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Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception

Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception 156 Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception STANFORD CASHDOLLAR I. Introduction lthough there has been renewed interest in Aristotle's theory of perception, not much attention has been paid to his treatment of perception of the incidental sense-objects.' It is the primary purpose of this paper to draw a clearer account of his thought on this matter. Commentators on De Anima have usually believed that Aristotle does not hold that incidental perception is a case of pure aisthgsis but rather a complex sort of psychic functioning involving thought or memory or both, as well as perception.2 Moreover, whatever faculties are thought to contribute to incidental perception, it is gene- rally believed that this process is the cognition (or recognition) of particular things or persons (viz. individual substances) alone.3 In addition, the general lack of interest in this topic has perhaps been responsible for the apparent further view - I assume this from silence on the matter - that incidental perception is not of central importance in Aristotle's psychology.4 I shall dispute the first two of these po- sitions. I believe it can be shown that Aristotle (.) does hold that incidental perception is a case of aisthgsis alone and (2) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception

Cashdollar, Stanford
Phronesis , Volume 18 (1-2): 156 – Jan 1, 1973
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1973 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852873X00113
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

156 Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception STANFORD CASHDOLLAR I. Introduction lthough there has been renewed interest in Aristotle's theory of perception, not much attention has been paid to his treatment of perception of the incidental sense-objects.' It is the primary purpose of this paper to draw a clearer account of his thought on this matter. Commentators on De Anima have usually believed that Aristotle does not hold that incidental perception is a case of pure aisthgsis but rather a complex sort of psychic functioning involving thought or memory or both, as well as perception.2 Moreover, whatever faculties are thought to contribute to incidental perception, it is gene- rally believed that this process is the cognition (or recognition) of particular things or persons (viz. individual substances) alone.3 In addition, the general lack of interest in this topic has perhaps been responsible for the apparent further view - I assume this from silence on the matter - that incidental perception is not of central importance in Aristotle's psychology.4 I shall dispute the first two of these po- sitions. I believe it can be shown that Aristotle (.) does hold that incidental perception is a case of aisthgsis alone and (2)

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Phronesis – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1973

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