of a Comprehensive Approach. Beyond the more immediate operational requirement, this concept is meant to be part of NATO ’s evolution from a strictly collective defence organisation into a multipurpose security agency. 1 Antonio Ortiz is a Policy Adviser at the Office of the Secretary-General at NATO . From 1998 to 2004 he worked as a Senior Programme Officer in the Conflict Prevention Centre, at the OSCE Secretariat. The views expressed in this paper are made in a personal capacity and do not reflect the views of NATO . NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 285 This article briefly explores the doctrinal sources of NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach and its possible links with the OSCE ’s comprehensive concept of security. It looks at the opportunities and the limits of this new approach in facilitating NATO ’s interaction and engagement with other international actors, in particular the OSCE , in conceptual, institutional and operational terms. And it briefly reflects on the paradoxical, parallel lives of the OSCE ’s and NATO ’s respective approaches to security cooperation. Elusive definitions OSCE ’s Comprehensive Approach remains difficult to define and the term is widely used in OSCE with many shades and tones and for very different purposes. Allies have yet to agree on a clear definition of the concept and identify what exactly lies behind a term so frequently used in dinner speeches. Political disagreements over the broader NATO agenda and the organization’s future roles have hindered consensus on the politico-strategic dimension of the Comprehensive Approach. The difficulty in reaching internal consensus on a common doctrine is further complicated by terminology issues and by the lack of symmetry between different national and multilateral methodologies. This persuaded NATO Allies to concentrate their efforts on making the idea work, rather than trying to agree on a political concept. Nevertheless, despite the current focus on the purely operational and process-oriented aspects, the Comprehensive Approach has a great potential to guide the transformation of OSCE ’s doctrine, concepts and capabilities in the coming years. The definition of the OSCE concept of comprehensive security is not clear either. It is more often described through its constituent components rather than being properly defined. Examples abound: ‘the CSCE ’s comprehensive concept of security and stability, which includes human rights, political, military, economic and environmental components’ 2 or ‘This concept relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity and co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations.’ 3 This approach to security also establishes a continuum between domestic and international security. It makes human rights — and their effect on the stability and security of a state — an issue of legitimate concern and involvement for all other states. Altogether, the OSCE understanding of security as a multifaceted phenomenon is ‘a central, integral and original element of the OSCE philosophy and action. As comprehensive as its territory and its goals and tasks has become the organization’s concept of security. 4 Although it is not clear when and by whom the concept was first used, it has become one of the most distinctive and lasting trade-marks of the 2 Summary of Conclusions , Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, 30-31 January ‘92, para. 6. 3 The Challenges of Change , Helsinki Summit Declaration, 9-10 July 1992, para. 21. 4 T.M. Buchsbaum, ‘ OSCE ’s Comprehensive Security: Integrating the Three Dimensions’, in D. Warner and V. Clerc, Challenges Faced by the OSCE During 2001 , PSIO Occasional Paper, 2002, no. 2, p. 82. Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 286 OSCE . For many years, it has made the CSCE / OSCE unique among Euro-Atlantic security organizations and it is indelibly linked with its brand-name. It is the OSCE which developed and implemented the concept, before other international institutions drew on it or just copied it. Today, the multidimensional nature of security is well understood and has been internalised by most international security organizations. There is an ever more acute awareness that complex contingencies cannot be resolved by military means alone and that all the tasks — humanitarian, military, political, social, and economic — are interconnected. NATO has acknowledged that the ‘challenges of our times demand a comprehensive approach to security, in which military and civilian means are employed together and in a coordinated way’ 5 . This formulation refers indistinctively both to a conceptual or an instrumental approach to security. However, most references to the Comprehensive Approach tend to focus on process as opposed to substance. 6 For the Alliance, the Comprehensive Approach would mean a higher degree of effective coordination at all levels within NATO and more effective cooperation with other actors to complement and mutually reinforce each other’s efforts to achieve the desired common goals, if possible within an overall strategy agreed and owned by local authorities. Outside the narrower NATO context, the Comprehensive Approach is defined as ‘the understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation’. 7 Although this explanation fails to identify what such principles are. The Comprehensive Approach may be applicable throughout the continuum of conflict and crisis and is the ‘parallel, more extensive employment of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations ( EBAO )’ 8 which is a similar doctrine, initially conceived by the United States military. The Comprehensive Approach initiative created some confusion among the NATO military establishment as to the exact relationship between both concepts. EBAO predates the Comprehensive Approach 9 and continues to be part of the current 5 J. de Hoop Scheffer, NATO and the EU : Time for a New Chapter , speech in Berlin, 29 January 2007. 6 The Alliance’s concept of defence against terrorism refers to ‘an overarching international strategy that integrates political, military, economic, legal and social initiatives.’ 7 The Comprehensive Approach , Joint Discussion Note 4/05, Ministry of Defence, London, January 2006. 8 The Effects-Based Approach to Operations ( EBAO ) is defined as ‘The way of thinking and specific processes that, together, enable the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a Comprehensive Approach’. Joint Discussion Note 1/05 , UK Ministry of Defence, 2005. 9 EBAO has been developed by HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, in Norfolk, USA , and is an outgrowth of effects-based operations ( EBO ) and the operational net assessment ( ONA ) doctrine first espoused by the US Joint Forces Command ( JFCOM ). NATO defines EBAO as ‘the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non- NATO actors, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 287 NATO military doctrine in complex emergencies. 10 As such, it is underpinned by NATO ’s Comprehensive Political Guidance, a policy paper that complements the 1999 Strategic Concept. 11 The fragile understanding within the Alliance, pending a political agreement on a clear definition of the concept, is that the Comprehensive Approach has a political dimension, not just an operational one. Therefore, it stands above EBAO , with the latter contributing to the delivery of the former. The point is that EBAO already contained many of the internal process-oriented proposals of the Comprehensive Approach. Notably, the harmonization of contributions from various NATO instruments and more effective internal coordination of strategic and operational-level planning, execution and assessment processes. EBAO also has an external dimension aimed at fostering practical cooperation and coherence with other actors at all levels — ‘not to command and control other instruments, but more to confer and co-ordinate more effectively’. Overall, EBAO encourages solutions that employ integrated joint military capability, but it is not a purely military concept. It is worth noting that when the Comprehensive Approach initiative was tabled, 12 discussions focused on demonstrating how it went beyond the existing NATO doctrine on enhanced civil military cooperation ( CIMIC ). No mention was made of its link and possible added value with respect to EBAO . As a matter of fact, EBAO was quickly obviated from political discussions despite attempts by the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe ( SHAPE ) to reivindicate it. This obvious case of duplication reflects a wider problem within the Alliance: the recurrent disconnection between its political and military realms and the difficulty to reform NATO structures in order to function as a truly politico-military institution. More interesting from a conceptual perspective is EBAO ’s multidimensional nature. In order to be truly useful, military means must achieve the stated political outcome, not just create favourable conditions for it, although this is important in itself. EBAO has therefore a political reading, not just an operational one. It opened the door to a more holistic and inclusive approach to security, closer to the OSCE ’s multidimensional approach. It recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. Indeed, the ‘effects- to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end-state’, NATO Military Committee, MCM0052, 6 June 2006. 10 EBAO has become part of NATO ’s broad conceptual framework through the Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations ( CAFJO ), which intends to inform and shape the future development of concepts, doctrine and capabilities in order to allow the Alliance to develop a capacity to conduct an effects-based approach to operations. 11 The CPG states that NATO should develop further ‘an approach to operations which, (…) aims at the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance to create overall effects that will achieve the desired outcome’, Comprehensive Political Guidance , November 2006, para. 17. 12 The first proposal was made by Denmark in late 2004, initially under the heading Concerted Planning and Action ( CPA ). Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 288 based way of thinking’ can be considered as the operational application of a broad approach to security at all levels of decision-making. It considers the strategic environment as a complex ‘system’ in which all actors and entities interact to create effects. A basic principle of EBAO is the analysis of such a system to achieve a holistic understanding of security problems and the casual relationship between actions and effects. Probably the main added value of the Comprehensive Approach was to give EBAO a political enhancement and provide a broader framework for existing military concepts, doctrines and processes. It was also meant to increase the legitimacy and acceptability of such methodology vis-à-vis other international organizations and partners. Ultimately, however, the intention was to change NATO ’s approach to security, to reach a more inclusive understanding of the relationship between peace, security and development. The irony is that Allies have been unable to agree on the political elements of the Comprehensive Approach, including its definition. The result has been a series of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO ’s contribution to a comprehensive approach, which essentially replicate the already existing EBAO . At the Riga Summit, in November 2006, NATO Allies formally put the Comprehensive Approach initiative on the agenda. The summit declaration stated that ‘a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors’. 