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In answering H. H. Clark's reply to their earlier paper, J. Huttenlocher and E. T. Higgins dispute the counterevidence to their imagery theory of reasoning and offer arguments against Clark's previous linguistic theory of reasoning. In the present reply, it is argued that the counterevidence to...
A review of recent evidence indicates that contingent reinforcement is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for operant learning. This dilemma reopens the old question of "what is learned." It is proposed that what laboratory Ss characteristically learn is not a response to a stimulus,...
Argues that theoretical developments in cognitive psychology and the increasing use of introspective reports require a rationale, and that this should involve consideration of consciousness. An information-processing model is suggested for cognitive processes, based on the ideas of G. A. Miller,...
Contends that all of the principal alternative theories that explain human behavior in tasks involving patterned sequences are variants on a basic theme. They agree in proposing that: (a) Ss perform these tasks by inducing pattern descriptions from the sequences; and (b) these descriptions...
The 1st 2 authors deal with issues raised by H. Clark in his rebuttal of J. Huttenlocher and E. Higgins' imagery theory of reasoning. In a separate reply, Clark presents new evidence to refute the imagery theory, and reaffirms the validity of his linguistic theory of reasoning. (40 ref.)
Analysis of previous data shows that the way in which stimuli are perceived is affected by the nature of stimulus combination and the particular stimulus dimensions used. Theories of stimulus processing (e.g., serial or parallel) depend on how stimuli are perceived and thus depend on stimulus...
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