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Alice Stuhlmacher, Treena Gillespie, Matthew Champagne (1998)
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A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure high versus low and accountability to constituents notaccountabletoconstituents versus accountabletoconstituents on the competitiveness of negotiators' interaction and on the outcome i.e., agreement or impasse of the negotiation. Using a newly developed negotiation game with the payoff structure of a game of chicken, we predicted and found an interaction effect. Based on the pattern of results we conclude that the effect of time pressure is contingent on the accountability to constituents of the negotiator. When negotiators are negotiating only for themselves, time pressure makes the negotiators act less competitive, and a higher proportion of the negotiations will result in an agreement. In contrast, when negotiators are negotiating on behalf of their constituents, time pressure will result in more competitive interaction and in a higher proportion of impasses.
International Journal of Conflict Management – Emerald Publishing
Published: Mar 1, 2000
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