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On the Terminology of 'Abstraction'in Aristotle

On the Terminology of 'Abstraction'in Aristotle 13 On the Terminology of 'Abstraction'in Aristotle JOHN J. CLEARY If we look at the standard commentaries on Aristotle's philosophy, we find the term 'abstraction' constantly being used to characterize his epistemo- logy in contrast to that of Plato. Historically speaking, it may have been Aquinasl who was responsible for making 'abstractionism' the byword for a kind of empiricism which holds that all knowledge derives from the senses. Indeed, the unanimity of the commentators appears to be such that it has congealed into the dogma that Aristotle's theory of knowledge is basically abstractionist in character2. In spite of the weight of opinion, I must confess myself to be sceptical about this dogma. Since this may appear heretical to some readers, I hasten to clarify my scepticism. I do not doubt that Aristotle opposed Plato's theory of recollection with his own claim that all of our knowledge ultimately derives from the senses. What I do question is whether Aristotle ever gives the name 'abstraction' to the process by which we grasp universals through sense experience. It is a well-known yet puzzling fact that such terminology does not appear in those few passages where Aristotle actually describes this process; cf. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

On the Terminology of 'Abstraction'in Aristotle

Phronesis , Volume 30 (1): 13 – Jan 1, 1985

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1985 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852885X00165
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

13 On the Terminology of 'Abstraction'in Aristotle JOHN J. CLEARY If we look at the standard commentaries on Aristotle's philosophy, we find the term 'abstraction' constantly being used to characterize his epistemo- logy in contrast to that of Plato. Historically speaking, it may have been Aquinasl who was responsible for making 'abstractionism' the byword for a kind of empiricism which holds that all knowledge derives from the senses. Indeed, the unanimity of the commentators appears to be such that it has congealed into the dogma that Aristotle's theory of knowledge is basically abstractionist in character2. In spite of the weight of opinion, I must confess myself to be sceptical about this dogma. Since this may appear heretical to some readers, I hasten to clarify my scepticism. I do not doubt that Aristotle opposed Plato's theory of recollection with his own claim that all of our knowledge ultimately derives from the senses. What I do question is whether Aristotle ever gives the name 'abstraction' to the process by which we grasp universals through sense experience. It is a well-known yet puzzling fact that such terminology does not appear in those few passages where Aristotle actually describes this process; cf.

Journal

PhronesisBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1985

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