International Studies Perspectives

Gupta,, Surupa;Mullen, Rani, D;Basrur,, Rajesh;Hall,, Ian;Blarel,, Nicolas;Pardesi, Manjeet, S;Ganguly,, Sumit

doi: 10.1093/isp/eky008pmid: N/A

Abstract Abstract: This forum comes from a 2016 panel at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. The forum participants offered mid-term assessments of the foreign policy of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This forum considers whether Modi heralded in a new era in Indian foreign policy, or whether Modi's policies just repackaged older policies. The authors in this forum answer these questions by focusing on a range of issues from the role of religion to economic issues, to the relations between India and major foreign partners. The authors conclude that while Modi has undeniably put a personal stamp on foreign policy, substantive changes have been minimal. The first significant change lies in the centralization of foreign policy decision-making in the Prime Minister's Office. Second, while religious diplomacy played an important role, the version of Hinduism that Modi has adopted in foreign affairs is more inclusive than the one on display in domestic politics. Third, India's foreign economic policy has adopted a distinct nationalist tone. Fourth, Modi has signaled a “neighborhood first” focus in foreign policy. Finally, despite attempts at imparting his personal stamp, India's foreign policy towards major partners and in most issue areas remains substantively similar to those of the previous administrations.   Resumen: Este debate surgió a partir de un panel de la reunión anual de la Asociación de Estudios Internacionales realizada en 2016. Los participantes presentaron sus evaluaciones intermedias de la política exterior de Narendra Modi, primer ministro de India. El debate analiza si Modi instauró una nueva era en la política exterior india o si, por el contrario, simplemente les dio un lavado de cara a las políticas anteriores. Para responder estas preguntas, los autores del debate se centran en varias cuestiones: desde el papel que juega la religión y los problemas económicos hasta las relaciones entre India y sus principales aliados extranjeros. Los autores concluyen que si bien Modi puso su impronta personal en la política exterior, los cambios representativos han sido mínimos. El primer cambio significativo reside en la centralización de la toma de decisiones sobre temas de política exterior en la oficina del primer ministro. En segundo lugar, aunque la diplomacia religiosa tuvo un papel importante, la versión del hinduismo que adoptó Modi en la política exterior es más inclusiva que la que se muestra en las políticas nacionales. En tercer lugar, la política económica exterior de India ha incorporado un tono nacionalista distintivo. En cuarto lugar, Modi pone el foco en los países vecinos en lo que respecta a la política exterior. Por último, a pesar de los esfuerzos por darle su propia impronta, la política exterior de India sobre las principales áreas problemáticas y en lo que respecta a los aliados más importantes, no ha experimentado cambios relevantes en comparación con las administraciones anteriores.   Extrait: Le présent forum a comme origine un panel constitué en 2016 lors de l'assemblée annuelle de l'International Studies Association. Les participants du forum ont proposé des évaluations à mi-mandat de Narendra Modi, ministre indien des Affaires étrangères. La question est de savoir si M. Modi s'est fait le héraut d'une nouvelle ère dans la politique étrangère de l'Inde ou s'il n'a fait que présenter d'anciennes politiques sous un nouveau jour. Les auteurs de ce forum abordent la question en réfléchissant à diverses problématiques, du rôle de la religion aux problèmes économiques en passant par les relations entre l'Inde et ses partenaires étrangers principaux. Les auteurs concluent que si Modi a indéniablement imprimé sa marque sur la politique étrangère du pays, les changements de fond sont restés mineurs. Le premier changement d'importance est le recentrage du processus de prise de décisions en politique étrangère sur le portefeuille du Premier Ministre. Le deuxième changement, opéré dans un contexte où la diplomatie religieuse joue un rôle important, est l'adoption d'une version de l'hindouisme plus solidaire en politique étrangère que celle qui est affichée en politique intérieure. Le troisième est l'apport d'une touche nettement nationaliste à la politique économique étrangère. Le quatrième est l'annonce par Modi d'une politique étrangère axée en priorité sur les « pays limitrophes ». Enfin, et en dépit des tentatives de Modi d'imprimer sa marque personnelle, la politique étrangère de l'Inde envers ses partenaires principaux et dans la plupart des domaines reste en substance similaire à celle des administrations précédentes. India, Narendra Modi, foreign policy, diplomacy, nationalism Articles in This Forum Introduction Surupa Gupta and Rani D. Mullen Modi, Hindutva, and Foreign Policy Rajesh Basrur Narendra Modi's New Religious Diplomacy Ian Hall India's Trade Engagement: The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same Surupa Gupta Indian Development Assistance: The Centralization and Mercantilization of Indian Foreign Policy Rani D. Mullen Looking West? Evaluating Change and Continuity in Modi's Middle-East Policy Nicolas Blarel Modi, from “Look East” to “Act East”: Semantic or Substantive Change? Manjeet S. Pardesi A New Era in India's Foreign Policy? Sumit Ganguly Introduction Surupa Gupta University of Mary Washington and Rani D. Mullen College of William & Mary The year 2017, a little over halfway through Indian Prime Minister Modi's tenure, was a good time to evaluate Prime Minister Narendra Modi's impact on Indian foreign policy. Has he heralded in a new era in Indian foreign policy, or have the changes under Modi just been new dressing that mask continuity? When Narendra Modi became Prime Minister of India in 2014, he had little prior foreign policy experience. At the same time, his reputation as a strong and decisive leader, and his ideological embrace of Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism, led observers to expect a new foreign policy and indeed, even a Modi Doctrine. His travels to China and Japan as the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat prompted some to believe that his foreign policy focus would accord preference to East Asia. The United States’ refusal to grant him a visa in 2005 because of the 2002 communal violence under his watch led many to expect that his relations with the United States would be less than cordial. Few anticipated the energy he would put into external affairs. Fewer predicted his engagement with countries in every corner of the world, let alone his embrace of the United States and even Pakistan during the early stages of his tenure. This forum identifies the broad contours of Indian foreign policy under Modi. Reading of his administration's articulation and implementation of policies, what exactly can we say about his foreign policy? Did his ideological preferences and personality traits redefine Indian foreign policy? Or did structural and domestic political factors continue to reign in agency? The essays in this forum suggest that Modi initially sought to carry out an activist and ideologically oriented foreign policy in several issue areas and demonstrated substantial personal initiative that was congruent with his preferences. In other areas, such as making overtures to the United States and Pakistan, he embraced pragmatism. Stylistically, he made his personal mark by centralizing foreign policy decision-making under his office and by explicitly articulating India's ambition as a “leading power” and as a counterweight to Chinese dominance in Asia. However, given the structural and domestic constraints, we observe that Modi's approach to foreign policy has made use of incremental change rather than making sharp turns and breaks. Even in the case of India's relation with the United States, where—contrary to expectations—there has been significant warming under Modi, with particularly dramatic increases in security cooperation, the trajectory follows that set by the previous administration. Speculation about the style and content of his foreign policy began even before he became Prime Minister, and it gathered steam after he led the Bharatiya Janata Party to an overwhelming majority in the Parliament (Miller 2014). On the one hand, scholars suggested that in a large, democratic country, foreign policy would not change dramatically with a change in leadership. On the other, there are those who suggested that soon after his election there was clear evidence of an emerging Modi Doctrine—one focused on building India's regional as well as global power status through a greater focus on economic diplomacy and more muscular foreign policy (Chellaney 2014; Chaulia 2016; Tandon 2016a). Those who argue that Modi has initiated a new foreign policy have also argued that, under Modi, India has become a rule-maker rather than a rule-taker and that his foreign policy was marked by new ideas and a never-before-seen pragmatism. After observing his foreign policy for three years, which of these views do we, a group of scholars of Indian foreign policy, find more support for? Foreign policy decision-making usually is a product of systemic-, domestic-, and individual-level factors. The seven essays presented in this forum look at different aspects of Modi's foreign policy by exploring the significance of these factors. India has, in recent years, been identified as a rising middle power with an increasing level of ambition, growing military and material power capabilities, a large and consolidated democracy, and an expanding economy that was ranked the world's seventh largest in 2017 (World Bank 2017a). India has graduated from being labeled as a less developed country to lower middle income country by the World Bank. In 1998, it became a nuclear power. While these are important milestones that presented opportunities for a foreign policy entrepreneur, Modi also came to power at a time when India's growth rate had fallen to a low not seen since 2002 (World Bank 2017b), and rising multipolarity, particularly the economic and political rise of China, posed not only opportunities but also several challenges.1 A key foreign policy challenge for the Modi administration has been how to manage its relations with China, the United States, and others in this environment of emerging multipolarity at the systemic level. China has been assertive in recent years, building islands in the South China Seas and constructing an international institutional architecture that provides a potential alternative to the Bretton Woods institutions. The United States responded with the pivot to Asia—an effort to both contain China and bring it back into a set of norms that the United States and its allies established after World War II. Though under President Trump there has been a lack of a clear US policy toward and leadership in Asia, India has forged ahead and sought pathways to acquiring military and material power that promise to bring it closer to its goal of transforming India into a “leading power” (Jaishankar 2015). The emerging multipolarity opened opportunities for India to both secure strategic support through closer relations with the United States, Japan, and Australia, and engage China by participating in the institutions that it is sponsoring. At the same time, China's effort at building up its Belt and Road Initiative makes New Delhi wary of its intentions (Modi 2017). With China as its neighbor and largest trading partner, Indian foreign policy needs to walk the tightrope of continued engagement with China despite worries about its intentions. A second major challenge is to use diplomacy and engagement with global governance institutions to deliver economic development at home. Modi's focus on bilateral diplomacy with major economic partners, his focus on foreign investment through his “Make in India” program, and his engagement with the multilateral and regional trade negotiations offer us some indication of the direction his government has taken to meet this challenge. Besides the demand for economic development, the domestic environment offers Modi several opportunities and a few constraints. The overwhelming support that Modi's party enjoys in the lower house of parliament offers him a level of opportunity for effecting change few recent Indian prime ministers have enjoyed. In fact, since 1989, all Indian prime ministers have led either a minority government that was dependent on issue-based support from other parties or coalition governments in which the government's survival was dependent on the support of coalition members. Modi has been the first prime minister since Rajiv Gandhi to enjoy this level of independence. Additionally, the party's victory was very much seen as a victory for Modi himself. The private corporate sector also sees Modi as a positive force. Together, the large political mandate for his party, the personal mandate for Modi in a parliamentary system, and the significant support Modi enjoys in the private sector translates into broad-based support for Hindutva as well as economic nationalism. With the main opposition party, the Congress, largely decimated in the 2014 national elections and the 2017 state-level elections, the primary institutional constraint facing Modi might have come from two places: India's permanent bureaucracy of civil servants and the opposition-dominated upper house of parliament. The civil servants are committed to long-standing aspects of India's foreign policy, such as India's support for the Palestinian cause, but the bureaucracy has not emerged as a significant constraint. Similarly, while the upper house has, on occasion, constrained Modi's ability to deliver domestic economic reforms, it has had little impact on foreign policy overall. The two main potential domestic sources that might have constrained Modi's foreign policy have turned out to be weak constraints at best. At the individual level, Modi was a symbol of Hindu nationalism, and his election led scholars to speculate that Hindutva might shape his foreign policy. His image as a strong, decisive leader, with a proven record in economic development, led others to expect prompt delivery of growth-friendly economic policies. However, the essays in this forum demonstrate that the impact of Hindutva on his foreign policy has been minimal. At the same time, the essays provide ample evidence that while the Modi government has adopted occasional pro-growth policies such as the 2017 tax reform, overall it has embraced economic nationalism rather than liberalism in the areas of trade and aid. Within this broad framework, each of the following essays focuses on specific areas of Modi's foreign policy to elucidate these overarching themes. The first two essays address Modi's role in bringing Hindutva and religious diplomacy into Indian foreign policy. Rajesh Basrur argues that the expectation that an aggressive version of Hindutva would shape Modi's foreign policy has not been borne out by reality: the version of Hindutva that Modi has embraced seeks to defend Indian culture and civilization from foreign dominance. Rather than abandon the use of religion in foreign policy, however, Ian Hall shows that Modi has used religious diplomacy to an extent no prior Indian prime minister has. Hall agrees, however, that Modi has adopted a version of Hinduism in foreign affairs that emphasizes the kind and inclusive side of it while using this as a soft power tool in his foreign policy. It is important to distinguish this from the use of a more exclusive and harsher version of Hinduism in domestic politics by groups closely associated with the government. Surupa Gupta and Rani D. Mullen focus on aspects of economic diplomacy. Looking at India's trade negotiations as well as the Modi government's articulation of policies on trade and investment, Gupta argues that while, under Modi, no major changes are evident in the way India negotiates at multilateral and regional settings, trade policy is articulated in more mercantilist language than in previous years. Similarly, Mullen argues that there has been significant continuity in Modi's soft power approach to foreign assistance. In Modi's trade and foreign aid policies, one observes both a greater focus on the neighborhood as well as on an explicit “India first” strategy and mercantilist approach. Both authors take note of the centralization of decision-making and analyze the role of strategic imperatives, ideology, party, and interest group politics in the outcomes they observe. Nicolas Blarel and Manjeet Pardesi turn to analyze Modi's foreign policy toward the Middle East and East Asia, strategically important regions for India. Blarel questions the accepted understanding of Modi's foreign policy engagement toward the Middle East as one expected to tilt toward Israel after decades of support for Palestine. Despite initial attempts at a pro-Israel policy, Blarel finds Modi has mainly pursued the traditional policy of engagement with all relevant regional actors in the Middle East. Pardesi similarly argues that Prime Minister Modi's upgrading of India's “Look East” policy into an “Act East” is better understood as rebranding rather than a wholesale new policy. Blarel and Pardesi explain these continuities as a function of broad structural and domestic imperatives. The final essay by Sumit Ganguly provides a summary of India's foreign policy under Modi. Systematically focusing on relations with key foreign policy partners in regions important to India's interests, the essay provides a broad survey of changes and continuities one may observe in India's external relations under Modi. The author argues that where changes are noticeable, convergence of interests at the systemic level, the need for economic development, and Modi's personal equation with partner country leaders have proved to be important factors. Several key themes emerge from these essays. As expected, structural and domestic factors continue to shape the broad contours of Indian foreign policy. The administration has sought to manage emerging multipolarity at the systemic level by engaging with partners on the basis of convergence of interests. The need for delivering economic development at home has been an overarching theme: there is both an effort to acknowledge global interdependence as well as to play up economic nationalism to assuage domestic constituents’ concerns. At the domestic level, the BJP's legislative majority has afforded him substantial independence from coalition partners as well as from bureaucrats. Finally, Modi's personal stamp shows up in numerous ways. He has practiced religious diplomacy even though he has embraced the soft power aspect of Hindutva rather than an aggressive, muscular version some expected him to adopt. By inviting all neighborhood heads of state to attend his inauguration, he signaled his personal commitment to greater engagement in India's neighborhood. His personal engagement is also obvious in his visits to 45 countries by early 2017, in his attempt to build personal equations with leaders of partner countries, and in his attempt to centralize decision-making in both security and economic aspects of foreign policy. In sum, Modi's foreign policy engagements have shown that there is no clear Modi Doctrine—Modi is neither a Hindutva ideologue, nor an adherent to liberal economic policies. Prime Minister Modi's foreign policy can best be described as those of a pragmatist who uses his large political mandate to espouse populist policies of economic nationalism. Modi, Hindutva, and Foreign Policy Rajesh Basrur Nanyang Technological University Narendra Modi's strong identification with the ideology of Hindutva (or Hindu-ness) raises the question: to what extent does his ideational framework extend to the realm of foreign policy? When Modi became prime minister in May 2014, there was widespread expectation that he would give his personal stamp to Indian political life. Unlike his predecessor, Manmohan Singh, Modi has a strong, assertive personality. Also unlike Singh, he was unhampered by the exigencies of coalition politics—his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had won a majority in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian parliament)—and he was comfortably in command of his party. The BJP's leanings as a right-wing Hindu party quickly became apparent in domestic politics as it pursued an agenda that encompassed efforts to ban beef consumption, reshape education in line with its ideational preferences, and clamp down on anti-national political dissidence (Sampath 2016; Varshney 2016). With respect to foreign policy, the BJP's reputation as a “Hindu nationalist” party has been equated with an emphasis on the symbols of national power, notably nuclear weapons, a willingness to use military power for force projection, and hostility to Islam and Pakistan (Vanaik 2002; Chacko 2004; Ogden 2014; Ganguly 2015). Gauging Modi's adherence to Hindutva in external affairs is a matter of some significance since it tells us something about India's future trajectory as a rising power. Will India be a more assertive state inclined to exert its growing material power? Will it integrate smoothly with the international system or might it pose significant challenges to the prevailing international order? I argue that Hindutva is a weak and relatively insignificant component of Modi's foreign policy and that Modi's worldview is not fixated on the assertion of national power. He has not departed significantly from the policies of his predecessors on key foreign policy issues because his external worldview is not significantly different from theirs. Hindutva may be aggressive within its homeland, but is defensive externally. Hindutva's Complex Weltanschauung The notion that Hindutva involves an obsession with national power needs to be placed in its historical context. V. D. Savarkar, M. S. Golwalkar, H. V. Sheshadri, and other stalwarts who developed its ideational foundations believed that the golden age of ancient Hindu civilization had been lost owing to material and moral weakness, which had brought it under the prolonged subjugation of Muslim and Christian/British power (Karner 2006, 163–189, 208–215). They saw it as their mission to rebuild Hindu civilization through the acquisition of power, erase the humiliation of a millennium of “foreign” rule, and spread the enlightening message of Hinduism throughout the world. As Golwalkar put it, “[t]he supreme conviction that we are a great people charged with a World Mission should ever be vibrant in our breasts” (Karner 2006, 208). Conceivably, this could mean an abiding desire to use power for spearheading a Hindu mission civilisatrice. On the political side, Savarkar was an admirer of Kautilya (or Chanakya), the author of the Arthashastra, a treatise on kingship that is in many ways a precursor of what goes by the name of “offensive realism” today (Jabbar 2009, 87).2 In this worldview, kings/states are caught in perennial conflict, and true security comes only from the attainment of sarva-bhauma or universal empire (Sarkar 1919). Leaving aside world conquest, a less ambitious conception of the compass of Hindu civilization was the idea of Akhand Bharat (Undivided India), which could span Bhutan and Nepal to the north, Myanmar to the east, and Sri Lanka to the south (Bjornson 2012). On closer investigation, however, Hindutva thinking does not conform to this expansionist perspective. Savarkar and Golwalkar had a primarily defensive understanding of the world, emphasizing the importance of national power for preserving Hindu civilization from foreign invaders (Devare 2011, 168–176). Such post-colonial concerns were hardly new to India, which has built up a foreign policy framework centered on national autonomy since the time of Nehru. Even the relatively limited conception of Akhand Bharat has drawn little interest from contemporary votaries of Hindutva. In December 2015, when the general secretary of the BJP, Ram Madhav, made public reference to it, his colleagues promptly downplayed the idea (Hebbar 2015). Narendra Modi's personal worldview shows an awareness of the complexity of the contemporary international system. First, he is conscious of the fact of global interdependence and the impracticality of isolating India from it (Business Standard 2015). Second, he has publicly declared that he abides by the concepts of Vasudaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family), which non-BJP leaders have also stressed (Kuber 2014), and Vishva Bandhuta (world brotherhood) and peace (Press Information Bureau 2015). Third, and relatedly, Modi has—like his predecessors—prioritized economics, which had indeed been central to his claim to national leadership after a long innings as chief minister of Gujarat state (2001–2014).3 And fourth, his enunciation of Panchamrit, or the five pillars of foreign policy, is staple foreign policy wisdom, encompassing honor (sammān), dialog (samvād), shared prosperity (samriddhi), regional and global security (suraksha), and cultural and civilizational linkages (sanskriti evam sabhyata) (Tiwari 2015).4 Without using the nomenclature, all previous prime ministers have held the same principles. The Evidence: Modi's Policies Unsurprisingly, Modi has followed a path chalked out by his predecessors on a wide range of policies. Those who emphasize the influence of Hindutva on the BJP's policies frequently point to the party's decision under Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee to test nuclear weapons in 1998. One can certainly make a case that the BJP dared to tread where others had not by testing nuclear weapons, but that overemphasizes its departure from established policy. The bomb was first tested by Indira Gandhi in 1974 and stockpiled (covertly) circa 1989 onward by Rajiv Gandhi, both Congress prime ministers. Narasimha Rao, also a Congress premier, had ordered a test in 1995, but held back when coerced by the United States, which had come to know of his intent (the actual tests in 1974 and 1998 took Washington by surprise). Since the 1998 tests, India has kept to a uniform policy under prime ministers of diverse political persuasion; they have all been committed to the continuous development of weapons capability in order to build a nuclear triad and other advanced systems, and, simultaneously, adhered to a recessed or non-deployed posture in which weapons are stored in an unassembled state. Under Modi, there has been no departure from established practice. With regard to conventional weapons, Modi has again stayed on a course charted by earlier leaders, spending relatively large sums on military modernization. Indian military spending rose from US $13.95 billion in 1998 to US $42.95 billion in 2015 (International Institute of Strategic Studies 1998, 299; 2016, 486). India became the world's largest importer of weapons during the period 2010–2014, a trend set by Manmohan Singh and continued under Modi (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2016, 486). But while its power has grown, India has become less interventionist in the post–Cold War era than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Border wars with Pakistan (1947–1948, 1965) and China (1962) aside, major Indian military action outside its territory occurred in 1971 (the Bangladesh War) and 1987 (Sri Lanka), lesser armed interventions were conducted in 1986 (Seychelles) and 1988 (the Maldives), and one more (in Mauritius in 1983) was planned, but not carried out. More recently, India has engaged in armed combat just once, when its troops fought Pakistan in Kargil in 1999 within Indian territory. Openings for external military action have been met with prudent restraint in Sri Lanka (Vajpayee in 2000, Singh in the mid-2000s), Iraq (Singh in 2003), and Syria (Modi in 2013). The picture, again, is one of continuity and a distinct lack of interest in pursuing a policy of power projection. Modi did send troops on a brief counter-terrorism mission into Myanmar (2015), but that was not new—India had been involved in joint missions in Bhutan earlier, and, for that matter, Myanmar has sent troops into India as well (BBC 2015). There is simply no evidence that Modi is inclined to employ Indian military power outside the country's borders. Modi's policies toward India's adversaries—China and Pakistan—have, like those of Singh and Vajpayee before him, been a mix of toughness and willingness to negotiate. New Delhi has played a strategic balancing game with Beijing, countering an enhanced Chinese profile in South Asia by strengthening military cooperation with Australia, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. It has also built up security links in the Indian Ocean by providing arms to the Seychelles and Mauritius. India under Modi has been less sensitive to Chinese concerns (compared to Singh) while drawing closer to the United States and building triangular security relationships with the United States, Japan, and Australia, which appears to have coalesced into a democratic “quad” following a sub-ministerial meeting of all four in November 2017. The buildup of coalitions with other major powers is a trend that began under earlier prime ministers, but these are not alliances—far from it. Rather, India has developed strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan, Russia, and others in which its arms purchases are distributed and its strategic commitments are limited (Basrur 2017). Modi's confrontational response to China's road building on the China-Bhutan border (the Doklam standoff in June–August 2017) is reminiscent of earlier standoffs dating back to at least 1986. At the same time, India has continued to build economic relations with China: trade has risen sharply, growing from US $188 million in 1992 to US $69.48 billion in 2016 (International Monetary Fund n.d.), as has Chinese foreign direct investment in India, and Modi, like his predecessors, has encouraged both. With regard to Pakistan, belying expectations stemming from the BJP's “Islamophobia,” Modi has retained a broad policy established much earlier. On one hand, like Vajpayee and Singh, he has talked tough, insisting that Pakistan put an end to cross-border terrorist attacks emanating from its territory. On the other hand, like Vajpayee, Modi has taken the initiative to travel to Pakistan (December 2015) and, as did both Vajpayee and Singh, tried to break the deadlock between the two countries, though thus far to no avail. In short, Modi has not displayed a harder line against India's adversaries than previous Indian prime ministers. Given the supposed predilections of Hindu nationalists, we might expect Modi to take an inordinate interest in pursuing higher status for India among the community of states. But there is nothing distinctive about his policy in this respect. The quest for enhanced status has been a long-standing one (Nayar and Paul 2003). As before, Modi's India has sought membership of major international institutions, most ambitiously the United Nations Security Council, but also the Nuclear Suppliers Group (both as yet without success). It has gained a position among the second tier of significant powers, such as the G20 and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), as well as in regional organizations in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean. India's strategy as a rising power has also involved the accumulation of symbols of power, both nuclear and conventional. But, as we have seen, these have not been employed aggressively. On the contrary, India has tried to establish a reputation as being an exemplar (Sullivan 2015), a “responsible power” exercising military restraint and always ready to contribute to the public good through disaster relief and anti-piracy missions. It is noticeable that when Modi or his officials have spoken of India being a “leading” power, they have emphasized these qualities rather than the traditional major power role of armed intervention during crises (Jaishankar 2015). Modi's focus on international cultural links is not particularly novel. To the extent that he has tried to develop diplomacy grounded in culture and religion (Mohan 2016a; Hall 2018), he has done so in relatively minor and not necessarily novel ways, though he has certainly carried it forward appreciably. The focus on Indian cultural influence via the vehicle of Buddhism (which Hindutva advocates is integral to Hinduism) and yoga is not new. The Indian Council of Cultural Relations, established in 1950, has long been active in promoting Indian culture as a form of “soft power.” Project Mausam (monsoon winds), aimed at reviving old trading and cultural links in the Indian Ocean, was announced in 2014, but has yet to take off (Sharma 2017). Relations with neighboring Hindu-majority Nepal have rarely been cordial and are not particularly warm today. Intra-community cultural diplomacy may have strengthened India's diasporic links, but it is unclear how much. Conclusion The role of Hindutva in Modi's foreign policy has not amounted to much. As an ideology, it has emphasized national power, but has been primarily defensive in orientation. Modi's own perceptions as a protagonist of Hindutva do not accord with the somewhat extreme depictions offered mainly (but not only) by critics. More telling is the evidence drawn from foreign policy behavior. The acquisition of instruments of power, the ways in which they are utilized, and strategic behavior toward adversaries and friends—all of this reflects a high degree of continuity drawing from precedent and is almost entirely unrelated to religious belief. Where Hindutva does play a role, it does so in relatively insignificant and unclear ways. How do we explain the stark difference between the determined application of Hindutva at home and its marginal role in shaping foreign policy? Externally, because Hinduism does not have a history of active proselytization, the Hindutva worldview is not deeply connected with power. At home, it sees itself as defensive, fighting humiliation, and therefore needing to wield power. At heart, the difference lies in territoriality. Hindutva was always embedded conceptually in the subcontinent (Bhatt 2001, 94–99). Savarkar, despite having lived abroad and engaged with writings and developments in Europe, was not deeply influenced by the security problematique embedded in European thought about inter-state relations. His Hindutva remained centered on defending the land of the Hindus against outsiders. Where it was outwardly oriented, it was ambitious—Savarkar held that “the only geographical limits to Hindutva are the limits of our earth!” (Bhatt 2001, 119)—but this was a cultural ambition wholly focused on India as an exemplar and on exercising cultural influence. From a foreign policy standpoint, there is no evidence that Hindutva today conceives of the world any differently from the centrist liberal worldview espoused by the Indian elite as a whole.5 Rather, it appears to have come to terms with the limits posed by interdependence, both economic and military (i.e., nuclear). It follows that Modi's politics, whatever its domestic distortions, remains a defensive realist one in the external realm. India as a rising power has stakes in the system and does not have the intellectual-emotional drive to alter its trajectory from the beaten path set by Modi's predecessors and now being travelled by him. Narendra Modi's New Religious Diplomacy Ian Hall Griffith University C. Raja Mohan argues that one of the few novel aspects of Narendra Modi's conduct of Indian foreign policy is his commitment to “religious diplomacy” (2015, 180–185).6 While references to India's philosophical and religious inheritance are not uncommon in the speeches of past Indian prime ministers,7 Mohan maintains that Modi's devotion to religious diplomacy sets him apart from his predecessors. It is so intense, indeed, that it is reportedly causing “unease,” “consternation[,] and confusion” in India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) (Ramachandaran 2015). What is driving Modi's engagement with religious diplomacy? At least five factors are at play. First, there is widespread support within the BJP and the wider Hindu nationalist community for a push to build India's “soft power,” which is informed, in part, by the perception that India's religious traditions are a useful source of that power. Second, it fits with the longer-running effort to improve India's image as a tourist destination, especially for East Asian visitors interested in Buddhist sites. Third, it is linked to the effort to engage with India's diaspora communities through their religious traditions. Fourth, there is a connection to Modi's ongoing effort, which dates back into his time as Gujarat Chief Minister, to dissociate him personally from the taint of communalism. And finally, his religious diplomacy appears to be informed by Modi's own beliefs about the role of religion in general, and Indian religion in particular, in world politics, which draw on the ideas of Swami Vivekananda. Together, these factors have opened a space for Modi to conduct his religious diplomacy alongside more conventional diplomatic approaches. Modi's religious diplomacy has at least three components: first, prominent visits to significant religious sites; second, engagement in conferences organized ostensibly for the purposes of inter-religious dialogue; and third, specific appeals to religious thinkers, concepts, and arguments in speeches delivered to foreign audiences. Modi's distinctive choices of gifts for foreign leaders are also significant—Shinzo Abe, Xi Jinping, and Barack Obama each received copies of the Bhagavadgita (Friedlander 2016, 79).8 Modi has made frequent visits to major Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Muslim religious sites, including the Pashupatinath temple in Kathmandu, Nepal (August 4, 2014); the Tō-ji temple in Kyoto, Japan (August 31, 2014); the Buddhist holy town of Anuradhapura and the Hindu Naguleswaram temple in Jaffna, both in Sri Lanka (March 14, 2015). He also visited the Gurdwara Khalsa Diwan and Laxmi Narayan temple in Vancouver, Canada (April 17, 2015); the Da Xingshan temple in Xi'an, China (May 14, 2015); and the Ganda monastery in Ulan Bator, Mongolia (May 17, 2015). That same year, he visited the Dhakashwari temple in Dhaka, Bangladesh (June 7, 2015), and the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi (August 16, 2015). Modi has also been involved in a series of high-profile inter-religious conferences and events, especially the Samvad Global Hindu Buddhist Initiative on Conflict Avoidance and Environment Consciousness in New Delhi and Bodh Gaya, Bihar (September 3–5, 2015), the World Culture Festival (March 11–13, 2016), and the World Sufi Forum, both in New Delhi (March 17–20, 2016). The Samvad was hosted by the BJP-aligned think tank, the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), sponsored by the Japanese Tokyo Foundation, and involved representatives from India, Japan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Modi addressed it twice, in New Delhi and at Bodh Gaya, the place where Buddha reputedly achieved enlightenment. He spoke on the now familiar themes of the contributions that Buddhist and Hindu thought can play in devising better approaches to social conflict and climate change—themes he developed when he was Gujarat Chief Minister (Modi 2011) and in a series of speeches as prime minister (see, for instance, Modi 2014a). He also has spoken at greater length on the need for philosophically minded dialogue between religions that “produces no anger or retribution.” Modi has argued that Buddhism has long been the “uniting and binding factor” in Asia and that, if an Asian Century is to be realized, Buddhism's truths and contribution must