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Contemporary cognitive psychologists share methodological solipsism (MS) as a general research strategy. MS postulates that a complete explanatory level dealing exclusively with processes within an organism is the domain of psychology. The paper undertakes a critical review of MS. By reanalysing...
Gibson's theorizing about perception represents a potent case against cognitivist constructions of that capacity. Primarily it is seen to apply in contexts not dependent upon language. Gibson's own position on language is argued to contain some unexamined characteristics which could create...
Much research demonstrates that people's choices do not conform to utility theory, a model of rational decision-making (Baron, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1988). Researchers have begun to question the normative status of utility theory in light of the many...
Six positions are described on the question of whether psychological concepts can and should be defined. Anger is defined as follows: `P in C at t is angry at Q' = df 'P in C at t believes that at least one person whom P in C at t cares for has, intentionally or through neglect, been treated...
The functional theory of psychogenic illness proposes that the human capacity for psychological states to cause physical illness evolved during the Paleolithic as an adaptive mechanism for ensuring mutually interdependent behaviour under conditions when mutual interdependence was essential for...
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