13 Short of an agreed definition, NATO leaders identified two main dimensions to NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach. An internal one focused on improving ‘coherent application of NATO ’s own crisis management instruments’. And an external one that fosters ‘practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the United Nations ( UN ) and other relevant international organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations’. At the Bucharest Summit, in April 2008, NATO restated these basic elements and approved an Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals aimed at adjusting its military and political planning procedures with a view to enhancing civil-military interface. These proposals include provisions to support stabilisation and reconstruction, relating to areas such as planning and the conduct of operations; training and education; and enhancing cooperation with external actors. 14 Altogether, the Comprehensive Approach has been reduced to an operational process and lacks a political and conceptual framework. The Riga and Bucharest Summit declarations and the NATO internal documents do not even link the initiative to the Alliance commitment to a ‘broad approach to security’ enshrined in NATO ’s 1999 Strategic Concept. 15 As it now stands, the 13 PR/CP(2006)0150, Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, para. 10. 14 PR/CP(2008)049, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, para. 11. 15 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept , April 1999, para. 25. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 289 Comprehensive Approach is not meant to facilitate a politico-military understanding of the complex security environment in which international organizations work, let alone to formulate a new concept of security. From a political viewpoint, the difficulty in agreeing on the political aspects of a Comprehensive Approach in many ways reflects the fact that the transatlantic security consensus post-9/11 is incomplete. 16 A shared understanding of the challenges we are facing is indeed more difficult to achieve today than it was in the past. That is something a new NATO Strategic Concept should try to remedy, at least partially. The Comprehensive Approach has therefore been reduced to an acknowledgement that NATO ’s own tools and processes are insufficient and that a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments are required to address the complex security context in which the Alliance’s military operations are conducted. It is not the prism through which the Alliance looks at the strategic landscape. It is rather the realization that NATO needs more sophisticated mechanisms and procedures to operate in such an environment. What has been developed is not an innovative doctrine to interpret the strategic context - and NATO ’s role therein, but an instrument to influence that context with the help of others. One common source At the risk of sounding somewhat incongruous, it is possible to trace back the deepest source of NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach to the Cold War interregnum of détente. By contrast, the roots of the OSCE concept of comprehensive security are more obvious and well established. The idea of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was developed in an effort to try dialogue and co-operation as a means to defuse the risks of the Cold War confrontation. For more than five years, before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was actually launched in 1972, as a series of preparatory meetings, a protracted ‘communiqué dialogue’ between NATO and the Warsaw Pact had gradually developed a common basis for the conference project. The objective of Western countries was to ease relations with the ‘Communist monolith’ by introducing a ‘number of more dynamic elements for inter-state relations and military aspects of security, as well as human rights, beginning with freer movement of peoples, information and ideas’. 17 The CSCE three-tiered structure was agreed in April 1973 and the famous ‘baskets’ were listed in the Helsinki Final Act. 18 Later, the Helsinki ‘baskets’ of the 1970s evolved into the ‘dimensions’ of the early nineties. It is true, as Professor 16 M. Rühle, ‘The Evolution of NATO : Expanding the Transatlantic Tool Kit’, in American Foreign Policy Interest , 2007, vol. 29, pp.237-242. 17 W. Höynck, ‘From Adversaries to Partners: CSCE Experience in Building Confidence’, Speech at Tel Aviv University, 5 March 1995, in From CSCE to OSCE , Vienna, June 1996. 18 These were Confidence-Building Measures ( CBM s); security and disarmament; the economy; science, technology and the environment; humanitarian and other fields. Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 290 Ghebali noted, 19 that no CSCE text made reference to any formal concept of comprehensive security until the early 1990s. The 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration formally acknowledged such a concept. 20 The Code of Conduct on Military Aspects of Security (1994) restated its validity and, finally, in an OSCE at ‘the human, economic, political and military dimensions of security’ must be addressed ‘as an integral whole’. 21 However, the idea that security does not solely depend on defence, deterrence and military means was manifest since the very beginning of the CSCE process. One of the first characteristics of the Helsinki process was its inclusiveness, from military security to human rights, and the systematic elaboration of a coherent body of security-related concepts and issues. In this regard, the Final Act contains an essential consideration: participating States, when engaged in joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, will take into account ‘the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security’. 22 The Final Act also affirmed that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ‘is an essential factor for the peace, justice and wellbeing necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation’ among participating States as among all States 23 . Hence, the idea of comprehensiveness — if not the concept of comprehensive security — was built into the Final Act and in the discussions that preceded it. And so was the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security. The Helsinki Decalogue stipulated that ‘All the principles set forth above [in the Decalogue] are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.’ 24 So, each specific aspect of security should be considered in a ‘comprehensive’ way, as part of a sophisticated structure made up of interconnected or related sub-structures. This comprehensiveness was operationalized through the CSCE ’s negotiating practice and political trade-offs, especially in the late 1980s. The so-called ‘cross-basket’ package deals contributed to this linkage, as plainly expressed by the then United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home: ‘In the language of Helsinki, Basket I will be empty unless there are plenty of eggs in Basket III ’. The notion that confidence related to military aspects of security could only develop in a broad, comprehensive context is therefore archetypal of the détente years. And it is precisely in that political context that NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach has its earliest origin. In many ways, the 19 V-Y. Ghebali, ‘The OSCE at a Crossroad: The Difficulty of Overcoming Russian-Related Dilemmas’, in V-Y. Ghebali, D. Warner and B. Gimelli, The Future of the OSCE in the Perspective of the Enlargements of NATO and the EU , PSIO , Geneva, 2004, pp. 5-26. 20 See above, footnote 3. 21 Istanbul Charter for European Security, 1999, para. 9. 22 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, para. 2/ III . 23 Final Act, Decalogue, principle VII , para. 5. 24 Final Act, Decalogue, principle X , para. 4. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 291 Comprehensive Approach goes back to the tradition established by the Harmel Report of 1967, ‘namely the idea that NATO should have two equally strong sides to its policy: defence and deterrence on the one side balanced with détente including disarmament on the other side, and both ultimately serving the stability of our continent’. 25 The Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance of the then Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, stated that ‘military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary’ 26 . The objective was to respond to critics who charged that NATO had become irrelevant amidst the changes in international relations. A critique that suggested that NATO ’s emphasis on the military aspects of security tended to undermine prospects for political solutions in the relations between the two blocks. NATO , however, had not been totally blind to non-military aspects of security. A Committee on Non-Military Cooperation had been set up by the North Atlantic Council in May 1956 to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields. The report of the ‘Three Wise Men’ was the first formal alliance initiative broadening its perspectives on security ‘beyond and above defence cooperation’ 27 . It stated that ‘security is today far more than a military matter’ and that the two aspects of security - civil and military — ‘can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations’. It also acknowledged that ‘perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognised their essential interrelationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides’. 28 That streams are not always purer at their source is an adage that is also valid for NATO , as the alliance broadened its approach to security after the end of the Cold War, coming somewhat closer to the OSCE philosophy. NATO ’s 1999 Strategic Concept states that ‘the Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations.’ 29 Still, the 1999 Strategic Concept is comparatively narrower in focus than the OSCE approach to security or the European Union’s Security Strategy and mainly reflects NATO ’s role as an alliance for collective defence focusing essentially on military aspects of security. 25 A. Bailes, ‘The Transatlantic Partnership of the Future and NATO 's Role in it’, Speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly 53 rd Annual Session, Reykjakiv, 5-9 October 2007. 