be recognized (Modi 2015a). The World Culture Festival was organized by the Art of Living Foundation, established by Sri Ravi Shankar in 1981 for the promotion of meditation, yoga, and spirituality. The Festival was intended to encourage a sense of global “unity in diversity,” involving cultural events and talks from speakers as diverse as the Dalai Lama, former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, former Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, and Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad al Sharqi of the United Arab Emirates. Modi's government was a prominent sponsor of the gather, which according to the organizers was attended by 3.7 million people (Art of Living 2016; cf. Modi 2016a). The last of these events, the World Sufi Forum, was organized by the All India Ulama and Mashaikh Board, which claims to represent and promote the interests of Sunni Sufis in India (All India Ulama and Mashaikh Board 2017). Modi gave the inaugural address, opening with a paean of praise to India as a “land that is a timeless fountain of peace, and an ancient source of traditions and faiths, which has received and nurtured religions from the world” (Modi 2016b). He also discussed what he sees as the commonalities between Hinduism and Sufism. In the second half of his speech, however, Modi shifted topic and tone, focusing on how the “message of Sufism” can combat the scourge of terrorism and “dissolve the clouds of discord and war and spread goodwill, peace, and harmony among the people” (Modi 2016b). Outside these contexts, Modi has appealed to Indian religious concepts or spiritual traditions as sources of wisdom for addressing international insecurity and climate change, among other issues, as well as launching a successful bid at the United National General Assembly for a World Yoga Day, now celebrated every June 21 (Modi 2014a; cf. Tandon 2016b, 60). He repeatedly refers—as earlier Indian PMs have also done—to the Sanskrit concept of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (“the world is one family”) as a supposed ideational lodestar for Indian foreign policy (see, for example, Modi 2014a). More unusually, Modi major foreign policy speeches also include prominent appeals to “de-link” religion and terrorism—a theme common to his addresses to events like the World Sufi Forum and to speeches like that he earlier gave to the East Asia Summit in November 2015 (Modi 2015b). In general, Modi's new religious diplomacy fits with the BJP's concern with boosting India's so-called “soft power” and giving its public diplomacy a religious complexion. India has of course long practiced public diplomacy—that is, attempts by government to influence foreign public opinion—and since the mid-2000s, the Ministry of External Affairs has invested significantly more resources in its pursuit (see Hall 2012; Mullen 2015). During the 2014 election campaign, however, the BJP claimed that these efforts were not producing the results that they should, promising a renewed focus on public diplomacy and a more religious character to its content. The BJP's election manifesto opened with a grand and sweeping discussion of the greatness of Indian civilization and the esteem in which Indian philosophy, science, wisdom, and religious tolerance were once held by foreigners (Bharatiya Janata Party 2014, 1–3). But it also complained that “India has long failed to duly appreciate the full extent and gamut of its soft power potential,” and promised a BJP-led government would harness “the magnetic power” of India, making it a vishwaguru (“world guru”) once more (Bharatiya Janata Party 2014, 40). This concept, in particular, clearly appeals to Modi, whose speeches since the election repeatedly refer to India as vishwaguru (Mohan 2015, 197; Hall 2017, 114). It also suggests that the push to leverage soft power rather than a harder edged Kautilyan strategy, rests not only on an appreciation of the limits imposed on India by interdependence, as Basrur suggests in this forum, but also on a deeper faith among some in the BJP that an India inspired by the right version of Hinduism need not become a normal, hard power-seeking state to play a full role in world politics. Modi thus has political backing for his religious diplomacy from the BJP, even if he lacks the support of career diplomats in the MEA (Ramachandaran 2015). Importantly, as we have seen, he can also draw upon the resources of a range of influential Hindu civil society groups, like the Art of Living Foundation, to support his agenda. Nationalist intellectuals in new think tanks like VIF can also help frame his efforts, as the VIF did with the Samvad conference. Moreover, Modi is able to push his agenda in a benign environment in which there is widespread support for the idea that more could be done to use India's religious inheritance for mundane purposes, especially boosting tourism. One recent report by a leading think tank argues that India is “sitting atop a millennia-old tourist mine”—its Buddhist sites and history (Stobdan 2016, 4; cf. Jacob 2015). Malone notes that inbound tourists into India from East Asia and the Pacific more than doubled between 2003 and 2007 and that interest in Buddhist history played a part in driving that growth (2014, 221). In parallel with his visits to Buddhist sites across Asia, Modi has moved to loosen visa regulations on citizens of a series of East Asian states in a concerted effort to attract more visitors into India, and his government is seeking to create Buddhist tourist “circuits” (Ghose 2015). Connecting with India's politically important diaspora is also driving Modi's religious diplomacy. When he visited the Gurdwara Khalsa Diwan and Laxmi Narayan temple in Vancouver in April 2015, Modi engaged the influential Sikh community in British Columbia and the Canadian Hindu community, which, like those in Australia, Europe, and the United States, had helped fund the BJP's extraordinarily expensive election campaign in 2014.9 When he went to the Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi in August 2015, Modi reached out to a different but no less politically significant diaspora, to Indian Muslims working throughout the Middle East, and especially to Biharis, who went to the polls for state elections in October and November of that year (Deccan Herald 2015). More personal motivations are also at work. For some time, Modi has made a concerted effort to improve his image, tarnished in the early stages of his political career. As a BJP firebrand and then as Gujarat chief minister, Modi became associated with religious intolerance and communal violence (Jaffrelot 2008). Toward the end of his time in Gujarat, however, as he emerged as a possible national leader, Modi worked to contrive a new image, one of a vikas purush (or “development man”) and as a reconciler, rather than generator, of differences between religious communities (Mukhopadhyay 2013, 361, 371–372, 388). Although undercut by persistent accusations that Modi continues to use communalism for political advantage, his prominent role in occasions like the World Sufi Forum is an extension of this effort, aiming to cast him—not wholly plausibly, to many—as a seeker of common ground between religions both domestically and internationally. Finally, Modi's religious diplomacy seems also driven by his personal beliefs—or at least by beliefs with which he wants to be associated. Modi is a committed Hindu nationalist, but some of his biographers quote him as saying he is not personally religious (Marino 2014, 260). He does, however, claim to be devoted to the ideas of Swami Vivekananda, the Bengali Hindu revivalist who famously travelled to Chicago in 1893 and spoke eloquently about his religion, and who founded the Ramakrishna Mission in Kolkata.10 Vivekananda argued that Hinduism—and by extension India—has a particular role to play as a vishwaguru who leavened Western materialism with Eastern spirituality, uplifting the whole and generating a peaceful world. India, he argued, was a spiritual “dynamo” capable of ending the “fanaticism and religious wars” that “mar the life of man and the progress of civilization” (Vivekananda 1990, 13, 17). Modi's diplomatic language, especially on terrorism, echoes these sentiments—sincerely or otherwise (see Hall 2017). Modi's religious diplomacy is not, of course, unparalleled or unprecedented. Various analysts of contemporary diplomatic practice have noted the recent emergence of “faith-based diplomacy,” especially that concerned with overcoming conflicts between religions, in a number of other contexts (see, for example, Cox and Philpott 2003; Johnston 2003; Troy 2008). And all Indian prime ministers have tried to leverage India's religious and philosophical inheritance to boost its image or its influence (Thussu 2013). Whether Modi's version of religious diplomacy pays off is a moot point. The core problem it faces is credibility. Modi's message that Hinduism and India are models of religious tolerance has been undermined by episodes of communal violence, including those perpetrated by Hindu nationalists aligned with Modi's party against members of India's Muslim minority, and accusations that religious freedom has come under threat during this time in office (McCarthy 2015). The recent denial of visas to members of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom compounded the impression in parts of the West that Modi's words on religious tolerance are out of kilter with his government's actions to uphold it (USCIRF 2016, 159–166). This impression, combined with longstanding doubts about Modi's past conduct as Gujarat chief minister, will likely stymie his attempts to boost India's influence with religious diplomacy. All this said it is nevertheless significant that given the right alignment of political will, civil society support, relatively benign institutional environment, significant economic interests, and personal drives, Modi has been able to introduce a new element into the conduct of Indian foreign policy where elsewhere he has arguably struggled to bring change. India's Trade Engagement: The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same Surupa Gupta University of Mary Washington At the end of more than three years of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration, the Indian government's approach to trade policy and engagement with trade negotiations demonstrate some bold attempts at changing the discourse while maintaining overall continuity in its positions. This essay looks at India's approach to multilateral and regional trade agreements as well as policy and advisory statements by the prime minister and major economic departments within the government to examine change and continuity in India's approach to trade. It finds that first, under Modi, the rhetoric on India's trade policy initially has taken a decisively nationalist turn. Second, while India's position on negotiations and commitment to multilateralism in trade remained unchanged, there has been an increasing focus on the neighborhood and also a continued effort at finding regional and sub-regional options to prevent India's isolation in the face of changing multilateral trade architecture. Third, foreign policy making, even in economic issues, has become increasingly centralized in the prime minister's office. The essay begins by articulating the long term consensus on trade in India. It then goes on to discuss the domestic and international factors that would have led us to expect change in trade policy. In section three, it examines the evidence on India's engagement with multilateral trade. It concludes by highlighting structural, domestic, and individual level factors that explain the change and continuity in the Modi government's approach to trade. Long-Term Consensus on Trade A broad consensus on India's engagement in trade emerged at the beginning of the 2000s. A comprehensive dialogue involving various stakeholders in trade ensued when the Department of Commerce set out, in 2000, to determine India's initial negotiating positions on agriculture, non-agricultural market access, services, and other issues for the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Round negotiations (Department of Commerce 2000). During the subsequent decade and a half, that consensus was revisited and reexamined in the light of India's efforts to negotiate the Doha Round and to sign free trade agreements with several of its trading partners. The consensus that Modi government inherited was made up of the following elements. First, there was broad agreement that India has a strong interest in multilateralism, including supporting the institutional framework of the WTO. However, since there has been a global move toward regionalism since the late 1990s, it was also agreed that India should negotiate regional and bilateral trade agreements. Second, the content of all trade agreements India signed was largely determined by the consensus on sectoral issues that emerged during consultation with stakeholders in the post-2000 period. Third, its position remained largely protectionist with respect to trade in agriculture and goods, while in certain aspects of trade in services, India took a more liberal position. During 2000–2014, this consensus remained largely unchanged. Why Expect Change? When Modi came to power with an overwhelming majority in May 2014, both international and domestic factors would have lead us to expect change in trade policy. The Modi administration assumed power at the end of a ten-year rule by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a government beset by policy paralysis during its second term. The institutional architecture for international trade was changing both inside and outside the WTO. The expectation among analysts was that the Modi administration, unlike Singh's before him, would initiate liberal economic reforms (Jaishankar 2014; Varshney 2014). The narrative that brought Modi to power was based on three factors. First, India's image as a “rising” economic power had taken a substantial beating after 2012. After achieving more than 9 percent growth during 2005–2006 to 2008–2009, India's growth rate fell to 4.7 percent during 2013–2014 (Department of Economic Affairs 2014, 2). During the post-crisis period, export growth fluctuated widely and remained anemic. Due mostly to global economic downturn, export growth fell from 21.9 percent in 2011–2012 to –1.3 percent in 2014–2015 (Department of Economic Affairs 2016, A101). Export growth is important: India's target growth rate of 8–10 percent requires export growth at 15–20 percent (Department of Economic Affairs 2017, 6). Second, given India's demographic trajectory—a growing working-age population—there was an urgent need to create jobs and, therefore, to attract both foreign and domestic investment (Planning Commission 2013, 139–40). Jobs were a priority also because India had added well over 100 million new voters since the 2009 elections. Third, Modi's ascent to power was largely seen as an endorsement of his record of delivering development in Gujarat where he had been chief minister for three terms. During his tenure, Gujarat's GDP growth rate was higher than the Indian average, and the state contributed to a larger share of total Indian exports than most others (Economist 2015). Modi's campaign narrative argued that restoring India's image, creating new jobs, and pushing the agenda for economic development forward required the economic reforms that Modi could deliver. The perception that Modi would be able deliver reforms was strengthened by domestic factors such BJP's performance in the 2014 elections—it won 282 out of 545 seats in the Lok Sabha, the Indian parliament's lower house, ending a streak of successive minority or coalition governments since 1989. The size of lower house majority was certainly interpreted as a mandate for Modi to initiate and implement policies that would deliver economic development. Structural factors such as changes in the international architecture for trade would have also led one to expect rethinking on trade under Modi's leadership. Trade negotiations have been moving from multilateralism to regionalism and plurilateralism at a faster pace since the Doha Round of negotiations reached a stalemate in 2008. The United States initially shifted its focus away from the WTO and redirected it to two mega-regional trade agreements, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving twelve countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and European Union—and India was not part of either. Even within the WTO, the United States focused on negotiating plurilateral agreements in information technology, services, and environmental goods, which did not require consensus among all members. India was not a party to any of these. The only major new multilateral initiative that India belonged to was the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that also included China, Japan, and thirteen Asia-Pacific countries but not the United States and other Western trading partners. Increasingly, there was a perception in New Delhi that India might get isolated in global and regional trade agreements—this prompted analysts to encourage a rethinking in India's approach to multilateral and regional trade (Singh 2014, 5–9). Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy: The Record So Far Shortly after assuming office in May 2014, Modi's position on trade was tested when the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), agreed upon by the WTO membership at the Bali ministerial meeting in December 2013, came up for ratification. The Modi government attracted worldwide attention when India refused to ratify it by its July 2014 deadline.11 The UPA government had agreed to sign the TFA only when it secured a promise that progress on the TFA would be accompanied by progress on food security and related issues—a component of the Bali declaration that was highly consequential for India and some developing countries (Gupta and Ganguly 2014). The Modi government took the position that it would refuse to ratify the TFA unless WTO members made progress on the food subsidy issue. Finally, in November 2014, India agreed to ratify the TFA after Modi received assurance from the United States that India's food security program would be exempt (known as the “peace clause”) indefinitely until a permanent solution was found. This was an opportunity for the new government, in its third month, to signal to its electorate that it would not back down under foreign pressure. The episode was also evidence of Modi's personalized and centralized approach to foreign policy: he chose a highly publicized, one-on-one meeting with the United States president to resolve a multilateral trade issue instead of allowing the commerce ministry to work the regular channels. Moreover, decision-making on trade policy also became centralized due to structural changes implemented by Modi; he represented the ministry in the cabinet, and Nirmala Sitharaman, responsible for the ministry's administration, held a lower rank than cabinet minister. She also reported to the minister for finance in a separate role. This new arrangement, not seen under previous governments, has reduced the autonomy of the commerce ministry in shaping trade policy and centralized policymaking in the prime minister's office. India's focus on subsistence farmers, its defensive negotiating position and strategy of aligning with other developing countries on agriculture remained unchanged at the Nairobi Ministerial meeting of the WTO in December 2015 (Kanth 2015). This continuity notwithstanding, India's proposal for a new TFA in services signaled potential change. India submitted a concept note for this initiative in September 2016 to the WTO to address impediments that service providers face both at the border and beyond the border (World Trade Organization 2016). While details of the proposed agreement remain unclear, the proposal can potentially develop into an effective bargaining chip for the Modi government in the upcoming negotiations. This thinking is not entirely new—the initiative to link the food security issue to the original TFA deal was prompted by a similar calculation. However, what was new was India's effort to propose a new agreement—a task that developed states have done in the past. This decision to act as a proactive demandeur in the negotiations was part of India's effort to play a larger role in the negotiations. Modi's approach to mega-regional trade negotiations also remained similar to those of the UPA: engagement in RCEP and a “wait and watch” approach to TPP. In 2012, the UPA government took the decision to join the RCEP negotiations in an attempt to avoid being isolated in the global trade architecture as well as to retain the option of shaping that mega-regional agreement (Department of Commerce 2016, 31; Sidhartha 2012). India joined RCEP also because it felt that the RCEP presented a high likelihood of getting a deal that balanced the concerns of developing and developed countries. When Modi took office, several analysts recommended that India should join the TPP even though India was never formally invited (Singh 2014, 5–9; Bergsten 2015, 3–4). The Modi government, like the previous one, decided that joining the TPP at the time was not a prudent option for India. Its decision was driven largely by TPP provisions on intellectual property and state-owned enterprises—areas in which India's position were in stark contrast with the TPP's agenda. The US decision to abandon the TPP in 2017 took away immediate pressure for India to consider politically costly reforms in those issue areas. Finally, the Modi government has sought to revive South Asian regionalism and sub-regionalism in trade in its effort to actualize the economic potential of its Act East Policy (see the Pardesi essay in this forum). One of Modi's signature initiatives in 2014 was to focus on a “neighborhood first” foreign policy including an effort to increase integration within South Asia, one of the least integrated regions in the world. The Modi administration recognized that fostering integration with eastern neighbors was a necessary precondition to building relations with Southeast Asia and thus strengthen India's Act East Policy. The primary focus of this initiative is to build physical and regulatory infrastructure that would enhance trade in the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal region, as well as in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a seven-country sub-regional cooperation institution. Again, some of these initiatives began under the UPA government, but the Modi government renewed these efforts and has sought to build on the UPA's groundwork. The Ministry of External Affairs and the prime minister's office have collectively pushed this subregional focus, highlighting its importance by holding a BIMSTEC summit alongside a BRICS summit in Goa in October 2016. While India's approach to negotiations largely demonstrates continuity, a focus on Modi's speeches and government documents reveals a bigger debate. The first clear enunciation of the Modi government's approach to trade appeared in his 2014 Independence Day speech that launched the “Make in India” program. He urged Indians to manufacture products in India rather than import them (Modi 2014b). This mercantilist perspective is a contrast with one of former Prime Minister Singh's early speeches where he explicitly eschewed mercantilism (Singh 2004). Modi's and the BJP's nationalist, pro-business—rather than pro-market—preferences, along with the need to play to the nationalist support base, shaped this articulation. India's 2015–2020 Foreign Trade Policy (FTP), published in April 2015, further developed the Modi government's approach to trade. While Modi's Make in India speech left analysts confused as to whether he was envisioning import substitution industrialization or export-led growth, the FTP more clearly recognizes the need for the latter and continued to emphasize the need to limit imports and to identify winners in exports. As outlined in the FTP, trade policy was to be nested within the overall framework of the Make in India program (Department of Commerce 2015, 15). By comparison, the 2004–2009 FTP emphasized both exports and imports and focused on export promotion in sectors in which India has had a comparative advantage (Department of Commerce 2004). Interviews suggest that the clearer articulation reflected in the FTP benefitted from wider consultation with New Delhi's trade policy apparatus. Against the backdrop of this changing rhetoric, the Finance Ministry, since early 2016, has begun to challenge the mercantilist positions described above. The 2014–2015 Economic Survey merely suggested ways in which Make in India could be more liberal than protectionist (Department of Economic Affairs 2015, 34). The 2015–2016 Economic Survey set a new tone by questioning India's overall approach to trade and by suggesting that the government rethink its approach to supporting agriculture at home (Department of Economic Affairs 2016, 32–33). It further asked that the government embrace trade liberalization more fully, both at the multilateral and at the regional level. By refuting the basis of India's support for safeguards for small farmers and for subsidies to ensure food security, the document challenged the consensus on trade policy to which this essay alluded earlier. The 2016–2017 Economic Survey follows up along the same lines by stating that given India's need to keep markets open, it should, along with other emerging economies, “play a more proactive role in ensuring open global markets” (Department of Economic Affairs 2017, 25). Arguing that high GDP growth rate requires high export growth, the document recommends that India should further open its own markets. It goes on to recommend that India should focus on its comparative advantage in labor-intensive exports. In doing so, the survey presents a position on trade that is at sharp variance with the nationalist worldview presented in the initial years of the Modi administration. That worldview eschewed comparative advantage and sought to focus mainly on high technology sectors. It is important to highlight that the survey performs an advisory function and is not a policy document. However, the recent surveys provide evidence of ideational tension within the government. Whether the more liberal vision will be adopted depends largely on the prime minister's preferences. In late 2017, as the WTO members congregated in Buenos Aires, we observed little change in India's negotiating position on food security, agriculture, and other issues (Siddharth 2017). Conclusion The Modi government's record on trade presents continuity on negotiating positions while change in both policymaking and the stated orientation of policy. First, India continues to espouse similar positions at multilateral and regional trade negotiations. That said it is also important to note the Modi government's focus on the immediate neighborhood. Second, trade policy under Modi has taken an explicitly nationalist turn. Three factors were responsible: Modi's focus on development and job creation, his and the BJP's nationalist, pro-business approach to economic policy, and pressure from Indian business interests who felt that past trade deals had not benefitted them. While there is evidence of divergent thinking within the government, thus far there is no indication that Modi will convert any of that advice into policy. Finally, policymaking has been centralized within the Prime Minister's office, allowing Modi to shape it according to his goals and preferences. Indian Development Assistance: The Centralization and Mercantilization of Indian Foreign Policy Rani D. Mullen College of William & Mary Prime Minister Modi has been clocking in the frequent flyer miles since winning the 2014 elections. His more activist approach to foreign policy has influenced Indian development assistance. On the one hand, there has been significant continuity in the Indian government's approach to foreign assistance at the individual, state, and international levels. The strategic imperatives driving Indian development assistance as well as the continued use of Indian assistance as a soft power instrument to burnish India's image abroad have not changed from the previous Indian government. On the other hand, there have been subtle but noticeable changes in three main areas of India's engagement in foreign aid. First, Modi's government has focused its foreign relations more squarely on India's neighborhood, though foreign aid to the neighborhood increasingly included Lines of Credit in addition to grants. Second, Indian foreign aid under Modi has become more mercantilist. It has been more focused on economic diplomacy, including the instrumental use of aid to serve Modi's India First and “Act East” policies, and has increasingly pursued new modes of development assistance that are more commercial in form, following in the footsteps of China and other East Asian countries. Third, under Modi decision-making on foreign aid has become centralized in the office of the prime minister, including a decision to channel less aid through the ministry of external affairs and more through the ministry of finance. These changes in the use of Indian foreign assistance are seen at each level of analysis. India under Modi has a pragmatic approach to development assistance as a tool of India's diplomatic efforts and as something that is mutually beneficial. Couched in the language of liberalism and internationalism, Indian foreign assistance under Modi is increasingly driven by realist thinking about aid as an instrument for enhancing India's bilateral, regional, and global power, as well as perhaps that of Prime Minister Modi himself. The Continuity in the Modi Government's Approach to Development Assistance Under Prime Minister Modi's government, there has been a general commitment to continuing and even increasing Indian aid to developing countries. The Modi-led government came to power in 2014 at a time when the Indian economy was suffering its worst slowdown since the early 1980s, and there was speculation about whether the new government's focus on meeting its financial targets would lead to an overall decrease in foreign aid allocations (Mitra 2014). These worries have not been borne out. If anything, the Modi-led government has surprised Indians and the international community with the intensity of his foreign policy engagements, the frequency of his foreign trips, and the range of development partnership projects announced at many of his foreign visits. Overall, Indian development assistance under the Modi government has largely continued the previous government's efforts to increase the development assistance budget and engagement, though the mix of lending instruments has changed. Since being elected into office, the Modi-led government has increased total Indian foreign aid commitments from 70.96 billion rupees under the previous government in 2013–2014 to 76.6 billion rupees budgeted for 2017–2018, as seen in Figure 1 (the US dollar figures show a slightly different trend due to exchange rate fluctuations). These totals also only capture Indian grants and loans to developing countries, not most of the lines of credit through India's Export-Import Bank, which India considers to be part of its foreign assistance and which have increased significantly during Modi's tenure. Modi's government thus continued the commitment to Indian foreign aid, through grants, loans, and particularly lines of credit. Figure 1 View largeDownload slide Indian development assistance, total and by different ministries, 2011/12–2017/18 Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) at the Centre for Policy Research Figure 1 View largeDownload slide Indian development assistance, total and by different ministries, 2011/12–2017/18 Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) at the Centre for Policy Research In addition to the Modi government's sustained commitment to Indian aid, the government also continued the strategic prioritization of foreign aid in India's diplomatic relations, using largely the same institutional structure for the formulation of development assistance priorities. Moreover, domestic drivers were still most important in influencing Indian foreign assistance, and the Government continued to use foreign aid as a soft power instrument to help build India's regional and international standing (Mullen 2015). This continuity in the approach to foreign aid is particularly noticeable at the national and systemic levels. At the national level, the process by which most Indian development assistance projects are conceptualized remained within the ambit of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Subnational governments, particularly border states, continue to play a role in the government's prioritizing of foreign relations with countries across the border, including development partnerships with these countries. For example, India has continued to increase its assistance relationship with neighboring states Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In the case of Bangladesh, the chief minister of the Indian state of West Bengal accompanied Prime Minister Modi on his official visits to Bangladesh in May 2015 and August 2016 in order to help ensure the smooth implementation of the plethora of agreements. At the systemic level, India's regional and global power ambitions continued to grow in an increasingly multipolar world, while the drivers of Indian foreign assistance remained the same. Yet global multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank failed to adapt quickly enough to the rising ambitions and changing power reality of rising powers like India. Given such systemic factors, Indian development assistance under Modi continued its policy of expanding its partnerships with countries from the Pacific islands to francophone Africa. Increasing the ambit of India's development partnerships continued to remain a way of gaining support for India's global ambitions, for example attaining a seat on the UNSC, since in the UN General Assembly each independent country has a vote. The Increasing Mercantilization of Indian Development Assistance under Modi While there has been much continuity in India's approach and commitment to development assistance, there have also been significant changes. These changes in regional emphasis, modality, and the management of the Indian government are characterized by an overall mercantilization of Indian foreign assistance and the increasing role of the individual-level factor in determining Indian foreign aid. Changing Nature of Engagement with Its Immediate Neighborhood Under Modi, there has been a more central and proactive regional focus in Indian foreign policy, particularly focusing on the economic dividends that enhanced engagement with India's neighborhood can bring. Modi set the tone for his “Neighborhood First” policy when he came to power in 2014 and invited the leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries to his swearing in as prime minister. Then, he chose Bhutan as his first foreign trip and subsequently visited most other countries in the neighborhood. The Modi government's “Act East” policy—meant to convey concrete steps being undertaken to further improve relations with the high-growth countries of Southeast Asia—and the fact that over half of Prime Minister Modi's foreign trips until January 2017 have been to Asian countries, have further cemented the regional focus of Modi's foreign policy. An integral part of India's bilateral relationships in the neighborhood has been the use of Indian foreign assistance to buttress those relationships. Indian foreign assistance in the form of grants and loans have always focused on the larger neighborhood, from Afghanistan and Bhutan to Bangladesh and Myanmar. This trend continued under Modi. However, the aid provided to India's neighbors during Modi's tenure until the end of 2017 was characterized by fewer grants and loans and more commercial lines of credit (LOCs). In 2013–2014, 95 percent of Indian grants and loans went to countries in India's neighborhood (IDCR 2017). While the vast majority of grants and loans continued to be focused on the neighborhood, as seen in Figure 2, by 2017–2018 only 82 percent of grants and loans were going to neighboring countries. Moreover, the percentage of LOCs (which India regards as foreign aid) given to neighboring countries increased. In 2013 under the previous administration, nearly 60 percent of all operational LOCs went to African countries, while only about 25 percent went to India's neighborhood. By October 2017, the focus on LOCs had changed with the Modi government announcing several new, large credits to India's neighbors, such as a US $4.5 billion credit line to Bangladesh (IDCR 2017). Moreover, the volume of LOCs had increased by more than 50 percent compared to the end of the previous government's tenure, from US $10 billion in 2013–2014 to more than US $23 billion by the end of 2017. Figure 2 View largeDownload slide Proportion of Indian grants and loan commitments by the ministry of external affairs going to India's immediate neighborhood (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Myanmar & Sri Lanka) Figure 2 View largeDownload slide Proportion of Indian grants and loan commitments by the ministry of external affairs going to India's immediate neighborhood (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Myanmar & Sri Lanka) Increased allocations of LOCs to neighboring countries have served a dual purpose. They have backed up India's Neighborhood First and Act East policies, as well as supported the Modi government's India First policy, since all LOCs are required to source a minimum of 75 percent of their goods and services from India. If one includes all new operational and committed LOCs, Indian foreign assistance under Modi has undergone an active shift toward reprioritizing the region in India's development partnerships and in seeking bilateral partnerships in the region that are mutually beneficial. The Modi government's focus on India's neighborhood is also seen in India's engagement with the two new international financial institutions in which India is a founding member: the New Development Bank (NDB) composed of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries and the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). While India's joining of these banks was already initiated under the previous administration, under Modi India has applied for loans from both of these banks that will be equivalent to or greater than the funds India contributes (IDCR 2017). Moreover, in more actively engaging with countries in the region, particularly those east of India, individual-level factors have come to the fore as Modi has clocked in more foreign trips with more foreign aid agreements than any other Indian prime minister in their first two years. The increased importance of individual factors in Modi's administration was to be expected from a government that did not require coalition partners to form a government and that rules with a majority in the lower house. Yet while Modi's presidential engagement in foreign policy is reminiscent of India's first post-independence Prime Minister Nehru, his activist pursuit of expanding development partnerships has been a noticeable shift from any previous Indian prime minister. New, Mercantilist Modes of Indian Development Assistance The second major change in India's approach to foreign assistance under Modi has been a greater focus on a more mercantilist mode of engagement. Indian development assistance has been an important part of Indian foreign policy particularly since the 1964 inauguration of its official Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program. The ITEC has traditionally