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This paper considers a smooth and noisy version of the statistical prediction model studied in the herding/informational cascades literature and compares market and optimal learning. The latter is characterized by defining a decentralized welfare benchmark as the solution to an infinite horizon...
We present partial results showing that risk-sensitive oligopolists would spend less on advertising than would their risk-neutral counterparts. The model is an infinite-horizon stochastic game in which each firm's “goodwill” is a random function of both its own and its competitors' current...
In this paper we consider n -person nonzero-sum games where the strategy spaces of players are compact subsets of R s . The main result states that if the payoff functions are semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave then an ε-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists for every positive ε....
This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negative externalities or positive externalities for nonmembers. Examples of...
We show that any correlation device with rational coefficients can be generated by a mechanism, where each player sends a private message to a mediator who in turn makes a public deterministic announcement. It is then shown that the mechanism can be adapted also to situations with differential...
We analyze the “equilibrium” outcomes of the preference revelation games induced by Pareto efficient and individually rational solutions in the context of marriage problems . We employ a Nash equilibrium refinement which allows deviations by a set of permissible coalitions, and show that the...
In a game v in characteristic function form, suppose the Banzhaf value ψ is used to pay a coalition S already formed. Then coalition S no longer receives v ( S ); instead it receives R ψ ( S ) = ∑ i ∈ S ψ i ( v s ), where v S denotes the subgame of coalition S . Surprisingly, the Shapley...
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