Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Negotiation with Terrorists

Negotiation with Terrorists <jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Negotiation with non-ideological ethno-nationalist terrorists is more common and more successful than with other kinds of terrorists. Additional strategies for dealing with terrorists include combating, isolating, and mainstreaming. There are many arguments against negotiation with terrorists, but most of them do not apply to secret backchannel talks, which are usually the method of choice in first approaching these groups. The success of negotiation depends on the development of flexibility by both the terrorists and the authorities. These and other points are illustrated with case materials from the Northern Ireland peace process, and the analysis is extended, on a speculative basis, to negotiation with several Islamic terrorist groups.</jats:p> </jats:sec> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Negotiation Brill

Negotiation with Terrorists

Pruitt, Dean
International Negotiation , Volume 11 (2): 371 – Jan 1, 2006
Download PDF
24 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/negotiation-with-terrorists-gyz7VNWmL1

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1382-340X
eISSN
1571-8069
DOI
10.1163/157180606778968290
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Negotiation with non-ideological ethno-nationalist terrorists is more common and more successful than with other kinds of terrorists. Additional strategies for dealing with terrorists include combating, isolating, and mainstreaming. There are many arguments against negotiation with terrorists, but most of them do not apply to secret backchannel talks, which are usually the method of choice in first approaching these groups. The success of negotiation depends on the development of flexibility by both the terrorists and the authorities. These and other points are illustrated with case materials from the Northern Ireland peace process, and the analysis is extended, on a speculative basis, to negotiation with several Islamic terrorist groups.</jats:p> </jats:sec>

Journal

International Negotiation – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2006

Keywords: PEACE PROCESSES; IRAQ; INTERMEDIARIES; THIRD PARTIES; TERRORISM; RIPENESS THEORY; AL QAEDA; NORTHERN IRELAND; HAMAS; NEGOTIATION; BACKCHANNEL TALKS

There are no references for this article.