26 The Future Tasks of the Alliance – ‘The Harmel Report’, Brussels, 13-14 December 1967, para. 5. 27 The Future Tasks of the Alliance …, supra, para. 13. 28 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO , 13 December 1956, paras. 13 to 16. The ‘three wise men’ were Foreign Ministers Gaetano Martino of Italy, Halvard Lange of Norway and Lester Pearson of Canada. 29 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept , April 1999, para. 25. Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 292 Hence, it was the Harmel Report which fundamentally altered the objective, image and ‘future tasks’ of the alliance. 30 The report’s defence and détente combination, not dichotomy, ‘provided an intellectual and political framework for NATO policies that accommodated the growing split in the alliance between left and right’. 31 It not only broadened the potential base for political support to NATO , but also provided the foundation for NATO to become a more complex political instrument after the end of the Cold War. It also allowed for different, often divergent, perspectives on security and in a very practical sense created a whole new set of responsibilities for NATO . Hence, NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach, even short of being a broad concept of security, relates to the tradition of the Harmel Report. It belongs to this Janus-like second face of NATO , the softer, reformist and even progressive side of the Alliance. One side that is today ‘set against its new global fighting role plus the commitment in theory to a kind of permanent warfare against new enemies like terrorists and proliferators’. 32 NATO ’s two main functions, however, should not be opposing each other, but converging towards the same security objective. Like Janus, whose two faces, albeit looking in opposite directions, most frequently symbolize change and transitions, the progression of past to future, of one condition to another or of one vision to another. Of platforms and hubs: Different approaches to cooperative security NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach does not amount to a comprehensive concept of security, although the doctrinal sources of both concepts may be related. It may be tempting to make a rapprochement with another OSCE notion, that of cooperative security, which ‘emerged as an offspring of common security, 33 a concept coined by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues’. 34 After the end of the Cold War, the OSCE adopted this concept and re- branded it as ‘cooperative security’ and progressively extended it to all three security dimensions. 35 There is no OSCE -agreed definition of ‘co-operative security’, but its main characteristics can be inferred from the Organization’s 30 The Harmel Report was partly inspired by de Gaulle’s famous trilogy of ‘détente, entente, coopération’ and Brandt’s ‘Ostpolitik’. 31 S.R. Sloan, ‘ NATO , the European Union, and the Atlantic Community’, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, US, 2005, p. 49. 32 A. Bailes, ‘The Transatlantic Partnership of the Future…’, supra. 33 In the context of the Cold War’s nuclear balance of terror, common security offered an alternative to deterrence and mutual assured destruction, which could only result in a zero sum game. Conversely, common security was considered as indivisible in the context of a cooperative endeavour bringing equal benefits to all the actors involved. 34 V-Y. Ghebali, The OSCE at a Crossroad …, supra, p. 7. 35 For example, the Helsinki Document (1992) states that ‘The participating States will aim at establishing among themselves new security relations based upon co-operative and common approaches to security. To this end, they will develop consultation, goal-oriented continuing dialogue and co-operation in the field of security’. CSCE Helsinki Document 1992 - The Challenges of Change , CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, para. 15. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 293 basic texts. Cooperative security ‘excludes confrontation, hegemonic behaviour and unilateralism, while prescribing equal partnership, confidence, mutual accountability, solidarity, preventative action, self-restraint and military transparency’. 36 Cooperative security is applicable essentially to relations among states and generally excludes other international actors. It entails a regime of ‘soft collective security’ whose rationale is to bring states actively together. It rules out coercion by definition and favours preventive diplomacy as its main form of action. Whereas a defence alliance is a form of ‘hard collective security’ based on deterrence against a common enemy or a threat. In this regard, the political and institutional dimension of NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach has many common elements with OSCE ’s cooperative security. The comprehensive approach would bring together, early in a crisis situation, military and non-military instruments aimed at conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction, as well as governance and development. This can only be provided through a coordinated and coherent response by all the actors involved. The fundamental objective of the Comprehensive Approach is therefore to enhance cooperation with relevant organizations and external actors through achieving lasting mutual understanding, trust, confidence and respect among them. Ultimately, the ideal scenario is one of cooperative security among international organizations involved in crisis-response operations. Hence, the Comprehensive Approach would be the operational translation of a more abstract OSCE proposal, the Platform for Co-operative Security adopted in 1999, as an essential element of the Charter for European Security. The Platform for Co-operative Security is based on the same premise as the Comprehensive Approach, namely that no single state or international organization has the capacity to respond in splendid isolation to the risks and challenges of the post-Cold War strategic environment. As stated in its operational document, the goal of the Platform was to ‘strengthen the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area.’ 37 As noted by Professor Ghebali, the Platform offered ‘a kind of partnership contract to mutually reinforcing security-related institutions based on mutual comparative advantages, complementarity, pragmatic synergy, transparency and non-hierarchical relationships’. 38 The contract is open to those institutions whose members, both individually and collectively, adhere to OSCE principles and commitments and actively support the OSCE ’s concept of common, comprehensive and indivisible security. Like NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach, the ultimate goal of the Platform is to develop a culture of institutional cooperation to avoid a duplication of efforts and a waste of 36 V-Y. Ghebali, The OSCE at a Crossroad …, supra, pp. 8-9. 37 Istanbul Summit Document 1999, PCOEW389, Charter for European Security, Operational Document – The Platform for Cooperative Security , para.1. 38 V-Y. Ghebali, ‘The OSCE ’s Istanbul Charter for European Security’, in NATO Review , No. 1, Spring-Summer 2000, pp. 23-26. Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 294 resources. The concept of different actors cooperating and coordinating their efforts is certainly not new, be it at NATO or at the OSCE . The Platform for Cooperative Security drew on the first lessons learnt from the difficult negotiations leading to the complex inter-agency institutional set-up in Kosovo in 1999. To a large extent, it codified the fruitful cooperation among international organizations in the Balkans following Dayton or at least offered a ‘kind of inter-institutional armistice’ 39 for the disgraceful competition that characterised the activities of security-related institutions in the early phases of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Hence, the Platform document has an operational flavour throughout its text. Through the Platform, participating States sought ‘to develop and maintain political and operational coherence (…), both in responding to specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks and challenges.’ 40 The Platform for Cooperative Security proposed a set of arrangements for closer ties and cooperation between the OSCE and other international organizations 41 . The Platform document also contained a specific reference to OSCE field operations, which for many years have been the flagship, the main added value and the success story of the organisation. The document called for the codification and development of existing cooperation between OSCE missions and other relevant international bodies, organizations and institutions in field operations, in accordance with their individual mandates. However, despite this attention to crisis management and field operations, the Platform for Cooperative Security appears as a rather theoretical construction providing a top-down approach to inter-agency cooperation. While the Platform may be a good model and a useful conditions-setter for the OSCE ’s co-operation with other international organisations, ‘reality rarely conforms to such programmatic decisions’. 42 One of the reasons for the Platform’s inability to overcome its more notional characteristics and to offer a forward-looking perspective lies in its conception. The Platform was an EU - inspired initiative, but for some it is still tainted by an original sin, in the context of discussions in the early nineties on the Russian proposal for a 39 V-Y. Ghebali, ‘ The OSCE ’s Istanbul Charter… ’, supra, p. 25. 40 Istanbul Summit Document 1999, PCOEW389, Charter for European Security, para. 12. 41 Different forms of cooperation between institutions could include: regular contacts, information exchange, cross-representation at appropriate meetings; special meetings at political/executive or working level; a continuous framework for dialogue; increased transparency and practical co-operation; appointment of liaison officers or points of contact; joint needs assessment missions; secondment of experts by other organizations to the OSCE ; the development of common projects and field operations; joint training efforts; cross- representation at appropriate meetings; and other contacts intended to increase understanding of each organization’s conflict prevention tools. Operational Document – The Platform for Cooperative Security , supra, paras. 4 to 6. 42 W. Zellner, ‘Managing Change in Europe. Evaluating the OSCE and its Future Role: Competencies, Capabilities and Missions’, CORE , Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Working Paper 13, Hamburg, 2005, p. 33. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 295 common and comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century. From a NATO perspective, allies had to preserve the transatlantic relationship embodied in the Alliance and prevent Russia from encouraging an institutional hierarchy among international organizations or creating new strategic dividing lines or spheres of influence. Difficulties in operationalizing the Platform were also aggravated by the post-9/11 US general mistrust of multilateralism and, in particular, the OSCE ’s own internal difficulties, which made the organization become ‘more narcissistic than operational’. 43 Another particular notion of the Platform is the OSCE ’s role as a ‘flexible co-ordinating framework to foster cooperation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths’ 44 However, combining the non- enforcement co-operative security culture of the OSCE with other organizations more robust approaches to security ‘is no more than the hardly novel strategy of backing diplomacy with force and need not lead to abstract debate about institutional interaction’. 45 The NATO Comprehensive Approach initiative, by contrast, is the direct result of an immediate operational requirement and offers a more pragmatic and bottom-up approach. From the beginning, its primary rationale was to adopt a more holistic perspective to operations that would integrate and appropriately synchronize political, security, economy, governance and other aspects. The objective was to move from existing ad-hoc coordination arrangements on the ground towards a more proactive approach in engaging with actors in charge of reconstruction and peace building. As opposed to the Platform, which offers a sort of open-ended contract to ‘any organization or institution whose members individually and collectively decide to adhere to [its principles]’ 46 , the Comprehensive Approach intends to reach out to other international actors. As operational policy is decided in headquarters and capitals, it intends to build upon coordination in the field, through better consultation and coordination at the strategic and institutional level. From a political standpoint, through the Comprehensive Approach initiative, NATO embraces a collective crisis management acquis that, in its modern form, has been developing since the mid-nineties. 47 It does so at a time when multilateral action has been seriously 43 W. Kemp, ‘Time to Prune the OSCE Tree’, in Helsinki Monitor , 2006, no. 3, pp.207-213. 44 Istanbul Summit Document 1999, PCOEW389, Charter for European Security, para. 12. 45 B. George, ‘A better Place: the Cooperative and Collective Security Fusion of OSCE and NATO ’, Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly , November 1999. 46 Istanbul Summit Document 1999, PCOEW389, Charter for European Security, para. 12. 47 In the United Nations, the thought process leading to the parallel concept of Integrated Missions started in 1997 with the Secretary-General report ‘Reviewing the UN – a Programme for Reform’, which recommended a number of measures mainly focused on strengthening overall authority and integrated planning and the execution of UN operations. This was later echoed in several other documents, notably the Brahimi Report of 2000, and again in the 2005 Secretary-General report ‘In Larger Freedom’. Although earlier efforts to ensure closer civil-military collaboration from the outset of a crisis took place in the area of international disaster relief assistance and humanitarian action. In particular, the UN Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 296 eroded by US unilateralism and other preferred options, like coalitions and ad hoc mechanisms. But also by multilateral inefficiencies, obsolete doctrine and concepts, a lack of political will, inadequate capabilities and an inhibited European force projection mentality. Much as the OSCE Platform, the Comprehensive Approach intends to provide a frame of reference or codification of existing practices of NATO cooperation with other actors in the field. In this regard, the good practices and new pragmatic proposals made by NATO in its Action Plan to develop and implement its contribution to a Comprehensive Approach 48 bear many similarities with those contained in the OSCE proposal made ten years ago. Maybe the novelty of the NATO concept is the added emphasis on enhancing planning and optimizing implementation in the conduct of stabilization operations and reconstruction efforts. The NATO Riga Summit underlined that the alliance does not have a requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes. NATO therefore needs to ensure that it is able to complement its military capabilities with those of civilian actors in the planning and conduct of operations. In particular that it can co-operate with a wide range of partners, including the UN , EU , OSCE , NGO s and local actors. NATO also needs to convince these actors that, in seeking such co-operation, it is not trying to claim any leadership role over them. Consequently, NATO insists on achieving mutual understanding, trust, confidence, respect and better cooperation with the relevant actors, while respecting the UN ’s leading role in coordination. It is interesting to note, however, that it was in the context of NATO ’s involvement in Afghanistan, and in particular the expansion of NATO ’s International Security Assistance Force ( ISAF ) throughout the entire Afghan territory 49 , that the Comprehensive Approach became a matter of urgency. In this respect, when it comes to institutional cooperation in multilateral crisis management, the one enduring lesson of Afghanistan is that NATO cannot and should not be a one-stop security shop. NATO should therefore abandon its ambition to act as the lead coordinator in complex missions that require the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power. NATO is certainly part of the solution, but it is not the solution itself. The question for the Alliance is how to make compatible its stated aspiration to increasingly act as a ‘hub of broader international coalitions’ 50 and as a security platform for global partners with the Guidelines for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets ( MCDA ) to support UN Humanitarian Activities (‘Oslo Guidelines’, 1994). 48 The NATO Action Plan seeks to make improvements in five areas: planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned processes; enhanced cooperation with external actors, public messaging and public diplomacy; and improving NATO ’s military support to stabilisation and reconstruction. 49 ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion by assuming command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan on 5 October 2006, thus taking international security responsibility for the entire country. 50 J. de Hoop Scheffer, ‘ Managing Global Security and Risk’ , speech at the IISS Annual Conference, 7 September 2007. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 297 recognition of the UN ’s leading role in coordination. Conclusion Altogether, NATO ’s and the OSCE ’s different approaches to inter-agency cooperation have one same goal: to adapt to the changing strategic environment. Security is no longer linked exclusively to the territorial defence offered by NATO . But, the OSCE ’s cooperative security is also insufficient as it presumes from states an automatic goodwill and permanent good faith. The twenty-first century global risks and challenges are not purely military in nature, but they are not strictly civilian either. However, NATO is still structured as a regional defence organisation designed to counter a military threat and has no civilian capabilities of its own. The OSCE , meanwhile, has not been able to materialize any non-civilian or military means or to develop its peacekeeping role. The strategic environment has radically changed and the traditional concept of self-defence is no longer valid. The first line of defence is now often abroad, which requires expeditionary capabilities, as well as a readiness to use and project force beyond its territory. NATO may seem well placed to do so. However, deterrence and pre-emptive action may not work with many of the new threats, which require an emphasis on conflict prevention, confidence building, and other non-military tools. This is an area where the OSCE would theoretically have a comparative advantage. Modern-day security risks are global in nature and while NATO has successfully put behind the out of area debate and may have a global reach, it has no universal competence. The OSCE on the other hand, is still very much centred on its own Eurasian region. While its role and activities in that region are being eroded by the European Union’s increased presence, the OSCE cannot reach consensus on its ‘out-of-area’ role. The OSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and has observer status at the UN . NATO , by contrast, is facing serious political obstacles to formalize a much more limited framework relationship with the UN , which would facilitate the implementation of a truly Comprehensive Approach. The OSCE , however, has limited resources to act globally and its legitimacy, even within its own region, is questioned by a number of participating States. NATO has a serious legitimacy and acceptability deficit in many parts of the world. In short, it is difficult for regional security organizations like NATO and the OSCE to be at the same time a hedgehog and a fox, while it seems that both natures are simultaneously needed to survive and strive in the modern strategic environment. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Security and Human Rights Brill

Neither fox nor hedgehog: NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE's concept of security

Security and Human Rights , Volume 19 (4): 284 – Jan 1, 2008

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Brill
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© 2008 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
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1874-7337
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1875-0230
DOI
10.1163/187502308786691108
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Abstract

