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Describes a novel Internet auction model achieving verifiable fairness, a requirement aimed at enhancing the trust of bidders in auctioneers. Distrust in remote auctioneers prevents bidders from participating in Internet auctioning. According to proposed survey reports, this study presents four characteristics that render the Internet untrustworthy for bidders. These intrinsic properties suggest that auction sites not only follow auction policies, but provide customers with evidence validating that the policies are applied fairly. Evidence of verifiable fairness provides bidders with a basis for confidence in Internet auctions. Cryptographic techniques are also applied herein to establish a novel auction model with evidence to manifest and verify every step of the auctioneer. Analysis results demonstrate that the proposed model satisfies various requirements regarding fairness and privacy. Moreover, in the proposed model, the losing bids remain sealed.
Internet Research – Emerald Publishing
Published: May 1, 2001
Keywords: Auctions; Computer privacy; Electronic commerce
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