focused on cementing bilateral and multilateral political relationships. Under Modi, the economic aspect of diplomacy has increasingly become the focus on Indian development assistance. Development partnerships are as tools through which India can realize its larger economic policy objectives and overall foreign policy goals. In addition to a larger focus on economic diplomacy in India's development partnership relationships, Modi's development assistance has engaged in more mercantilist modes of foreign assistance. Indian LOCs, which through their tied aid component provide a government boost to Indian exporters, have grown substantially under Modi, as discussed above. Prime Minister Modi's office personally designed two new lending instruments, the Concessional Financing Scheme and the SAARC Special Purpose Facility, and channeled them through the ministry of finance in the 2016/2017 budget.12 The first new scheme is intended to support Indian private companies that are bidding to construct infrastructure projects in countries in Africa and in India's neighborhood, which are deemed strategically important to India. This new budget item provides interest rate equalization support directly to Indian companies engaged in building infrastructure in countries of strategic importance to India. The SAARC Special Purpose Facility scheme will be managed by India's EXIM Bank; its purpose is to finance Indian companies engaged in infrastructure projects aimed at increasing trade and connectivity in the South Asian Region. Both these new schemes follow the Chinese or East Asian model of the state subsidizing the expansion of commercial enterprises abroad and considering it foreign assistance. The two new schemes along with the rapidly increasing credit lines are the products of a government that is focused on reigning in India's budget deficit while continuing to increase India's development partnerships. Moreover, since the goods and services imported from India under these credit lines are usually free from import taxes and other forms of levies, they provide Indian companies with a competitive advantage in recipient countries. They also signal the Modi administration's mercantilist approach to Indian development partnerships, where foreign assistance is increasingly being used to open up markets for Indian exporters of goods and services. Centralization of Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy The biggest change in India's approach to foreign aid and foreign policy more generally, however, has undoubtedly been at the individual level where the powerful office of the prime minister has increasingly centralized decision-making. Disbursement of development assistance is a way of furthering the foreign policy agenda of the executive, and in a government where a single party holds the majority and where the campaign was conducted as much by Modi as the party he represented, one would expect this greater control in decision-making by the office of the prime minister. Modi's 2014 brought an end to 25 years of coalition governments. The new government was the first single-party majority government ever formed by the BJP. The historic win was widely attributed to Modi, who was named the BJP's prime ministerial candidate nine months before the election, a first for the BJP. Since becoming prime minister, Modi has centralized foreign policy decision-making, including foreign assistance decisions, by increasing the power of the office of the prime minister and leading it in a quasi-presidential style. Modi has marginalized the minister of external affairs and increasingly has channeled development assistance resources through the ministry of finance, where Modi is able to be more directly involved in decision-making. Taken together this increasing centralization has made India's foreign assistance policy appear more coherent. Yet it also begs the question of checks and balances in foreign policy decision-making in a consolidated democracy like India. An example of this centralization of foreign policy decision-making in the office of the prime minister has been Modi's approach to the exodus of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. India has traditionally prided itself on being welcoming to refugees, from Tibetans to East Pakistanis and Afghans, and on not interfering in the domestic politics of other countries. Yet despite this history of openness, during his September 2017 visit to Myanmar, Modi played to his Hindutva base by characterizing the genocide against the ethnic Rohingyas—who are coincidentally also a Muslim minority in Myanmar—as a response to terrorism conducted by the Rohingyas. While Myanmar is crucial to India's Act East foreign policy, siding with Myanmar's de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi was a decision that went against the broad contours of Indian foreign policy engagement. In contrast to most prime ministers since Nehru who empowered cabinet ministers with decision-making powers, Modi's first press statement in which he allocated the portfolios within his cabinet clearly stated that the prime minister is in charge of “all important policy issues” as well as “all other portfolios not allocated to any minister” (Dhoot 2014). Managing the prime ministerial post much as he did the post of chief minister of Gujarat, Modi leaves no important foreign policy decisions to his ministers or administrators. For example, during his June 2015 historic visit to Bangladesh, the joint press briefing with Bangladesh's leader was also used as a forum for announcing India's largest line of credit ever offered at that time. Moreover, many of Modi's foreign policy press statements refer to his foreign relations and foreign policy accomplishments (Chandra 2016), rather than those of his party. Under Modi, the office of the prime minister has increasingly become fused with that of the individual Modi. Modi's centralization of foreign assistance decision-making is also increasingly visible in the marginalization of the traditional ministry in charge of foreign assistance decision-making, the ministry of external affairs. Not only has the actual amount of foreign assistance channeled through MEA decreased under Modi's tenure, but increasingly directors in MEA are hesitant to make larger decisions without consulting the prime minister's office. Under previous administrations, MEA directors had free reign in deciding India's foreign aid lending portfolios in conjunction with the ambassadors posted in the respective countries. Major foreign assistance decisions are made in the office of the prime minister, if not made by Modi himself. Perhaps the clearest indication of the increasing role of individual-level factors, the centralization of foreign aid decision-making and the increasing mercantilization of Indian aid under Modi, is the growing role played by the ministry of finance in managing and disbursing foreign assistance. Between 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 the amount of development assistance channeled through the finance ministry doubled. Moreover, the rupee amount disbursed through the MOF also undervalued the large credit line increases, since budget reporting only necessitates indicating the interest rate subsidy rather than the amount of the credit line. Furthermore, the two new foreign-aid lending instruments created in 2015/2016 and discussed above are ostensibly managed by the ministry of finance, but the ministry administrators have been required to report initial functioning of these programs directly to the prime minister.13 Furthermore, while the overt purpose of these new lending instruments and the existing credit lines is to provide large credits to borrowing countries at concessional rates, they also provide significant subsidies to Indian exporters who provide the supplies and services through these new lending instruments and credit lines. Prime Minister Modi's more activist and centralized approach to foreign policy making is visible in his approach to Indian development assistance. While continuing the previous administration's commitment to increasing Indian foreign assistance commitments and maintaining the strategic imperatives underlying Indian assistance, systemic- and national-level factors in determining foreign aid remained largely unaffected. Yet in contrast to the administrations of the last three decades, individual-level factors have played a significant role in determining Indian foreign aid, as Prime Minister Modi has personally overseen the increasing mercantilization of Indian foreign assistance. Looking West? Evaluating Change and Continuity in Modi's Middle East Policy Nicolas Blarel Leiden University In the three years since Narendra Modi became prime minister of India, various journalistic and policy accounts have emphasized a reorientation of India's Middle East policy. These studies have generally emphasized Modi's public overtures toward Israel, including the unprecedented 2017 visit to Tel Aviv, as public signs of a break with India's traditional pro-Arab and pro-Palestine approach (Madan 2016; Roy 2016a; Desai 2017). Others have interpreted Modi's successive visits to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar as indicators of a novel outreach to all relevant actors in the region (Pant 2016; Mohan 2016b). But have these overtures and visits clearly signaled a substantial foreign policy change? Can this seeming policy shift be attributable to the personal influence of Modi or to a wider number of international, regional, and/or domestic factors? In order to answer these questions, this essay first briefly looks at the history of India's relations with the Middle East. Second, building on foreign policy scholarship, the essay looks at theoretical expectations about Modi's role in (re)shaping India's approach toward the Middle East. Third, the essay assesses the degree of continuity and change in India's approach toward the region for the last three years. Finally, the essay concludes with a discussion of whether this case study can give us some indications of whether the Indian Prime Minister has been willing and/or able to redirect India's foreign policy since his election. Background: India's Middle East Policies In order to assess the nature and magnitude of any policy change, it is important to look at the history of India's engagement of the Middle East and to identify some long-term determinants. India's approach to the region has mainly evolved based on three dimensions: the perception of its interests, the perception of its national capacities to effectively meet those interests, and the perception of actors in the Middle East of India's regional role and influence. From its independence in 1947 to the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, India initially pursued what could be called a policy of open engagement of all actors in the region, including Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, believed India should be direct party to the resolution of regional disputes to preserve its influence and interests. As a consequence, India was directly involved in the international negotiations leading to the settlement of crises in Palestine, Lebanon, and Suez in the late 1940s and 1950s (Mudiam 1994). However, India's approach changed after the Suez crisis when it opted for a less interventionist strategy toward the region (Blarel 2015, 124–132). Because of its limited projection capabilities, India decided to defer to regional allies, such as Egypt, to have an influence on regional events. This alignment strategy was also a reaction to the emergence of US-sponsored Baghdad pact, an alliance system that directly favored India's rival, Pakistan (McGarr 2013, 16–25). A series of structural shocks in the early 1990s allowed India to decisively reorient its Middle East policy. First, both the Gulf War and the Oslo Peace process revealed important divisions within the Arab-Muslim world that left India with unprecedented diplomatic leeway, notably to engage actors it had previously neglected without any concern of diplomatic repercussions. One major indicator of this policy shift was the establishment, under a Congress-led government, of diplomatic relations, in January 1992, with Israel, a country that Indian political leaders had long neglected for fear of estranging its Arab partners or its domestic Muslim population (Kumaraswamy 2010). In addition, India's economic growth, rising international influence, and new status as a nuclear weapons state in the 1990s gradually made it a major destination for exports, and a venue for investments for most Middle Eastern states. India's imports from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) increased from $2 billion to $108 billion from 2000 to 2013 (Department of Commerce 2016–2017). The UAE is also now India's largest source of investment from the Arab world (80 percent of GCC investments in India), its 11th largest foreign investor, and the UAE is negotiating to devote an additional $75 billion commitment to India's infrastructure sector (Calabrese 2017). As an indirect result of sustained economic growth and technological breakthroughs rather than driven by an explicit outreach policy, the Gulf states’ perceptions of India dramatically changed from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. Conditions Ripe for Foreign Policy Change? Based on the existing scholarship that emphasizes the role of leadership on foreign policy outcomes, why would we expect Modi to reshape India's Middle East policy? The literature generally distinguishes various causal mechanisms. Some scholars insist on the importance of exogenous shocks (whether of an international or domestic nature) as key enablers for those espousing alternative foreign policy agendas to prevail (Legro 2005). Using this literature as a benchmark, it is important to assess whether Modi acts as a policy entrepreneur who perceives opportunity structures to implement his own policy ideas or whether it is his cognitive predispositions as a decision-maker that enable or limit his capacities to initiate foreign policy reforms (Welch 2005; Ziv 2013). While studies emphasizing predispositions would not argue that an individual is capable of independently pushing for foreign policy change, they give greater importance to leaders’ cognitive filters as key intervening variables to account for the timing and degree of policy change. Finally, some scholarship highlights the impact of ideational variables, when international and institutional conditions are propitious, to explain the process of foreign policy change (Checkel 1997). Following this logic, the ideological preferences of leaders like Modi are the key variables to understanding any policy shift toward the Middle East. There are two main explanations given to understand Modi's Middle East policy. The first one is ideological, as argued by Basrur and Hall. Given Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) membership, some scholars emphasized the role of Hindu nationalism in favoring the rapprochement with Israel and in reorienting India's policy toward the Middle East (Jaffrelot 2003). It is possible to trace some continuity in the BJP's approach to Israel as campaign manifestos have consistently promoted a reassessment of India's policy toward Israel (Blarel 2015). The BJP (and its predecessor, the Jana Sangh) has long highlighted that India's long-standing and unconditional backing of the Arab states was never reciprocated in international institutions when India needed support in its disputes with Pakistan. In a complete break with past policies, the previous BJP government (1998–2004) had also welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in New Delhi in September 2003. The other explanation for a possible policy change can be linked to Modi's more favorable disposition toward Israel, which can be traced back to his tenure as chief minister of Gujarat when he directly negotiated with Tel Aviv on agricultural cooperation. Modi visited Israel in 2006 and promised that he would come back to Tel Aviv when he became prime minister (Moskowitz 2014). The assumption here is that Modi was personally conscious of the benefits of openly cooperating with Israel and that he would assertively push for stronger bilateral relations once in power. Furthermore, by contrast with the previous BJP cabinet that had to govern in the context of a large political coalition, the National Democratic Alliance, the BJP now has more political and institutional leverage to impose Modi's own policy preferences. Obstacles to Policy Change and Course Correction In accordance with the suggested theoretical expectations, Modi made some overtures to Israel during his first year in office. Breaking with past Indian governments, he publicly acknowledged what had until then been a discreet, albeit burgeoning, commercial and defense relationship with Israel. Modi publicly met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2014 and again during the Paris Climate Change Conference in November 2015. Finally, Modi became the first sitting Indian Prime Minister to visit Tel Aviv in July 2017 (Kershner and Barry 2017). This publicized and increased political interaction stands in sharp contrast with the approach adopted by the preceding Indian National Congress government. The previous Prime Minister Manmohan Singh never met with any Israeli ministers during his ten years in office (2004–2014). In parallel with this heightened public dialogue with Israel, India abstained in July 2015 and in March 2016 from supporting a Palestine-sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva to launch a probe by the International Criminal Court against Israel for war crimes during the 2014 Gaza crisis (Mitra 2016). Breaking with an informal pattern established through previous ministerial visits, Modi also deliberately decided not to make a stop by Ramallah when visiting Israel (Stacey and Reed 2017). These recent diplomatic initiatives have led to speculation about a possible shift in India's traditional support of Palestine. However, the narrative of a paradigmatic shift in India's position is complicated by other empirical realities. After initial signaling in the direction of a pro-Israel tilt, Modi quickly embarked on a course correction and effectively resumed the policy of multi-engagement of all relevant regional actors in the Middle East—the policy that most Indian governments have followed since 1991. Ideological and individual preferences were trumped by domestic politics, international developments, and institutional constraints. While the BJP has been more public in its engagement with Israel since 2014, it has also regularly reasserted its support for the Palestinian Authority and developed parallel relations with Iran. There were concerns that a too apparent alignment with Israel could lead to adverse electoral consequences, both at the national and regional levels, because both the Muslim minority in India and the communist parties are critical of an explicit tilt toward Israel in the Middle East. Furthermore, the establishment of diplomatic relations and the development of defense relations with Israel have been supported by a bipartisan consensus over the last 25 years. Since 2014, Modi primarily has continued defense deals that had been signed under the previous Congress party government. Consequently, there is in fact great continuity in India's Israel policy. At the institutional level, there has been opposition within the MEA to a change in India's traditional position of support for the Palestinian position in the Israel-Palestine dispute. The MEA for instance encouraged the inclusion of a paragraph critical of Israel in the 2014 BRICS summit declaration, as well as encouraged the government to condemn Israel during the Gaza War of July–August 2014. These two positions are at odds with Modi's apparent willingness to improve strategic ties with Israel. These repeated divergences between his desires and the MEA reportedly led Modi to replace Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh in January 2015 (Bagchi 2015). Anticipating international and domestic criticisms linked to a stand-alone visit to Israel, Modi also invited Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas to New Delhi in May 2017 and reasserted India's traditional position in support for an independent Palestinian nation “at peace with Israel” (Bhattacherjee 2017). In addition, it took Modi three years to visit Israel, preferring to let President Pranab Mukherjee make the historic first trip to Israel and Palestine in October 2015. Instead, the Indian Prime Minister made his first highly publicized Middle East visit to the UAE in August 2015. Along with the spring 2016 visits to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar, this tilt toward the Gulf demonstrated that there were other short- and long-term factors that prevailed in shaping Modi's approach to the Middle East. First, Modi's Middle East policy has been driven by structural conditions that justify increased public exchanges with the Gulf States. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are India's fourth and third largest trade partners (Department of Commerce 2016–2017), respectively, as well as its first and sixth largest sources of oil (OEC 2013). Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also home to important Indian diaspora communities, with 2 million expatriates in Saudi Arabia and 2.3 million in the UAE. These expats respectively send $11.0 and $13.2 billion in remittances back to India (World Bank 2016). Modi's visits to these Gulf countries can therefore be seen as an effort to consolidate those economic ties. The interest has also been reciprocal as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other GCC members increasingly see India as an important emerging market for their energy exports, foreign investments, and joint venture opportunities. Second, more immediate regional developments can also help explain Modi's (re)focus on the Gulf States. By refusing to contribute troops to the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen or to quell dissent in Bahrain, Pakistan has sent mixed signals about its unconditional military support for Saudi Arabia. Modi and his government have perceived a potential deterioration in Pakistan's ties with the Gulf states as a window of opportunity to reinforce India's security cooperation with partners in the region, including in the area of counter-terrorism. Discussions during the visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have focused on finalizing agreements ensuring the extradition of Pakistan and Indian terrorists as well as limiting money laundering activities from these same groups in the UAE and Saudi Arabia (Government of India 2016; Ministry of External Affairs 2016). This increased counter-terrorism cooperation with the Gulf States is a continuation of policies initiated by previous governments instead of a radical policy departure. The strategic partnership signed with Saudi Arabia in 2010 included robust anti-terror cooperation measures. Additionally, Saudi Arabia's 2012 deportation of Indian terrorist Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari, who was involved in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, had already signaled a willingness from Saudi Arabia to cooperate on these issues, even though such coordination has been to the detriment of Pakistan's interests (Lakshmi 2012). Finally, in parallel to the overtures made to Israel and the Gulf States, the Modi government also began a reengagement of Iran. The 2015 nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—signed by Iran and the P5 + 1 was perceived by the Modi government as a window of opportunity for further economic engagement after years of international embargo. During his May 2016 visit to Tehran, Modi concluded a tripartite contract (along with Afghanistan) for the expansion of the strategically located Chabahar Port (Iyengar 2016). For the energy-starved and rapidly growing India, the Chabahar Port provides a vital link to the resource- and mineral-rich Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Yet here again, Modi's foreign policy toward Iran can be viewed as capitalizing on efforts initiated by previous Indian governments as the Chabahar deal was 13 years in the making. Conclusion Much of the literature on foreign policy change argues that it is difficult to identify and weigh the causal influence of single personalities. It is equally challenging to distinguish rhetorical innovation from substantial and long-term changes in Modi's Middle East policy. Finally, the contours of the Modi government's policy toward the Middle East are still in flux since this analysis was undertaken midway through Modi's (first) term in office. That being said it seems that Modi's cognitive and ideological predispositions have indeed encouraged him to make public overtures to Israel and to suggest the elevation of a transactional relationship to a more mature political relationship during his first year in office. However, Modi also acted as a more rational policy entrepreneur, taking advantage of regional developments in 2015 such as the deterioration of links between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and the Iran nuclear deal to push for increased cooperation with regional actors other than Israel. Modi, from “Look East” to “Act East”: Semantic or Substantive Change? Manjeet S. Pardesi Victoria University of Wellington In 2014, India's newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the BJP announced that India was turning its “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy given the “great sense of priority” that India attached to its engagement with East Asia (Hindu 2014). The aim of this essay is to assess whether there has been any change in India's approach toward East Asia over the 2014–2017 period since Modi became prime minister. Despite a seeming policy upgrade through a name change, India's approach toward East Asia under Modi is in fact a continuation of the approach of his predecessor, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the Congress Party. This continuity is a result of the interplay between structural and ideational factors. At the structural level, India is responding to America's emerging approach toward a larger strategic Asia that combines the Indian and Pacific Oceans, China's rise, Japan's re-emergence, and Southeast Asia's economic dynamism. At the ideational level, Indian elites across the ideological spectrum are committed to the vision of India as a great power in Asia. This continuity is demonstrated with an analysis of India's approach toward Southeast Asia, the United States (in Asia), China, and Japan under Singh and Modi. While Modi's diplomacy has been more robust than his predecessor's, there has been no radical departure in India's policy toward East Asia; it has all the hallmarks of incremental advances on the policies of the previous government(s) (Singh 2017). I demonstrate four strands in India's approach toward East Asia that support elements of continuity: seeking congruence with America's approach toward Asia; upgrading of India's military capabilities vis-à-vis China while continuing with economic/political engagement; assuming a strategic approach toward Japan; and continuing to emphasize Southeast Asia and ASEAN-centrality. At the core of India's strategy in Asia is the quest to create a multipolar regional order with India as one of the poles. The Significance of Southeast Asia and ASEAN-Centrality Given the Chinese military presence in Tibet and the Sino-Pakistani quasi-alliance, Indian strategists have always feared that Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia would be tantamount to an encirclement of India. India's Look East policy was partially a response to such thinking. Prime Minister Singh who was one of the architects of India's Look East policy in 1991 (when he was finance minister) noted that this policy “was not merely an external economic policy, it was also a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and India's place in the evolving global economy. . . . India's destiny . . . [is] linked with that of Asia and more so [sic] South East Asia” (Singh 2005). At the same time, Singh also ensured that India became a founding member of the East Asia Summit in 2005. He also endorsed ASEAN-centrality in the emerging institutional architecture in Asia after noting that ASEAN's institutional leadership should set the agenda for regional cooperation (Singh 2012). In addition to this, New Delhi is also keen to partake in ASEAN's economic dynamism by cultivating closer economic links and by promoting physical connectivity. The ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (FTA) in goods came into effect in 2010 while the FTA in services and investment came into force in 2015. Both Singh and Modi have invested political capital to develop physical infrastructure connecting India and Southeast Asia. In the pipeline are an India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway (work for which began in 2002) and a project for an industrial corridor linking Chennai in southern India with Dawei in Myanmar that was launched in 2012–2013 (with the aim of eventually connecting it to Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam). In 2015, Modi proposed a $1 billion line of credit to foster physical and digital connectivity between India and ASEAN (Balasubrahmanian 2015). However, despite successive Indian governments’ commitment to these projects, the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway's completion has been pushed backed from 2016 to 2020 (Firstpost 2017). India is also bilaterally engaging its Southeast Asian partners such as Vietnam and Singapore. For example, India has been involved in oil exploration along with Vietnam in the South China Sea (under Singh as well as Modi) despite Chinese misgivings. Likewise, the Singapore air force and army obtained long-term access to military facilities in India for training purposes under Singh, and Singapore continues to use these facilities today.14 Beginning in 2011, India started conducting coordinated patrols in the Malacca Strait with Indonesia (Antara 2011). While India is willing to extend its naval assistance to Southeast Asia, the signal that New Delhi is trying to send to its Southeast Asian neighbors as recently articulated by Modi is that “India's Look East Policy is shaped around ASEAN, and its centrality in the regional security architecture” (PTI 2017). In other words, India is not seeking leadership in the region; instead India wants recognition as a major power by contributing positively to Asian security. The United States in India's Eastern Neighborhood As early as 2007, Singh's ambassador to the United States, Ronen Sen, noted that the “Pacific facet of the United States should . . . be factored into India's Look East policy” (Sen 2007). Modi has continued with Singh's policies to forge a close partnership with America, especially in East Asia. During Obama's 2015 visit as the chief guest during India's Republic Day celebrations, Obama and Modi signed a “joint vision” document for Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. This document demonstrated their overlapping strategic interests, as they called for “safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation” in this vast region, “especially in the South China Sea” (The White House 2015). Both Singh and Modi have understood the implications of closer ties with the United States to maintain a favorable balance of power in Asia in the context of China's phenomenal rise. It is noteworthy that the Trump administration has begun to refer to the wider Asian region as “the Indo-Pacific” to emphasize America's maritime approach to the region while highlighting the gradual emergence of India as a major power (Sevastopulo, 2017). However, this vision of the region is not new; Singh used this terminology in the past. Modi's Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar has specifically noted “the transformation of the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific” in this regard (Jaishankar 2017). There is an obvious military-strategic dimension to this conceptualization, and the Pentagon even sees “a strategic convergence between India's ‘Act East’ policy and the US Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region” and that America is “seeking to reinforce India's maritime capabilities as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region and beyond” (United States Department of Defense 2015, 28). At the same time, the State Department is also promoting Indo-Pacific Regional Connectivity—stretching from Central Asia to Southeast Asia via India—as an economic corridor (United States Department of State 2016). Engaging and Competing with China While India certainly values its growing partnership with the United States, India is unlikely to forge an alliance with the United States aimed at China (nor is it clear that America desires such a confrontational approach toward China) as strategic autonomy remains at the core of the Indian worldview (Khilnani et al. 2012; Hall 2016). Nevertheless, it is not lost on Indian policymakers that China's economy is five times the size of the Indian economy, while China's defense expenditure is four times larger than India's. While India is expected to grow faster than China over the coming decade, China's relatively high growth rate will ensure that India will be able to narrow the power differential with China only in the medium to long term. This power asymmetry coupled with China's growing military capabilities, including advanced infrastructure in Tibet (like high-speed rail links and high-altitude landing strips for aircraft/helicopters), has major security implications for India. Indeed, China has begun to refer India's Arunachal Pradesh (claimed more or less in its entirety by China) as “South Tibet” since 2006. Given this political dynamic and the large asymmetry in material power between China and India, New Delhi has two military options: lowering the nuclear threshold vis-à-vis China or upgrading its conventional military posture from defense to deterrence by denial. Given the implications of the former for India's relations with Pakistan, the United States, and its image as a responsible rising power, Singh's government chose to upgrade of India's military posture to create the capabilities to implement a deterrence by denial strategy. In 2013, Singh sanctioned the largest peacetime modernization of the Indian military by allocating $15 billion over five years (2013–2017) in response to the Chinese challenge. In addition to building roads and activating/upgrading airfields along the Sino-Indian border, the government also planned to raise two new mountain divisions (60,000 troops) for defensive operations and one new mountain strike corps (30,000 troops) for offensive operations (Pandit 2014). While India has been faced with its usual problems related to time delays and cost overruns in this regard, these plans seem to be continuing under Modi (The Tribune 2016). Whether India is able to raise a large mountain strike corps (as planned) or several small rapid reaction forces in its absence, India's current military strategy revolves around developing the capability to implement offensive military operations against China (at the operational/theater level) in order to deny China its battlefield objectives in any future war between the two countries. In addition to upgrading India's military and diplomatic posture vis-à-vis China, both Singh and Modi have sought to engage China politically and economically since a high-intensity rivalry with China would detract from India's urgent developmental needs. In 2013, India signed a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement with China to manage any misunderstandings that might arise from China and India's military interaction along their unmarked frontier. Likewise, the Modi government is in the process of establishing a military hotline between the Chinese and Indian military headquarters as a part of bilateral Confidence Building Measures. On the economic front, China is now India's single-largest trading partner with bilateral trade valued at $72.3 billion in 2014–2015, but with a trade surplus of $48.5 billion in China's favor (Department of Commerce 2016). This is a major dilemma for New Delhi that only may be resolved in the medium to long term if India develops a stronger industrial base. In the meanwhile, India has joined three China-led international institutions—the New Development Bank (NDB or the BRICS Development Bank, formed in July 2014), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB, formed in 2016), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, joined in 2017). India seeks to improve its international status by joining important international institutions and by enhancing its own role within the decision-making processes within these institutions. Notably, the discussions related to the formation of the NDB and the AIIB as well as India's impending membership in the SCO were begun under Singh, thereby further demonstrating continuity under Modi. However, this is not an endorsement by India of a China-led Asian regional order as demonstrated by India's refusal to participate in China's inaugural Belt and Road Initiative in 2017. India's overall strategy is to ameliorate sources of tension with China (while safeguarding its core interests), thereby facilitating India's own rise as a great power. Nevertheless, China remains uncomfortable with India's emergence as a major power in Asia, and given the power differential between China and India as well as Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative—that has the potential to radically transform Asian geopolitics—India has also been reaching out to Japan. Partnership with Japan Singh had a special affinity toward Japan and sought a closer partnership with Tokyo. In 2010, India and Japan organized their first “2 + 2” dialogue (with top bureaucrats from the foreign and defense ministries) to engage in high-level policy consultations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). When launched, it was India's first such dialogue with an external partner. Japan has also been involved with high-profile projects, under Singh and Modi alike, such as the Delhi Metro and the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridors. Japan has the technology and the political will (at least under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) to help bring about India's economic and technological transformation while contributing to a stable balance of power in Asia (Mukherjee and Yazaki 2016). Notably, Abe and Modi especially emphasized their commitment to “align Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy with India's Act East Policy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). The India-Japan Vision 2025 statement signed by Modi and Abe called for a “peaceful, open, equitable, stable, and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). While China was not officially mentioned, the implication was clear—the India-Japan partnership was essential to maintain a stable and equitable balance of power in Asia. It is noteworthy that under Modi, India, Japan, and the United States launched a trilateral dialogue at the level of their foreign ministers for mutual consultations (United States Department of State 2015). Furthermore, Japan has also joined the India-United States Malabar Exercises on a permanent basis starting in 2015. In late 2016, Modi and Abe signed a landmark civil nuclear deal (the negotiations for which had begun under Singh in 2010), which makes India the first non-member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to have such an agreement with Japan. In 2017, the United States, Japan, and India resurrected the “quad” along with Australia that had first met in 2007 (Madan 2017). The region's leading democracies see this as a platform to share information and promote consultations in order to better manage the rise of China. The quad also represents a measure of competition vis-à-vis China's Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, Modi's foreign secretary has noted that India prefers “having Japanese or the Americans in the room” in New Delhi's discussions related to physical connectivity and commerce in the region as it raises the “comfort levels” of all parties (The Hindu 2017). This is tacit acknowledgement by India that New Delhi needs support from Japan and the United States in its own approach toward Asia. Conclusion India's foreign policy toward East Asia has not witnessed any radical changes under PM Modi despite his rhetoric. Modi's policies represent a continuation of the policy momentum of his predecessor. Under Singh, India discovered America as a partner in East Asia, as the worldviews of the two countries overlapped with respect to the region to India's east. Modi has continued with these policies as India realizes that a strong partnership with the United States promotes India's strategic interests in East Asia while facilitating India's rise in the international order. Similarly, Modi has continued with Singh's pragmatic approach toward China—a healthy mix of competition and cooperation—which arguably began after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's landmark trip to China in 1988. Finally, both Singh and Modi believe that a strong India-Japan partnership contributes to creating a stable balance of power in Asia and that closer ties with Southeast Asia promote India as a major power in Asia's emerging strategic architecture. There has been an elite consensus in India (since independence) that the country is (or should emerge as) a great power in Asia. In 2006, Singh noted that “the emergence of India as a major global power is an idea whose time has come” (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). More recently, Modi clearly believes India to be one of the rising poles in the world when he observed that “the multi-polarity of the world, and an increasingly multi-polar Asia, is a dominant fact today. And, we [Indians] welcome it” (Modi 2017). A New Era in India's Foreign Policy? Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington When Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi assumed office in May 2014 after a stunning electoral victory for the BJP, few, if any, Indian or foreign analysts had predicted that he would pursue an activist foreign policy. There were sound reasons for assuming otherwise. Apart from a handful of foreign trips that he had undertaken during his tenure as the chief minister of the western state of Gujarat, he had evinced little or no interest in foreign affairs. Furthermore, during the election campaign he had, quite unsurprisingly, focused on issues of governance, corruption, and economic growth—three issues much on the minds of Indian voters. Consequently, his extraordinary focus on foreign policy issues since assuming office has come as a near complete surprise to both domestic and foreign observers. In his first two years in office, he had visited 44 countries. It is worth mentioning that including his visits to the UN General Assembly meetings, he visited the United States four times. The number of his visits to the United States is ironic because, as is made clear in the Introduction to this forum, during his stint as the chief minister of Gujarat, the United States had actually denied him a visa because of his possible role in an anti-Muslim pogrom that had swept across much of the state in February 2002 (Varadarajan 2002). Even more striking was his decision to invite and host President Barack Obama as the chief guest to the annual Republic Day parade in New Delhi in January 2015. This was the first time since 1950 when India had formally become a republic that an American president was asked to grace the occasion. Modi's frenetic foreign trips and the symbolic significance of inviting the president of the United States aside, we should ask whether any of his foreign policy choices really reflected a significant shift from past practices? Are the policy changes mostly cosmetic or do they reflect more substantive departures? Finally, has he brought about any noticeable changes in the country's foreign policy decision-making apparatus during his brief span in office? The essays in this forum have attempted to answer several of these questions through a careful examination of policies in particular issue areas as well as toward two important geographic regions. There is no reason to recapitulate the arguments and evidence adduced in the essays as that task has been addressed quite ably in the Introduction. Instead, it might be useful to summarize the more prominent foreign policy initiatives that have been launched under the Modi administration. To that end, it is possible to discuss its foreign policy choices in three distinct arenas: India's immediate neighborhood, its ties to several of the major powers, and in regions that lie athwart to the east and west of India. A Turn to the Neighborhood At the outset, it is evident that Modi has attached considerable priority to India's immediate neighborhood. To that end he has sought, albeit not always successfully, to mend fences with all of India's smaller neighbors. Most significantly he has settled a long-standing set of border disputes with Bangladesh (Associated Press 2015). He has also sought to improve relations with Sri Lanka and with the two Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal. The efforts to tackle India's ties to Nepal are especially significant as relations had frayed quite dramatically during Modi's first year in office over India's displeasure with the Nepalese regime's treatment of its minorities. His moves toward all India's smaller neighbors, barring Pakistan, have proven successful. However, despite his conciliatory gestures toward Pakistan, including a surprise visit to the country on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's birthday, he has failed to make much headway. Three factors explain this failure: first, India has faced internal disturbances in its portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir that Pakistan has sought to exploit, and second, the Pakistani military establishment, which wields disproportionate power in the country, has prevented Sharif from reciprocating Modi's overtures. Third, at least two significant terrorist attacks on Indian military bases, both of which were traced back to Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, have also vitiated the atmosphere between the two long-standing rivals. Faced with inflamed public opinion in the wake of the second attack at Uri in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, it is believed that Modi authorized military retaliation against terrorist encampments across the Line of Control—the de facto international border in the state (Ganguly 2016a). Modi's emphasis on improving ties with India's immediate neighbors stems from two very compelling imperatives that undergird his regime: without a stable neighborhood India cannot pursue economic growth and nor can it emerge as a major actor in Asia and beyond. Modi has also demonstrated a clear interest in bolstering ties with the major powers. To that end, he has made relations with the United States, Japan, and even India's principal adversary, China, major priorities. He has particularly made India's connections with the United States and Japan quite robust. Dealing with the Great Powers The Obama administration, for its part, set aside whatever qualms it may have had about associating itself with Modi. Instead, concerned with the uncertain trajectory of the rise of China, it has sought to enlist India as a potential strategic partner in Asia. Modi has also managed to place the Indo-Japanese relationship on a secure footing. In this endeavor three factors have come to his assistance. Japan, like the United States, shares misgivings about the increasing assertiveness of China in Asia. Its prime minister, Shinzo Abe, like his Indian counterpart, is also a nationalist. Consequently, the two individuals seem to share a common worldview (Chaudhuri 2015). More to the point, Abe sees India as a significant investment destination, and Modi has welcomed Japan's willingness to invest in India's infrastructure. Modi's effort to place relations with China on a more even keel, however, has run up against some unexpected shoals. For example, during Xi Jinping's elaborately staged state visit to India, the People's Liberation Army made a series of incursions along the Sino-Indian border in the region of Ladakh (TNN 2014). Not surprisingly, these incidents not only cast a pall on the visit but also vitiated the climate of Sino-Indian relations. Since then the government in New Delhi has adopted a more defiant deportment toward China. Among other matters, it has allowed both the US Ambassador to India, Richard Verma, as well as the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal head of the vast Tibetan diaspora community in India, to visit Arunachal Pradesh, a state in northeast India, which China has claimed in its entirety in recent years (PTI 2016a). Modi's willingness to engage the United States on the other hand has proven to be quite successful. In this context, it needs to be mentioned that Modi's government has benefited from the legacy of the previous regime. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's two terms, despite some differences on global issues such as trade and climate change, significant improvements had taken place in Indo-US relations. Modi has been able to build on these foundations for three compelling reasons. First, the Obama administration, after having initially courted China, shifted its focus. Second, once the United States overcame its earlier misgivings about Modi, he was willing to engage it in a wholly pragmatic fashion. His matter-of-factness in working with the United States also stems from his recognition of the need to balance the growing power of China. Third, Modi and his foreign policy team has also concluded that it was their interests to seize upon the willingness of the Obama administration to work with India on a range of issues. This, in their view, stemmed from the uncertainty associated with the outcome of the US presidential electoral cycle.15 One of the more significant developments that took place under the Modi regime was the signing of the logistics exchange memorandum of agreement (LEMOA) with the United States in August 2016 (Raj 2016). This agreement, which had been long under discussion, enables the two sides to use their respective military bases for the purposes of refueling and supplying their respective military forces. Previous Indian governments had engaged in endless discussions about this foundational agreement but had ultimately shied away from it because of their ideological unease with the United States and also fear of domestic political opposition. It needs to be underscored that Modi, while an ardent Indian nationalist, does not carry the ideological baggage of the once-dominant Congress Party. For example, not once has he paid the ritualistic obeisance to the doctrine of nonalignment in his public speeches. More to the point, he chose to skip the seventeenth meeting of the nonalignment summit in Venezuela, making him the second Indian prime minister in history ever to do so (Ganguly 2016b). Aside from pursuing good relations with the United States and Japan and dealing with China, Modi has enjoyed excellent relations with most European states. However, he has evinced a particular interest in France owing to a defense deal for 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft that had been initiated under the previous government. Though unable to fully consummate it owing to the labyrinthine procedures of India's weapons acquisitions process, Modi has moved forward on his own with the purchase of 36 Rafale Dassault aircraft (Clark 2015). Since the Indian air force remains in dire need of multiple squadrons to replace an aging fleet of MiG-21s, it is highly likely that this defense relationship with France will be sustained. Even while consummating this defense deal with France, Modi, intriguingly enough, has not allowed the substantial Indo-Russian arms transfer relationship to wither. In considerable part, Modi's continued reliance on Russia for defense supplies stems from two compelling reasons. First, despite the turn to the United States and France to meet India's defense needs, India's policymakers and defense bureaucrats have always wanted to diversify their sources of supply to the extent possible. Second, it is difficult to terminate the relationship with Russia because of path dependence. For several decades during the Cold War, when for either ideological or fiscal reasons India was unable to obtain weaponry from the Western world, it had come to rely on Russia. As a consequence, a substantial portion of its arsenal remains of Russian origin. Furthermore, even today Russia does not place end-user limits on the weaponry it sells to India and is often willing to pursue co-production arrangements (Farchy and Kazmin 2015). Heading East Beyond India's dealings with the major powers, Modi has pursued an assertive set of policies toward the states that lie immediately to the east and west of India. In the East he has sought to work with a range of countries stretching from Japan to Vietnam. In some measure, as argued in the Introduction, his policies have built upon an earlier initiative, India's Look East policy that had been inaugurated as early as the1990s under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. This policy shift had been undertaken in the wake of the end of the Cold War upon the recognition that India had long neglected the vibrant economies of Southeast Asia to its own detriment. The policy, though initiated under a Congress government, was nevertheless continued under BJP-led regimes and beyond. Under Modi the policy has been rebranded as the Act East policy and with this rebranding has come greater attention to the region (PTI 2014). Modi's policy, however, is not only designed to improve trade relations with the states of East and Southeast Asia but to also to address India's concerns about China's growing assertiveness in the region. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that much of India's efforts have been focused on bolstering ties with Japan and Vietnam, the two states that are probably most concerned about the growing Chinese boldness. The relationship with Japan deserves particular comment. Even before assuming his present office, Modi had evinced a keen interest in the country. At the time, his principal concern had been to attract investment to the state of Gujarat from Japan. Once in his present position he found a kindred spirit in the current Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe. Both individuals are staunch nationalists, they are keen on developing their respective country's military capabilities, and they share common misgivings about the role of the PRC in Asia. Consequently, individual, national, and regional interests neatly converge in this burgeoning bilateral relationship (PTI 2016b). India, of course, had long enjoyed cordial ties with Vietnam harking back to the Cold War era. Both Nehru and Ho Chi Minh were anti-colonial nationalists, and so they had shared a common bond. Subsequently, with India's unyielding opposition to the US war in Vietnam, Indo-Vietnamese ties had prospered. These links, in turn, were bolstered by their common strategic nexus with the Soviet Union (Thakur and Thayer 1992). India was one of the few states of any consequence in Asia that had supported the Vietnamese overthrow of the genocidal Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. Ties with Vietnam under Modi may now go beyond their historical and economic dimensions and include a strategic component. In June 2016, the Indian cabinet cleared the way for the sale to Vietnam of a short-range missile, the Brahmos, a missile developed in a joint venture with Russia (Negi 2016). Indo-Vietnamese ties were further strengthened in recent years as India's Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) sought to develop gas fields off the coast of Vietnam. These attempts at joint exploration ran aground of China's expansive maritime claims. Initially, India, wary of offending China, had chosen to withdraw from its investments. However, under Modi's regime, India has returned to the contested areas despite Chinese objections (Khanh and Thu 2014). Bridging the Gulf Modi has also built upon India's past record of tightrope diplomacy in the Persian Gulf. Its overtures toward the region for over a decade have involved a very delicate balancing act between the antagonistic regional powers of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Modi has not only continued the policies of his predecessors but has sought to build upon them. To that end, he has continued to court Saudi Arabia. His courtship of the country is hardly surprising. It supplies the largest amount of crude oil to India, and it hosts three million Indian expatriate workers (Johny 2016). Furthermore, a cordial relationship with Saudi Arabia is also important from another standpoint—keeping Pakistan off balance since the Saudis have historically enjoyed close ties with the country. Unlike his predecessor, Singh, who had expressed an interest in visiting the UAE but never did, Modi has made it a point to travel to the country. His visit was part and parcel of an overall strategy to enhance India's footprint in a region from which it derives 70 percent of its hydrocarbon needs. Yet, Modi has not neglected India's critical relationship with Iran. This relationship is of vital importance for a number of compelling reasons. Iran, like Saudi Arabia, is another major source of hydrocarbons for India. Also, given India's very substantial Shia population, maintaining good terms with Iran is an important domestic imperative. However, perhaps most importantly, Iran matters for reasons of regional security. In the absence of a close relationship with Iran, India has no viable access to Afghanistan—a country that is critical to India's security. Finally, with China investing in a vast port facility at Gwadar in southern Pakistan, Indian policymakers have sought to obtain a similar foothold in Iran. Modi has successfully negotiated an Indian role in building a port at Chabahar in Iran (Roy 2016b). Conclusion Does Modi's foreign policy then reflect a fundamental departure from past practices? Such a shift, in a democratic state with a well-developed foreign policy bureaucracy, is difficult to bring about. Furthermore, domestic political constituencies who care about particular foreign policy issues cannot be easily set aside, nor, for that matter, can the views of the powerful, permanent Indian foreign service be entirely disregarded. Despite these sources of political and institutional ballast that make radical departures in foreign policy orientation difficult at best, Modi has, in fact, broken new ground in some areas. In this context, it is important to underscore that he has benefited from a very weak parliamentary opposition, a point that has been underscored in the Introduction. As a consequence, he has been able to successfully move India closer to the United States. The scope of security cooperation with the United States, for example, has dramatically increased during his brief tenure in office. However, as argued in the Introduction, in a number of other realms, his changes have involved repackaging and rebranding of past initiatives, rather than dramatic departures from previous policies. Acknowledgements The forum contributors would like to thank Surupa Gupta and Rani Mullen for their stewardship of this special section, to all those involved in the ISA panel from which the articles are derived, and to the reviewers for their helpful suggestions for improvement. Footnotes 1 The only exception was 2008 when India's growth rate dipped to 3.8 percent, but that was a year of worldwide crisis. 2 For the leading contemporary statement of offensive realism, see Mearsheimer (2001). 3 For an insightful study that highlights the relationship between the illiberal politics of Hindutva and liberal economic policy in Gujarat, see Sud (2012). 4 Panchamrit literally means a mixture of five foods—clarified butter (ghee), honey, milk, sugar, and yogurt—commonly used during Hindu rituals. 5 For the view that elite foreign policy debates are essentially between centrist perspectives, see Ollapally and Rajagopalan (2011). 6 The novelty of Modi's foreign policy is much debated. See Hall (2015; 2016), Mohan (2015), and Tellis (2016). 7 India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, set the tone. See Nehru (1961). 8 The Bhagavadgita, which consists of passages from the epic Mahabharata, is a dialogue between a warrior-protagonist, Arjuna, and Krishna, in which the latter explains the meaning of dharma (or, roughly, “duty”). 9 Successive Indian governments have cultivated the diaspora since the mid-1990s (see Rana 2009). Some estimate about US $5 billion was spent in the 2014 campaign in which the BJP spent far more than its opponents (Sridharan 2014, 28). 10 On Vivekananda and contemporary Hindu nationalism, see Sharma (2013). On Modi's supposed devotion, see Mukhopadhyay (2013, 59–60). 11 The TFA addresses bureaucratic delays that slow down and impose costs on the movement of goods across borders. 12 Interview with senior foreign policy official, New Delhi, July 22, 2016. 13 Interview with an official of the Indian Ministry of Finance in New Delhi, March 31, 2017. 14 Singapore is the only foreign country given such facilities in India on a long-term basis. 15 Interview with senior foreign policy official, New Delhi, July 2016. References All India Ulama and Mashaikh Board . 2017 . “ Vision .” Accessed December 15, 2017. http://www.aiumb.org/about-us/vision/ . Antara . 2011 . “ RI, India Hold Joint Patrol in Malacca Strait .” Antara , September 27. Accessed February 2, 2018. https://en.antaranews.com/news/76025/ri-india-hold-joint-patrol-in-malacca-strait . Art of Living . 2016 . “ The World Culture Festival .” Art of Living . Accessed December 15, 2017. http://www.artofliving.org/world-culture-festival#/ . 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Fattore,, Christina

doi: 10.1093/isp/eky006pmid: N/A

Abstract Abstract: The Women's Caucus for International Studies and the ISA Committee on the Status of Women conducted a survey of the membership concerning the effects of gender on members’ professional and personal lives in November and December 2015. Other iterations of this survey using similar questions were conducted in 1995 and 2006. A plurality of women and a majority of men responded that things have gotten better for women in the discipline. However, using more specific questions and asking for open responses, the survey uncovered that men and women still have very different experiences within the discipline and that the chilly climate continues to persist in international relations. The 2015 survey reveals continued concerns regarding the tension between familial responsibilities and the academic environment, overt and structural discrimination, and the perception of “reverse discrimination” against men. Resumen: Entre noviembre y diciembre de 2015, el Comité de Mujeres del área de Estudios Internacionales y el Comité sobre la Situación de la Mujer de la Asociación de Estudios Internacionales (ISA, por sus siglas en inglés) les hicieron una encuesta a los miembros sobre las repercusiones del género en sus vidas personales y profesionales. Esta encuesta ya se realizó en 1995 y 2006 con preguntas similares. Muchas mujeres y la mayoría de los hombres respondieron que la situación de las mujeres ha mejorado en esta disciplina. Sin embargo, al hacer preguntas más específicas y pedir respuestas abiertas, la encuesta reveló que hombres y mujeres siguen teniendo experiencias muy dispares en la disciplina y que sigue habiendo un clima distante en el área de relaciones internacionales. La encuesta de 2015 muestra que sigue habiendo una preocupación por el equilibrio entre responsabilidades familiares y el entorno académico, una discriminación patente y estructural, y una percepción de “discriminación inversa” hacia los hombres. Extrait: Le Women's Caucus for International Studies (groupe collaboratif de soutien et de promotion des intérêts des femmes dans les Études internationales) et le Committee on the Status of Women de l'ISA (Comité de travail sur le statut des femmes de l'International Studies Association) ont mené en novembre et décembre 2015 une enquête auprès de leurs adhérents pour savoir si les différences entre sexes produisaient des effets sur leurs vies professionnelles et personnelles. D'autres itérations de cette enquête utilisant des questions similaires avaient été menées en 1995 et 2006. De nombreuses femmes et une majorité d'hommes ont répondu que la situation s’était améliorée pour les femmes dans la discipline. Toutefois, lorsque des questions plus spécifiques ont été posées et que des réponses ouvertes ont été demandées, l'enquête a permis de découvrir que de grandes différences subsistent dans le vécu des hommes et des femmes au sein de la discipline et que la frilosité perdure dans les relations internationales. L'enquête de 2015 a mis au jour des préoccupations persistantes relatives à la tension entre responsabilités familiales et environnement académique, au caractère flagrant et structurel de la discrimination, ainsi qu’à la «discrimination inverse» ressentie à l'encontre des hommes. gender, women, chilly climate, international studies, structural discrimination The Women's Caucus for International Studies (WCIS) celebrated its 20th anniversary at the 2016 International Studies Association meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. The Women's Caucus was founded “to upgrade the status of women in the profession of international studies and to promote their professional development; to advocate for the inclusion of women of diverse ethnic, racial, and national backgrounds…; [and] to promote equal opportunities for women in international studies in their professional lives…” (WCIS 2015). The membership of WCIS has grown exponentially over the years, from less than 200 members in 2011 to 459 in 2015. The growth of WCIS might suggest that women have found a place of their own within the ISA organization. Simultaneously, it is hard to ignore the pervasiveness of institutionalized biases within our discipline that perpetuate the chilly climate toward female scholars. Scholars have discussed the deep-rooted issues of graduate mentoring (Hesli, Fink, and Duffy 2003a, b), the gender gap in citations and publishing (Mathews and Andersen 2001; Breuning and Sanders 2007; Maliniak, Powers, and Walter 2013; Mitchell, Lange, and Brus 2013; Østby, Strand, and Gleditsch 2013; Zigerell 2015), the fact that women are less likely than men to be invited to coauthor (Teele and Thelen 2017), and the fact that women often carry heavier service commitments than male colleagues (Guarino and Borden 2017). These factors also contribute to issues regarding the confidence gap (Merriman-Goldring, Nelson, and Petrie 2015), tenure attainment (Hesli, Lee, and Mitchell 2012; Hancock, Baum, and Breuning 2013; Monroe 2013), promotion/leadership (Kadera 2013), and overall job satisfaction (Hesli and Lee 2013). The leaky pipeline problem continues to plague international studies and political science as a whole, with men reaching prominence in the field at a faster pace than women (Masuoka, Grofman, and Feld 2007; Lake 2016). Women in international studies and political science have sought ways to mitigate this bias. In the past decade, various types of formal and informal women-mentoring-women opportunities have arisen, from workshops like Journeys in World Politics and ISA's Pay It Forward, to the WCIS ISA breakfast meeting, to happy hours sponsored by the Women in Conflict Studies group and WCIS. More research-oriented sections, such as the ISA Feminist Theory and Gender Studies section, also provide a space for mentoring and networking among female scholars. Facebook groups and email listservs allow these conversations to expand beyond annual meetups at conferences. Female graduate students and junior scholars are seeking out senior women mentors in these various contexts, as they may not have that opportunity in their own departments (Blau et al. 2010; Chenowith et al. 2016). More recently, a group of mid-career female political scientists created a website called “Women Also Know Stuff” as a way for women scholars to self-promote their work in a database that is available for other scholars and journalists to use to find women who are experts on specific political science/international relations topics (Beaulieu et al. 2017). While women are seeking support among their peers and from senior women scholars to combat the structural barriers to their success in the field, recent issues in international studies and academia illustrate that sexism and sexual harassment continue to be prevalent. In the United States, Title IX has come under attack over the past decade as it has become clear that large universities consciously choose to ignore the protections provided by this legislation to female students and scholars who are victims of sexual violence and harassment. A recent Guardian expose uncovered that “sexual harassment, misconduct, and gender violence by university staff are at epidemic levels in the UK” (Batty, Weale, and Bannock 2017). In fact, because of the number of complaints made by conference attendees in recent years (none of them formal), ISA introduced a series of ten panels at the 2017 annual meeting with the point of “challenging systemic oppression” against women, the LGBTQ + community, and Global South scholars, as well as other underrepresented groups. These panels were organized by broad coalition of sections and caucuses within ISA as well as by individuals who were committed to these issues. Discussion centered around “the systemic roots of marginalization, discrimination, and violence within ISA, the profession, and the world” (WCIS 2016) and provided a space for those who wanted to share personal stories and experiences (MacKenzie 2015) for their own benefit as well as providing advice for navigating this hostile environment. The names of these related panels reveal some of the issues that women and other underrepresented groups continue to face within our discipline and the neoliberal university. Panel titles such as “confronting systems of power and privilege in higher education,” “the academy as a hostile work environment,” “how to cope with retaliation,” and “speaking truth to power: challenging toxic masculinities, faculty predators, and institutional betrayal” illustrate that women (and others) face challenges that are unique to their position and situation in the discipline and academia. Many of these panels provided participants with a safe space to “share and discuss experiences in the academy” as well as to suggest mechanisms “to survive and flourish under such [hostile] conditions.” Conversations about the omnipresent sexism in our discipline and academia can also be found in much more informal settings than at annual conventions or in journal articles. Blogs and online forums have become a space in which both men and women discuss sexism in international studies and political science. Sexism, sexual harassment, and diversity issues have been discussed by many of the most visible blogs in the discipline such as The Duck of Minerva (Sjoberg 2012; Merriman-Goldring et al. 2015; Weber 2015; Wilkinson 2015; Saideman 2015a, b; 2016; Cunningham 2016; Wibben 2016; Fujii 2017) and The Disorder of Things (Shepherd 2015; Särmä and Wilkinson 2016; Zalewski 2016; Kirby 2017; Yao and Delatolla 2017). Interestingly, many sexism deniers utilize their ability to hide behind anonymity in such online forums to complain about mentoring programs that are exclusive to women as being “reverse sexist.” While published scholarship, informal blog posts, and panels at annual conferences have been drawing attention to the issue of sexist behavior and sexual harassment in our discipline, there are critiques that the apparent pervasiveness of hostile behavior is misleading because many discussions make use of hearsay or gossip. The truth of the matter is that women, especially those that are most vulnerable in the profession, are unlikely to share their experiences for fear of retribution or ridicule. In order to combat this, WCIS (joined later by the ISA Committee on the Status of Women) has surveyed both women and men about their experiences and observations regarding the gender climate of the discipline. The first survey was via mail in 1995, with the next survey emailed to members in late 2005–early 2006. This study compares the results of the 1995 survey (Henehan and Sarkees 1996), the 2005/2006 survey (Henehan and Sarkees 2009), and a more recent survey from November–December 2015 (Hudson, Haight, and Fattore 2016). The main hope/assumption was that the survey would show that the chilly climate for women in international relations had indeed warmed. However, the survey responses indicated that women still need a space of their own to survive and thrive in international studies. Survey Administration and Sample The 2015 survey included many of the same questions used in the 1995 and 2005 surveys to make longitudinal comparisons possible. Prior to the administration of the survey, the Institutional Review Board at West Virginia University provided an “exempt” status for this study. The survey was administered through a Google Form and was available to all ISA members who were interested in participating from November 17 to December 11, 2015. An email from ISA headquarters dated November 17, 2015, notified the membership of the availability of the survey. ISA HQ sent email reminders from time to time over the course of the open period. Informal reminders were sent to various caucuses and groups within ISA through social media. Like the 1995 and 2005 surveys, the response pool was “self-selected” and “not a random sample of the ISA membership, [therefore] there are limits to what one can infer from statistical patterns” (Henehan and Sarkees 2009, 431). With 696 respondents out of a total ISA membership of 6,080, the response rate was 11.45 percent. The response rate was lower than the 2005–2006 survey, which had an estimated response rate of 21 percent. Clearly, there are limits to the representativeness of this sample. ISA does not collect data on age, race, or religiosity of its membership. However, it does collect data on sex and rank of its membership. While some groups are overrepresented in this sample, as will be described more fully in the next section, this study does allow for a comparison between what men and women experience in our discipline and how their sex affects their experiences. Descriptive Statistics Demographics The respondents of the 2015 survey were more likely to be female than the ISA membership overall: 68.5 percent of the respondents identified as female, while only 40.1 percent of ISA members are women. While women are overrepresented in our sample, this is to be expected given the subject matter of our survey. As a whole, the survey's respondents were among the younger members of the association: 18.68 percent of all respondents were either age 30 or below, while 60.34 percent were age 40 or below. This seemed to be consistent across the sexes: 53.3 percent of male respondents and 63.3 percent of female respondents were age 40 or below. Additionally, more than two-thirds of the respondents had belonged to ISA for ten years or less. This also illustrates the “young” nature of the sample. Finally, the US was strongly represented among the respondents: 54 percent of all respondents identified themselves as being US citizens, while 31.9 percent of all respondents belonged to non-US, Global North countries, while 12.5 percent came from the Global South. Both the 1995 and 2006 surveys also had disproportionalities regarding participation. Henehan and Sarkees (2009, 431) suggest that “rather than expecting the responses to paint a representative picture of the field, we should see this survey as giving voice to an interested population… to whom gender issues are important enough to respond to a survey.” While a more representative sample that reflects the composition of ISA membership would be ideal, there are still important observations to be garnered from this survey and its results. Employment As with the two previous surveys, some groups were underrepresented in the sample (students, specifically) while other groups were overrepresented (male assistant and full professors as well as female assistant and associate professors). Continuing the trend from 2006, men were still more likely to be employed full-time (82.7 percent of men in 2015 versus 74.5 percent in 2006) than women (74 percent of women in 2015 versus 66.6 percent in 2006). The gap between men and women who were employed part-time shrank in the ten years since the last survey (9.2 percent of women and 6.5 percent of men in 2006; 5.5 percent of women and 4.2 percent of men in 2015), which illustrates some gender parity at this level of employment. Only four female respondents (<1 percent of women) identified themselves as being retired, while seven male respondents (3.3 percent of men) did the same. The gender gap regarding attaining tenure persists in the 2015 sample: 30.6 percent of female respondents and 46.3 percent of men were tenured. The percentage of women who are tenured shrank in the ten years between surveys (41.9 percent of women in 2006). The 2015 result was similar to that in the original 1995 survey (36.7 percent of women had tenure). This could be due to the sample makeup. However, at a minimum, this suggests that obtaining tenure remains a challenge for women. Examining salary also provides a measure of professional advancement and success (see Table 1). In both the 1995 and the 2006 surveys, there was a statistically significant relationship between sex and salary. While the significant relationship persists in the 2015 survey, it is a statistically weaker relationship (significant at the p = 0.05 level rather than the p = 0.000 level in the two previous surveys). Women are still disproportionally represented in the less-than $60,000 categories, but that margin decreased over the years. In 1995, 91 percent of the women and 70.6 percent of the men made less than $60,000 annually. The gap got smaller in 2006 with 67.7 percent of women and 53.9 percent of men identifying their salary in these categories. In 2015, 49.5 percent of women and 39.1 percent of men were still earning less than $60,000. While the income gap at the lower end of this scale persists, it has gotten smaller. It is especially interesting that there is relative equality in the $80,001–$100,000 category (14.5 percent of female respondents and 14.6 percent of male respondents reported this salary range in the 2015 survey). In the highest income category (salary more than $100,000), the gap between men and women lessened over the past ten years but continues to be noticeable. This trend should persist because of the structural issues relating to the promotion of women from associate professor to full professor. Table 1. Salary by sex. 1995 2006 2015 Salary Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Under $20,000 # 80 85 165 74 96 170 14 67 82 % 16.2 28.2 20.7 19.0 26.0 22.4 6.9 15.4 12.9 $20,001 to $40,000 # 131 103 234 39 58 97 24 62 86 % 26.5 34.2 29.4 10.0 15.7 12.8 11.9 14.3 13.5 $40,001 to $60,000 # 138 86 224 97 96 193 41 86 129 % 27.9 28.6 28.1 24.9 26.0 25.5 20.3 19.8 20.3 $60,001 to $80,000 # 88 21 109 80 81 161 46 89 137 % 17.8 7.0 13.7 20.6 22.0 21.2 22.8 20.5 21.5 $80,001 to $100,000 # 58 6 64 38 22 60 30 63 93 % 11.7 2.0 8.0 9.8 6.0 7.9 14.6 14.5 14.6 Over $100,001 # 61 16 77 47 68 115 % 15.7 4.3 10.2 23.3 15.6 18.1 Total # 495 301 796 389 369 758 202 435 637 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1995 2006 2015 Salary Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Under $20,000 # 80 85 165 74 96 170 14 67 82 % 16.2 28.2 20.7 19.0 26.0 22.4 6.9 15.4 12.9 $20,001 to $40,000 # 131 103 234 39 58 97 24 62 86 % 26.5 34.2 29.4 10.0 15.7 12.8 11.9 14.3 13.5 $40,001 to $60,000 # 138 86 224 97 96 193 41 86 129 % 27.9 28.6 28.1 24.9 26.0 25.5 20.3 19.8 20.3 $60,001 to $80,000 # 88 21 109 80 81 161 46 89 137 % 17.8 7.0 13.7 20.6 22.0 21.2 22.8 20.5 21.5 $80,001 to $100,000 # 58 6 64 38 22 60 30 63 93 % 11.7 2.0 8.0 9.8 6.0 7.9 14.6 14.5 14.6 Over $100,001 # 61 16 77 47 68 115 % 15.7 4.3 10.2 23.3 15.6 18.1 Total # 495 301 796 389 369 758 202 435 637 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1995: Chi-square = 55.0, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 2006: Chi-square = 36.6, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 2015: Chi-square = 13.2, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.022 View Large Table 1. Salary by sex. 1995 2006 2015 Salary Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Under $20,000 # 80 85 165 74 96 170 14 67 82 % 16.2 28.2 20.7 19.0 26.0 22.4 6.9 15.4 12.9 $20,001 to $40,000 # 131 103 234 39 58 97 24 62 86 % 26.5 34.2 29.4 10.0 15.7 12.8 11.9 14.3 13.5 $40,001 to $60,000 # 138 86 224 97 96 193 41 86 129 % 27.9 28.6 28.1 24.9 26.0 25.5 20.3 19.8 20.3 $60,001 to $80,000 # 88 21 109 80 81 161 46 89 137 % 17.8 7.0 13.7 20.6 22.0 21.2 22.8 20.5 21.5 $80,001 to $100,000 # 58 6 64 38 22 60 30 63 93 % 11.7 2.0 8.0 9.8 6.0 7.9 14.6 14.5 14.6 Over $100,001 # 61 16 77 47 68 115 % 15.7 4.3 10.2 23.3 15.6 18.1 Total # 495 301 796 389 369 758 202 435 637 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1995 2006 2015 Salary Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Under $20,000 # 80 85 165 74 96 170 14 67 82 % 16.2 28.2 20.7 19.0 26.0 22.4 6.9 15.4 12.9 $20,001 to $40,000 # 131 103 234 39 58 97 24 62 86 % 26.5 34.2 29.4 10.0 15.7 12.8 11.9 14.3 13.5 $40,001 to $60,000 # 138 86 224 97 96 193 41 86 129 % 27.9 28.6 28.1 24.9 26.0 25.5 20.3 19.8 20.3 $60,001 to $80,000 # 88 21 109 80 81 161 46 89 137 % 17.8 7.0 13.7 20.6 22.0 21.2 22.8 20.5 21.5 $80,001 to $100,000 # 58 6 64 38 22 60 30 63 93 % 11.7 2.0 8.0 9.8 6.0 7.9 14.6 14.5 14.6 Over $100,001 # 61 16 77 47 68 115 % 15.7 4.3 10.2 23.3 15.6 18.1 Total # 495 301 796 389 369 758 202 435 637 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1995: Chi-square = 55.0, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 2006: Chi-square = 36.6, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 2015: Chi-square = 13.2, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.022 View Large When we examine academic ranks by sex, we can see this structural barrier (see Table 2). The 2015 results resemble the 1995 and 2006 results in that there are similar percentages of men and women at the associate professor rank and the instructor/adjunct rank. The gap between how many male and female full professors responded to the 2015 survey is similar to the ratio in the 2006 survey. There is a strong statistically significant relationship between sex and rank. The clearest differences between male and female respondents in our survey are at the student rank and the full professor rank. Similar to what we see in the discipline, there are more female students, but a significantly larger number of male full professors. This also supports the leaky pipeline scenario. Table 2. Rank by sex. 1995 2006 2015 Rank Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Full Professor # 176 31 207 94 41 135 56 60 116 % 36.7 10.8 27.1 23.4 11.0 17.4 26.3 12.7 16.9 Associate Professor # 72 46 118 70 61 131 47 96 143 % 15.0 16.1 15.4 17.5 16.4 16.9 22.1 20.3 20.8 Assistant Professor # 93 85 178 70 78 148 65 167 232 % 19.4 29.7 23.3 17.5 20.9 19.1 30.5 35.3 33.8 Instructor/Adjunct # 31 26 57 38 35 73 13 27 40 % 6.5 9.1 7.