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This article argues that the peculiarly ‘common law tradition’ separation of common law and equity had at its origins a principled basis in the concept of ‘conscience’. But ‘conscience’ here did not mean primarily either the modern lay idea, or the ‘conscience’ of Christopher St...
There is a deep tension between liberalism and retributivism. On the face of it, one cannot coherently believe liberalism about the fundamental purpose of the state and retributivism about the basic end of legal punishment, given widely held and well-motivated or what I call ‘standard’...
This article seeks to explain why, in terms of Iain Macneil's relational theory of contract, the implied mutual duty of trust and confidence can be described as a quintessentially relational norm. The role played by the duty in the development of a relational approach to variation of the...
This article presents a philosophical account of the nature of crime. It argues that the criminal law contains both fault-based crimes and strict liability offences, and that these two represent different paradigms of liability. It goes on to argue that the gist of fault-based crimes lies in...
In emphasizing the importance of the separability thesis, legal philosophers have inadequately appreciated other philosophically important ways in which law and morality are or might be connected with one another. In this article, I argue that the separability thesis cannot shoulder the...
The view of patents as well-defined property rights is as simplistic as it is ubiquitous. This article argues that in newly arising or immature technologies, patents are subject to intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty that make them very opaque representations of the underlying inventions. The...
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