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In this paper we analyze the equilibria structure of k -price auctions, k ≥ 3, under the independent-private-value assumption. We discuss agents with an arbitrary attitude toward risk. That is, agents may be risk averse or risk seeking, or they may have an alternating attitude toward risk. We...
This paper introduces ambiguous games, a modification of the normal form that allows the presence of vagueness in players' beliefs over the opponents' choice of strategies. An appropriate notion of equilibrium is presented, and a general existence result is proved. Journal of Economic Literature...
We formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for interim rationalizable trade between two players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, C72.
A team is a group of people having the same motives but possibly different available actions. A team game is a game where two teams face each other. An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the entries are absorbing, in the sense that once they are chosen the play terminates, and all...
This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act...
In a seminal paper Bagwell ((1995). Games Econom. Behav. 8 , 271–280) claims that the first mover advantage, i.e., the strategic benefit of committing oneself to an action before others can, vanishes completely if this action is only imperfectly observed by second movers. In our paper we report...
We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with...
We consider markets in which agents supply their time or the services of a capital good and the duration of the market is limited. We show that a coalitional game can be generated by such a market if and only if the characteristic function of the game is superadditive. Journal of Economic...
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