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 6.1 5.7 5.8 Student # 66 73 139 37 48 85 19 74 93 % 13.8 25.4 18.2 9.2 12.9 11.0 8.9 15.6 13.6 Other # 41 25 66 92 110 202 13 49 62 % 8.6 8.7 8.7 22.9 29.5 26.1 6.1 10.4 9.0 Total # 479 286 765 401 373 774 213 473 686 % 100 99.8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1995 2006 2015 Rank Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Full Professor # 176 31 207 94 41 135 56 60 116 % 36.7 10.8 27.1 23.4 11.0 17.4 26.3 12.7 16.9 Associate Professor # 72 46 118 70 61 131 47 96 143 % 15.0 16.1 15.4 17.5 16.4 16.9 22.1 20.3 20.8 Assistant Professor # 93 85 178 70 78 148 65 167 232 % 19.4 29.7 23.3 17.5 20.9 19.1 30.5 35.3 33.8 Instructor/Adjunct # 31 26 57 38 35 73 13 27 40 % 6.5 9.1 7.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 6.1 5.7 5.8 Student # 66 73 139 37 48 85 19 74 93 % 13.8 25.4 18.2 9.2 12.9 11.0 8.9 15.6 13.6 Other # 41 25 66 92 110 202 13 49 62 % 8.6 8.7 8.7 22.9 29.5 26.1 6.1 10.4 9.0 Total # 479 286 765 401 373 774 213 473 686 % 100 99.8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1995: Chi-square = 68.0, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 2006: Chi-square = 24.0, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 2015: Chi-square = 25.2, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 View Large Table 2. Rank by sex. 1995 2006 2015 Rank Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Full Professor # 176 31 207 94 41 135 56 60 116 % 36.7 10.8 27.1 23.4 11.0 17.4 26.3 12.7 16.9 Associate Professor # 72 46 118 70 61 131 47 96 143 % 15.0 16.1 15.4 17.5 16.4 16.9 22.1 20.3 20.8 Assistant Professor # 93 85 178 70 78 148 65 167 232 % 19.4 29.7 23.3 17.5 20.9 19.1 30.5 35.3 33.8 Instructor/Adjunct # 31 26 57 38 35 73 13 27 40 % 6.5 9.1 7.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 6.1 5.7 5.8 Student # 66 73 139 37 48 85 19 74 93 % 13.8 25.4 18.2 9.2 12.9 11.0 8.9 15.6 13.6 Other # 41 25 66 92 110 202 13 49 62 % 8.6 8.7 8.7 22.9 29.5 26.1 6.1 10.4 9.0 Total # 479 286 765 401 373 774 213 473 686 % 100 99.8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1995 2006 2015 Rank Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Full Professor # 176 31 207 94 41 135 56 60 116 % 36.7 10.8 27.1 23.4 11.0 17.4 26.3 12.7 16.9 Associate Professor # 72 46 118 70 61 131 47 96 143 % 15.0 16.1 15.4 17.5 16.4 16.9 22.1 20.3 20.8 Assistant Professor # 93 85 178 70 78 148 65 167 232 % 19.4 29.7 23.3 17.5 20.9 19.1 30.5 35.3 33.8 Instructor/Adjunct # 31 26 57 38 35 73 13 27 40 % 6.5 9.1 7.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 6.1 5.7 5.8 Student # 66 73 139 37 48 85 19 74 93 % 13.8 25.4 18.2 9.2 12.9 11.0 8.9 15.6 13.6 Other # 41 25 66 92 110 202 13 49 62 % 8.6 8.7 8.7 22.9 29.5 26.1 6.1 10.4 9.0 Total # 479 286 765 401 373 774 213 473 686 % 100 99.8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1995: Chi-square = 68.0, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 2006: Chi-square = 24.0, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 2015: Chi-square = 25.2, degrees of freedom = 5, p = 0.000 View Large Focusing on the trends relating to full professor, the percentage of female respondents who have achieved this rank has inched up over the past twenty years. In the 1995 survey, 10.8 percent of female respondents were full professors. That number increased microscopically to 11 percent with the 2006 responses, and to 12.7 percent with the 2015 survey. Henehan and Sarkees (2009, 434) expected that “people can move one or two ranks” within a “10 year time span.” The virtual stagnation of women who achieved the full professor rank over the ten-year period they were examining was disappointing, and this trend continued in the ten years since. A closer examination of men and women at the rank of full professor revealed some interesting trends: 65 percent of the women who responded to the 2015 survey as full professors only achieved that rank within the previous seven years. On the other hand, less than 40 percent of the male full professor respondents have held that rank for seven years or less. Forty-one percent of male full professors who participated in the 2015 survey had held that rank for 12 or more years, where only 23.4 percent of women had been a full professor for that same amount of time. While there may have not been a significant change when comparing the percentages of women who achieved the rank of full professor over these three surveys, the relative newness of these female full professors may be indicative of some changes within the makeup of senior IR faculty. In their 2009 study, Henehan and Sarkees utilized various controls to see if the differences regarding sex and rank remained statistically significant. They found that, even when controlling for the number of years in the profession as well as the number of books and articles a scholar had published, the statistically significant differences between men and women's salary and academic rank remain. Using the 2015 data, I ran similar controls and found that only one control was statistically significant. That is, there is a nonrandom difference between men’s and women's salaries when they have been a part of the profession for 16 to 20 years. However, this statistically significant difference goes away in the next category, which is more than 20 years in the profession. Similar results were found when examining if there was any statistically significant difference between men's and women's ranks when controlling for years in the profession and for productivity. Henehan and Sarkees (2009, 434) claimed that “if the relationship between the two [variables] completely disappeared, we could conclude that the most egregious aspects of the overt discrimination of the past have been largely corrected.” While they were unable to find support for this with the 2006 data, the 2015 data illustrates that the profession has moved closer to rectifying these blatant biases. While these findings regarding salary and rank are important to moving toward equity, other evidence suggest that the chilly climate toward women continues to exist within our discipline. Workplace Environment Another straightforward indicator of the status of women in our profession is to examine their presence in the workplace. The inclusion of women in the average department has steadily increased over the past 20 years. In 1995, 40.6 percent of survey respondents were in departments where women were less than 15 percent of its composition. In 2006, that number shrank to 22.1 percent. In 2015, 7.8 percent of the respondents worked in a department with less than 15 percent women. Two-thirds of the 2015 survey respondents report working in departments comprised of 21–50 percent women. This is probably the most marked improvement apparent in the 2015 survey. It also begs the question of why this statistic improved so markedly. There are three possible answers as to why there are more women in academic departments over the past 20 years: First, it is possible that college- and university-level policies are addressing structural issues that may have previously excluded women from being included in hiring “short lists.” Second, more women are earning tenure, and/or third, the problems associated with the “leaky pipeline” are being addressed and senior women are growing in number. Other aspects of department life can illustrate whether women are gaining more equal footing with their male counterparts. In 2015, women (43.5 percent) were less likely than men (57.6 percent) to have held an administrative position in their department. Women were also more likely to feel that their departmental service was overwhelming (41.4 percent female; 30.6 percent male). Historically, women have carried the departmental service load (Misra et al. 2011; Flaherty 2017). Guarino and Borden (2017) found that women in academia spent more time weekly on service activities than their male counterparts. The question that was included in the 2015 survey of ISA members asked about perception of service being overwhelming rather than the number of service activities or the weekly amount of time spent on service. Unfortunately, this is not a direct measurement of whether women continue to be overburdened with service when compared to their male counterparts. While there is a substantial gap between women and men perceiving their service load to be overwhelming, knowing the actual amount of time spent on service would allow for a better understanding of whether men and women carry unbalanced service loads. Respondents were asked whether they have observed, perceived, or experienced certain behaviors that would contribute to a chilly climate for women in the discipline. The first question asked: “How… intense is the ‘chilliness’ for women in your workplace?” An overwhelming majority of male respondents claimed that inappropriate behavior in their workplace was rare (55.6 percent) or present but in an insignificant manner (26.2 percent). A noticeable portion of female respondents claimed that inappropriate behavior in the workplace was common (18.9 percent), while 31.7 percent of female respondents also claimed that inappropriate behavior was rare and 39.8 percent felt that the behavior was present but insignificant. Only 5 percent of women and 0.5 percent of men felt that inappropriate behavior was intense and pervasive in their work environment. In another question, respondents were asked about how proactive their workplace is regarding sex/gender issues; 32.2 percent of men and 30 percent of women claim that their workplace has proactive efforts in place to create a positive climate. This is indeed an improvement from the 2006 survey, where only 13.2 percent of women felt their workplace was proactive on gender issues. In the 2015 survey, 36.9 percent of men and 38.6 percent of women felt that their workplace was “somewhat supportive” with occasional efforts to improve the chilly climate. Only 8.9 percent of men and 8.8 percent of women report chronic and deep-seated problems in their workplace based on sex/gender. In contrast, 40.5 percent of female respondents report having experienced sexual harassment “a few times” over the past ten years, while 82.7 percent of men experienced no sexual harassment in the same period. 75.5 percent of women and 47.2 percent of men have observed or perceived the “leaky pipeline” problem, in which women are disproportionally dropping out of the discipline at various stages of their career. 25.4 percent of women feel that their sex has adversely affected their treatment in their workplace, with only 4.2 percent of men feeling similarly. Almost half (42.3 percent) of women reported that their sex has both hurt and helped them in their workplace, while only 1.9 percent of women felt their sex affected them positively (15 percent of men felt this way). More than a third (34.6 percent) of women felt they are underemployed (defined as being at a rank/status or salary lower than one's record merits). Women are still experiencing discriminatory behavior in the workplace, whether measured by overt sexual harassment, respondents’ comments on new trends such as the gender citation policy, or the inflexibility of family leave policy. These trends are examined more in the next section. The Role of Gender in Professional Life Similar to the 2005 survey, participants were asked about 15 different professional situations and whether they perceived them to be “harder for women,” “harder for men,” “gender neutral,” or “don't know.” Unlike the previous survey, participants could only pick one answer per situation. Again, these perceptions were based on a person's own experiences and observations within the discipline and are not generalizable. However, they do provide a better understanding of the discipline since more than two-thirds of female respondents reported that their sex had affected their treatment in the workplace in some fashion. These responses are aggregated in Table 3 (grad school/early career situations) and Table 4 (tenure/mid-to-late career situations). Table 3. Perceptions of gender effects in graduate school/early career, 2015 survey.* Financial Aid Entry to Grad School Success in Grad School Mentored in Grad School Obtaining Post-Doc Entry Job Market Salary M F M F M F M F M F M F M F Neutral # 133 267 138 321 90 164 82 161 75 135 59 99 65 48 % 62.7 57.2 65.1 68.3 42.7 35 38.9 34.3 35.7 28.9 27.8 21.3 30.7 10.2 Harder for # 14 63 27 78 96 274 89 245 43 178 65 263 111 379 Women % 6.6 13.5 12.7 16.6 45.5 58.4 42.2 52.2 20.5 38.1 30.7 56.6 52.4 80.8 Harder for # 14 10 18 10 7 5 8 9 15 3 42 14 2 2 Men % 6.6 2.1 8.5 2.1 3.3 1.1 3.8 1.9 7.1 0.6 19.8 3 0.9 0.4 Don't Know # 51 127 29 61 18 26 32 54 77 151 46 89 34 40 % 24.1 27.2 13.7 13 8.5 5.5 15.2 11.5 36.7 32.3 21.7 19.1 16 8.5 Totals # 212 467 212 470 211 469 211 469 210 467 212 465 212 469 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.1 99.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 99.9 Financial Aid Entry to Grad School Success in Grad School Mentored in Grad School Obtaining Post-Doc Entry Job Market Salary M F M F M F M F M F M F M F Neutral # 133 267 138 321 90 164 82 161 75 135 59 99 65 48 % 62.7 57.2 65.1 68.3 42.7 35 38.9 34.3 35.7 28.9 27.8 21.3 30.7 10.2 Harder for # 14 63 27 78 96 274 89 245 43 178 65 263 111 379 Women % 6.6 13.5 12.7 16.6 45.5 58.4 42.2 52.2 20.5 38.1 30.7 56.6 52.4 80.8 Harder for # 14 10 18 10 7 5 8 9 15 3 42 14 2 2 Men % 6.6 2.1 8.5 2.1 3.3 1.1 3.8 1.9 7.1 0.6 19.8 3 0.9 0.4 Don't Know # 51 127 29 61 18 26 32 54 77 151 46 89 34 40 % 24.1 27.2 13.7 13 8.5 5.5 15.2 11.5 36.7 32.3 21.7 19.1 16 8.5 Totals # 212 467 212 470 211 469 211 469 210 467 212 465 212 469 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.1 99.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 99.9 *These data here are slightly different than in Henehan and Sarkees (2009). I have decided to present them in chronological order and will emphasize the biggest differences in the text. Additionally, respondents were permitted to choose only one option for the 2015 survey, while they were able to choose more than one option in the 2006 survey. View Large Table 3. Perceptions of gender effects in graduate school/early career, 2015 survey.* Financial Aid Entry to Grad School Success in Grad School Mentored in Grad School Obtaining Post-Doc Entry Job Market Salary M F M F M F M F M F M F M F Neutral # 133 267 138 321 90 164 82 161 75 135 59 99 65 48 % 62.7 57.2 65.1 68.3 42.7 35 38.9 34.3 35.7 28.9 27.8 21.3 30.7 10.2 Harder for # 14 63 27 78 96 274 89 245 43 178 65 263 111 379 Women % 6.6 13.5 12.7 16.6 45.5 58.4 42.2 52.2 20.5 38.1 30.7 56.6 52.4 80.8 Harder for # 14 10 18 10 7 5 8 9 15 3 42 14 2 2 Men % 6.6 2.1 8.5 2.1 3.3 1.1 3.8 1.9 7.1 0.6 19.8 3 0.9 0.4 Don't Know # 51 127 29 61 18 26 32 54 77 151 46 89 34 40 % 24.1 27.2 13.7 13 8.5 5.5 15.2 11.5 36.7 32.3 21.7 19.1 16 8.5 Totals # 212 467 212 470 211 469 211 469 210 467 212 465 212 469 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.1 99.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 99.9 Financial Aid Entry to Grad School Success in Grad School Mentored in Grad School Obtaining Post-Doc Entry Job Market Salary M F M F M F M F M F M F M F Neutral # 133 267 138 321 90 164 82 161 75 135 59 99 65 48 % 62.7 57.2 65.1 68.3 42.7 35 38.9 34.3 35.7 28.9 27.8 21.3 30.7 10.2 Harder for # 14 63 27 78 96 274 89 245 43 178 65 263 111 379 Women % 6.6 13.5 12.7 16.6 45.5 58.4 42.2 52.2 20.5 38.1 30.7 56.6 52.4 80.8 Harder for # 14 10 18 10 7 5 8 9 15 3 42 14 2 2 Men % 6.6 2.1 8.5 2.1 3.3 1.1 3.8 1.9 7.1 0.6 19.8 3 0.9 0.4 Don't Know # 51 127 29 61 18 26 32 54 77 151 46 89 34 40 % 24.1 27.2 13.7 13 8.5 5.5 15.2 11.5 36.7 32.3 21.7 19.1 16 8.5 Totals # 212 467 212 470 211 469 211 469 210 467 212 465 212 469 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.1 99.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 99.9 *These data here are slightly different than in Henehan and Sarkees (2009). I have decided to present them in chronological order and will emphasize the biggest differences in the text. Additionally, respondents were permitted to choose only one option for the 2015 survey, while they were able to choose more than one option in the 2006 survey. View Large Table 4. Perceptions of gender effects on tenure/mid-late career, 2015 survey.* Tenure Promotion Publications Influence Honors & Awards Leadership M F M F M F M F M F M F Neutral # 59 99 79 59 137 174 90 94 101 123 105 132 % 34 13.1 37.3 12.7 64.6 37.2 42.7 20.1 47.9 26.4 49.5 28.2 Harder for Women # 65 263 87 350 28 201 96 334 51 246 73 253 % 42.5 71.4 41 75.1 13.2 42.9 45.5 71.5 24.2 52.8 34.4 54.1 Harder for Men # 42 14 10 2 3 2 7 1 14 3 8 10 % 5.2 0.4 4.7 0.4 1.4 0.4 3.3 0.2 6.6 0.6 3.8 2.1 Don't Know # 46 89 36 55 44 91 18 38 26 73 26 73 % 18.4 15.1 17 11.8 20.8 19.4 8.5 8.1 21.3 20.2 12.3 15.6 Totals # 212 465 212 466 212 468 211 467 211 466 212 468 % 100.1 100 100 100 100 99.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 100 Tenure Promotion Publications Influence Honors & Awards Leadership M F M F M F M F M F M F Neutral # 59 99 79 59 137 174 90 94 101 123 105 132 % 34 13.1 37.3 12.7 64.6 37.2 42.7 20.1 47.9 26.4 49.5 28.2 Harder for Women # 65 263 87 350 28 201 96 334 51 246 73 253 % 42.5 71.4 41 75.1 13.2 42.9 45.5 71.5 24.2 52.8 34.4 54.1 Harder for Men # 42 14 10 2 3 2 7 1 14 3 8 10 % 5.2 0.4 4.7 0.4 1.4 0.4 3.3 0.2 6.6 0.6 3.8 2.1 Don't Know # 46 89 36 55 44 91 18 38 26 73 26 73 % 18.4 15.1 17 11.8 20.8 19.4 8.5 8.1 21.3 20.2 12.3 15.6 Totals # 212 465 212 466 212 468 211 467 211 466 212 468 % 100.1 100 100 100 100 99.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 100 *These data here are slightly different than in Henehan and Sarkees (2009). I have decided to present them in chronological order and will emphasize the biggest differences in the text. Additionally, respondents were permitted to choose only one option for the 2015 survey, while they were able to choose more than one option in the 2006 survey. View Large Table 4. Perceptions of gender effects on tenure/mid-late career, 2015 survey.* Tenure Promotion Publications Influence Honors & Awards Leadership M F M F M F M F M F M F Neutral # 59 99 79 59 137 174 90 94 101 123 105 132 % 34 13.1 37.3 12.7 64.6 37.2 42.7 20.1 47.9 26.4 49.5 28.2 Harder for Women # 65 263 87 350 28 201 96 334 51 246 73 253 % 42.5 71.4 41 75.1 13.2 42.9 45.5 71.5 24.2 52.8 34.4 54.1 Harder for Men # 42 14 10 2 3 2 7 1 14 3 8 10 % 5.2 0.4 4.7 0.4 1.4 0.4 3.3 0.2 6.6 0.6 3.8 2.1 Don't Know # 46 89 36 55 44 91 18 38 26 73 26 73 % 18.4 15.1 17 11.8 20.8 19.4 8.5 8.1 21.3 20.2 12.3 15.6 Totals # 212 465 212 466 212 468 211 467 211 466 212 468 % 100.1 100 100 100 100 99.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 100 Tenure Promotion Publications Influence Honors & Awards Leadership M F M F M F M F M F M F Neutral # 59 99 79 59 137 174 90 94 101 123 105 132 % 34 13.1 37.3 12.7 64.6 37.2 42.7 20.1 47.9 26.4 49.5 28.2 Harder for Women # 65 263 87 350 28 201 96 334 51 246 73 253 % 42.5 71.4 41 75.1 13.2 42.9 45.5 71.5 24.2 52.8 34.4 54.1 Harder for Men # 42 14 10 2 3 2 7 1 14 3 8 10 % 5.2 0.4 4.7 0.4 1.4 0.4 3.3 0.2 6.6 0.6 3.8 2.1 Don't Know # 46 89 36 55 44 91 18 38 26 73 26 73 % 18.4 15.1 17 11.8 20.8 19.4 8.5 8.1 21.3 20.2 12.3 15.6 Totals # 212 465 212 466 212 468 211 467 211 466 212 468 % 100.1 100 100 100 100 99.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 100 *These data here are slightly different than in Henehan and Sarkees (2009). I have decided to present them in chronological order and will emphasize the biggest differences in the text. Additionally, respondents were permitted to choose only one option for the 2015 survey, while they were able to choose more than one option in the 2006 survey. View Large From the 2015 survey, only two categories were deemed gender neutral by both men and women: entry to graduate school and financial aid in graduate school. More than two-thirds of both male and female respondents reported that entry to graduate school was gender neutral while two-thirds of men and a majority of women felt that financial aid in graduate school was gender neutral. Also, men and women agreed that salary (which is a vague descriptor in the survey; it could mean many different aspects of salary) was harder for women (men, 52.4 percent; women, 80.8 percent, the highest percentage for female respondents in any situation and category).1 From these points of agreement, perceptions from men and women diverge. Men tended to feel that most situations are gender neutral or biased against women. While these responses do not reach a majority, a plurality of men said that women have it harder when it comes to success in graduate school (45.5 percent), being mentored in graduate school (42.2 percent), getting tenure (42.5 percent), promotion (41 percent), and being influential within the department (45.5 percent). Men also felt that publishing in good quality outlets (64.6 percent) and getting grants (54.7 percent) are not affected by gender. Finally, it is important to mention that, in all but one of the scenarios provided to our respondents, less than 10 percent of men chose “harder for men” as an option. The only scenario where there was an unexpectedly high response was regarding obtaining a tenure track position after graduate school where 19.8 percent of male respondents felt that it was harder for men. There are a number of categories where women recognize that they are in a situation that is biased against them. A majority of women felt they were at a disadvantage because of their sex regarding success in grad school (58.4 percent), being mentored in grad school (52.2 percent), obtaining a tenure track position after graduate school (56.6 percent), getting tenure (71.4 percent), promotion (75.1 percent), being an influential member of their department (71.5 percent), receiving honors and awards (52.8 percent), being appointed to leadership positions in one's department (54.1 percent), and being competitive in the senior job market (66.9 percent). These results are very telling about the path of a woman's career. Getting into graduate school and obtaining funding for one's studies is perceived as a level playing ground, but the rest of a woman's career is an uphill battle. Family Concerns Discussions of work-life balance have been pervasive in academia over the past few decades. While some may feel that academia fosters a more flexible work environment, it does not always lend itself to creating the space for strong work-life balance since academic jobs lack the boundaries that one might find in a traditional 9-to-5 job. Many women are also burdened with the “second-shift” of traditional home responsibilities related to childrearing and housekeeping. Over the past 20 years, there has been a noticeable increase in married women in the discipline; 87.9 percent of male respondents and 71.3 percent of female respondents of the 2015 survey were married. In 1995, only 53 percent of female respondents were married, while in 2005, 69.2 percent were married. In 2015, 40.2 percent of men and 57.3 percent of women did not have children. Men were more likely to have more than three children (8.9 percent) than women (4.6 percent). Half of all male respondents and more than one-third (37.5 percent) of female respondents had one or two children. Some of the most interesting results of this survey stem from the questions related to the personal consequences of pursuing an academic career. In the 2006 survey, there were some significant differences between the sexes and how they answered these questions. Men were much more likely to feel like there was no personal effect on their lives due to their career. Women were more than twice as likely to say that their career limited the number of children they chose to have. In 2015, the answers were extremely similar between the sexes as illustrated in Table 5. About one-quarter of respondents felt their career had no effect on their personal lives. About one-third of all respondents mentioned that their career influenced how many children they had. More significant were the increased numbers of people who indicated that their career contributed to a breakup/divorce (14.5 percent of men and 14.7 percent of women). Similar amounts of men (28 percent) and women (23.7 percent) also said that their careers prevented them from living with their partner/spouse, which was also an increase from 2006. Finally, and probably most telling, 54.2 percent of men and 48.8 percent of women admitted that their career hindered the type of home life they had envisioned for themselves. This is a significant increase from the 2006 result, where only one-quarter felt that way. While this survey intended to focus solely on the status of women in the discipline, this finding suggests that workplaces and departments need to do a better job of promoting work-life balance and self-care within realistic expectations of the demands of an academic career. Table 5. Personal consequences of pursuing an academic career, 2015 survey Limited # of Children Contributed to Breakup/Divorce Prevented from Living with Partner Hindered Home Life No Personal Affect M F M F M F M F M F Yes # 80 147 31 70 60 113 116 233 55 128 % 37.4 30.8 14.5 14.7 28 23.7 54.2 48.8 25.7 26.8 No # 134 330 183 407 154 364 98 244 159 349 % 62.6 69.2 85.5 85.3 72 76.3 45.8 51.2 74.3 73.2 Totals # 214 477 214 477 214 477 214 477 214 477 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Limited # of Children Contributed to Breakup/Divorce Prevented from Living with Partner Hindered Home Life No Personal Affect M F M F M F M F M F Yes # 80 147 31 70 60 113 116 233 55 128 % 37.4 30.8 14.5 14.7 28 23.7 54.2 48.8 25.7 26.8 No # 134 330 183 407 154 364 98 244 159 349 % 62.6 69.2 85.5 85.3 72 76.3 45.8 51.2 74.3 73.2 Totals # 214 477 214 477 214 477 214 477 214 477 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 View Large Table 5. Personal consequences of pursuing an academic career, 2015 survey Limited # of Children Contributed to Breakup/Divorce Prevented from Living with Partner Hindered Home Life No Personal Affect M F M F M F M F M F Yes # 80 147 31 70 60 113 116 233 55 128 % 37.4 30.8 14.5 14.7 28 23.7 54.2 48.8 25.7 26.8 No # 134 330 183 407 154 364 98 244 159 349 % 62.6 69.2 85.5 85.3 72 76.3 45.8 51.2 74.3 73.2 Totals # 214 477 214 477 214 477 214 477 214 477 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Limited # of Children Contributed to Breakup/Divorce Prevented from Living with Partner Hindered Home Life No Personal Affect M F M F M F M F M F Yes # 80 147 31 70 60 113 116 233 55 128 % 37.4 30.8 14.5 14.7 28 23.7 54.2 48.8 25.7 26.8 No # 134 330 183 407 154 364 98 244 159 349 % 62.6 69.2 85.5 85.3 72 76.3 45.8 51.2 74.3 73.2 Totals # 214 477 214 477 214 477 214 477 214 477 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 View Large Open-Ended Responses The open-ended comments provided by the respondents also illustrate the environment of our discipline for both men and women. In the 2015 survey, 68.7 percent of all respondents provided comments, with comments from 70.6 percent of the female participants and 47.7 percent of the male participants. Many of the men and women had similar concerns, which reflects previous iterations of the survey, but a concern for reverse discrimination seemed to persist. The main concern (69 total comments) expressed in these comments focuses on family obligations (and mainly motherhood), and expresses worry that these are not compatible with the expectations of an academic career. These comments from both men and women concentrate on the imbalance between evening activities on campus, conferences, or research opportunities and their impact on family time. Women repeatedly mentioned that some of their colleagues only see them as mothers once they have children and that these same colleagues ask them more about their children rather than about their research. Women also mention how they are perceived to be “choosing the ‘mommy track’” rather than pushing for their next promotion while their children are young. Finally, both men and women mention the imbalance of family leave time (if it is at all available; many graduate students mentioned how family/maternity leave is not an option for them at their institutions) and how faculty colleagues and administration then interpret that time. Some women voiced concern that men might be able to utilize tenure clock stoppage and family leave for research purposes rather than child-rearing purposes, which has been illustrated as an advantage in research by Antecol, Bedard, and Stearns (2016). The next largest category of comments focused on overt sexist behavior, discrimination, and the pervasive chilly climate in academia (57 comments). Women shared stories about male faculty discouraging women from being “serious” about their careers because they would eventually get married and/or have children. Other women discussed how they were asked illegal questions about their relationship status during formal, on-campus job interviews and less formal job interviews at large discipline-wide conferences. Still others discussed how they felt uncomfortable after comments were made about their clothing or their looks. A handful of comments made by younger female scholars (less than 30 years old) indicated that they had not been targets of gender-based discrimination. Finally, there were multiple mentions that in Brazil and Mexico gender-based discrimination continued to be rampant, even for the younger generation. The biggest example of this chilly climate is the omnipresent “old boys’ club.” There were mentions of scenarios where male faculty members assisted male graduate students in ways that were unethical. Other respondents discussed how networking seems to be dominated by men and how that can diminish a scholar's chances for publishing in top journals. For instance, one participant shared this perception of the challenges associated with publishing: “Women often do not have these personal connections or mentor-mentee relationships with senior male faculty that can provide positive [article] reviews. As a result of less access to these informal male networks, women are less likely to receive positive reviews.” Women also discussed how some male colleagues excluded them from socializing outside of the office, which led to exclusion from some informal mentoring and networking. Women were also concerned that their research is perceived in a gendered context (21 comments). Some mentioned that they did not think they were considered to be “serious scholars” by their male colleagues, particularly in the security studies field. One participant mentioned how one of her most supportive colleagues “talks about [her] to others in an occasionally patronizing way, as if [her] skills and tendencies as a scholar are ‘cute’ or amusing.” Feminist scholars also discussed in their comments how members of the security studies field exclude them and their research, as if feminism is not a “real” approach to studying international security. A different respondent said that her work sometimes was seen as “emotional.” Finally, there were multiple mentions about how women who utilize qualitative research methodologies were perceived as not as rigorous with their studies as those who use quantitative approaches. There were 27 comments about the need for (or the positive effects of) gender balance in various professional contexts. Many participants lauded the movement to create balance in conference panels after the “Congrats! You Have An All Male Panel!” movement created by Dr. Saara Särmä in 2015. Both men and women also have discussed the benefits related to adhering to creating more of a gender balance in their citations and in their syllabi (Maliniak et al. 2013; Colgan 2017). In fact, most men (65.7 percent) and women (81.8 percent) responded that they either already do check for gender balance in their citations or are open to doing so in the future. Survey respondents who revealed in their open-ended comments that they worked in a relatively gender-balanced department generally reported more positive experiences than those who did not. There were also a number of other issues that were mentioned repeatedly in response to the survey's request for comments. First, many women discussed a bias against those who identified as feminists and/or as feminist scholars, as if that label automatically meant they were not “team players” within departments. In fact, there were 12 comments written by men about “reverse discrimination” and how women have an advantage in the job market. This was a small percentage of the open-ended responses, but still significant enough to be mentioned in this report. Second, some respondents focused on discrimination happening outside traditional academic departments. Women mentioned experiencing discrimination and harassment at academic conferences. They also discussed cyberbullying and discrimination occurring on blogs and online forums. Finally, eight respondents brought up the lack of intersectionality in the survey. These people felt that although gender was one aspect of discrimination they experienced, other dimensions of their identity (such as race, nationality, religious identity, gender identity, and sexual orientation) played into discrimination in a much deeper manner. Conclusion The results of this survey beg two questions. First, have things gotten better? Second, are women nearing equal status with men within the International Studies Association? Like the 2006 survey, the 2015 survey asked whether things have gotten better, worse, or better and worse. 62.6 percent of men and 40.5 percent of women agreed that the situation for women has gotten better, with no men and only 2.9 percent of women responding that it had gotten worse. However, women did not perceive themselves to be treated as equals to men. Only 1 percent of women and 10.7 percent of men felt that equality had been achieved. On the other hand, 35.4 percent of women expressed that women are still at a disadvantage when compared to men. The perceptions that were uncovered by this survey illustrate that men and women have different experiences in our discipline. One respondent commented: “There is a lot of talk/theoretical issues surrounding female equality, but this doesn't always become a reality.” This reflects the frustration that, while there are greater formal institutional policy efforts to keep women in academia, the chilly climate persists. While there has been progress, it is apparent that there is still so far to go. Over the past ten years, there has been an explosion in-group mentoring opportunities for women, the sharing of advice via social media, and a very public recognition that all scholars can take specific steps to help their female colleagues overcome the structural and informal factors that lead to gender discrimination in our field. This certainly needs to continue. However, positive progress without any real gains for equality will continue to be the trend if more men do not proactively become a part of the solution to gender discrimination in our discipline. Acknowledgements The author would like to acknowledge Valerie Hudson, Jennifer Ramos, Marie Henehan, and Meredith Reid Sarkees for their leadership and teamwork in organizing and distributing the 2015 WCIS/CSW Survey. She would also like to thank Mark Boyer, Alexandra Lewis, Kristy Belton, and the rest of the staff at ISA headquarters for their assistance with the survey and other endeavors of the Committee on the Status of Women and the Women's Caucus. Marijke Breuning and Annick Wibben deserve a special acknowledgement for their comments on a previous draft. Finally, this paper is dedicated to those colleagues who work every day, in both big and little ways, to promote the status of women in our discipline. Footnotes 1 This vague descriptor could mean that women have a lower salary or that women are less likely to negotiate (or be successful at negotiating) for a higher salary. In future iterations of this survey, it would important to clarify exactly what is being asked here. References Antecol Heather , Bedard Kelly , Stearns Jenna . 2016 . “Equal But Inequitable: Who Benefits from Gender-Neutral Tenure Clock Stopping Policies?” Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany. 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Wilkinson Cai . 2015 . “Continuing the ‘All-Male’ Theme At EISA.” Duck of Minerva , September 13. Accessed June 20, 2017. http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/continuing-the-all-male-theme-at-eisa.html . Women's Caucus for International Studies . 2015 . “Charter of the Women's Caucus for International Studies.” Accessed September 9, 2017. http://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Documents/WCIS/WCIS%20Revised%20Charter%20February%2020%202015.pdf . Women's Caucus for International Studies . 2016 . “Transforming International Studies’ Professional Culture(s): Challenging Systemic Oppression.” Accessed August 9, 2017. http://www.isanet.org/News/ID/5200/Transforming-International-Studies-Professional-Cultures-Challenging-Systemic-Oppression . Yao Joanne , Delatolla Andrew . 2017 . “Gender and Diversity in the IR Curriculum: Why Should We Care?” The Disorder of Things , April 20. Accessed June 20, 2017. https://thedisorderofthings.com/2017/04/20/gender-and-diversity-in-the-ir-curriculum-why-should-we-care/ . Zalewski Marysia . 2016 . “The Weight of a Man's Shoe.” The Disorder of Things , January 21. Accessed June 20, 2017. https://thedisorderofthings.com/2016/01/21/the-weight-of-a-mans-shoe/ . Zigerell L.J. 2015 . “Is the Gender Citation Gap in International Relations Driven By Elite Papers?” Research and Politics 2 : 1 – 7 . © The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)

