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10.1515/9780691221755
- Publisher
- Emerald Publishing
- Copyright
- none
- ISSN
- 1355-252X
- DOI
- 10.1108/13552529910273952
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In this study I revisit the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, in order to gain additional perspective on the relationship between organizational decision making and crisis outcomes. This exercise is an historical “counterfactual” or “what if” excursion, using recently declassified documents and simulated exchange calculations, from which I hope to draw three principal benefits. First, the study may shed some additional light on why Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was willing to take such a dangerous gamble. Second, our counterfactual crisis suggests that the risk of inadvertent war, so much written about in connection with Cuba, 1962, was less important than the risk of a deliberate, but miscalculated, escalation. Third, the balance of command and control vulnerability might have mattered more to crisis‐ridden US leaders than the balance of strategic nuclear forces. If so, it helps to explain the apparent reluctance of US leaders to employ highly coercive forms of nuclear brinkmanship.
Journal
Journal of Management History (Archive) – Emerald Publishing
Published: Jun 1, 1999
Keywords: Crises; Strategy; War; USA