Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Tuncay Karartı (2014)
Impact of ownership structure on leverage of non-financial firms in developing countries, 1
Elena Rivo-López, Mónica Villanueva-Villar, Santiago Lago‐Peñas (2014)
Does the composition of the board matter? On the relationship between corporate governance and value creation
Benjamin Maury (2006)
Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Western European CorporationsJournal of Corporate Finance, 12
Luigi Zingales (1994)
The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange ExperienceReview of Financial Studies, 7
J. Ward (1988)
The Special Role of Strategic Planning for Family BusinessesFamily Business Review, 1
J. Stein (1988)
Takeover Threats and Managerial MyopiaJournal of Political Economy, 96
Tatiana Nenova (2003)
The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysisJournal of Financial Economics, 68
Minna Martikainen, Jussi Nikkinen, Sami Vähämaa (2009)
Production Functions and Productivity of Family Firms: Evidence from the S&P 500The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach (2003)
Founder-CEOs and Stock Market Performance
Melissa Shanker, J. Astrachan (1996)
Myths and Realities: Family Businesses' Contribution to the US Economy— A Framework for Assessing Family Business StatisticsFamily Business Review, 9
Large Shareholders (2013)
Family Ownership and Control, the Presence of Other Large Shareholders, and Firm Performance: Further Evidence
David Miller, Isabelle Breton-Miller, Richard Lester, Albert Cannella (2007)
Are family firms really superior performersJournal of Corporate Finance, 13
W. Lane, Mel Jameson (1993)
Control Preference and Financial Attributes: Founders as CEOs in Small, Publicly Traded FirmsThe Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
M. Faccio, Larry Lang, L. Young (2000)
Dividends and ExpropriationCorporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies
Kasper Meisner, Nielsen Pérez-González, Renee Adams, Marianne Bertrand, Douglas Diamond, Mariassunta Giannetti, Denis Gromb, Maria Guadalupe, Atif Mian, Thomas Rønde, Jonah Rockoff, Amir Sufi, Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, D. Yermack (2006)
Inside the Family Firm: the Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance
E. Fama, M. Jensen (1983)
Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 26
R. Barontini, L. Caprio (2006)
The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental EuropeEuropean Finance
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer (1998)
Corporate Ownership Around the WorldCorporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
M. Lunati (1997)
Ethical Issues in Economics: From Altruism to Cooperation to Equity
M. Sacristán-Navarro, S. Gómez‐Ansón, L. Cabeza‐García (2011)
Family Ownership and Control, the Presence of Other Large Shareholders, and Firm Performance: Further EvidenceFamily Business Review, 24
C. Andres (2008)
Large shareholders and firm performance--An empirical examination of founding-family ownershipJournal of Corporate Finance, 14
W. Johnson, R. Magee, Nandu Nagarajan, Harry Newman (1985)
An analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths: Implications for the managerial labor marketJournal of Accounting and Economics, 7
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1996)
A Survey of Corporate GovernanceOrganizations & Markets eJournal
Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, Andrew Metrick (2004)
Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class CompaniesNBER Working Paper Series
Josep Giné, M. Martínez (2010)
Banks as firms’ blockholders: a study in SpainApplied Financial Economics, 20
Henrik Cronqvist, Mattias Nilsson (2003)
Agency Costs of Controlling Minority ShareholdersJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38
Renée Adams, Heitor Almeida, Daniel Ferreira (2003)
Department of Finance Understanding the Relationship between Founder-ceos and Firm Performance Understanding the Relationship between Founder-ceos and Firm Performance
Belén Villalonga, R. Amit (2004)
How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?Corporate Finance: Governance
Jonchi Shyu (2011)
Family ownership and firm performance: evidence from Taiwanese firmsInternational Journal of Managerial Finance, 7
Óscar López-de-Foronda, F. López-Iturriaga, Marcos Santamaría-Mariscal (2007)
Ownership Structure, Sharing of Control and Legal Framework: International EvidenceS&P Global Market Intelligence Research Paper Series
M. Faccio, Larry Lang (2002)
The Ultimate Ownership of Western European CorporationsCorporate Finance: Governance
S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry Lang (1999)
The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian CorporationsCorporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
(2003)
Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
H. Demsetz, Belén Villalonga (2001)
Ownership Structure and Corporate PerformanceCorporate
Darius Palia, S. Ravid (2003)
The Role of Founders in Large Companies: Entrenchment or Valuable Human Capital?
