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2021 Rhizomata
AbstractIn the Timaeus, human bodies are treated as homeostatic systems, striving to maintain their natural state. This striving constitutes Plato’s explanatory framework for perception: perceptions come about when the equilibrium is shaken, and when it is restored. The article makes two main suggestions: first, that experienced pleasure and pain are grounded in non-experiential departures from and restorations of the natural state. Second, that the striving to maintain the natural state grounds perceptual interests, especially through conscious algesic and hedonic affection. Explanation of what humans find desirable and avoidable in their environment – what they attend to – is a complicated story that in the context of the Timaeus must include the role of human rational abilities. This article, however, only sheds light on its other, very basic aspect: the teleology involved in bodies and how it affects perceptual interests.
2021 Rhizomata
AbstractThe surviving writings of Epicurus and his followers contain several references to epibolê – a puzzling notion that does not receive discussion in the extant Epicurean texts. There is no consensus about what epibolê is, what it is of, and what it operates on and, moreover, its epistemological status is controversial. This article aims to address these issues in both Epicurus and later Epicurean authors. Part One focuses mainly on Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus, highlights a crucial distinction hitherto unnoticed in the literature between two different types of epibolê, and brings out he necessary connection between epibolê and the application of the criteria of truth. Part Two considers the philosophical merits of the traditional interpretation of epibolê as projection and/or attention. Part Three examines the two aforementioned types of epibolê in Lucretius and Philodemus and shows that these authors accord epibolê paramount epistemological and ethical importance.
2021 Rhizomata
AbstractLate Stoics and, in particular, Epictetus made ample use of the notion of attention (prosochê), which they understood as the soul’s vigilant focus on sense impressions and on the Stoic principles. Attention, in their view, was meant to assist our self-examination and lead to ethical progress. It was thus regarded as a Stoic good and a constitutive part of eudaimonia. Early Stoics did not seem to have invoked such a notion, whereas the Neoplatonists appropriated it into their psychology by postulating the soul’s attentive part, which they introduced to explain both perceptual and intellectual attention as well as self-awareness.
2021 Rhizomata
AbstractSeneca’s Letters sketch a theory of attentive action according to which distraction is caused by inconsistent beliefs about values, such that the degree of an agent’s attention to an endorsed action is proportionate to the consistency of her beliefs about value, i. e. her proximity to virtue. The agent’s activity of attentive action is co-ordinated with a state of alertness to her interests, which accordingly triggers switches in attention that sustain the endorsed action in single-minded agents or cause distraction if the new interest is irrelevant to it. Seneca’s theory reflects the older Stoic conception of the tensional mental strength of the virtuous agent, which Chrysippus identified as the causal factor over and above virtue that ensures her successful performance of right action.
2021 Rhizomata
AbstractThe article treats the role of attention (intentio or attentio) in Augustine’s analysis of sense perception, the notion of time, and the Trinitarian structure of the human mind. The term intentio covers a broad range of meanings in Augustine’s usage. Its most fundamental meaning is the life-giving presence of the soul in the body, intensified in attention’s being concentrated on a particular thing or experience; Augustine also uses the term attentio in this latter sense. According to his analysis of time, by way of attention (intentio or attentio), the soul fixes the present in which the future passes into the past. Due to the intention of the soul, the form abstracted from an external object is both imprinted into the sense organ and retained in the memory in order to be, by intention again, recalled before the sight of mind. As “the intention of the will” or just “the will”, attention connects intellectual understanding with memory. In Augustine’s eyes, attention has a different quality depending on the object it is oriented to, and a different intensity, ranging from inattentive distraction (distentio) to concentrated effort (intentio).
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