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Heidegger's Value-Criticism and its Bearing on the Phenomenology of Values

Heidegger's Value-Criticism and its Bearing on the Phenomenology of Values 190 Heidegger's Value-Criticism and its Bearing on the Phenomenology of Values.* PARVIS EMAD DePaul University I. Introduction Throughout his work Heidegger criticizes value as an idea, which, its pretensions notwithstanding, is completely unfit to guide us through the present world-historical crisis. He upholds this judgment despite the fact that phenomenology of values purports to have initiated a whole new approach to value and to have formulated a novel conception of the same. A brief preview of the treatment of value by Heidegger is likely to bring into sharper focus his actual stance on the phenomenology of values. Already in Being and Time (B&1) Heidegger regards value as a notion whose ontological status is quite unclear. Several years later in Nietzsche (N, I & II) he subjects value to a scrupulous scrutiny, revealing its "metaphysical" nature. It is only later, in the Letter on Humanism (LH), when referring to such Schelerian theses as; "God is the highest value", and "values are either positive or negative" that he flatly rejects thinking in terms of values as "the greatest blasphemy that can be thought of in the face of Being."' However, nowhere does *1 wish to thank John Thornbrugh for his http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Heidegger's Value-Criticism and its Bearing on the Phenomenology of Values

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 7 (1): 190 – Jan 1, 1977

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1977 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916477X00130
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

190 Heidegger's Value-Criticism and its Bearing on the Phenomenology of Values.* PARVIS EMAD DePaul University I. Introduction Throughout his work Heidegger criticizes value as an idea, which, its pretensions notwithstanding, is completely unfit to guide us through the present world-historical crisis. He upholds this judgment despite the fact that phenomenology of values purports to have initiated a whole new approach to value and to have formulated a novel conception of the same. A brief preview of the treatment of value by Heidegger is likely to bring into sharper focus his actual stance on the phenomenology of values. Already in Being and Time (B&1) Heidegger regards value as a notion whose ontological status is quite unclear. Several years later in Nietzsche (N, I & II) he subjects value to a scrupulous scrutiny, revealing its "metaphysical" nature. It is only later, in the Letter on Humanism (LH), when referring to such Schelerian theses as; "God is the highest value", and "values are either positive or negative" that he flatly rejects thinking in terms of values as "the greatest blasphemy that can be thought of in the face of Being."' However, nowhere does *1 wish to thank John Thornbrugh for his

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1977

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