Neither fox nor hedgehog: NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE ’s concept of security Antonio Ortiz 1 The great political philosopher and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin, famously categorized human beings as either ‘hedgehogs’ or ‘foxes’ following a verse by the ancient Greek poet Archilochus: ‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’. Hedgehogs' lives are the embodiment of a single, central vision of reality according to which they feel, experience and think; they are ‘system addicts’. On the contrary, foxes pursue many divergent ends and, generally, possess a sense of reality that prevents them from formulating a definite grand system of everything, simply because they realize that life is too complex to be compressed into any scheme. In the post-Cold War security environment of strategic confusion and deep uncertainty, multilateral security institutions are struggling to adjust and evolve from a single vision of reality to a more complex understanding of the strategic risks and challenges. Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE ) have gone through in-depth transformation, with different degrees of success, to be able to address the new threats to the security of their members. The relevance and effectiveness of multilateral security institutions depends more and more on the ability and determination of their members to adapt to and to seize the opportunities of change. This difficult ongoing and continuous process requires innovative doctrines and new mechanisms for which some organizations are conceptually or institutionally better prepared than others. Back in 1975, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSCE ) laid the foundations for what seemed to be a rather avant-garde concept of comprehensive security articulated around the well-known three dimensions. A model apparently well adapted to the present multidimensional strategic environment. However, the OSCE is now facing serious difficulties in operationalizing its unique approach to security. Since the early nineties, the international community has been facing complex conflicts simultaneously involving military engagement, reconstruction and development. In its struggle to successfully resolve these ‘modern wars’ NATO has put forward the idea of a Comprehensive Approach. Beyond the more immediate operational requirement, this concept is meant to be part of NATO ’s evolution from a strictly collective defence organisation into a multipurpose security agency. 1 Antonio Ortiz is a Policy Adviser at the Office of the Secretary-General at NATO . From 1998 to 2004 he worked as a Senior Programme Officer in the Conflict Prevention Centre, at the OSCE Secretariat. The views expressed in this paper are made in a personal capacity and do not reflect the views of NATO . NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 285 This article briefly explores the doctrinal sources of NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach and its possible links with the OSCE ’s comprehensive concept of security. It looks at the opportunities and the limits of this new approach in facilitating NATO ’s interaction and engagement with other international actors, in particular the OSCE , in conceptual, institutional and operational terms. And it briefly reflects on the paradoxical, parallel lives of the OSCE ’s and NATO ’s respective approaches to security cooperation. Elusive definitions OSCE ’s Comprehensive Approach remains difficult to define and the term is widely used in OSCE with many shades and tones and for very different purposes. Allies have yet to agree on a clear definition of the concept and identify what exactly lies behind a term so frequently used in dinner speeches. Political disagreements over the broader NATO agenda and the organization’s future roles have hindered consensus on the politico-strategic dimension of the Comprehensive Approach. The difficulty in reaching internal consensus on a common doctrine is further complicated by terminology issues and by the lack of symmetry between different national and multilateral methodologies. This persuaded NATO Allies to concentrate their efforts on making the idea work, rather than trying to agree on a political concept. Nevertheless, despite the current focus on the purely operational and process-oriented aspects, the Comprehensive Approach has a great potential to guide the transformation of OSCE ’s doctrine, concepts and capabilities in the coming years. The definition of the OSCE concept of comprehensive security is not clear either. It is more often described through its constituent components rather than being properly defined. Examples abound: ‘the CSCE ’s comprehensive concept of security and stability, which includes human rights, political, military, economic and environmental components’ 2 or ‘This concept relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity and co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations.’ 3 This approach to security also establishes a continuum between domestic and international security. It makes human rights — and their effect on the stability and security of a state — an issue of legitimate concern and involvement for all other states. Altogether, the OSCE understanding of security as a multifaceted phenomenon is ‘a central, integral and original element of the OSCE philosophy and action. As comprehensive as its territory and its goals and tasks has become the organization’s concept of security. 4 Although it is not clear when and by whom the concept was first used, it has become one of the most distinctive and lasting trade-marks of the 2 Summary of Conclusions , Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, 30-31 January ‘92, para. 6. 3 The Challenges of Change , Helsinki Summit Declaration, 9-10 July 1992, para. 21. 4 T.M. Buchsbaum, ‘ OSCE ’s Comprehensive Security: Integrating the Three Dimensions’, in D. Warner and V. Clerc, Challenges Faced by the OSCE During 2001 , PSIO Occasional Paper, 2002, no. 2, p. 82. Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 286 OSCE . For many years, it has made the CSCE / OSCE unique among Euro-Atlantic security organizations and it is indelibly linked with its brand-name. It is the OSCE which developed and implemented the concept, before other international institutions drew on it or just copied it. Today, the multidimensional nature of security is well understood and has been internalised by most international security organizations. There is an ever more acute awareness that complex contingencies cannot be resolved by military means alone and that all the tasks — humanitarian, military, political, social, and economic — are interconnected. NATO has acknowledged that the ‘challenges of our times demand a comprehensive approach to security, in which military and civilian means are employed together and in a coordinated way’ 5 . This formulation refers indistinctively both to a conceptual or an instrumental approach to security. However, most references to the Comprehensive Approach tend to focus on process as opposed to substance. 6 For the Alliance, the Comprehensive Approach would mean a higher degree of effective coordination at all levels within NATO and more effective cooperation with other actors to complement and mutually reinforce each other’s efforts to achieve the desired common goals, if possible within an overall strategy agreed and owned by local authorities. Outside the narrower NATO context, the Comprehensive Approach is defined as ‘the understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation’. 7 Although this explanation fails to identify what such principles are. The Comprehensive Approach may be applicable throughout the continuum of conflict and crisis and is the ‘parallel, more extensive employment of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations ( EBAO )’ 8 which is a similar doctrine, initially conceived by the United States military. The Comprehensive Approach initiative created some confusion among the NATO military establishment as to the exact relationship between both concepts. EBAO predates the Comprehensive Approach 9 and continues to be part of the current 5 J. de Hoop Scheffer, NATO and the EU : Time for a New Chapter , speech in Berlin, 29 January 2007. 6 The Alliance’s concept of defence against terrorism refers to ‘an overarching international strategy that integrates political, military, economic, legal and social initiatives.’ 7 The Comprehensive Approach , Joint Discussion Note 4/05, Ministry of Defence, London, January 2006. 8 The Effects-Based Approach to Operations ( EBAO ) is defined as ‘The way of thinking and specific processes that, together, enable the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a Comprehensive Approach’. Joint Discussion Note 1/05 , UK Ministry of Defence, 2005. 9 EBAO has been developed by HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, in Norfolk, USA , and is an outgrowth of effects-based operations ( EBO ) and the operational net assessment ( ONA ) doctrine first espoused by the US Joint Forces Command ( JFCOM ). NATO defines EBAO as ‘the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non- NATO actors, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 287 NATO military doctrine in complex emergencies. 10 As such, it is underpinned by NATO ’s Comprehensive Political Guidance, a policy paper that complements the 1999 Strategic Concept. 11 The fragile understanding within the Alliance, pending a political agreement on a clear definition of the concept, is that the Comprehensive Approach has a political dimension, not just an operational one. Therefore, it stands above EBAO , with the latter contributing to the delivery of the former. The point is that EBAO already contained many of the internal process-oriented proposals of the Comprehensive Approach. Notably, the harmonization of contributions from various NATO instruments and more effective internal coordination of strategic and operational-level planning, execution and assessment processes. EBAO also has an external dimension aimed at fostering practical cooperation and coherence with other actors at all levels — ‘not to command and control other instruments, but more to confer and co-ordinate more effectively’. Overall, EBAO encourages solutions that employ integrated joint military capability, but it is not a purely military concept. It is worth noting that when the Comprehensive Approach initiative was tabled, 12 discussions focused on demonstrating how it went beyond the existing NATO doctrine on enhanced civil military cooperation ( CIMIC ). No mention was made of its link and possible added value with respect to EBAO . As a matter of fact, EBAO was quickly obviated from political discussions despite attempts by the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe ( SHAPE ) to reivindicate it. This obvious case of duplication reflects a wider problem within the Alliance: the recurrent disconnection between its political and military realms and the difficulty to reform NATO structures in order to function as a truly politico-military institution. More interesting from a conceptual perspective is EBAO ’s multidimensional nature. In order to be truly useful, military means must achieve the stated political outcome, not just create favourable conditions for it, although this is important in itself. EBAO has therefore a political reading, not just an operational one. It opened the door to a more holistic and inclusive approach to security, closer to the OSCE ’s multidimensional approach. It recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. Indeed, the ‘effects- to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end-state’, NATO Military Committee, MCM0052, 6 June 2006. 10 EBAO has become part of NATO ’s broad conceptual framework through the Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations ( CAFJO ), which intends to inform and shape the future development of concepts, doctrine and capabilities in order to allow the Alliance to develop a capacity to conduct an effects-based approach to operations. 