Ayhan, Kadir, Jun

doi: 10.1093/isp/eky010pmid: N/A

Abstract Abstract: Public diplomacy (PD) lacks an agreed-upon definition and boundaries. The ambiguity surrounding the conceptualization of the term leads to confusion among scholars and practitioners and hinders the consolidation of PD as an academic field. This article surveys 160 articles and books on PD, categorizes diverse perspectives into a taxonomy, and explores the coherence of each. The taxonomy can be categorized into these perspectives: state-centric, neo-statist, nontraditional, society-centric, and accommodative. The article maps the boundaries of public diplomacy with much needed clear and coherent criteria and positions PD within the broader discipline of international relations.   Resumen: Una definición y límites consensuados es lo que le falta a la diplomacia pública (DP). La ambigüedad del término confunde tanto a académicos como a profesionales, y dificulta la consolidación de la DP como un área de estudio académico. Este trabajo analiza 160 artículos y libros sobre DP, clasifica las distintas perspectivas y explora la coherencia de cada una de ellas. Dicha clasificación incluye las siguientes perspectivas: centrado en el Estado, neoestatismo, no tradicional, centrado en la sociedad y acomodativa. El artículo define los límites de la diplomacia pública mediante criterios claros, coherentes y necesarios, y posiciona a la DP en la disciplina de relaciones internacionales, la cual es más amplia.   Extrait: La diplomatie publique (DP) est dépourvue de consensus quant à sa définition et à sa délimitation. L'ambiguïté dont est empreinte la conceptualisation du terme amène à une confusion parmi les universitaires et les praticiens et empêche la consolidation de la DP en tant que domaine académique. Le présent article est une étude de 160 articles et ouvrages sur la DP, il établit une taxonomie des différentes perspectives diplomatiques et explore la cohérence de chacune d'elles. Les perspectives réunies au sein de cette taxonomie sont les suivantes : école centrée sur l’état, école néo-étatiste, école non traditionnelle, école centrée sur la société et école accommodante. L'article propose une délimitation de la diplomatie publique à l'aide de critères dont la clarté et la cohérence étaient très attendues – et positionne la DP au sein de la discipline élargie des relations internationales. public diplomacy, nonstate actors, taxonomy, diplomacy studies, international relations theories In his International Studies Perspectives article, Murray (2008, 34) raised the confusion caused by the disparity of views on diplomacy. He attempted to “consolidat[e] the gains made in diplomacy studies” by building a taxonomy of diplomatic thoughts (see also Hocking et al. 2012). Murray's article clarified the main discrepancies between three schools of diplomacy to introduce “order, clarity, and purpose to the diplomatic studies field.” His grounded appraisal of diplomatic studies indicates that the major debate in the field is the proper placement of nonstate actors in diplomacy, an issue resulting from their recent rise in world politics. The field of public diplomacy (PD) begs for a similar taxonomy since the confusion is more frustrating than the case of diplomacy studies. Indeed, this research was initiated to address the frustration of the author's students since each article they read throughout a PD course had discordant definitions of the term. It is argued here that the disparity of perspectives on PD, particularly regarding the place of nonstate actors in this realm, must be “classified and consolidated” (Murray 2008, 23) to have a clearer understanding of what PD is and how it works. This requires a closer look at how articles in the field define PD and on what grounds they differ from each other. Only then can one understand the trends in this realm and negotiate diverse perspectives behind the conceptualization of PD. This article aims to map the boundaries of PD as an initial step in theory building in this relatively new field. In parallel to diplomatic studies, the central debate in recent PD research concerns the role and place of these new actors (see Huijgh, Gregory, and Melissen 2013). To clarify this subject, this article investigates how scholars conceptualize PD and how they describe the place of nonstate actors in it. An analysis of the diverse approaches to PD leads to a taxonomy of five broad groups: State-centric perspectives that restrict PD to state agencies in a coherent way rejecting diplomatic actorness of nonstate actors completely Neo-statist perspectives that reserve the term PD for states only, while offering alternative terms such as social diplomacy or grassroots diplomacy for similar nonstate actor activities Nontraditional perspectives that define diplomacy based not on status, but on capabilities, accepting some nonstate actor activities as PD Society-centric perspectives that share most traits with nontraditional perspectives, except that they define public as people in the global public sphere Accommodative perspectives that accommodate nonstate actor activities within the realm of PD, but only if those activities meet certain criteria. Using this taxonomy, PD scholars and practitioners can more precisely identify weaknesses and strengths of each perspective, and this in turn may make future studies more comparable. This article addresses the inconsistencies and analytical problems in each of the five categories. In the last part of the article, coherent criteria for the boundaries of PD are compiled that strengthen the case for the accommodative perspectives category. Accordingly, the argument here ultimately fits in this fifth group. Based on a SCOPUS search, 185 articles cited five times or more and published from 1985 to July 30, 2017, with the exact term “public diplomacy” in the title, keywords, and/or abstracts were found. In all, 25 of these articles were excluded from the set because it was not possible to identify how the authors conceptualized PD and how they viewed the place of nonstate actors in PD. In some of these excluded articles, PD is used interchangeably with other terms such as “nation branding” or “nation's image” (Van Ham 2008; Peijuan, Ting, and Pang 2009; Dinnie et al. 2010; Chua and Pang 2012), “soft power” (Brown 2008; Wilson 2008), “international public relations” (Lee 2006, 2007; Lee and Hong 2012; Scott 2013), “strategic communication” (Dimitriu 2012), “international broadcasting” (Price 2009), “persuasion” (Van Evera 2006), “propaganda” (Willen 2015), and “pressure politics” (Gorman 2008). The taxonomy in this article is based on an analysis of the remaining 160 articles. The article begins with a conceptualization of PD, with the goal of positioning its concept within the broader discipline of international relations (IR). The next section discusses how PD scholarship handles nonstate actors. Following this, the third section identifies and offers a taxonomy of five groups of perspectives based on how they view the boundaries of PD. The last section summarizes the findings and offers implications for PD research and practice. The Concept of Public Diplomacy PD is classically defined as “the means by which governments, private groups, and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions” (Murrow Center 2002; see also Delaney 1968, 3; Malone 1985, 199). Recent literature often referred to as “new public diplomacy” (NPD) (Melissen 2005b; Seib 2009)1 takes a more two-way approach to PD as “an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub‐state agencies and non‐state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory 2008b, 276). In line with the literature on NPD, Cull (2008) suggests a taxonomy of PD practices: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting. Fitzpatrick (2010) also surveys the PD literature and suggests six main functions: advocacy, communication, relationship management, promotion, political engagement, and warfare.2 This article uses Gregory's definition, which better reflects the environment of NPD, in recognition of the fact that nonstate actors are more empowered than ever, and more capable and willing to participate in PD-like activities. However, Gregory's definition is also imperfect as it lacks boundaries establishing what PD is not and who PD actors are not. The latter part of this article offers modifications to this definition. PD can be used as an instrument that cultivates and wields soft power (Nye 2008; see also Hayden 2012), which can be defined as “the power to construct the preferences and images of self and others through ideational or symbolic resources that lead to behavioral changes of others” (Lee 2010, 116; see also Hayden 2012). Why is there a need to engage foreign publics to “influence foreign policy decisions” (Murrow Center 2002) or “to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory 2008b, 276)? The need to engage foreign publics is mainly due to developments in the last century that empowered individuals and nonstate actors and made them more relevant in world politics. These developments include globalization, which created greater interconnections between people in different countries; technological advancements, which made it easier and less expensive for individuals to travel, communicate, network internationally, and access and produce information; and waves of democratization and liberalization, which made public opinion matter in most societies (see Cull 2009; Zaharna 2010, 81–88; Fitzpatrick 2012, 435). While the argument above is almost uncontested in any theoretical debates in IR, there are different approaches as to how much and in what ways the empowerment of people and nonstate actors influence the international system. Realists hold that, ultimately, only states can make any difference in the international system. Liberals maintain that states are central to the international system, but key individuals and nonstate actors have a critical influence in the formation of state behavior (see, e.g., Moravcsik 1997). Therefore, liberals are interested in public diplomacy's potential to build relations and eventually influence key individuals (Nye 2004, 109–10). Constructivists argue that individuals and nonstate actors can play important roles in changing the current discourses in the international system by influencing reconstruction of prevalent ideas, norms, beliefs, and, in turn, the interests of states about their surroundings. For realists, individuals and nonstate actors, at best, can affect low political issues such as culture and social policies and are not able to make a difference in high political issues such as peace and security. While realist perspectives of PD are discussed in the literature (Yun and Toth 2009), it would be inconsistent and hypocritical for realists to expect significant returns from investment in communication with foreign publics. On the other hand, Nye and Keohane (1971a, 728–29) argue that “distinctions between high and low politics are of diminishing value” since developments in the last century—noted above—led “[h]igh and low politics [to] become tightly intertwined.” Their “world politics paradigm” and issue-areas approaches, common in the transnationalism and global governance literature (see Risse-Kappen 1995; Rosenau 1995; Arts 2003; Peinhardt and Sandler 2015), support the idea that individuals and nonstate actors might matter as much as states or even have more authority in certain issue areas such as global finance, the environment, and human rights (see Rosenau 1997, 407–11; Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 12–14). Issue-areas approaches explain how investing in PD increases the odds of certain outcomes in specific issue areas in the international or global stage. Furthermore, the PD objectives of shaping societal and potentially state interests through engaging foreign publics work better with constructivism than with the IR theories associated with rationalism. If the actors that matter in the world politics are assumed to be rational, then there would not be much point in attempting to indirectly manipulate or influencing their decisions by engaging with their publics. On the other hand, if world politics actors are “cognitive actors” who are “purposive, conditioned by bounded rationality and regular cognitive propensities” (Rosati 2000, 73; see also Wendt 1992), then there is room to construct and reconstruct these actors’ interests through mediated or interpersonal exposures by employing PD initiatives. Constructivists point out the potential agency of epistemic communities, transnational advocacy networks, and key individuals, as well as international organizations and state agencies, in diffusing ideas and values through transnational and international interactions, which, in turn, lead to reconstructing societal and state interests (Haas 1992; Wendt 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Deacon 2007). PD initiatives are instrumental in achieving such constructivist goals. Two groups in the taxonomy, the state-centric perspectives and neo-statist perspectives, regard only states’ activities as PD, while the other three—the nontraditional, society-centric, and accommodative perspectives—leave the door open for nonstate actor activities to be characterized as PD. The former two are implicitly inclined to view IR from a state-centric perspective with rationalist tendencies and are uneasy about calling nonstate actor activities PD because of this theoretical conviction. Nor are scholars employing these perspectives realists, as they devote their research to a “frivolous and trivial” (Van Ham 2008, 20) kind of diplomacy that engages foreign publics and not official agents of sovereigns. The distinction between the two former perspectives and the latter three is more similar to the division within the constructivist camp over state-centric systemic theories of IR (see Wendt 1999, 353; Hurd 2008, 308; Snidal 2013, 107–9). Systemic theories of IR, including the “‘conventional’ strand [of constructivism], which shares the anarchy problematique with neorealists and neoliberals” (Hurd 2008, 309), downplay the role of nonstate actors in world politics. Scholars who hold state-centric PD perspectives share these views. On the other hand, there is more room for nonstate actors to participate in world politics in issue-areas approaches or what Hurd (2008, 309) refers to as the “post-anarchy strand” of constructivism. Scholars who hold that nonstate actors can also do PD belong to this camp. Indeed, this theoretical division is the most significant cleavage among the PD scholars. The next section introduces the debate regarding the role of nonstate actors in the realm of PD. Nonstate Actors in the Realm of Public Diplomacy As noted, a central issue in the field of PD is whether it is exclusively a state-centric practice or if the activities of nonstate actors are also PD. In this article, nonstate actors are viewed as those that are relevant to international relations and operate at the international or transnational level (Arts, Noortmann, and Reinalda 2001; Reinalda 2001, 13; Arts 2003, 5). There is near total agreement in the recent literature that nonstate actors are important to PD, but the question of whether nonstate actor activities should be called PD is answered differently by two camps of PD researchers. While communication scholars (authoring 49 percent of the sample used here) do not mind extending PD activities beyond state agencies, political scientists (34 percent of the sample) are warier of treating nonstate actors as PD actors because of actorness’ heavy connotations in IR theories.3 Some scholars regard nonstate actors as important partners in state-centric PD but not as PD actors per se (Malone 1985; Peterson 2002; Ross 2002; Van Ham 2003; Kennedy and Lucas 2005; Scott-Smith 2006; Pahlavi 2007; Hall 2012), while others treat them as independent actors in their own right (Fitzpatrick 2007; Zaharna 2007; Cowan and Arsenault 2008; Gilboa 2008; Nye 2008; Gregory 2008b, 2011; Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte 2009). It is widely accepted in the literature that state-centric PD alone falls short of achieving effective PD outcomes, particularly in the long term (Armitage and Nye 2007; Lord 2008; Snow 2008; US Department of State 2010; Zatepilina-Monacell 2010; Attias 2012; Seo 2013; Cabral et al. 2014). The “built-in disadvantage and an inherent weakness” (Attias 2012, 475) of state agencies, namely “public skepticism” (Leonard, Stead, and Smewing 2002, 54) and “distrust” (Payne 2009a, 603; Nye 2004, 113), might be remedied by making use of nonstate actors and individuals on the ground who are more credible in the eyes of the foreign publics engaged (Gilboa 2008, 73, 281–82; Payne 2009a, 604; Rasmussen 2010, 268; Lee and Ayhan 2015, 61). Nonstate actor activities, in collaboration with state agencies or independent of them, complement official efforts for more effective PD outcomes (see Lee and Ayhan 2015 and Zaharna and Uysal 2016). Nevertheless, most PD scholars do not clearly indicate which nonstate actor activities should be classified as PD and/or what kind of nonstate actors can be labeled as PD actors. This ambiguity regarding the place of nonstate actors impedes the “sunrise of [PD as] an academic field” (Gregory 2008b). The lack of agreement on at least a minimal definition of PD and its boundaries has academic and practical implications. Diplomacy studies are often considered “short on theory” (Jönsson 2002, 215; see also Der Derian 1987). The field of PD is even shorter as the “[search] for a theory of public diplomacy” continues (Gilboa 2008; Pamment 2017). The greatest obstacle in solidifying a theory of PD, particularly one that concerns the place of nonstate actors, is a deficiency of boundaries. Demarcating boundaries is a requisite for theory building, according to Dubin (1978, 125), who said, “[i]n order that a model may represent an empirical system, it has to have boundaries corresponding to the empirical system. The boundaries are important to the specification of any theoretical model.” This article lays the foundation for further PD theory-building by mapping the much-needed boundaries of PD with distinct criteria. There are also practical implications of blurry boundaries. Failure to build a common understanding of nonstate actors’ roles in PD has impeded any realization of the untapped potential of nonstate actors. Further, empirical research on nonstate actor activities related to PD should be generalizable to certain types of nonstate actors (Vakil 1997, 2057), and this requires boundaries. While this article is an initial step in the larger research project, building this typology of PD actors is beyond the scope of this article. Lacking these boundaries, we end up treating all kinds of transnational activities of nonstate actors under the banner of nonstate PD that indeed have nothing in common except for not being initiated by state agencies. In significant studies, nonstate actor activities that have unintentional consequences and no clear PD agendas are referred to as nonstate PD (see Leonard et al. 2002; Nye 2004; Hocking 2005; Riordan 2005; Sharp 2005; Melissen 2005a; Gilboa 2008; Kelley 2009; L'Etang 2009; Seib 2009; Szondi 2009; Zaharna 2010; Van Ham 2013; d'Hooghe 2015). These scholars refer to nonstate PD superficially without providing details and the criteria to make nonstate actor activities PD. However, in the case of most nonstate actors, their engagement in PD is rather unintentional as they contribute to outcomes for others (e.g., their home countries’ ministry of foreign affairs) without having a prioritized PD agenda. In other words, for this literature, most nonstate actors do not have PD agendas, but the outcomes of their activities may overlap with some states’ PD objectives. The unintentional contributions of nonstate actors are significant and must be analyzed to explore untapped potential. However, for the sake of analytical clarity, these activities should be regarded as unintentional contributions rather than as PD activities per se.4 If there are no clear boundaries to distinguish the intentional from unintentional PD objectives of nonstate actors, then every transnational communication of every entity can fall into the realm of PD (La Porte 2012, 449). Some scholars mention the problem of the blurry boundaries of PD but offer little or no insights into this issue (Henderson 1973, XXI-XXVII; Zöllner 2009, 266; Brown 2013b, 53; Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, and Kendrick 2013, 36; Melissen 2013, 449; Wiseman 2015, 13, 298). The taxonomy in the next section aims to address the issue of an unconsolidated definition of PD by attempting a research appraisal of the field and mapping the boundaries. A Taxonomy of Public Diplomacy Perspectives In this section, 160 articles are categorized into a taxonomy of five groups of perspectives. The conceptualizations of public diplomacy, particularly meanings of public and diplomacy in these articles are investigated. Furthermore, the articles are analyzed with an eye to whether they treat nonstate actor activities as PD, and if they do, whether any boundaries determine what is and is not PD. Where boundaries of PD are not clear, the conceptualizations of PD are not analytically coherent, but rather vague. In the last part of this section, the criteria for analytical boundaries of PD are compiled and summarized. State-Centric Perspectives Out of 160 articles, 94 articles defined PD in state-centric terms without any reference to nonstate actor activities. The most common definition used in these studies is that of Tuch (1990, 3), who defines PD as “a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.” However, none of the articles explicitly argued that nonstate actor activities cannot be regarded as PD. Most of these articles empirically analyzed a governmental PD initiative with a state-centric definition of PD without any reference to nonstate actors. Golan (2015, 417), in his extended chapter based on his earlier work (Golan 2013), emphasizes that his “definition of public diplomacy is government biased,” as he considers “government as the primary organization and foreign publics as the primary publics.” Brown (2013a) holds that PD “is the way that it is because it is done by states,” and he does not treat nonstate actor activities as PD “unless they are acting on behalf of states.” Those against the idea of referring to nonstate actor activities as PD have two types of reservations. The first and most common type of reservation is that public diplomacy is a kind of diplomacy that requires status to practice it. The second type of reservation, which is not mainstream, is that the public in public diplomacy implies state agencies as the subject of the initiative. In order to address these two reservations, we need to disaggregate the term public diplomacy into its components. The first type of reservation is about the word diplomacy in public diplomacy. Scholars who refuse to recognize nonstate actor activities as PD do so particularly based on what the word diplomacy entails. For these scholars, nonstate actor activities are not PD or any kind of diplomacy for that matter, since nonstate actor activities “have little to do with the functions and objectives of diplomacy” (Hocking et al. 2012, 10).5 In a similar vein, McDowell (2008, 10) contends that the word “diplomacy” entails “a role for the state,” while the word “public” refers to the people rather than the state, because PD “takes place in public.” He accepts that nonstate actors conduct similar activities without government direction, but argues that these activities cannot be regarded as PD if there is no government direction to achieve particular goals.6 If one agrees that diplomacy requires status, then for consistency's sake, one should avoid using terms such as social diplomacy and people-to-people diplomacy for nonstate actor activities. Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann (2011, 536) argue that while some NGOs might be performing “some elements of diplomatic practice,” which are “negotiation, representation, information-gathering, and communication,” they are not performing all of them and their activities cannot be treated as diplomacy, which “is an institutionalized feature of the state system.” In a similar vein, Sharp (1997, 630–31) argues that diplomats’ representation of their states has political significance beyond symbolic meaning, and no profession, however capable it is thought to be, would be able to replace it and be as effective as diplomats. These categoric rejections of nonstate PD fit into the state-centric perspectives in the taxonomy. These approaches to PD are similar to the Traditional School of Diplomacy, in Murray's (2008, 28) taxonomy, which “emphasize the centrality of the state to diplomacy.” Neo-Statist Perspectives While 92 out of 94 articles reviewed categorically reject nonstate actor activities in the realm of PD, two articles suggest alternative terms for nonstate actors’ PD-like activities. Lam (2007) refers to the British Premier League's influence in China as “informal public diplomacy,” while adopting a state-centric understanding of PD. Furthermore, Sevin, Kimball, and Khalil (2011) suggest using Payne's “grassroots diplomacy” (Payne 2009b; see also Payne, Sevin, and Bruya 2011) and Czubek's “social diplomacy” (Czubek 2002; see also Sevin and Salcıgil White 2011; Van Doeveren 2011) as alternatives to “public diplomacy” for nonstate actor activities. Like Czubek, Van Doeveren (2011, 18–19) distinguishes between “public diplomacy,” which is “a component of national diplomatic practice,” and “social diplomacy,” which “refers to the activity that pursues PD goals but that moves beyond the confined limits of diplomats.” These suggestions represent the second reservation concerning the use of the term PD for the activities of nonstate actors. This reservation stems from the term public: does public refer to those on the receiving end, the foreign publics who are addressed, or does it refer to the subject of PD, state agencies? Almost all articles in the sample, except two (Castells 2008; Lindholm and Olsson 2011), explicitly or implicitly define the public in PD as the foreign publics who are the target audiences or stakeholders. However, the terms “social diplomacy,” “informal public diplomacy,” and “grassroots diplomacy” are suggested as alternatives to nonstate PD, which shows discontent with the word public. These alternative terms have the term diplomacy in common, yet it is not clear why the PD-like activities of nonstate actors cannot be simply labeled PD but must be termed “something-else” diplomacy.7 Alternative notions of nonstate diplomacy in this mold fit within the neo-statist perspectives in the taxonomy, as they feature a rather state-centric understanding of PD, and reserve the term public, but not necessarily the term diplomacy, for state agencies. Proponents of alternative terms for nonstate PD offer only a vague distinction between what is PD and what is not. Their approaches lack conceptual clarity compared to the more rigid boundaries provided by state-centric perspectives, above, and accommodative perspectives, below. From an analytical standpoint, state-centric perspectives are more coherent than are neo-statist perspectives, but they are similarly outdated because of their insistence on not recognizing nonstate actors as PD actors. The argument against these state-centric perspectives derives from an analysis of the nontraditional, society-centric, and accommodative perspectives below. Nontraditional Perspectives Many scholars tackled the first reservation by defining diplomatic action not by the status but by the capabilities of the actors (Sharp 1999, 51, 55; Jönsson 2008, 34; Scholte 2008, 55–56; Kelley 2010, 288; Hocking et al. 2012, 38, 52; Henrikson 2013, 120; Kelley 2014; Henders and Young 2016, 333–34; Young and Henders 2016, 355–56).8Kelley's (2010) argument that nonstate actors are now nonstate diplomatic actors (NDAs), beyond being new actors in PD, is cited in some of these articles. According to Kelley, NDA actions lead to disruption of traditional diplomacy and give way to a new diplomacy characterized by “agency change” (Kelley 2014). Kelley argues for defining diplomacy as the diplomacy of capabilities as opposed to the diplomacy of status. NDAs do not have the legal status to represent their states as diplomats, but they have diplomatic capabilities and sources of legitimate representation that make them actors in the field of diplomacy, thereby disrupting the state monopoly on diplomacy. In a similar vein, but in contrast to his 1997 view cited above, Sharp (1999, 55) argues “it is becoming increasingly plausible to claim that more people are so employed and more are ‘diplomats’ . . . viewing diplomacy as representation.” The arguments regarding the diplomacy of capabilities imply that the borders of diplomacy are blurred, and diplomatic action is highly decentralized and relocated partially to nonstate actors such as NGOs and transnational advocacy networks (Rosenau 1997, 44, 61–64; Hocking 2004, 149–50; Kelley 2014, 19, 108). These scholars argue that PD “exists wherever its core capabilities are to be found, which requires extending the identification of [its actors] beyond simply who they are to include what they do” (Kelley 2014, 101).9 In turn, exclusive state monopoly on diplomatic activities, including PD activities, is ended as nonstate actors become more active and matter more in transnational affairs (Weiss 2000, 810; Melissen 2005a, 22–25; Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2007; Hocking et al. 2012, 10–23; Kelley 2014). Although nonstate actors are “becoming more important than states as initiators of change,” it is still implausible to suggest that nonstate actors have become units of analysis in the “inter-national” system, since “system change ultimately happens through states” (Wendt 1999, 9, 353). Similarly, Sending and Neumann (2006, 657; see also Van Rooy 1999; Kleiner 2008) argue that nonstate actors have become the subject of governance in addition to long being an object as they now engage in the “shaping and carrying out [of] global governance functions.” However, this does not imply power transfer from the state to nonstate actors in a zero-sum way; rather, it is better explained by “political power operat[ing] through” civil society (Sending and Neumann 2006, 658). This argument is the main difference between the traditionalist camp (state-centric and neo-statist perspectives), which emphasize nonstate actors as potential partners in state-led PD, and the nontraditional camp (nontraditional, society-centric, and accommodative perspectives), which hold that nonstate actors can also conduct PD independently. Still, arguing for the diplomatic actorness of nonstate actors does not mean actorness in the international system. After all, diplomacy is but one way that states, and nonstate actors, interact in the system. Actorness in PD, which deals more with low politics issues such as culture and people-to-people exchanges, is a weaker and hence more acceptable claim than diplomatic actorness, and obviously more acceptable than being an actor in the international system. Nonetheless, the diplomacy of capabilities approach holds two risks. First, following this logic, almost any transnational interaction can be called PD (Wiseman 2015, 298–99; Gregory 2016, 3–4). Having authority based on expertise or capabilities may make a nonstate actor a significant component of fuzzier and broader global governance, yet (public) diplomatic actorness is a far-fetched claim. Gregory (2016, 15) maps the boundary between diplomacy and governance very neatly, stating “[d]iplomacy, in contrast to governance, refers to the communication and representation activities through which governance actors manage their relationships and achieve governance-related outcomes.” Second, justifying nonstate actor activities as PD based on capabilities, effectiveness, and representation alone is quite subjective. It is also possible to question the representativeness of nonstate actors—in terms of representing societies—since nonstate actors lack “democratic legitimacy” and “internal democracy” (Riordan 2008, 140; see also Anderson 2000, 112–19; Kelley 2014, 25). Nonstate actors are not accountable to the public at large and often advocate for particular interests only. A possible way to address this risk is to add one more criterion to PD, which is that nonstate actors should be accountable to the public interests of a society, rather than private interests only (Gregory 2016). Gregory (2016) implicitly distinguishes between public interests and private interests by drawing the line between operational NGOs and advocacy NGOs (Malena 1995, 14). For Gregory, while Doctors Without Borders (MSF), an operational NGO, is doing PD for public interests, Amnesty International (AI), an advocacy NGO, is not doing PD because, in AI's case, “private interests dominate” (Gregory 2016, 13, 23–24). There are two problems with Gregory's distinction between public interests and private interests. First, Gregory's definition of public interests is arbitrary. His argument is parallel to the idea that interests of the public “should be defined more in society-wide than state-centric terms” (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2007, 6), and so advocacy NGOs’ activities serve private interests. Neither MSF nor AI is delegated by the public to conduct their activities, but both are interested in producing collective benefits beyond the private interests of their boards and constituents. While both lack delegation-based accountability, they might have some participation-based accountability (Grant and Keohane 2005; see also Pigman 2014, 95–96). Therefore, advocacy NGOs are as suitable as operational NGOs to conduct PD as far as the criterion of pursuing public interests is concerned.10 Second, operational NGOs’ main function is service provision, while advocacy NGOs’ main function is communication with publics. Therefore, contrary to Gregory's boundaries, advocacy NGOs are more likely to do PD than operational NGOs because of their communication function. The vitality of the communication function in PD is discussed under the accommodative perspectives category below. Those who advocate for diplomacy of behavior treat nonstate actor activities as (public) diplomacy based on the understanding that diplomacy exists whenever “there are boundaries for identity and those boundaries of identity are crossed” (Constantinou 1996, 113; see also Der Derian 1987). Such logic opens wide the gates of (public) diplomacy. Using this vague conceptualization, a wide range of activities can be called (public) diplomacy. If this approach is used without clearer boundaries of PD, the term loses its analytical value. This uncertainty over the boundaries of PD puts such views in the nontraditional perspectives of the taxonomy. In that respect, these perspectives resonate to the nascent school of diplomacy, in Murray's (2008, 29) taxonomy, which “emerged to challenge” state-centric perspectives. Nontraditional perspectives are inclined to be more normative and idealist as a reaction to the earlier two perspectives, which give little weight to nonstate actors. Society-Centric Perspectives Society-centric perspectives share the most traits with nontraditional perspectives, except for the definition of public. Castells’ (2008) article, the most cited article in the sample (267 times), is the primary example. While other articles in the sample view public as foreign publics, Castells interpret public as social actors who conduct PD in the global public sphere. Based on Castells’ conceptualization of PD, Lindholm and Olsson (2011, 255) also “understand the notion of public in terms of both organized nonstate actors as well as the general public.” Castells argues that PD is not government diplomacy since there is no need for a new term for that, but “public diplomacy is the diplomacy of the public, that is, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public” (Castells 2008, 91; emphasis added; see also Hocking 2005, 32). He contends that the public sphere acts as a “communication space in which a new, common language could emerge as a precondition for diplomacy” (Castells 2008, 91). In line with nontraditional perspectives, Castells also does not make clear which activities of which social actors are PD and which are not. According to this view, all “networked communication and shared meaning” (Castells 2008, 91) in the international arena is PD. Accommodative perspectives, explained next, offer criteria for exclusivity and thereby provide more analytical value to the boundaries of PD. Accommodative Perspectives Another answer to the question of where one draws boundaries comes from asking whether PD should be defined by the actor who practices it or by the object of the action. Gregory (2008a, 245–46) questions whether nonstate actor activities “in support of governance interests and values” should be given a different name when they attempt “to understand, engage, and influence” global publics, while the same activities by states are termed PD. La Porte's work (2012) is representative of the accommodative perspectives. She suggests that in the past PD was defined by the subject, but now it should be defined by the object of the action. La Porte bases her arguments on Gregory's (2008b, 276; 2011, 355) objective-based definition of PD, which lists “understanding, planning, engagement, and advocacy” as PD's core concepts regardless of the host of the initiative. She attributes PD actorness to nonstate actors that have legitimacy, defined as confidence and support from