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Instability, Modus ponens and uncertainty of deduction

Instability, Modus ponens and uncertainty of deduction Considering the instability of nonlinear dynamics, the deductive inference rule Modus ponens itself is not enough to guarantee the validity of reasoning sequences in the real physical world, and similar results cannot necessarily be obtained from similar causes. Some kind of stability hypothesis should be added in order to draw meaningful conclusions. Hence, the uncertainty of deductive inference appears to be like that of inductive inference, and the asymmetry between deduction and induction becomes unrecognizable such as to undermine the basis for the fundamental cleavage between analytic truth and synthetic truth, as W. V. O. Quine pointed out. Induction is not inferior to deduction from a pragmatic point of view. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Frontiers of Philosophy in China Brill

Instability, Modus ponens and uncertainty of deduction

Huajie, Liu
Frontiers of Philosophy in China , Volume 1 (4): 17 – Jan 1, 2006
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1673-3436
eISSN
1673-355X
DOI
10.1007/s11466-006-0030-7
Publisher site
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Abstract

Considering the instability of nonlinear dynamics, the deductive inference rule Modus ponens itself is not enough to guarantee the validity of reasoning sequences in the real physical world, and similar results cannot necessarily be obtained from similar causes. Some kind of stability hypothesis should be added in order to draw meaningful conclusions. Hence, the uncertainty of deductive inference appears to be like that of inductive inference, and the asymmetry between deduction and induction becomes unrecognizable such as to undermine the basis for the fundamental cleavage between analytic truth and synthetic truth, as W. V. O. Quine pointed out. Induction is not inferior to deduction from a pragmatic point of view.

Journal

Frontiers of Philosophy in China – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2006

Keywords: chaos; Modus ponens; asymmetry between deduction and induction

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