Indian Growth and Development Review

Shastri, Shruti

2019 Indian Growth and Development Review

doi: 10.1108/igdr-11-2018-0124

The purpose of this study is to revisit the twin deficit hypothesis (TDH) and provide insights into the transmission mechanism connecting budget deficits and current account deficits for five major South Asian countries, namely, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan Sri Lanka and Nepal for the period 1985-2016.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a multivariate framework including real interest rate, real exchange rate and real gross domestic product to avoid the possibility of incorrect inferences caused by omission of relevant mediating variables. The long-run relationship and causality are investigated through the autoregressive distributed lag bounds testing approach and Toda Yamamoto approach, respectively, for each individual country. The robustness of the results is assessed with the help of Westerlund’s cointegration test and group mean fully modified ordinary least squares (GM-FMOLS), group mean dynamic ordinary least square (GM-DOLS) and common correlated effect mean group (CCEMG) estimators in the panel framework.FindingsBoth time series and panel evidences indicate long-run relationship between budget balance (BB) and current account balance (CAB) together with the mediating variables. The results indicate bi-directional causation between the two balances for India and Bangladesh, TDH for Pakistan and Sri Lanka and the reverse causation from CAB to BB for Nepal. Regarding the transmission mechanism, the results indicate the absence of the causal chain postulated by Mundell–Fleming, which predicts that BB causes CAB via interest rate and exchange rate. A CCEMG estimate of the import demand function reveals a positive government spending elasticity of imports suggesting that BB affects CAB by direct impact through demand.Originality/valueThis study augments the twin deficit literature on South Asian countries by providing insights into the transmission mechanism connecting the BB and CAB. Moreover, the study provides robust evidences on the TDH by using both time series and panel data techniques.

Grover, Charu; Bansal, Sangeeta

2019 Indian Growth and Development Review

doi: 10.1108/igdr-04-2018-0039

This paper aims to investigate the role of certification in providing information and reducing market inefficiencies when the “certification process is imperfect”. In the setting, eco-labels imperfectly signal environmental product quality to consumers where the error in the process of certification could be either Type 1 or Type 2 error. The paper examines firms' incentive to get certified, equilibrium quantities and profits. The authors use perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept for the analysis. They then examine conditions for separating and pooling equilibrium to exist and welfare implications of certification process.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a vertical product differentiated model where firms are competing in quantities. Consumers are unable to observe the environmental quality of the product. To signal the product quality to consumers, firms may adopt certification by a third party. Using a framework where certification process is imperfect, the paper derives conditions for Perfect Bayesian separating and pooling equilibrium to exist.FindingsThe paper shows that the existence of separating and pooling equilibrium depends on the certification fee. A separating equilibrium, where one firm seeks certification and other firm does not seek certification exists for an intermediate value of certification fee. A pooling equilibrium, where both firms seek certification, exists only when the certification fee is sufficiently small. The paper shows conditions for the certification fee for which welfare will be higher under separating equilibrium as compared to pooling equilibrium and analyses welfare implications for subsidy policy for the certification fee.Originality/valueThe paper contributes to the literature by examining the role of labelling under imperfect certification.

Pandey, Piyush; Sehgal, Sanjay; Ahmad, Wasim

2019 Indian Growth and Development Review

doi: 10.1108/igdr-07-2018-0079

Banks in the South Asian region are the fulcrum of economic growth and development as they provide means to development credit and working capital, trade and infrastructure finance and are seen as custodians of the trust in the financial system. This paper aims to study the nature of banking sector linkages for the region.Design/methodology/approachThe dependence structure between deposits and lending rates individually for the banks of the South Asian countries are studied using time invariant and time varying family of copula functions. The degree of connectedness is further studied by Diebold and Yilmaz methodology.FindingsResults indicate poor levels of banking integration in the region as the dependence parameter for both deposits and lending rates was around 0 for the sample countries, thereby confirming poor banking sector integration in the region.Practical implicationsPolicymakers of the region are interested in the co-movements of the interest rates to understand the cross-sector risk management and any systemic risk pressures for the regional economies. Corporates in these countries are scouting out for competitive borrowing rates to lower their cost of capital.Social implicationsRationale for examining the banking sector linkages is that the South Asian countries are at different stages of economic growth and development and this region in particular is the fastest growing region in the world and has largely increased its trade integration with the world albeit having lowest levels of intra-regional trade integration.Originality/valueThis is a first of a kind of studies to examine the banking sector linkages in South Asia.

