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Is Transcendental Phenomenology Metaphysically Absurd? 1. Introduction This great, exciting book reworks and enriches what for this reviewer are central themes tied to transcendental phenomenology’s status as a metaphysics. In itself it is an outstanding independent philosophical achievement that, incidentally, forces phenomenologists to engage the issues of naturalism, “naturalizing phenomenology,” and Husserl’s assertion of the primacy of spirit. Even though Valberg’s own background is in the analytic tradition, especially as informed by Wittgenstein, its achievement challenges any doctrine of an unbridgeable “divide” between analytic and phenomenological philosophy by deferring rather “ zu den Sachen selbst .” 1 In Valberg, the themes of Dream and Death force us to a study of the Self because they bring out the philosophical merits of solipsism. The etymological roots of “solipsism,” are clear: solus ipse , the self-alone, myself alone. Solus ipse is a phrase to which Husserl often had recourse to elucidate transcendental phenomenology as a kind of “solipsism.” For Husserl the world and all that is within it, including transcendental intersubjectivity or Others, has its meaning or ontological sense ( Seinssinn ) through (not because of ) its appearing to me, to me who am presupposed for all appearings. All
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2013
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