constituents, and effectiveness, defined as effective satisfaction of the constituents. Arguing that Gregory's approach lacks clear boundaries, La Porte (2012, 449–50; see also Hayden 2009) proposes two conditions to qualify nonstate actors as legitimate nonstate PD actors: nonstate actors must be minimally institutionalized, understood as “hav[ing] a basic organization, clear objectives, stable representation, and coordinated activity,” and have a political agenda, understood as “desir[ing] to have a permanent influence on policies, procedures, and international relations.” Similarly, in a rare attempt to “[map] the boundaries” between “diplomacy and civil society” and “diplomacy and global governance,” Gregory (2016, 13–14) argues that nonstate actors can be regarded as actors in “diplomacy's public dimension” when their political activities and goals are intentional and serve “governance and public interests rather than private interests.” Gregory (2016) does not address La Porte's criticisms of his earlier works (Gregory 2008b; 2011) and leaves a gap in the two authors’ attempt to draw the boundaries of PD. This gap is discussed below. Another significant condition for distinguishing PD activities from unintentional contributions to PD outcomes is intentionality. While the exercise of soft power, or power in general, may sometimes be unintentional (Arts 2003; Nye 2004; Barnett and Duvall 2005), PD is an intentional policy tool. As such, any definition of PD must be “concerned with purposive acts, not tacit arrangements” (Finkelstein 1995, 369). In other words, the main difference between PD and “other channels . . . through which ideas travel, including commercial relations and private communications” is “the intention to direct specific ideas at specific targets for specific political goals” (Scott-Smith 2008, 186). Therefore, intentionality should be a prerequisite for activities to be PD and initiators of the activities to be attributed PD actorness. In addition to being intentional and politically motivated, PD activity should involve communication as a primary function since PD “operates through essentially communicative practices” (Rasmussen 2009, 266; see also Gilboa 2002, 83; Jönsson and Hall 2003; Wang 2006, 42; Van Ham 2010, 116; La Porte 2015, 130). Following this logic, transnational transactions that lack a communication function should not be recognized as PD.11 Furthermore, this communication must address estranged foreign publics and/or transnational communities to achieve PD objectives. Soft power may also target domestic audiences to augment the popularity of a government or a leader or to maintain the unity of a political entity (Lee 2010). On the other hand, in PD's domestic dimension citizens can become legitimate stakeholders who participate in policymaking and the practice of PD (Huijgh 2013; Melissen 2013); however, they cannot be a target audience per se. If there is no “estrangement” (Der Derian 1987; see also Constantinou 1996, 113) between the hosts of the PD initiative and the public, what is being practiced is simply political or strategic communication and not PD. For example, while China's addressing of domestic constituents could be part of China's two-level (domestic/ international) soft power strategy (see Lee 2010), it should not be regarded as diplomacy or PD due to the lack of estrangement (c.f. Wang 2008; Manzenreiter 2010; Zappone 2012). One question requires clarification regarding the word diplomacy in PD. What is the nexus between diplomacy, or PD, and foreign policy? In some languages, “diplomacy” has been a synonym for “foreign policy” while a general understanding is that the former is a “means by which such policies are implemented” (Hocking and Lee 2011, 659; see also Nicolson 1988, 3; Clinton 2011). Nevertheless, it is impossible to conceptualize diplomacy and PD without considering its relationship to foreign policy.12 Cull (2013, 125) defines PD as “the conduct of foreign policy by engagement with a foreign public.” In a similar vein, Rasmussen (2010, 263) conceptualizes PD “as a modality of diplomacy that seeks to influence foreign political discourses.” In her comprehensive definition of PD, Zatepilina-Monacell argues that “ultimately, public diplomacy seeks to influence” foreign policies of other governments by influencing their citizens’ opinions (2009, 156, emphasis added; see also Malone 1988; Tuch 1990; Manheim 1994; Armstrong 2008). In addition to influencing the foreign policies of other governments, one of the main objectives of PD has always been communicating a country's foreign policies to make these policies more effective and accepted by foreign publics (Murrow Center 2002; Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos 2012, 729; Pamment 2012, 313). In the global arena, countries also employ PD in parallel with their foreign policies “to gain influence and shape [the international] agenda,” sometimes, particularly in the case of small and middle power countries,13 “in ways that go beyond their limited hard power resources” (Bátora 2005, 1). PD objectives may also be connected to economic-related foreign policies such as attracting more tourists, international students, and foreign direct investment to boost the nation-brand of the country. Furthermore, PD initiatives can go beyond national interests of particular nations, but still pursue political goals in line with foreign policies or political discourses. Zhang and Swartz (2009, 383) add a fourth dimension of PD: the promotion of global public goods such as “global efforts to prevent global warming, to form International Criminal Court and to prevent influenza pandemic.” Transnational advocacy networks also promote foreign policy or discourse changes using communication tools. An important example is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which started as a transnational nongovernmental initiative seeking a complete ban on antipersonnel landmines by all states, a political goal tied to a significant pillar of foreign policy—defense (see Zaharna 2007, 2013). Byrne (2016, 117) does not consider programs that are “disconnected from foreign policy ideas” as PD. She points out that Australia's New Colombo Plan is distinct from its predecessors as it is the first student mobility program designed as part of Australia's foreign policy portfolio. When PD is detached from foreign policy, it “loses its commonsense meaning and becomes something else” (Wiseman 2015, 298). Furthermore, if PD is not analytically tied to foreign policy, the Gezi Park protests can be labeled as PD (Zaharna and Uysal 2016, 114), and the Internet Corporation on Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) can be called a PD actor (Gregory 2016, 13), depriving the term of its conceptual value. In their seminal work on transnational relations and world politics, Nye and Keohane (1971b, 345) define political behavior as activities “to achieve the modification of other actors’ behavior.” One of the most ambitious goals of PD is to attempt the modification of other actors’ foreign policy behaviors. Less ambitious goals, such as the economy-related goals mentioned above, attempt individual-level attitude-behavior changes in the interests of the PD actor. Furthermore, activities necessary to achieve these, ambitious or less ambitious, objectives need to be purposive and involve communication that transcends boundaries for them to be PD. It is possible to offer a list of attributes for delineating the boundaries of PD and PD activities as derived from the broader survey and situated within the accommodative perspectives. This list might be useful in stimulating further discussion.14 First, PD actors must be institutionalized at least to some extent (La Porte 2012, 449). Second, PD activities must have intentional PD objectives (Scott-Smith 2008, 186; Gregory 2016, 13) such as “understand[ing] cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build[ing] and manag[ing] relationships; and influenc[ing] opinions and actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory 2008b, 276). Third, the activities must have political goals (Hayden 2009; La Porte 2012) and be connected to foreign policies (Rasmussen 2010; Cull 2013; Byrne 2016) that either contribute to a PD agenda of a government or influence foreign policy changes of governments. Fourth, communication with foreign publics or the international community must be the main tool of the initiative (Jönsson and Hall 2003; Rasmussen 2009).15 And, fifth, the initiatives must be for public rather than private interests (Peterson 1992; Hemery 2005; Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2007; Castells 2008; Gregory 2016). Conclusion: Implications for Research and Practice PD is a recent academic field that lacks a unified understanding of what it is and who its actors are. If there is to be a meaningful debate in the field, there must be a consensus at least on a minimal definition of PD and its related actors. This requires a closer look at how articles in the field define PD and how they differ from each other. This article analyzed and categorized disparate perspectives about the concept. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the findings of this article. The findings suggested five groups of perspectives. Three of them, the neo-statist, nontraditional, and society-centric perspectives, are not clear conceptually. The other two, the state-centric and accommodative perspectives are more analytically coherent. Table 1. Public diplomacy perspectives by definition Diplomacy of status of capabilities Public as subject Vague boundaries Neo-statist perspectives Society-centric perspectives as foreign public Vague boundaries Nontraditional perspectives Analytical boundaries State-centric perspectives Accommodative perspectives Diplomacy of status of capabilities Public as subject Vague boundaries Neo-statist perspectives Society-centric perspectives as foreign public Vague boundaries Nontraditional perspectives Analytical boundaries State-centric perspectives Accommodative perspectives View Large Table 1. Public diplomacy perspectives by definition Diplomacy of status of capabilities Public as subject Vague boundaries Neo-statist perspectives Society-centric perspectives as foreign public Vague boundaries Nontraditional perspectives Analytical boundaries State-centric perspectives Accommodative perspectives Diplomacy of status of capabilities Public as subject Vague boundaries Neo-statist perspectives Society-centric perspectives as foreign public Vague boundaries Nontraditional perspectives Analytical boundaries State-centric perspectives Accommodative perspectives View Large Table 2. Taxonomy of public diplomacy perspectives State-centric perspectives Neo-statist perspectives Nontraditional perspectives Society-centric perspectives Accommodative perspectives Primary examples Dutta-Bergman 2006; Cull 2013 Lam 2007; Sevin, Kimball, and Khalil 2011 Gilboa 2008; Nye 2008 Castells 2008; Lindholm and Olsson 2011 Scott-Smith 2008; La Porte 2012 Theoretical tendencies Rationalism, conventional constructivism Rationalism, conventional constructivism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach) Public as Foreign public Foreign public and/or subject of PD Foreign public Subject of PD (people in the public sphere) Foreign public Conditions for PD Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics Legitimacy, effectiveness, political agenda, intention, public interest, estrangement, connection to foreign policies Nonstate actors as PD actors No, nonstate actor activities can be seen as PD only if state agencies direct them No, nonstate actor activities can be regarded as social or grassroots diplomacy Yes, if nonstate actors are capable of engaging in PD initiatives Nonstate actors are primary actors of PD Yes, only if nonstate actors meet conditions above Boundaries of PD Analytically coherent Vague Vague Vague Analytically coherent Count 92 (57.5%) 2 (1.3%) 60 (42.9%) 2 (1.3%) 4 (2.5%) State-centric perspectives Neo-statist perspectives Nontraditional perspectives Society-centric perspectives Accommodative perspectives Primary examples Dutta-Bergman 2006; Cull 2013 Lam 2007; Sevin, Kimball, and Khalil 2011 Gilboa 2008; Nye 2008 Castells 2008; Lindholm and Olsson 2011 Scott-Smith 2008; La Porte 2012 Theoretical tendencies Rationalism, conventional constructivism Rationalism, conventional constructivism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach) Public as Foreign public Foreign public and/or subject of PD Foreign public Subject of PD (people in the public sphere) Foreign public Conditions for PD Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics Legitimacy, effectiveness, political agenda, intention, public interest, estrangement, connection to foreign policies Nonstate actors as PD actors No, nonstate actor activities can be seen as PD only if state agencies direct them No, nonstate actor activities can be regarded as social or grassroots diplomacy Yes, if nonstate actors are capable of engaging in PD initiatives Nonstate actors are primary actors of PD Yes, only if nonstate actors meet conditions above Boundaries of PD Analytically coherent Vague Vague Vague Analytically coherent Count 92 (57.5%) 2 (1.3%) 60 (42.9%) 2 (1.3%) 4 (2.5%) View Large Table 2. Taxonomy of public diplomacy perspectives State-centric perspectives Neo-statist perspectives Nontraditional perspectives Society-centric perspectives Accommodative perspectives Primary examples Dutta-Bergman 2006; Cull 2013 Lam 2007; Sevin, Kimball, and Khalil 2011 Gilboa 2008; Nye 2008 Castells 2008; Lindholm and Olsson 2011 Scott-Smith 2008; La Porte 2012 Theoretical tendencies Rationalism, conventional constructivism Rationalism, conventional constructivism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach) Public as Foreign public Foreign public and/or subject of PD Foreign public Subject of PD (people in the public sphere) Foreign public Conditions for PD Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics Legitimacy, effectiveness, political agenda, intention, public interest, estrangement, connection to foreign policies Nonstate actors as PD actors No, nonstate actor activities can be seen as PD only if state agencies direct them No, nonstate actor activities can be regarded as social or grassroots diplomacy Yes, if nonstate actors are capable of engaging in PD initiatives Nonstate actors are primary actors of PD Yes, only if nonstate actors meet conditions above Boundaries of PD Analytically coherent Vague Vague Vague Analytically coherent Count 92 (57.5%) 2 (1.3%) 60 (42.9%) 2 (1.3%) 4 (2.5%) State-centric perspectives Neo-statist perspectives Nontraditional perspectives Society-centric perspectives Accommodative perspectives Primary examples Dutta-Bergman 2006; Cull 2013 Lam 2007; Sevin, Kimball, and Khalil 2011 Gilboa 2008; Nye 2008 Castells 2008; Lindholm and Olsson 2011 Scott-Smith 2008; La Porte 2012 Theoretical tendencies Rationalism, conventional constructivism Rationalism, conventional constructivism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach), idealism Postanarchy strand of constructivism (issue-areas approach) Public as Foreign public Foreign public and/or subject of PD Foreign public Subject of PD (people in the public sphere) Foreign public Conditions for PD Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention Diplomatic status, engagement with foreign publics, political agenda, public interest, intention Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics Diplomatic capabilities and representation, engagement with foreign and domestic publics Legitimacy, effectiveness, political agenda, intention, public interest, estrangement, connection to foreign policies Nonstate actors as PD actors No, nonstate actor activities can be seen as PD only if state agencies direct them No, nonstate actor activities can be regarded as social or grassroots diplomacy Yes, if nonstate actors are capable of engaging in PD initiatives Nonstate actors are primary actors of PD Yes, only if nonstate actors meet conditions above Boundaries of PD Analytically coherent Vague Vague Vague Analytically coherent Count 92 (57.5%) 2 (1.3%) 60 (42.9%) 2 (1.3%) 4 (2.5%) View Large In summary, the state-centric and neo-statist perspectives argue that PD is state-centric. The former claims that public diplomacy requires an official status and reject nonstate actor activities as PD, while the latter suggests alternative diplomacy terms for nonstate actors’ PD-like transnational activities. In contrast, the nontraditional, society-centric, and accommodative perspectives regard some nonstate actor activities as PD. State-centric definitions do not acknowledge the changing environment in which nonstate actors increasingly employ PD strategies to achieve diplomatic goals through using their capabilities. Nontraditional perspectives developed as a response to this denial and make the case that nonstate actors are new players in the diplomatic field. Although similar to nontraditional perspectives, society-centric perspectives have a more radical approach, claiming that public diplomacy's very subject is people and nonstate actors in the global public sphere. Where the nontraditional and society-centric perspectives might be criticized as naïve, the accommodative perspectives take a step back and suggest working criteria to include nonstate actors and their activities in PD. This article suggests several implications for further research. The taxonomy of PD perspectives in this article has introduced more lucidity and coherence for PD studies. This is the first attempt to produce a comprehensive research appraisal in the field of PD. Hence, this article reflects trends in PD research. Furthermore, this taxonomy can guide further research on PD and help authors orient their conceptualizations of the term more coherently and consistently by negotiating disparate perspectives behind the definition of PD. Future studies can benefit from this article to form more structural conceptualizations and related justifications. Acknowledgements An earlier version of this paper was presented at 57th Annual Conference of International Communication Association in San Diego, California, on May 29, 2017. The author is indebted to Efe Sevin, Natalia Grincheva, Sevde Arpaci Ayhan, and three anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback on earlier drafts. Footnotes 1 Following September 11, 2001, PD evolved into new public diplomacy (NPD), which sought to accommodate new objectives, new actors, and the new environment in which PD is practiced. The debate on the boundaries of PD started with the start of the NPD. Previously, state agencies were perceived as the only initiators of PD, while nonstate actors were seen as just instrumental in achieving state-centric initiatives. Indeed, only eight (4 percent) out of the 185 most-cited articles were written before September 11, 2001, while 177 articles were written after. 2 Warfare as a function of public diplomacy is problematic, since diplomacy fundamentally concerns avoidance of war. 3 Fifty-three of the 160 articles (33 percent) were published in three journals: Public Relations Review (PRR) (19 articles), The Hague Journal of Diplomacy (HJD) (18 articles), and American Behavioral Scientist (ABS) (16 articles). HJD is much more likely to publish articles that accept nonstate actor activities as PD (72 percent) compared to PRR (32 percent) and ABS (31 percent). Overall, the ratio is 41 percent in all 160 articles. 4 See Zatepilina-Monacell’s (2009; 2010; 2012) work, among others, for an example of NGOs’ unintentional contributions to the United States’ PD. 5 While Hocking et al. (2012, 20) question vague usage of diplomacy, their categorization of diplomatic domains into intergovernmental, multi-layered, private, and loose coupling begs the same question of which (shared) processes and practices in these domains have to do with the functions and objectives of diplomacy. 6 For a similar discussion, see Potter (2008, 33–34). 7 For similar observations, see Hayden (2011b) and Riordan (2017). 8 Scholars have used various other terms to refer to this phenomenon making similar arguments including diplomacy of behavior, diplomacy of effectiveness, diplomacy of expressiveness, diplomacy as representation, process-based diplomacy, and practices-based diplomacy, among others. 9 For more on diplomatic capabilities or functions, see Cooper and Hocking (2000), Jönsson and Hall (2003), Murray (2008), Neumann (2008), Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann (2011), Henders and Young (2016), and Young and Henders (2016); for PD functions, see Leonard et al. 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Blagden,, David

doi: 10.1093/isp/eky007pmid: N/A

Abstract Abstract:The “Impact Agenda” of the UK Research Excellence Framework has major implications for the relationship of international relations scholars, and social scientists more generally, to government policymaking—not just in Britain, but around the world. This article demonstrates that, at its worst, the Impact Agenda may struggle to capture the true contribution of scholarship to the public good, incentivize sub-optimal forms and modes of research, erode academics’ property rights, see atomized academics exploited or harmed by powerful institutions, and jeopardize scholars’ intellectual integrity and independence. The article also suggests, however, that these vulnerabilities can be managed by the resolution of certain key questions pertaining to scholarly conscience and expectations of reward prior to pursuing “Impact.” Given that the pursuit of international peace and societal progress through teaching and research is the reason many of us choose to become professional international relations scholars, the article concludes with some reflective “tips” for achieving policy influence from early in an academic career.   Resumen: El «programa de impacto» del Marco para la Excelencia en la Investigación (Research Excellence Framework) del Reino Unido tiene una gran repercusión en la relación entre los investigadores del área de relaciones internacionales (y, en general, los académicos de Ciencias Sociales) y los encargados de crear políticas no solo en el Reino Unido, sino en todo el mundo. Este artículo demuestra que, en su peor versión, el programa de impacto no logra reflejar la verdadera contribución de los investigadores al bien común, incentiva métodos y formas de investigación desfavorables, menoscaba los derechos de propiedad de los académicos, ve a los investigadores disgregados en una situación de explotación o perjuicio causada por instituciones poderosas, y pone en peligro la independencia e integridad intelectual de los académicos. No obstante, el artículo también sugiere que esas vulnerabilidades pueden controlarse mediante la resolución de algunos interrogantes clave relacionados con la conciencia y las expectativas de recompensa de los investigadores antes de adentrarse en el «impacto». Dado que la búsqueda de la paz internacional y el progreso de la sociedad a través de la enseñanza y la investigación es la razón por la que muchos de nosotros decidimos ser investigadores profesionales en el área de relaciones internacionales, el artículo concluye con algunos consejos para la reflexión que pueden servir para influir en las políticas en las primeras etapas de la carrera de investigador.   Extrait: La stratégie intitulée «Impact Agenda» du Research Excellence Framework (Organisme évaluant l'excellence de la recherche dans les établissements d'enseignement supérieur au Royaume-Uni) au Royaume-Uni pose des enjeux majeurs en matière de relation entre chercheurs en relations internationales, et plus généralement en sciences sociales, et législateurs, ce qui ne vaut pas uniquement pour le Royaume-Uni, mais pour tous les pays. Le présent article démontre que, dans le pire des cas, la stratégie de l'Impact Agenda a des difficultés à appréhender l'apport réel de l'université au bien public, qu'elle incite à des formes et à des modes de recherche non optimaux, qu'elle érode les droits de propriété des universitaires, qu'elle laisse les universitaires dispersés aux prises avec l'exploitation exercée par des institutions puissantes, et qu'elle met en danger l'intégrité et l'indépendance intellectuelles des universitaires. L'article suggère toutefois que ces aspects vulnérables peuvent être gérés par la résolution de certaines questions clé ayant trait à la conscience universitaire et aux attentes de rétribution comme éléments préalables à la poursuite des objectifs de la stratégie. Étant donné que la recherche de la paix dans le monde et du progrès sociétal par l'intermédiaire de l'enseignement et de la recherche sont les raisons pour lesquelles nombre d'entre nous choisissent la profession de chercheur en relations internationales, l'article propose en conclusion des axes de réflexion permettant d'opérer une influence politique dès le début d'une carrière universitaire. policy, impact, Britain, influence, scholarship The past decade has seen a sustained wave of interest in the challenges and merits of achieving policy impact via scholarship on the part of international relations scholars (Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Reus-Smit 2012; Walt 2012; Avey and Desch 2013; Byman and Kroenig 2016; Freedman 2017; Gavin 2017; Preble 2017; Wiers 2017). Yet in Britain today, few terms are as likely to induce ire and eye rolling in any university faculty gathering as the word “impact.” The “Impact Agenda” of the UK Research Excellence Framework (REF)—the official ranking exercise of universities’ research used to determine their subsequent public funding—is understood as the scourge of “pure” scholarship by some, a cash cow to be milked by others, and a game to be played by many. This ire represents a prima facie puzzle, however. After all, professional academics represent a cohort of over-educated high-achievers who have deliberately traded off the riches and status of other potential careers to advance scientific knowledge, foster the next generation of thinkers, and see their discoveries turned to the cause of human progress—in short, to have “impact.” Professional scholars of politics and policy also tend, unsurprisingly, to be particularly concerned with policy and politics. So why do so many roll their eyes (or worse) at the REF Agenda? How did a profession obsessed with impact come to be so skeptical of “Impact”? Britain's Impact Agenda merits consideration by the global community of international relations scholars, as opposed to solely UK-based academics, for six reasons. First, the implicit focus of the recent wave of international relations scholarship on academia-policy links has been predominantly American-centric (Gavin 2017, 270). Of course, the United States “Beltway–Ivory Tower” relationship is the most important connection in this domain, due to the size of the US scholarly community and the global reach of US policy. Yet this recognition needs caveating with two further points. Second, therefore, many non-British scholars—particularly international PhD graduates—are looking at UK academic career opportunities, given the tightness of their home job markets. The REF and its Impact Agenda require understanding as key aspects of the professional landscape for British and non-British scholars alike for the foreseeable future in UK academia (Carey 2014): forewarned is forearmed. Third, moreover, while US policy may indeed be most consequential globally, Britain remains a systemically significant major power whose policy decisions still reverberate internationally. Choices such as the Anglo-French militarization of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) concept against Libya in 2011 (Bellamy and Williams 2011), Parliament's vote against military intervention in Syria in 2013 that unwound Franco-American momentum behind such a move (Porter 2016), and of course, Britain's dramatic 2017 commencement of the “Brexit” process to leave the European Union (Blagden 2017) have all had substantial international ramifications. UK government policy is therefore still worth influencing. Fourth, and more generally, a study of the UK Impact climate sheds light on the up- and downsides of influencing policy through scholarship—with other governments or multilateral organizations, say—and obstacles to doing so. Fifth, as a specific manifestation of the previous point, the weighting of “impact” in UK universities’ REF-linked funding settlements makes for a unique case study in the incentives and distortions generated by such an official mandate. And sixth, given the current wave of anti-expert hostility even in hitherto liberal states with a long-standing commitment to evidence-based science (Hoffman 2016; Krauss 2016; Mance 2016; Nichols 2017), dogged scholarly engagement with policy has never been more important—in Britain, America, and around the world. This article appraises the Impact Agenda as it applies to scholarship in general and the social sciences in particular. It focuses specifically on the contribution of international relations and related fields to the formation and improvement of public policy, examining both the promise that increased attention to the public impact of social research offers and several of the potential pitfalls that may have given Impact—at least in its REF-mandated guise—a bad name. The analysis pertains predominantly to foreign and defense policy, due to the author's specialist sub-field, but its conclusions—like some of its examples—aspire to apply more widely. It is therefore focused on influencing national-level policy outcomes, although influence on other areas of public life—local government, civil society, economic productivity, multilateral organizations, and so forth—are also valuable areas of scholarly engagement and recognized as such by the REF. The article's purpose is to raise key questions about the Impact Agenda and academics’ activities under its aegis, even if it cannot satisfactorily answer them all. These questions are not all new (Martin 2011; Oliver 2014; Ní Mhurchú et al. 2016), and many were even flagged before the formal introduction of “impact” to the REF (Smith, Ward, and House 2011), but they nonetheless merit exploration in the specific context of international relations scholars aspiring to policy influence. It is written from an early-career perspective, when achieving policy access—which is not itself the same as influence or impact, although it is a common precursor to both—is often most difficult. Senior faculty members with more experience of impact activities may be able to offer alternative perspectives. One of the author's unique selling points, meanwhile, is experience of conducting external consultations in a UK government department. The article therefore offers perspectives from “both sides of the fence,” having been both a receiver and a submitter of academic attempts to engage with policy. Along the way, it contributes to a live disciplinary debate (Flinders and John 2013) as to whether political science is already amply engaged in analysis of “real-world” importance (John 2012) or whether it needs to become more publicly and politically active to survive (Flinders 2012). First, the article explains the Impact Agenda and its origins. Second, it identifies positive prospects that emerge from this growing focus on the public- and policy-relevance of social-scientific advancement. Third, it examines some of the potentially negative aspects of academic engagement with policy, both in general and under the specific auspices of the REF Agenda. Finally, it offers some reflective tips for achieving impact while navigating the possible pitfalls of Impact, based on the author's (admittedly limited, but at least early-career-focused) experience. The article thus develops two different—but related—themes. On the one hand, it concludes that REF-mandated “impact” has key failings that necessitate instrumental game-playing, while academic engagement with public policy more generally is potentially perilous for atomized, institutionally weak individual scholars, particularly at junior levels. It also concludes, however, that public impact through research can and should remain among the highest aspirations of the professional academic, while the downsides of policy engagement can be mitigated by identifying and answering certain questions about one's personal intellectual integrity and expectations of reward in advance. In that spirit, its recommendations for achieving policy influence at an early career stage are offered despite—and to surmount—the Impact Agenda's various pitfalls. What Is the “Impact Agenda”? The UK Higher Education Funding Councils introduced Impact as a criterion for assessing scholarly contribution in the most recent Research Excellence Framework, conducted in 2014 (REF 2012a). At first glance, this may not seem a significant development: English universities’ total income amounted to £29.08bn in 2015–2016 (HEFCE 2017b 8), for example, while the REF-determined Quality-Related (QR) “Block Grant” accounted for only £1.56bn of that (HEFCE 2015, 5–6).1 In context, though, that figure was bigger than the sector's £1.52bn operating surplus (HEFCE 2017b, 2). Because it is fixed between REFs and can be spent flexibly, moreover—as opposed to for prescribed purposes, such as teaching or capital investment—it forms the basis for most universities’ ongoing support to research, particularly those outside Oxbridge that lack substantial private endowments. Additionally, it is doubly important to the support of research in the social sciences and humanities, fields that typically attract less project-specific external funding than natural/medical/engineering sciences.2 For all its limitations (Sayer 2014), therefore, doing well in the REF is a matter of supremely high stakes for British universities’ ability to sustain research (Ratcliffe 2014; Brennan 2015)—and Impact is now a large and growing part of that, as discussed below. Despite its REF-induced contemporary prominence, however, linking state-provided research funding to excellence in a way that defines “excellence” as including economic and societal contribution is not a new idea in Britain, and neither is lamenting the distortionary incentives that such rankings create (Macilwain 2009). REF2014’s precursor—the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)—had explicit criteria for weighing the contribution of applied research (RAE 2008), although it did not yet make “impact” an independent metric of research quality.3 Going back further still, the idea that publicly funded UK universities should deliver measurable value to the economy, as well as intellectual excellence, derives from the “Three Es” drive in public spending—“Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness”—of Margaret Thatcher's premiership (Martin 2011, 247; Vincent 2015). The contemporary REF's first precursor was conducted in 1986 (Stern 2016, 8)—though many scholars in the British academy valued the contribution of scholarship to the public good long before the government mandated that they should do so, of course (Dahrendorf 1968). REF Impact is thus not the “leading edge” of academic engagement with policy, in Britain or anywhere else, but it is nonetheless a powerful element of the UK government's university funding allocation mechanism that incentivizes certain behaviors—some of them desirable, some of them less so (Hicks 2012). Scholarly excellence (measured by “originality,” “significance,” and “rigor”) of research “outputs” (books and journal articles) accounted for 65 percent of departments’ overall “quality profile” in REF2014, while “impact” (measured by “reach” and “significance”) accounted for a further 20 percent (REF 2012a).4 In REF2021, this will increase to 25 percent (HEFCE 2017c, 13) following a recent review (Stern 2016), with “outputs” falling to only 60 percent, confirming the former's growing prominence.5 Impact is assessed by REF Panels of senior scholars, via departments’ “Impact Case Studies”6: effectively portfolios demonstrating how particular pieces of academic research, themselves of high enough quality to be assessed as REF “outputs,” have yielded positive effects for the economy and/or wider society (HEFCE 2016c). Performing well against such criteria is financially imperative, since “impact” contributes substantially to REF score, and overall REF scores determine universities’ subsequent QR research funding settlement (Francis 2011, 5; Rogers et al. 2014, 2).7 It is noteworthy, however, that British REF stipulations do not go so far as the controversial alterations proposed by US Senator Tom Coburn that only political science research that enhances American national security/prosperity should receive US National Science Foundation funding (Mervis 2014)—UK government has focused on incentivizing preferred behavior, rather than barring state support to certain areas of research. Of course, “original,” “significant,” and “rigorous” research will make an impression within its academic field based on those qualities alone. The REF defines research as having “impact” through “reach” and “significance” outside academic fields, however, defined as “an effect on, change, or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment, or quality of life, beyond academia” (HEFCE 2016c, emphasis added). As the UK Research Councils (RCUK) explain, “[e]conomic and societal impacts embrace all the extremely diverse ways in which research-related knowledge and skills benefit individuals, organizations, and nations by: fostering global economic performance, and specifically the economic competitiveness of the United Kingdom; increasing the effectiveness of public services and policy; and enhancing quality of life, health, and creative output” (RCUK 2012a). “Impact” can therefore take many forms and does not necessarily have to mean policy influence (Stern 2016, 23). It could instead mean a spin-off start-up company, a well-attended public exhibition, or a popular software download. There is, nonetheless, a distinctive and instrumental focus on economic and social benefit, with an assumption of research-driven prosperity and progressive change. Indeed, REF2014’s Impact Agenda arose from the mandate to maximize universities’ economic return following the 2010 general election as part of the effort to increase national prosperity while pursuing fiscal consolidation (Cable and Willetts 2010; Vincent 2015). The straitened public spending backdrop in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, which affected the finance-centric UK economy particularly severely (Seager, Kollewe, and Hopkins 2009), gave rise to the 2010–2015 Conservative-Liberal coalition government's supreme focus on deficit reduction. The Impact criterion centered around scholarship's direct economic benefit—above and beyond RAE2008’s mere recognition of applied research—was thus critical to preserving any level of state support to university research. Whether the Impact Agenda is needed within British international relations—or has had much effect since its inception—is a matter of perspective.8 The Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project found in its faculty survey over 2008–2011 that only 19 percent of UK-based international relations academics self-identified as doing “primarily applied” or “more applied than basic” research—compared to 23 percent in the United States and 69 percent answering “primarily basic” or “more basic than applied” (Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney 2012, 37). By the survey of 2014—after the incorporation of Impact into the REF and its associated incentivization—the figure had barely shifted, at 20 percent (Maliniak, Peterson, Powers, and Tierney 2014, #36). That said, between the 2011 and 2014 surveys, the number of scholars answering “both about equally” in their balance of basic-versus-applied research increased from 