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This issue of SIGecom Exchanges brings to our readers a letter from the SIGecom executive committee, the job candidate profiles for 2022, two surveys, and three research letters.
Despite the challenges of the past year, the SIGecom community has continued to grow, and to embrace opportunities to gather and connect (virtually).
This is the seventh annual collection of profiles of the junior faculty job market candidates of the SIGecom community. The twenty four candidates for 2022 are listed alphabetically and indexed by research areas that define the interests of the community. The candidates can be contacted...
Inspired by the SIGecom Exchanges' annual survey of job market candidates,1 this is the second annual collection of profiles of the junior faculty job market candidates of the market design community. The nine candidates are listed alphabetically. Along with information regarding the candidate's...
The exchange market is a basic model of an economy, where agents bring resources that they own to the market in order to exchange them for other goods that they need. There is a rich literature on the equilibrium properties of such markets starting with the work of Arrow and Debreu. In this note...
The fair allocation of resources to interested agents is a fundamental problem in society. While the majority of the fair division literature assumes that all allocations are feasible, in practice there are often constraints on the allocation that can be chosen. In this survey, we discuss...
We describe results from Dasaratha and He [DH21a] and Dasaratha and He [DH20] about how network structure influences social learning outcomes. These papers share a tractable sequential model that lets us compare learning dynamics across networks. With Bayesian agents, incomplete networks can...
We provide an overview of our recent work that studies the market for fake product reviews on Amazon.com where reviews are purchased in large private internet groups on Facebook and other sites. We find that a wide array of products purchase fake reviews, including products with many reviews and...
We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over n items [Rubinstein and Zhao 2021]. Motivated by the fact that revenue-optimal auctions are randomized [Thanassoulis 2004;...
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