11 The CPG states that NATO should develop further ‘an approach to operations which, (…) aims at the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance to create overall effects that will achieve the desired outcome’, Comprehensive Political Guidance , November 2006, para. 17. 12 The first proposal was made by Denmark in late 2004, initially under the heading Concerted Planning and Action ( CPA ). Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 288 based way of thinking’ can be considered as the operational application of a broad approach to security at all levels of decision-making. It considers the strategic environment as a complex ‘system’ in which all actors and entities interact to create effects. A basic principle of EBAO is the analysis of such a system to achieve a holistic understanding of security problems and the casual relationship between actions and effects. Probably the main added value of the Comprehensive Approach was to give EBAO a political enhancement and provide a broader framework for existing military concepts, doctrines and processes. It was also meant to increase the legitimacy and acceptability of such methodology vis-à-vis other international organizations and partners. Ultimately, however, the intention was to change NATO ’s approach to security, to reach a more inclusive understanding of the relationship between peace, security and development. The irony is that Allies have been unable to agree on the political elements of the Comprehensive Approach, including its definition. The result has been a series of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO ’s contribution to a comprehensive approach, which essentially replicate the already existing EBAO . At the Riga Summit, in November 2006, NATO Allies formally put the Comprehensive Approach initiative on the agenda. The summit declaration stated that ‘a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors’. 13 Short of an agreed definition, NATO leaders identified two main dimensions to NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach. An internal one focused on improving ‘coherent application of NATO ’s own crisis management instruments’. And an external one that fosters ‘practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the United Nations ( UN ) and other relevant international organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations’. At the Bucharest Summit, in April 2008, NATO restated these basic elements and approved an Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals aimed at adjusting its military and political planning procedures with a view to enhancing civil-military interface. These proposals include provisions to support stabilisation and reconstruction, relating to areas such as planning and the conduct of operations; training and education; and enhancing cooperation with external actors. 14 Altogether, the Comprehensive Approach has been reduced to an operational process and lacks a political and conceptual framework. The Riga and Bucharest Summit declarations and the NATO internal documents do not even link the initiative to the Alliance commitment to a ‘broad approach to security’ enshrined in NATO ’s 1999 Strategic Concept. 15 As it now stands, the 13 PR/CP(2006)0150, Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, para. 10. 14 PR/CP(2008)049, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, para. 11. 15 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept , April 1999, para. 25. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 289 Comprehensive Approach is not meant to facilitate a politico-military understanding of the complex security environment in which international organizations work, let alone to formulate a new concept of security. From a political viewpoint, the difficulty in agreeing on the political aspects of a Comprehensive Approach in many ways reflects the fact that the transatlantic security consensus post-9/11 is incomplete. 16 A shared understanding of the challenges we are facing is indeed more difficult to achieve today than it was in the past. That is something a new NATO Strategic Concept should try to remedy, at least partially. The Comprehensive Approach has therefore been reduced to an acknowledgement that NATO ’s own tools and processes are insufficient and that a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments are required to address the complex security context in which the Alliance’s military operations are conducted. It is not the prism through which the Alliance looks at the strategic landscape. It is rather the realization that NATO needs more sophisticated mechanisms and procedures to operate in such an environment. What has been developed is not an innovative doctrine to interpret the strategic context - and NATO ’s role therein, but an instrument to influence that context with the help of others. One common source At the risk of sounding somewhat incongruous, it is possible to trace back the deepest source of NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach to the Cold War interregnum of détente. By contrast, the roots of the OSCE concept of comprehensive security are more obvious and well established. The idea of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was developed in an effort to try dialogue and co-operation as a means to defuse the risks of the Cold War confrontation. For more than five years, before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was actually launched in 1972, as a series of preparatory meetings, a protracted ‘communiqué dialogue’ between NATO and the Warsaw Pact had gradually developed a common basis for the conference project. The objective of Western countries was to ease relations with the ‘Communist monolith’ by introducing a ‘number of more dynamic elements for inter-state relations and military aspects of security, as well as human rights, beginning with freer movement of peoples, information and ideas’. 17 The CSCE three-tiered structure was agreed in April 1973 and the famous ‘baskets’ were listed in the Helsinki Final Act. 18 Later, the Helsinki ‘baskets’ of the 1970s evolved into the ‘dimensions’ of the early nineties. It is true, as Professor 16 M. Rühle, ‘The Evolution of NATO : Expanding the Transatlantic Tool Kit’, in American Foreign Policy Interest , 2007, vol. 29, pp.237-242. 17 W. Höynck, ‘From Adversaries to Partners: CSCE Experience in Building Confidence’, Speech at Tel Aviv University, 5 March 1995, in From CSCE to OSCE , Vienna, June 1996. 18 These were Confidence-Building Measures ( CBM s); security and disarmament; the economy; science, technology and the environment; humanitarian and other fields. Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 290 Ghebali noted, 19 that no CSCE text made reference to any formal concept of comprehensive security until the early 1990s. The 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration formally acknowledged such a concept. 20 The Code of Conduct on Military Aspects of Security (1994) restated its validity and, finally, in an OSCE at ‘the human, economic, political and military dimensions of security’ must be addressed ‘as an integral whole’. 21 However, the idea that security does not solely depend on defence, deterrence and military means was manifest since the very beginning of the CSCE process. One of the first characteristics of the Helsinki process was its inclusiveness, from military security to human rights, and the systematic elaboration of a coherent body of security-related concepts and issues. In this regard, the Final Act contains an essential consideration: participating States, when engaged in joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, will take into account ‘the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security’. 22 The Final Act also affirmed that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ‘is an essential factor for the peace, justice and wellbeing necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation’ among participating States as among all States 23 . Hence, the idea of comprehensiveness — if not the concept of comprehensive security — was built into the Final Act and in the discussions that preceded it. And so was the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security. The Helsinki Decalogue stipulated that ‘All the principles set forth above [in the Decalogue] are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.’ 24 So, each specific aspect of security should be considered in a ‘comprehensive’ way, as part of a sophisticated structure made up of interconnected or related sub-structures. This comprehensiveness was operationalized through the CSCE ’s negotiating practice and political trade-offs, especially in the late 1980s. The so-called ‘cross-basket’ package deals contributed to this linkage, as plainly expressed by the then United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home: ‘In the language of Helsinki, Basket I will be empty unless there are plenty of eggs in Basket III ’. The notion that confidence related to military aspects of security could only develop in a broad, comprehensive context is therefore archetypal of the détente years. And it is precisely in that political context that NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach has its earliest origin. In many ways, the 19 V-Y. Ghebali, ‘The OSCE at a Crossroad: The Difficulty of Overcoming Russian-Related Dilemmas’, in V-Y. Ghebali, D. Warner and B. Gimelli, The Future of the OSCE in the Perspective of the Enlargements of NATO and the EU , PSIO , Geneva, 2004, pp. 5-26. 20 See above, footnote 3. 21 Istanbul Charter for European Security, 1999, para. 9. 22 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, para. 2/ III . 23 Final Act, Decalogue, principle VII , para. 5. 24 Final Act, Decalogue, principle X , para. 4. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 291 Comprehensive Approach goes back to the tradition established by the Harmel Report of 1967, ‘namely the idea that NATO should have two equally strong sides to its policy: defence and deterrence on the one side balanced with détente including disarmament on the other side, and both ultimately serving the stability of our continent’. 25 The Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance of the then Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, stated that ‘military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary’ 26 . The objective was to respond to critics who charged that NATO had become irrelevant amidst the changes in international relations. A critique that suggested that NATO ’s emphasis on the military aspects of security tended to undermine prospects for political solutions in the relations between the two blocks. NATO , however, had not been totally blind to non-military aspects of security. A Committee on Non-Military Cooperation had been set up by the North Atlantic Council in May 1956 to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields. The report of the ‘Three Wise Men’ was the first formal alliance initiative broadening its perspectives on security ‘beyond and above defence cooperation’ 27 . It stated that ‘security is today far more than a military matter’ and that the two aspects of security - civil and military — ‘can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations’. It also acknowledged that ‘perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognised their essential interrelationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides’. 