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We theoretically identify two levels of agency conflicts related to foreign direct investment (FDI): within a parent firm and between parent(s) and an affiliated firm. For a sample of 182 firms that announced U.S.‐related FDIs in 1995, we examine the effects of agency conflicts on the choice between a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) and a joint venture (JV), and the relative share ownership of a parent. Firms with higher management ownership, especially the firms that made related FDIs, and firms with higher foreign affiliate monitoring efficiency are more likely to choose a WOS. Differences between U.S. and non‐U.S. parents are also examined.
Multinational Business Review – Emerald Publishing
Published: Jun 17, 2003
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Joint venture; Shared ownership; Wholly owned subsidiary
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