Within the last year
Within the past 3 years
1 - 6 of 6 articles
The paper discusses in an epistemological setting certain difficulties in determining the nature of the psychological datum, and especially the difficulties arising from the "artificial" process-meaning distinction.
A criticism of Neifeld's article, based upon G. E. Müller's doctrine of cortical gray.
Such terms as "goal-seeking (purpose)," "initial exploratory impulses (initial cognitive "hunches')," and "final object-adjustments (final cognitions)" may be used advantageously in the study of animal behavior. These terms are more fruitful in the study of animal learning than the purely...
The question of mechanism teleology in psychology should be approached disinterestedly and the conditions for an experimental test should, if possible, be determined. The teleologist believes in the efficacy of consciousness as, for example, in the case of intuition. The burden of proof for this...
The current physiological treatment of hunger as stomachic contraction is inadequate. There is no doubt about the correlation between hunger pang and peristaltic contraction but this fact does not answer certain important questions (318-323). Normal gastric hunger depends on conditions far more...
The paper considers a number of problems relative to the conditioned response, for example: the theoretical possibility of double conditioning; the mechanism of redintegration; the acquisition of images and perceptions (which topic is treated in a monistic manner); problems in learning, in...
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Sign up with Facebook
Sign up with Google
Already have an account? Log in
Save this article to read later. You can see your Read Later on your DeepDyve homepage.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Sign Up Log In
To subscribe to email alerts, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
To get new article updates from a journal on your personalized homepage, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.