28 That streams are not always purer at their source is an adage that is also valid for NATO , as the alliance broadened its approach to security after the end of the Cold War, coming somewhat closer to the OSCE philosophy. NATO ’s 1999 Strategic Concept states that ‘the Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations.’ 29 Still, the 1999 Strategic Concept is comparatively narrower in focus than the OSCE approach to security or the European Union’s Security Strategy and mainly reflects NATO ’s role as an alliance for collective defence focusing essentially on military aspects of security. 25 A. Bailes, ‘The Transatlantic Partnership of the Future and NATO 's Role in it’, Speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly 53 rd Annual Session, Reykjakiv, 5-9 October 2007. 26 The Future Tasks of the Alliance – ‘The Harmel Report’, Brussels, 13-14 December 1967, para. 5. 27 The Future Tasks of the Alliance …, supra, para. 13. 28 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO , 13 December 1956, paras. 13 to 16. The ‘three wise men’ were Foreign Ministers Gaetano Martino of Italy, Halvard Lange of Norway and Lester Pearson of Canada. 29 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept , April 1999, para. 25. Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 292 Hence, it was the Harmel Report which fundamentally altered the objective, image and ‘future tasks’ of the alliance. 30 The report’s defence and détente combination, not dichotomy, ‘provided an intellectual and political framework for NATO policies that accommodated the growing split in the alliance between left and right’. 31 It not only broadened the potential base for political support to NATO , but also provided the foundation for NATO to become a more complex political instrument after the end of the Cold War. It also allowed for different, often divergent, perspectives on security and in a very practical sense created a whole new set of responsibilities for NATO . Hence, NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach, even short of being a broad concept of security, relates to the tradition of the Harmel Report. It belongs to this Janus-like second face of NATO , the softer, reformist and even progressive side of the Alliance. One side that is today ‘set against its new global fighting role plus the commitment in theory to a kind of permanent warfare against new enemies like terrorists and proliferators’. 32 NATO ’s two main functions, however, should not be opposing each other, but converging towards the same security objective. Like Janus, whose two faces, albeit looking in opposite directions, most frequently symbolize change and transitions, the progression of past to future, of one condition to another or of one vision to another. Of platforms and hubs: Different approaches to cooperative security NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach does not amount to a comprehensive concept of security, although the doctrinal sources of both concepts may be related. It may be tempting to make a rapprochement with another OSCE notion, that of cooperative security, which ‘emerged as an offspring of common security, 33 a concept coined by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues’. 34 After the end of the Cold War, the OSCE adopted this concept and re- branded it as ‘cooperative security’ and progressively extended it to all three security dimensions. 35 There is no OSCE -agreed definition of ‘co-operative security’, but its main characteristics can be inferred from the Organization’s 30 The Harmel Report was partly inspired by de Gaulle’s famous trilogy of ‘détente, entente, coopération’ and Brandt’s ‘Ostpolitik’. 31 S.R. Sloan, ‘ NATO , the European Union, and the Atlantic Community’, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, US, 2005, p. 49. 32 A. Bailes, ‘The Transatlantic Partnership of the Future…’, supra. 33 In the context of the Cold War’s nuclear balance of terror, common security offered an alternative to deterrence and mutual assured destruction, which could only result in a zero sum game. Conversely, common security was considered as indivisible in the context of a cooperative endeavour bringing equal benefits to all the actors involved. 34 V-Y. Ghebali, The OSCE at a Crossroad …, supra, p. 7. 35 For example, the Helsinki Document (1992) states that ‘The participating States will aim at establishing among themselves new security relations based upon co-operative and common approaches to security. To this end, they will develop consultation, goal-oriented continuing dialogue and co-operation in the field of security’. CSCE Helsinki Document 1992 - The Challenges of Change , CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, para. 15. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 293 basic texts. Cooperative security ‘excludes confrontation, hegemonic behaviour and unilateralism, while prescribing equal partnership, confidence, mutual accountability, solidarity, preventative action, self-restraint and military transparency’. 36 Cooperative security is applicable essentially to relations among states and generally excludes other international actors. It entails a regime of ‘soft collective security’ whose rationale is to bring states actively together. It rules out coercion by definition and favours preventive diplomacy as its main form of action. Whereas a defence alliance is a form of ‘hard collective security’ based on deterrence against a common enemy or a threat. In this regard, the political and institutional dimension of NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach has many common elements with OSCE ’s cooperative security. The comprehensive approach would bring together, early in a crisis situation, military and non-military instruments aimed at conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction, as well as governance and development. This can only be provided through a coordinated and coherent response by all the actors involved. The fundamental objective of the Comprehensive Approach is therefore to enhance cooperation with relevant organizations and external actors through achieving lasting mutual understanding, trust, confidence and respect among them. Ultimately, the ideal scenario is one of cooperative security among international organizations involved in crisis-response operations. Hence, the Comprehensive Approach would be the operational translation of a more abstract OSCE proposal, the Platform for Co-operative Security adopted in 1999, as an essential element of the Charter for European Security. The Platform for Co-operative Security is based on the same premise as the Comprehensive Approach, namely that no single state or international organization has the capacity to respond in splendid isolation to the risks and challenges of the post-Cold War strategic environment. As stated in its operational document, the goal of the Platform was to ‘strengthen the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area.’ 37 As noted by Professor Ghebali, the Platform offered ‘a kind of partnership contract to mutually reinforcing security-related institutions based on mutual comparative advantages, complementarity, pragmatic synergy, transparency and non-hierarchical relationships’. 38 The contract is open to those institutions whose members, both individually and collectively, adhere to OSCE principles and commitments and actively support the OSCE ’s concept of common, comprehensive and indivisible security. Like NATO ’s Comprehensive Approach, the ultimate goal of the Platform is to develop a culture of institutional cooperation to avoid a duplication of efforts and a waste of 36 V-Y. Ghebali, The OSCE at a Crossroad …, supra, pp. 8-9. 37 Istanbul Summit Document 1999, PCOEW389, Charter for European Security, Operational Document – The Platform for Cooperative Security , para.1. 38 V-Y. Ghebali, ‘The OSCE ’s Istanbul Charter for European Security’, in NATO Review , No. 1, Spring-Summer 2000, pp. 23-26. Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 294 resources. The concept of different actors cooperating and coordinating their efforts is certainly not new, be it at NATO or at the OSCE . The Platform for Cooperative Security drew on the first lessons learnt from the difficult negotiations leading to the complex inter-agency institutional set-up in Kosovo in 1999. To a large extent, it codified the fruitful cooperation among international organizations in the Balkans following Dayton or at least offered a ‘kind of inter-institutional armistice’ 39 for the disgraceful competition that characterised the activities of security-related institutions in the early phases of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Hence, the Platform document has an operational flavour throughout its text. Through the Platform, participating States sought ‘to develop and maintain political and operational coherence (…), both in responding to specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks and challenges.’ 40 The Platform for Cooperative Security proposed a set of arrangements for closer ties and cooperation between the OSCE and other international organizations 41 . The Platform document also contained a specific reference to OSCE field operations, which for many years have been the flagship, the main added value and the success story of the organisation. The document called for the codification and development of existing cooperation between OSCE missions and other relevant international bodies, organizations and institutions in field operations, in accordance with their individual mandates. However, despite this attention to crisis management and field operations, the Platform for Cooperative Security appears as a rather theoretical construction providing a top-down approach to inter-agency cooperation. While the Platform may be a good model and a useful conditions-setter for the OSCE ’s co-operation with other international organisations, ‘reality rarely conforms to such programmatic decisions’. 42 One of the reasons for the Platform’s inability to overcome its more notional characteristics and to offer a forward-looking perspective lies in its conception. The Platform was an EU - inspired initiative, but for some it is still tainted by an original sin, in the context of discussions in the early nineties on the Russian proposal for a 39 V-Y. Ghebali, ‘ The OSCE ’s Istanbul Charter… ’, supra, p. 25. 