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We study the long-run properties of a class of locally interactive learning systems. A finite set of players at fixed locations play a two-by-two symmetric normal form game with strategic complementarities, with one of their “neighbors” selected at random. Because of the endogenous nature of...
This paper studies renegotiation-proof equilibria of Benoı̂t and Krishna (1993) in finitely repeated games with more than two players. We provide a simple characterization of the set of average payoffs from renegotiation-proof equilibria: the limiting set of average equilibrium payoffs is...
In an average surplus sharing game, such as a Cournot oligopoly, a group of agents share a production process. Each contributes an amount of input to the process, and output is divided in proportion to the amount of input contributed. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is needed for any type of...
In a finite game fix a space of extended probabilities over strategies and a profile of best response correspondences. A profile of rationality orderings is then given by an ordered partition of the set of strategies of each player, representing different degrees of rationality, where at-least...
The Envelope Theorem for Nash equilibria shows that the strategic reaction of the other players in the game is important for determining how parameter perturbations affect a given player's indirect objective function. The fundamental comparative statics matrix of Nash equilibria for the i th...
A technology with decreasing marginal costs is used by agents with equal rights. Each agent demands a quantity of output and costs are divided by means of a fixed formula. Several such mechanisms are compared for the existence of Nash equilibrium demand profiles and for the equity properties of...
We study Bayesian coordination games in which players choose actions conditional on the realization of their respective signals. Due to differential information, the players do not have common knowledge that a particular game is being played. However, they do have common beliefs with specified...
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