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AbstractWe describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabictradition. The early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true andfalse; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning pluralsubjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes anunsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its beingtrue is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes thatthe sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referentialsen-tences, like the Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim byappealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts areprovided as an appendix.
Vivarium – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2009
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