40 Istanbul Summit Document 1999, PCOEW389, Charter for European Security, para. 12. 41 Different forms of cooperation between institutions could include: regular contacts, information exchange, cross-representation at appropriate meetings; special meetings at political/executive or working level; a continuous framework for dialogue; increased transparency and practical co-operation; appointment of liaison officers or points of contact; joint needs assessment missions; secondment of experts by other organizations to the OSCE ; the development of common projects and field operations; joint training efforts; cross- representation at appropriate meetings; and other contacts intended to increase understanding of each organization’s conflict prevention tools. Operational Document – The Platform for Cooperative Security , supra, paras. 4 to 6. 42 W. Zellner, ‘Managing Change in Europe. Evaluating the OSCE and its Future Role: Competencies, Capabilities and Missions’, CORE , Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Working Paper 13, Hamburg, 2005, p. 33. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 295 common and comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century. From a NATO perspective, allies had to preserve the transatlantic relationship embodied in the Alliance and prevent Russia from encouraging an institutional hierarchy among international organizations or creating new strategic dividing lines or spheres of influence. Difficulties in operationalizing the Platform were also aggravated by the post-9/11 US general mistrust of multilateralism and, in particular, the OSCE ’s own internal difficulties, which made the organization become ‘more narcissistic than operational’. 43 Another particular notion of the Platform is the OSCE ’s role as a ‘flexible co-ordinating framework to foster cooperation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths’ 44 However, combining the non- enforcement co-operative security culture of the OSCE with other organizations more robust approaches to security ‘is no more than the hardly novel strategy of backing diplomacy with force and need not lead to abstract debate about institutional interaction’. 45 The NATO Comprehensive Approach initiative, by contrast, is the direct result of an immediate operational requirement and offers a more pragmatic and bottom-up approach. From the beginning, its primary rationale was to adopt a more holistic perspective to operations that would integrate and appropriately synchronize political, security, economy, governance and other aspects. The objective was to move from existing ad-hoc coordination arrangements on the ground towards a more proactive approach in engaging with actors in charge of reconstruction and peace building. As opposed to the Platform, which offers a sort of open-ended contract to ‘any organization or institution whose members individually and collectively decide to adhere to [its principles]’ 46 , the Comprehensive Approach intends to reach out to other international actors. As operational policy is decided in headquarters and capitals, it intends to build upon coordination in the field, through better consultation and coordination at the strategic and institutional level. From a political standpoint, through the Comprehensive Approach initiative, NATO embraces a collective crisis management acquis that, in its modern form, has been developing since the mid-nineties. 47 It does so at a time when multilateral action has been seriously 43 W. Kemp, ‘Time to Prune the OSCE Tree’, in Helsinki Monitor , 2006, no. 3, pp.207-213. 44 Istanbul Summit Document 1999, PCOEW389, Charter for European Security, para. 12. 45 B. George, ‘A better Place: the Cooperative and Collective Security Fusion of OSCE and NATO ’, Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly , November 1999. 46 Istanbul Summit Document 1999, PCOEW389, Charter for European Security, para. 12. 47 In the United Nations, the thought process leading to the parallel concept of Integrated Missions started in 1997 with the Secretary-General report ‘Reviewing the UN – a Programme for Reform’, which recommended a number of measures mainly focused on strengthening overall authority and integrated planning and the execution of UN operations. This was later echoed in several other documents, notably the Brahimi Report of 2000, and again in the 2005 Secretary-General report ‘In Larger Freedom’. Although earlier efforts to ensure closer civil-military collaboration from the outset of a crisis took place in the area of international disaster relief assistance and humanitarian action. In particular, the UN Antonio Ortiz Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 296 eroded by US unilateralism and other preferred options, like coalitions and ad hoc mechanisms. But also by multilateral inefficiencies, obsolete doctrine and concepts, a lack of political will, inadequate capabilities and an inhibited European force projection mentality. Much as the OSCE Platform, the Comprehensive Approach intends to provide a frame of reference or codification of existing practices of NATO cooperation with other actors in the field. In this regard, the good practices and new pragmatic proposals made by NATO in its Action Plan to develop and implement its contribution to a Comprehensive Approach 48 bear many similarities with those contained in the OSCE proposal made ten years ago. Maybe the novelty of the NATO concept is the added emphasis on enhancing planning and optimizing implementation in the conduct of stabilization operations and reconstruction efforts. The NATO Riga Summit underlined that the alliance does not have a requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes. NATO therefore needs to ensure that it is able to complement its military capabilities with those of civilian actors in the planning and conduct of operations. In particular that it can co-operate with a wide range of partners, including the UN , EU , OSCE , NGO s and local actors. NATO also needs to convince these actors that, in seeking such co-operation, it is not trying to claim any leadership role over them. Consequently, NATO insists on achieving mutual understanding, trust, confidence, respect and better cooperation with the relevant actors, while respecting the UN ’s leading role in coordination. It is interesting to note, however, that it was in the context of NATO ’s involvement in Afghanistan, and in particular the expansion of NATO ’s International Security Assistance Force ( ISAF ) throughout the entire Afghan territory 49 , that the Comprehensive Approach became a matter of urgency. In this respect, when it comes to institutional cooperation in multilateral crisis management, the one enduring lesson of Afghanistan is that NATO cannot and should not be a one-stop security shop. NATO should therefore abandon its ambition to act as the lead coordinator in complex missions that require the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power. NATO is certainly part of the solution, but it is not the solution itself. The question for the Alliance is how to make compatible its stated aspiration to increasingly act as a ‘hub of broader international coalitions’ 50 and as a security platform for global partners with the Guidelines for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets ( MCDA ) to support UN Humanitarian Activities (‘Oslo Guidelines’, 1994). 48 The NATO Action Plan seeks to make improvements in five areas: planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned processes; enhanced cooperation with external actors, public messaging and public diplomacy; and improving NATO ’s military support to stabilisation and reconstruction. 49 ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion by assuming command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan on 5 October 2006, thus taking international security responsibility for the entire country. 50 J. de Hoop Scheffer, ‘ Managing Global Security and Risk’ , speech at the IISS Annual Conference, 7 September 2007. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s concept of security Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 297 recognition of the UN ’s leading role in coordination. Conclusion Altogether, NATO ’s and the OSCE ’s different approaches to inter-agency cooperation have one same goal: to adapt to the changing strategic environment. Security is no longer linked exclusively to the territorial defence offered by NATO . But, the OSCE ’s cooperative security is also insufficient as it presumes from states an automatic goodwill and permanent good faith. The twenty-first century global risks and challenges are not purely military in nature, but they are not strictly civilian either. However, NATO is still structured as a regional defence organisation designed to counter a military threat and has no civilian capabilities of its own. The OSCE , meanwhile, has not been able to materialize any non-civilian or military means or to develop its peacekeeping role. The strategic environment has radically changed and the traditional concept of self-defence is no longer valid. The first line of defence is now often abroad, which requires expeditionary capabilities, as well as a readiness to use and project force beyond its territory. NATO may seem well placed to do so. However, deterrence and pre-emptive action may not work with many of the new threats, which require an emphasis on conflict prevention, confidence building, and other non-military tools. This is an area where the OSCE would theoretically have a comparative advantage. Modern-day security risks are global in nature and while NATO has successfully put behind the out of area debate and may have a global reach, it has no universal competence. The OSCE on the other hand, is still very much centred on its own Eurasian region. While its role and activities in that region are being eroded by the European Union’s increased presence, the OSCE cannot reach consensus on its ‘out-of-area’ role. The OSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and has observer status at the UN . NATO , by contrast, is facing serious political obstacles to formalize a much more limited framework relationship with the UN , which would facilitate the implementation of a truly Comprehensive Approach. The OSCE , however, has limited resources to act globally and its legitimacy, even within its own region, is questioned by a number of participating States. NATO has a serious legitimacy and acceptability deficit in many parts of the world. In short, it is difficult for regional security organizations like NATO and the OSCE to be at the same time a hedgehog and a fox, while it seems that both natures are simultaneously needed to survive and strive in the modern strategic environment.

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Security and Human RightsBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2008

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