Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/brill/knowing-lions-and-understanding-lion-two-jobs-for-concepts-in-ockham-xsS7ZU93uX
References
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © 2010 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 0042-7543
- eISSN
- 1568-5349
- DOI
- 10.1163/156853410X533358
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Externalist readings of Ockham are currently most prominent in the literature. For instance, an externalist interpretation with respect both to mental content and the meaning of expressions is advocated by prominent scholars. In this paper, I want to argue that although this externalist picture is certainly not incorrect, it is nonetheless incomplete. As I show, Ockham distinguishes between two ways of acquiring concepts: one of them can be accounted for in wholly externalist terms while the other involves the understanding of linguistic expressions. According to the reading of Ockham I suggest here, it turns out that we can have two kinds of concepts pertaining to the same kind of things. But only one of the two is completely determined by external relations. Thus I conclude that the externalist picture of Ockham calls for some additions.</jats:p> </jats:sec>
Journal
Vivarium – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2010
Keywords: concepts; conventional meaning; externalism; acquisition of concepts; subordination