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Motives as Causes

Motives as Causes 185 MOTIVES AS CAUSES Magda B. Arnold In recent years, the only causes that have been recognized are what used to be called efficient causes, in which one thing brings another into being by some action. For instance, the gun firing a bullet produces heat and the movement of the bullet. The bullet, in turn, produces a bullet hole. But when we look at hu- man or animal action, its causes are not necessarily of the same kind. A man may wake up from sleep and get dressed. He, him- self is the cause of the movements that result in clothes being put on his body. To say that something in him, a motive or some purpose he may have, produces this action, is unintelligible: the muscular movements are produced by nerve impulses initiating muscular contractions. But the fact that these particular move- ments result in being clothed cannot be explained by nerve im- pulses, nor can it be explained by a 'drive' that produces action. We know nothing that would indicate that a 'hunger drive' causes physical movements directed toward a particular goal. In other words, the hunger drive or any other drive cannot act as an effici- http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Phenomenological Psychology Brill

Motives as Causes

Arnold, Magda B.
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology , Volume 1 (2): 8 – Jan 1, 1971
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0047-2662
eISSN
1569-1624
DOI
10.1163/156916271x00110
Publisher site
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Abstract

185 MOTIVES AS CAUSES Magda B. Arnold In recent years, the only causes that have been recognized are what used to be called efficient causes, in which one thing brings another into being by some action. For instance, the gun firing a bullet produces heat and the movement of the bullet. The bullet, in turn, produces a bullet hole. But when we look at hu- man or animal action, its causes are not necessarily of the same kind. A man may wake up from sleep and get dressed. He, him- self is the cause of the movements that result in clothes being put on his body. To say that something in him, a motive or some purpose he may have, produces this action, is unintelligible: the muscular movements are produced by nerve impulses initiating muscular contractions. But the fact that these particular move- ments result in being clothed cannot be explained by nerve im- pulses, nor can it be explained by a 'drive' that produces action. We know nothing that would indicate that a 'hunger drive' causes physical movements directed toward a particular goal. In other words, the hunger drive or any other drive cannot act as an effici-

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Journal of Phenomenological Psychology – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1971

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