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Regional Influences on Mediation Behavior

Regional Influences on Mediation Behavior Research on interstate mediation tends to assume (implicitly) that regional factors have little effect on the occurrence of mediation. We relax this assumption and advance an explicit regional theory of mediation in which regional ties create a type of bias that motivates both (potential) third parties to mediate conflicts within their region and disputants to select or accept these regional actors as mediators more frequently than non-regional actors. This bias first appears when states belong to the same region. In such situations, the potential third party and disputants likely understand one another better and share common security concerns. Yet regional membership does not explain the variation in mediation behavior within regions. To account for this, we argue that regionally more powerful states, as well as those that share (regional) institutional memberships with the disputants, have greater incentives to mediate than some regional counterparts. We empirically test the effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of mediation in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946–2000. Our findings uncover support for our argument and suggest that accounting for regional bias is important in explaining mediation patterns in interstate conflict. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Negotiation Brill

Regional Influences on Mediation Behavior

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References (47)

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1382-340X
eISSN
1571-8069
DOI
10.1163/15718069-12341279
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Research on interstate mediation tends to assume (implicitly) that regional factors have little effect on the occurrence of mediation. We relax this assumption and advance an explicit regional theory of mediation in which regional ties create a type of bias that motivates both (potential) third parties to mediate conflicts within their region and disputants to select or accept these regional actors as mediators more frequently than non-regional actors. This bias first appears when states belong to the same region. In such situations, the potential third party and disputants likely understand one another better and share common security concerns. Yet regional membership does not explain the variation in mediation behavior within regions. To account for this, we argue that regionally more powerful states, as well as those that share (regional) institutional memberships with the disputants, have greater incentives to mediate than some regional counterparts. We empirically test the effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of mediation in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946–2000. Our findings uncover support for our argument and suggest that accounting for regional bias is important in explaining mediation patterns in interstate conflict.

Journal

International NegotiationBrill

Published: Jun 26, 2014

Keywords: mediation; regions; regional powers; regional security complex; security orders; conflict management

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