Gupta, Manash Ranjan; Dutta, Priya Brata

2019 Indian Growth and Development Review

doi: 10.1108/igdr-11-2018-0125

International tourism has experienced a substantial growth during the second half of twentieth century. Tourism development can contribute substantially to the reduction of poverty problem by creating new employment opportunities. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effect of tourism development on unemployment problem using an efficiency wage framework.Design/methodology/approachThe authors developed a two-sector two-factor static competitive general equilibrium model of a less-developed open economy called South with an imported traded goods sector and with a non-traded tourism service sector, and with two factors, capital and labour. Labour is measured in efficiency unit; there exists unemployment in the labour market which is explained by the efficiency wage hypothesis. The authors also consider extensions of the basic model by introducing an exportable traded goods sector as well as sector-specific capital in the tourism sector.FindingsThe authors show that, with perfect intersectoral mobility of capital and with only one traded good, tourism development in South lowers unemployment rate and raises national income. However, this tourism development neither affects unemployment rate nor national income in South, in the mobile-capital model when there are two traded goods. When tourism sector uses sector-specific capital but capital is mobile between two traded goods sectors, tourism development keeps the unemployment rate unchanged but raises national income in South.Originality/valueThere exists a lot of debate about economic benefits of tourism development in a less-developed economy. A few works analyse the economic effects of tourism without developing formal models. However, no existing work analyses the effect on unemployment in an efficiency wage model. Although Harris–Todaro model is of relevance to explain unemployment in low-income countries, efficiency wage models are relevant for middle-income countries.

Gupta, Dhruv

2019 Indian Growth and Development Review

doi: 10.1108/igdr-04-2017-0033

In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in history to assist the State Governments in fighting the Naxalite insurgency. Comparing across schemes, it was found that though Matching Security Grants scheme was preferred in general, during asymmetric information scenario it led to an emergency situation wherein the Union Government had to provide the less preferred Bulk Security Grants. Later, it became difficult to withdraw these grants as the State Governments free rode by reducing own security contribution. The author finds that instead, in this scenario, Matching Development Grants are more suitable, as they incentivize the State Governments to reveal private information and help the Union Government exit its third-party role. For a practitioner involved in conflict resolution, these conclusions imply that as the desirability of policies can change diametrically overtime, Union Government must spend resources only on those heads of expenditure that provide both security and development benefits provided they aid in preventing flow of resources to Naxalites. Further, to end its assistance, the Union Government’s expenditures should also complement the capabilities of the State Government rather than substituting them. These results can also guide policy in other protracted civil wars with substantial third-party intervention, which are common these days.Design/methodology/approachThe paper is an historical analysis of strategies used by Union and State Governments and Naxalites. The analysis is based on game theoretic tools supported with examples.FindingsThe Union Government must provide matching grants instead of bulk grants such as Central Armed Police Forces, and the grants should be aimed at building complementarities with the state governments’ security contributions. Under asymmetric information scenario, the Union and State Governments reduce their expenses incurred to fight the Naxalites. A Matching Development Grants scheme would have done better. Union Government must spend resources on heads of expenditure that provides both Development and Security benefits, to curb flow of resources to Naxalites, besides complementing the Security Contributions of the State Government.Research limitations/implicationsThe research is limited by disaggregated data to test the hypotheses. It is also limited by the data on hidden variables like the contribution of the Naxalites to fighting. The research is also limited to the extent that individual groups in the war like police commanders, politicians and Naxalite commanders are not incorporated. Multiple asymmetric parties are also not considered; that may generalize the model to other theaters of insurgency.Practical implicationsCertain heads of expenditure such as roads, mobile communication, improving quality of investigation, preventing human rights violations by the security forces, etc. are both security and development enhancing. The Union Government's expenditures must be directed toward this end. Therefore, from a practitioner's perspective, the debate between greed and grievances exists not as a limitation but as a guide. The relevant articles of Constitution of India must be redrafted on these principles. Third-party interventions in other insurgencies may be revisited under these conclusions.Social implicationsSecurity and Development policies are tools for controlling Naxalite insurgency, which can also be used to prevent flow of resources to Naxalites. Security and development policies to resolving insurgencies are useful at different information scenarios. Therefore, information neutral policies should be preferred.Originality/valueThis paper has contributed theoretically in modeling continuing conflicts like Naxalite insurgency, explicitly. The author also shows that though the field of civil wars may have evolved along the Greed vs Grievance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), for a practitioner, the lines blur when it comes to solutions, as many heads of expenditures have features of both security and development. This paper also shows that when the Union Government faced asymmetric information scenario, the policy of matching development grants would be beneficial in long run though of limited value in short run. This is an important conclusion as the most intense period of violence was preceded by the asymmetric information scenario. Besides, it has relevance for the other civil wars with third-party intervention, such as NATO in Afghanistan.