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To control risk-related incentive problems, equity holders are expected to manage both the convexity and slope of the relation between firm performance and managers’ wealth. I find stock options, but not common stockholdings, significantly increase the sensitivity of CEOs’ wealth to equity...
We empirically analyze the information hypothesis that the separation of a firm's divisions into independently traded units through a spin-off enhances value because it mitigates information asymmetry about the firm. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms that engage in spin-offs...
For 307 firms over the 1990–1994 period, I find that board meeting frequency is related to corporate governance and ownership characteristics in a manner that is consistent with contracting and agency theory. The annual number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value. This result is...
We examine the importance of stockholder–bondholder conflicts in capital-structure choice. Numerical techniques are used to compute the expected wealth transfer between stockholders and bondholders when a firm adopts a new project. We characterize the set of positive NPV projects that...
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