Eugene Kandel, E. Lazear (1992)
Peer Pressure and PartnershipsJournal of Political Economy, 100
Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, Andrew Metrick (2008)
Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Companies in the United StatesAFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings (Archive)
H. Demsetz (1983)
The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the FirmThe Journal of Law and Economics, 26
Shorey Peterson, A. Berle, G. Means (1933)
The Modern Corporation and Private Property.Journal of the American Statistical Association, 28
Takuji Saito (2008)
Family firms and firm performance: Evidence from JapanJournal of The Japanese and International Economies, 22
Xianming Zhou (2001)
Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: commentJournal of Financial Economics, 62
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1980)
The free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation
Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, Andrew Metrick (2010)
Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United StatesReview of Financial Studies, 23
Karl Lins (2002)
Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging MarketsJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38
D. Yermack (1996)
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directorsJournal of Financial Economics, 40
Ronald Anderson, D. Reeb (2003)
Founding‐Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage*The Journal of Law and Economics, 46
Ronald Anderson, S. Mansi, D. Reeb (2003)
Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of DebtCorporate Finance: Valuation
M. Martínez, J. Giné (2005)
BANKS AS A FIRM ` S BLOCKHOLDERS . A STUDY FOR SPAIN
W. Schulze, M. Lubatkin, Richard Dino, Ann Buchholtz (2001)
Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and EvidenceOrganization Science, 12
J. Davis, F. Schoorman, L. Donaldson (1997)
TOWARD A STEWARDSHIP THEORY OF MANAGEMENTAcademy of Management Review, 22
R. Vancil (1987)
Passing the Baton: Managing the Process of CEO Succession
R. Tagiuri, John Davis (1996)
Bivalent Attributes of the Family FirmFamily Business Review, 9
F. Pérez-Gónzalez (2002)
Inherited Control and Firm PerformanceCorporate Finance: Governance
John Maddox (1995)
Succeeding generations.Science, 269 5221
S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, Larry Lang (2002)
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large ShareholdingsJournal of Finance, 57
Daniel Mcconaughy, G. Phillips (1999)
Founders versus Descendants: The Profitability, Efficiency, Growth Characteristics and Financing in Large, Public, Founding-Family-Controlled FirmsFamily Business Review, 12
R. Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1988)
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical AnalysisJournal of Financial Economics, 20
E. Demircioglu (2014)
Organization performance and happiness in the context of leadership behavior (case study base on psychological well-beings)
Julio Pindado, Ignacio Requejo, C. Torre (2008)
Does family ownership impact positively on firm value?: empirical evidence from Western Europe
J. Stein (1989)
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate BehaviorQuarterly Journal of Economics, 104
H. James (1999)
Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family FirmInternational Journal of The Economics of Business, 6
H. Leland., David Pyle. (1977)
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATIONJournal of Finance, 32
Michael Jensen, W. Meckling (1976)
Theory of the Firm
M. King, Eric Santor (2008)
Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital structure of Canadian firmsJournal of Banking and Finance, 32
D. Sraer, D. Thesmar (2006)
Performance and Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence from the French Stock MarketIO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets eJournal
James Chrisman, J. Chua, Reginald Litz (2004)
Comparing the Agency Costs of Family and Non–Family Firms: Conceptual Issues and Exploratory EvidenceEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28
Belén Villalonga (2000)
Does Diversification Cause the 'Diversification Discount'?Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
R. Morck, David Stangeland, B. Yeung (1998)
Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control and Economic Growth: the Canadian DiseaseDevelopment Economics
Brian Smith, Ben Amoako-Adu (1999)
Management succession and financial performance of family controlled firmsJournal of Corporate Finance, 5
Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste (2004)
Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm ValueCorporate Finance: Governance
F. Pérez-Gónzalez (2010)
Does inherited control hurt firm performance
Ronald Lease, John Mcconnell, W. Mikkelson (1984)
The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held CorporationsThe Journal of Business, 57
Michael Barclay, C. Holderness (1989)
Private benefits from control of public corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 25
Erling Barth, T. Gulbrandsen, Pål Schønea (2005)
Family ownership and productivity: the role of owner-managementJournal of Corporate Finance, 11
Daniel Mcconaughy, Michael Walker, G. Henderson, C. Mishra (1998)
Founding family controlled firms: Efficiency and valueReview of Financial Economics, 7
H. Demsetz, K. Lehn (1985)
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and ConsequencesJournal of Political Economy, 93
T. Habbershon, M. Williams (1999)
A Resource-Based Framework for Assessing the Strategic Advantages of Family FirmsFamily Business Review, 12
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1986)
Large Shareholders and Corporate ControlJournal of Political Economy, 94
Bengt Holmstrom (1982)
Moral Hazard in TeamsThe Bell Journal of Economics, 13
David Sirmon, M. Hitt (2003)
Managing Resources: Linking Unique Resources, Management, and Wealth Creation in Family FirmsEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27
Marianne Bertrand, A. Schoar (2003)
THE EFFECT OF MANAGERS ON FIRM POLICIES
C. Holderness, D. Sheehan (1988)
The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysisJournal of Financial Economics, 20
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value. Design/methodology/approach – The paper studies a sample of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1999 and 2007 and apply multivariate regression with firm value as a dependent variable. The paper measures firm value as Tobin ' s Q and ROA based either on net income or EBITDA. The independent variables include family firm dummy and ownership percentage. Findings – It is found that control-enhancing mechanisms which are often employed by family companies add value to companies. Furthermore, it is found that agency conflicts between ownership and management are less costly than those between majority and minority shareholders, suggesting that family ownership helps resolve the agency conflicts between ownership and management and in turn enhances firm value. Finally, it is found that family companies with founders as CEOs outperform those with descendants as CEOs. Research limitations/implications – The paper studies Canadian family firms; as such, the sample size is not relatively large. Nonetheless, the results should be generalized as Canada is one of the largest markets in the world and have high integration with the rest of the world. Practical implications – The results suggest investors should invest in family ownership firms. Originality/value – The paper shows whether firm ownership increases firm value and the determinant of family firm value.
International Journal of Managerial Finance – Emerald Publishing
Published: Feb 22, 2013
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.