13 to 20 percent—so the number of scholars reporting that applied work accounts for at least an equal amount of their research rose from 32 to 40 percent in total. The number saying that they had consulted (paid/unpaid) for the UK government also came in at 21 percent (2014, #36). The previous data (2012, 59–60) demarcated paid (10 percent) and unpaid (14 percent) consultancy, so is not directly comparable—but assuming that the paid/unpaid percentages in 2011 covered many of the same individuals, 2014’s combined 21 percent may imply some modest uptick. For those who believe the primary aim of universities should be to conduct research with immediately marketable/policy-implementable implications, therefore, much seemingly remains to be done (i.e., applied research remains a distinct minority). For those who believe that the Impact Agenda poses a threat to universities’ core mission of foundational science, by contrast, then it could be read as already having an insidious effect in international relations (i.e., an 8 percent shift away from basic research over just three years). Either way, such data is hardly conclusive; it will thus be interesting to see how the proportions shift in future TRIP surveys. And, it is important to note that such crude “applied” versus “basic” self-identification captures only one element of the Impact Agenda's potential influence on scholarly behavior. For Impact's proponents, it is less about driving scholars away from foundational research and more about maximizing the public benefit derived from scientific discoveries. For the Agenda's opponents, by contrast, sub-optimal dislocation of research priorities is but one of its many potential distortionary consequences. As such, TRIP surveys’ “applied” versus “basic” questions are unlikely to ever precisely capture the Impact Agenda's full consequences for UK-based international relations scholarship, be they positive or negative. On the recommendations of the government-commissioned Stern Review, the UK funding councils will run the next REF in 2021 (Stern 2016, 32; HEFCE 2016a 6; HEFCE 2017c). Impact is lauded by Stern as “one of the success stories of REF2014” (Stern 2016, 21–22; HEFCE 2016a 18–24; Rogers et al. 2014, 2; Wilsdon 2016). A HEFCE-commissioned RAND study similarly concludes: “[c]onfidence in outcomes, and in the processes used in the research impact assessment, were relatively high” (Manville et al. 2015, xvi). Accordingly, “impact” has moved from 20 to 25 percent of total REF score (HEFCE 2017c, 13)—although Stern's proposal to assess overall “institutional impact” at the university level has been postponed beyond 2021 (Else 2017). REF2021 will require all “Units of Assessment” (UoA) to submit one “Impact Case Study,” plus another per fifteen full-time-equivalent (FTE) faculty members (HEFCE 2017d, 8). The minimum for even the smallest academic departments will therefore be two Case Studies, followed by another Study for every additional fifteen FTE staff (up to 105 FTE, decreasing to another Study per 50 FTE beyond that). Keen to broaden and deepen understandings of “impact” (HEFCE 2017c, 13), there will also be an assessment of UoA-level “impact environment” (HEFCE 2017c, 7–9); further official direction on the content/conduct of both the Case Studies and the Environment Statement will follow over 2018–2019 (HEFCE 2017d, 10).9 “Pathways to Impact” must also now be incorporated into the design of proposals for Research Council funding (RCUK 2012a; RCUK 2012b)—the other pillar of Britain's “dual support” public research funding system, alongside HEFCE's Block Grants to whole institutions—which provide competitive financial support to specific projects. The government focus on “value-for-money” deliverance of prosperity/security in exchange for public funding—including university spending—thus looks set to remain (Universities UK 2015; Giles 2016; HM Government 2016d). With Brexit exacerbating financial uncertainty in UK Higher Education, pressure to conduct “impactful” research that enhances British competitiveness will only grow. Loved or otherwise, therefore, the Impact Agenda will remain a feature of UK academic life for the foreseeable future. The Promise of Public Policy Engagement As noted, academics generally forego more lucrative careers to enhance human knowledge, pass that knowledge on to students, and see that knowledge deliver positive payoffs for humanity. Having an impact—albeit not necessarily construed in terms of policy influence, which as noted above, many international relations scholars remain understandably indifferent to—is thus why most of us pursue academia (Walt 2012; Flinders and John 2013), even if not so narrowly conceived as REF-defined Impact. At the very least, we are deeply immersed in a subject and have a vested interest in advancing our field—and probably, therefore, want the public and policymakers to appreciate its importance too. We even, arguably, have a moral duty—a social contract—to maximize the public benefits of the academic knowledge that we have been privileged enough to accrue (Francis 2011, 6; Jentleson and Ratner 2011, 6; Martin 2011, 247; Phipps 2014). For its part, policy practice certainly benefits from scholars’ theoretical and empirical insights (Stoker and Evans 2016, 1; Walt 2005; Nye 2008; Reus-Smit 2012); the limited influence of academic expertise on UK government is often identified as a source of recent British foreign/defense policy failings, for example (Strachan 2009; Porter 2010). In short, impact matters, and was a core part of our profession (Dahrendorf 1968; Nau 2008) before the REF formalized the requirement. Indeed, given that many academics have long been engaged in publicly valuable intellectual activity beyond teaching and published research, the Impact Agenda provides scope for that to gain recognition (Rogers et al. 2014, 2). For many social scientists, particularly scholars of international politics and security, academic research and knowledge can most readily have impact through influencing government policy (or, increasingly, non-governmental or inter-governmental organizations). As such, while the REF's Impact Agenda recognizes non-traditional forms of impact, there is enduring value in the traditional approach of seeking to inform and improve policymaking through academic engagement and contribution. It is therefore fortuitous that opportunities for academic involvement in British government policy formulation are increasing, albeit modestly. Part of this owes to conscious efforts by the likes of RCUK to achieve improved access as a precursor to impact, although it is also a consequence of coincidental trends. Closure of policymaking communities to external thinkers can have its upsides: the optimistic assumptions about low-cost, high-efficacy regime change underpinning the 2003 Iraq invasion, for example, were more readily devised in the reality-detached climate of American neoconservative think-tanks and then imported into government (Arin 2014) than they may have been in a country with a less permeable, less partisan civil service.10 And it is not as if UK security policymaking has recently blossomed as some barrier-free arena of academic engagement or is about to anytime soon (Rayner 2011; Farmer 2014; Newton 2015, 1–7); impediments of official information and classification, opaque/inaccessible policymaking communities, and political expediency overriding policy expertise persist. Nonetheless, opportunities for academic engagement with UK policymaking, even in the traditionally secretive foreign and defense sectors, are proliferating. The 2015 National Security Strategy/Strategic Defence and Security Review (NSS/SDSR) was the first such exercise in Britain to feature a public consultation suitable for academics with issue-/area-specific expertise to contribute to the overall macro-document that sets the framework for all UK national security policymaking (HM Government 2015b). The Chief of the Defence Staff's Strategic Forum has represented an effort to bring external experts into a quasi-institutionalized structure for providing consultation and critique (Strachan 2013, 49). Policymaking departments, including those covering foreign affairs, increasingly seek advice from—or even contract whole projects to—external experts, including academics (Ministry of Defence 2015; HM Government 2016b).11 Academic secondments into policymaking departments, while not as regular or developed as those in the United States (Blagden 2015c, 12–13; Andrews et al. 2015; Bridging the Gap Project 2015a; Himmrich 2016, 1–2), are appearing (ESRC, 2016, 2017a). Attitudes toward encouraging academic debate and engagement are now favorable even in organizations with good reasons to be secretive, such as the Atomic Weapons Establishment and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (HM Government 2014a).12 The rise of Parliamentary Select Committee activism (Dunleavy and Muir 2013), meanwhile, provides increasingly visible and influential inquiries to which academics can contribute, which in turn can pressure government and impact public opinion via media reportage. Alongside increasing consultation opportunities, the growth and diversification of outlets for popular writing and expert commentary similarly offers opportunities for academics to shape policy. This can impact public opinion in a way that then sways policymakers—usually only a modest effect, except for uncommonly high-profile scholars—and/or raise the academic's public profile in a way that leads policymakers to heed their advice. Digital publishing's reduced column-inch constraints mean that opportunities to write for outlets like the Guardian, the Independent, the Spectator, the New Statesman, and so forth, have grown exponentially. Some are more open than others about how contributors should submit a piece for consideration: the Guardian (2010) has a dedicated webpage (even if most pitches go unanswered), but sometimes it can be an exercise in tracking down editors via Twitter.13 Similarly, the proliferation of specialist and semi-specialist majority-online or online-only magazines and blogs—like the Conversation (for academically informed analysis), WarOnTheRocks (US-based, for foreign/defense policy), and ConservativeHome and LeftFootForward (for partisan perspectives)—provide more opportunities for academics in profile-raising, policy-influencing punditry. Writing such pieces can aid wider dissemination of “proper” academic publications, via embedded hyperlinks or other references. It can also help time-pressured journalists identify potential television/radio commentators when a relevant story breaks. Social media provides further opportunities to build profile, identify media contacts (bureaucratic officials are unlikely to be so visible), circulate writings to a wider audience, and keep track of policy/media developments to which one could contribute. The resources available for engagement activities have also increased since 2010—despite nationwide fiscal consolidation—not least because the Impact Agenda has incentivized it. Again, this is partly coincidental: the growing activism of UK think-tanks, for example, has resulted in programs (at least in the foreign/defense policy field) explicitly pitched at enabling early career scholars to present work to policy audiences and make connections with relevant policy/media contacts.14 But much of it owes directly to REF-motivated, RCUK-channeled money: the creation of RCUK Impact Acceleration Accounts (RCUK 2014a) in anticipation of a heavier weighting for Impact at REF2021 has facilitated engagement events to disseminate research findings to policymakers and other stakeholders, for example. The same goes for the resources for “Pathways to Impact” now embedded within RCUK-funded research projects. These funding streams may help to maximize the social benefits of scholarship. Alongside potential societal benefit, Impact may also offer instrumental payoffs to the individual academic (Matthews 2011). First, the “public” and “scholarly” domains of academic life can be mutually reinforcing. Active policy/public engagement may prompt greater appreciation of a particular issue-area's real-world complexity and associated politics, a deeper knowledge of a particular policy domain, or improved access (to information, individuals, and so on) for future research (Freedman 2017, 264). Being highly regarded in public engagement may enhance scholarly status and regard (with caveats, discussed subsequently), and vice versa. Second, early-career pro bono policy/media work may lead to subsequent paid opportunities as a consultant or columnist (with caveats, discussed below).15 Third, being active in current policy debates can provide teaching material, while extending policy experience into teaching approaches—by assigning “ministerial submission” writing exercises or hosting simulation exercises, for example—can boost students’ engagement and develop their employability (McMahon 2007). And many students, especially those attracted to fields with clear policy applicability like the social sciences, are actively drawn in by real-world debates and decisions. Ultimately, in a world of tight budgets and complex challenges, there is a desire—up to a point, bounded by politics and vested interests—in both policymaking and media organizations to utilize academic knowledge, which is often free to them (or at least relatively cheap), for explaining and resolving problems that they themselves lack the expertise to handle optimally. The challenge for the impact-inclined academic is to work out how to realize such opportunity—and how to manage the many potential pitfalls, discussed below. The Perils of Impact and the Impact Agenda Despite the previous section's advocacy of scholarly impact, the Impact Agenda was greeted skeptically by many (Phillips 2010, 447) and has become deeply unpopular with others over time (Francis 2011, 5). This cannot solely be down to academics’ temperamental cynicism. More generally, the relationship between research-derived evidence and public policy has long been recognized as not universally characterized by straightforward positive progress (Weiss 1979). This section therefore lays out five of the criticisms levelled at both scholarly engagement with policy in general and the REF's conception of “impact” in particular. They are offered as criticisms-in-principle, to avoid naming specific examples/individuals, but these are not hypotheticals: they are already live problems with concrete manifestations, as many readers will recognize from their own experience. Of course, academics retain agency throughout: neither universities nor government departments compel faculty members to achieve impact. Even if crude rules mandating policy engagement were added to academics’ contracts in some hypothetical future, they could likely be gamed/dodged. Individuals will retain choices over their career trajectories, professional goals, research priorities, institutional affiliations, and so forth. Nonetheless, the pursuit of policy engagement—particularly in REF-conceived form—creates powerful and potentially distortionary incentives. The five criticisms below fall within this vein. Linearity and the Limitations of Impact “Capture” First, much of the eye rolling over Impact owes to the seemingly contrived, simplistically mechanistic, unrealistically linear way in which the REF seeks to capture and assess it (Oliver 2014). The Impact Case Studies by which REF2014 sought to measure impact (REF 2012b)—in addition to their labor intensity, administrative burden, and associated opportunity costs (Sayer 2014; Else 2017)—rested on tracing a causal relationship between a piece of “REF-able” published research (that is, a qualifying REF “output”) and a positive economic/social outcome.16 This rendered Impact a game to be played (Francis 2011, 5; Oliver 2014). Given the length of the journal publishing process, and the fact that work often goes through many iterations and presentations (including exposure to policymakers) before the final article/book appears, the impact narrative may need to be “creatively” written to give the appearance of linear cause/effect (Ní Mhurchú et al. 2016, 66–68). Such an approach can have more pernicious effects than a mere requirement for creative form filling and hoop jumping, however. It may struggle to properly capture long-term relationships, whereby an academic and a policy community work together to refine each other's thought, but without any particular piece of research underpinning a change in behavior (Ní Mhurchú et al. 2016, 63–65). It may similarly miss diffuse effects—hardly a new observation (Weiss 1979, 427; Wilson 1987)—whereby an academic is one participant in a scholarly community that eventually shifts policy consensus, but in which it also proves difficult to identify the causal role of any individual academic (barring potentially the most senior/prominent).17 For example, before 2010, the conventional wisdom in the “War-on-Terror” era UK government was that counterinsurgency (COIN) and Afghan-like wars were the future; academics arguing for caution about the resurgence of major power competition, and suggesting that COIN was unlikely to be hastily repeated after Iraq/Afghanistan, were marginal (Blagden 2009). Following the fiscally constrained 2010 NSS/SDSR, the “no-boots-on-the-ground” Libya campaign, and Russia's recent belligerence in Eastern Europe, by contrast, reluctance to pursue COIN-based nation building in the Islamic world and the idea that UK defense should hedge against hostile major powers have returned as commonplace (HM Government 2015a, 18–19). But this shift had many influences and could not plausibly be traced to any single academic intervention, or even a group of interveners. Major evolutions of thought or changes of practice in an area with such high stakes as national security policy are rarely “start/stop”; they emerge interactively through debate, over time, and in the face of external pressures (Weiss 1979, 428–429; Ní Mhurchú et al. 2016, 63–65). They can therefore be hard to capture in an Impact Case Study, but that does not mean that academic contributions were not valuable. The same goes for academics whose research pertains to a highly stable/sclerotic policy area. Britain's nuclear posture, for example—based on four ballistic missile submarines, with one continuously on patrol to avoid first-strike incentives—has been effectively unchanged since the introduction of the Polaris-carrying Resolution-class submarines in 1968. That does not mean that UK academics focused on nuclear deterrence, disarmament, and security are not advancing an area of active policy contestation (BBC 2016); indeed, a Prime Minister Jeremy Corbyn could yet blow apart the previous bipartisan nuclear consensus. But the bias toward causing progressive change built into the REF definition of “impact” may make it harder to prove impact when there is little observable variation (Lloyd 2016).18 Moreover, observable change is not necessarily a good in itself; an existing policy may be the best available option and thus in need of protection, not alteration. Another variant of this critique is the false dichotomy between “academic” and “real-world” impact. That the Impact methodology should count more than scholarly excellence—which tends to correlate with impact within an academic field—is understandable. But much of the best science percolated through to policymaking and public awareness anyway—even before the REF—possibly helped by the absence of distortionary incentives that the Impact Agenda can create. This raises the possibility of tension between competing understandings of “research excellence” embedded in the REF criteria, following the premise that any time spent doing one sort of academic activity is time not spent doing another. The “rigor” criterion applied to research “outputs” can, when construed as complex theory or sophisticated data-analysis, preclude dissemination via the channels most engaged by policymakers and the public—and conversely, striving for “impactful” research may preclude publication in the sorts of outlets most likely to be construed as “rigorous” (and thus “excellent”). Of course, well-designed research projects can often be configured to yield both high-sophistication scientific publications and general-interest/policy interpretations thereof—but such translation is not always seamless, or even possible, and all time spent on one form of writing/engagement is time not spent on another. Given that REF “stardom” is the ultimate quality on which UK faculty members’ job security and prospects rest, this creates dangers—especially for early-career scholars—in the incentives that universities pass on to their academic employees. As academic institutions pressure their staff to become more “impactful,” responding to one set of REF incentives, there is a risk—not unlike the relevance-versus-rigor tensions that can afflict US tenure processes (Gavin 2017, 269)—that they will subsequently sanction those same staff for failing to meet other REF-defined measures of excellence (Freedman 2017, 264). Faculty members therefore face incentives to ensure that they are doing just enough of both to hedge against capricious variation in future institutional policy priorities, which may not be a recipe for excellence in either domain. The same goes for universities’ impact-maximizing drive toward “interdisciplinarity,” which—while potentially more useful to policymakers (Gavin 2017, 273)—can similarly have a career-jeopardizing depressant effect on academic productivity (Leahey, Beckman, and Stanko 2017). All aspects of scholarly activity entail tradeoffs; no set of incentives and subsequent behaviors is cost free. Illustrating the artificiality of the academic/real-world distinction, some of the most influential ideas of post-1945 foreign/defense policy—nuclear peace through deterrence (Brodie 1946), soft power (Nye 1990), the social taboo on certain types of weapons (Tannenwald 1999), and so on—have transformed public discourse by filling a gap in human understanding. The “originality,” “significance,” and “rigor” that the REF uses to assess scholarly excellence were also the characteristics that saw these ideas transform policy debates. Whether they represent the linear change envisaged by an Impact Case Study, however, is contestable—and if they had had to be designed as research projects that could only garner funding via a “Pathways to Impact” statement, or aligned with the five-year REF cycle, they may not have resulted in field-defining research. Similarly, Tannenwald's high-impact project on the norms constraining nuclear use built on emerging theoretical work on the role of norms in international relations (Klotz 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), which itself built on conceptual work on the role of social pressures in the international system (Bull 1977; Wendt 1992). Such theoretical work has thus been hugely impactful, in the end, but may not qualify for an Impact Case Study if produced in Britain today. Indeed, the five-year cycle effectively forces the REF conception of “impact” to operate with a steep discount rate against possible future payoffs. The underlying research may have occurred in a previous REF cycle, but at least for REF2014, the “impact” itself had to have happened in the most recent REF cycle to count, further diminishing the ability of the Impact Case Study to capture long-term, diffuse impacts in potentially sclerotic policy areas. Linear impact measurement is not necessarily the fault of HEFCE, RCUK, or anyone else. Once tasked by government to demonstrate economic/social value added from scientific research via the REF—not an unreasonable demand, given government's mandate to use taxpayers’ money stringently against a challenging economic backdrop—some such methodology was inevitable. Moreover, because it needs to provide “mass-produced” assessment, some crudeness of criteria was similarly likely (Martin 2011, 248).19 Nevertheless, such (over-)simplification goes a long way toward explaining why a profession that prizes impact often sneers at Impact. Many of these complaints about overly linear impact measurement during REF2014 are recognized in the Stern Review (2016, 16–17, 22–23) and are set to be addressed for REF2021. Impact will be linked to a scholar's body of research in future, rather than a particular “output” (HEFCE 2017c, 9). And pre-2014 Case Studies will be eligible for redevelopment, provided that the claimed “new” societal/economic impact occurred post-2013 (HEFCE 2017c, 7). Nonetheless, the emphases on demonstrable change, clear links to an individual scholar's body of sufficiently excellent (by REF criteria) publications produced within a certain time period, and meaningful new effects within the latest REF cycle remain. And addressing one set of distortionary incentives creates others, as will also be discussed below. The Limitations and Distortions of “Applied” Research The next major criticism of the Impact Agenda is that it privileges close-to-market and close-to-policy research. The UK government does not, of course, tell academics in British universities what to research, except through grants available for projects that address questions to which it particularly seeks answers. But given the five-year REF timetable and criteria that privilege measurably improved economic performance or social benefits, the Impact Agenda rewards research that can deliver “applied” payoffs quickly, potentially distorting incentives and skewing research questions (Ní Mhurchú et al. 2016, 68). Applied research rests, however, on core, foundational science that—as a non-discriminatory public good that does not deliver exclusive returns to a private investor—is systematically under-provided by the private sector (hence the long-recognized need for state and/or philanthropic support).20 Applied research that the REF incentivizes academics to produce, therefore, is also the kind of research that the private sector is best at producing anyway. The underlying core science that marketable applications build upon, meanwhile, and which is highly “impactful" eventually, is least likely to be provided by the private sector but is also less likely to be rewarded by the Impact Agenda. Of course, if an enterprising scholar can demonstrate how marketable/policy-implementable outcomes followed from their underlying core science, then they will be amply lauded by the REF—but, as discussed above, this may be difficult. As noted earlier, TRIP surveys hint that the Impact Agenda's introduction between 2011 and 2014 may have induced UK-based international relations scholars to self-identify as conducting a larger share of “applied” research, although such data is hardly conclusive thus far. Either way, REF2021’s move to 25 percent “impact” and 60 percent “scholarly excellence” (compared to 20 percent and 65 percent respectively in REF2014) will further shift the incentive structure in this direction. The REF approach to “impact” measurement may also undervalue reflective, critical approaches—and the humanities in general—vis-à-vis the natural sciences (Monbiot 2009, Molas-Gallart 2015; Olmos-Peñuela, Benneworth, and Castro-Martinez 2015). The biomedical sciences may tell us how to clone mammals; philosophy, history, theology, geography, sociology, psychology, and more besides, meanwhile, can help us understand this innovation and decide whether to use it. Similarly, a strategic studies scholar may calculate—based on a database of past COIN campaigns—the proportion of local civilians who need to be killed to defeat an insurgency and to weigh that outcome against associated strategic risks (blowback, for example). Different scholarship is necessary, however, to understand whether the overall approach is defensible. Critical approaches may not tell us how to make or do something, but they are vital in appraising societal consequences. Again, if a scholar can write an Impact Case Study showing how their analysis of biomedical or military ethics has changed government thinking on whether to clone humans or raze insurgent villages, then they achieve REF-conceived “impact.” But if a tradition of critical thought is simply a diffuse quality of a healthy society, then the scholars engaged in such reflective analysis will have a harder time satisfying the Impact Agenda, even if their research and teaching is a key part of the social fabric (Weiss 1979, 429–430; Dunn 2015; Ní Mhurchú et al. 2016, 65–66; Naughton 2017). For both core science and critical reflection, there is still REF reward for research that is simply excellent scholarship, regardless of its “impact.” Nonetheless, to the extent that securing the 25 percent of a Department's REF2021 score that is governed by Impact will necessitate institutional expenditure on activities other than core science—and to the extent that Research Council grant applications require an incorporation of “Pathways to Impact” to succeed—there are necessarily opportunity-costs associated with rewarding one behavior at the expense of another. Thus, even when the funding councils provide separate funding to support Impact activities, the British public purse is necessarily not providing that same level of funding to some other activity.21 The Impact Agenda's prioritization of close-to-market/close-to-policy research can similarly incentivize research into the popular rather than the important. When it comes to curing cancer, for example, these two criteria are likely to align benignly; this is work that the public and policymakers understand to be important and therefore value. In other fields, however, these two criteria may create tension. Since the Impact Agenda prizes public engagement and social change, a gallery exhibit attended by thousands of visitors and with much media coverage may count as highly “impactful” (for example). By contrast, research on some highly stable, specialist domain of foreign policy may yield little observable change, little public excitement, and thus little “impact.” Yet the latter may be no less valuable to society than the former, possibly more so. Government policymakers, similarly, focus on immediately pressing priorities, but academics may be best placed to assess (and thus choose to research) the longer-term questions, of possibly greater importance, that will subsequently arise.22 Many of the enduring problems of politics are both important and intractable: that is why they are unresolved, continuing targets of research. Experts in these questions arguably have a duty, therefore, to direct research priorities in a way that the general-interest public or multi-tasking policymakers cannot. Yet if the REF-led incentive is to study topics that entertain the public or immediately address a specific problem faced by policymakers—because of the associated “impact”—such intractable-yet-important questions may go under-studied. This is a particular issue in fields such as history: “boring” analysis of past financial crises or political movements can shape our understanding of our current social situation, but if the public wants to be tantalized by the salacious private lives of bygone royalty, say, work on the latter may be excessively rewarded by the Impact Agenda. Science should be guided by intellectual curiosity (Phillips 2010, 448) and social need. There is also value in engaging the public with scholarly research. It is important, however, that curiosity-led research does not solely become the research of curiosities.23 Impact and the Circumvention of Academics’ Intellectual Property A third major critique of the Impact Agenda relates to its potential to further erode academics’ property rights and become exploitative. This comes against a backdrop of the West's general weakening of salaried labor and Britain's yawning wealth disparities (Blagden 2015b; Inman 2016). The Impact Agenda effectively mandates academics to undertake consultation activities pro bono, while professionals in any other field sell their expertise for commensurate remuneration. Media commentary and other forms of public engagement similarly compensate academics only rarely. Scholars have in effect been told to hand over their private human capital for use by profit-making businessmen or vote-winning politicians free of charge. The REF does not “force” scholars to become management consultants, political advisers, or television personalities, of course. But it incentivizes such behaviors through the implicit threat of job insecurity—UK universities hire and retain “REF stars” over others, with such “stardom” now having a linkage to Impact—rather than through enhanced remuneration. Of course, part of most scholars’ human capital has been accrued through state-subsidized education, so it is not unreasonable that they owe some of it to the public good—but that is also true of investment bankers or corporate lawyers. Private-sector professionals quite rightly do not believe that they owe their services to the state pro bono in perpetuity, contending instead that much of their expertise and wealth-generation owes to private investment of time and effort, thereby meriting generous compensation.24 This is not to rail against private property or argue that high-skill professionals in any sector should not be well paid, but simply to observe that academics are high-skill professionals whose private return to such human capital is paltry compared to other sectors with stronger private property rights. Of course, academics are used to the weak property rights associated with the creation and dissemination of core science: diffuse, public knowledge yields diffuse, public ownership of academics’ generated wealth. Academia is a privileged profession with other associated benefits that attract talented participants willing to eschew superior remuneration packages. But the Impact Agenda, by incentivizing the transfer of academics’ expertise via a format other than the publication of core science, effectively takes scholars’ human capital and turns it to the benefit of private property rights—via consultation, spin-off technology, policy advice, popular media writing, and so forth. The academic who provided the underlying expertise often has no claim to commensurate private remuneration.25 This is not just a hypothetical risk, moreover: UK universities’ “Impact Support” offices now transmit constant flows of requests for consultation from both public and private sector organizations, making clear that the reward is not remuneration but a potential strengthening of faculty members’ “Impact” files, while probation/promotion committees pay close attention to such activity. In short, the Impact Agenda risks turning academics—or at least those without the prominence or seniority to bargain otherwise—into consultants who are expected to serve the private ends of others for free. The forthcoming REF2021 assessment criteria, whereby “impact” can be linked to a body of work rather than a specific “output” (HEFCE 2017c, 9)—while reducing the unrealistic linearity discussed above—may exacerbate this problem of simply being expected to work as pro bono consultants, illustrating that there are few easy fixes: ameliorating one set of distortionary incentives creates another. If this drives academics to use participants in their “impactful” research in a way that is itself exploitative, then the problem is compounded (Allen 2014). And if junior scholars have foregone research time to conduct impact activities, then it is compounded again. This may be palatable when the beneficiary is UK state policy that in turn benefits the entire British public, but when the beneficiaries are private companies and/or powerful individuals, it is particularly questionable. Impact and the Vulnerabilities of the Lone Scholar Fourth, there is the more general problem of the atomization and relative institutional weakness of academics vis-à-vis competitors in the policy impact space (Himmrich 2016, 2). Think-tanks benefit from proximity to government, inside connections to policymakers and forthcoming decisions, media access, and from being purpose-built for providing customer-led policy analysis quickly. They can thus sometimes be a conduit for rigorous academic research into policy, but are also a regular obstacle to that outcome (Williamson 2011). The journalist-turned-pundit commentariat, meanwhile, may lack expertise in any given specialist field, but benefit from personal connections and from being well placed to write or say anything that a newspaper or broadcaster asks for at short notice. Taken together, this Westminster-centric punditocracy—like its Washington-Beltway counterpart—often leaves academics behind the curve, only discovering that their area of expertise is a focus of policy/media attention after think-tank analysts and pundit-columnists have already colonized the issue. An academic with only a non-specialist press officer for company, however excellent, may struggle to gain media or policy facetime despite their superior specialist expertise. And the think-tank/punditry communities have a vested interest in keeping it that way, hence their closed-shop operation and sustainment of pernicious myths about academics’ inability to constructively engage with the public or policymakers. As Klein (2014) half-honestly puts it, “[i]t would be a disaster for our profession [journalism] if academics became good at communicating what they know”—the honest part being that it could be disastrous, and the self-interestedly dishonest part being that academics are universally poor at public/policy communication (Preble 2017, 280). Of course, a few academics do break into the circles of government advisers and/or media columnists, who can then become insiders with an interest in preserving the closed shop (Himmrich 2016, 2). Government's understandable desire to hear “sound” academics who “get” the policy environment can see only a regular clique of scholars consulted (Freedman 2017, 265). Breaking into such circles is also problematic; biases toward sourcing academics from Southeastern (particularly London-based) institutions and senior figures prevail. These challenges are exacerbated by the rise of social media and its relationship to policy commentary. The likes of Twitter and Facebook—the former, in particular, given its public micro-blogging format—allow academics to raise their public profile and disseminate their work within and beyond their specialist communities. Yet in the echo-chamber cacophony of 140-/280-character commentary (Daykin 2016; Hoffman 2016), academics’ specialist expertise can easily get eclipsed—particularly when number of “followers,” which tends to benefit celebrity journo-pundits rather than scholars, is taken as a proxy for credibility. Social media may have enriched the marketplace of ideas, but it has also saturated it. “Click-bait” pundits with less insight but greater presence often crowd out academic voices—a perverse consequence of the democratization of information, under which many of the general public regard themselves as equally knowledgeable—regardless of academics’ specialist expertise (Nichols 2017). Scholars around the world must counter this, especially in this age of skepticism over the existence and value of knowledge (Krauss 2016; Mance 2016; Nichols 2017). The heavy social media presence required by scholars who seek to break into the punditocracy can itself become a time sink, moreover, with perilous opportunity-costs for junior academics in need of blue-chip publications to establish their research credentials. And it can expose academics to personal abuse from those who disagree with their conclusions (Phipps 2014) or disproportionately reward those most willing/able—thanks to various forms of privilege—to brag about their achievements. In the recent tide of anti-expert sentiment, this combination of marginalization and vilification looks unlikely to improve anytime soon. The Ethical Quandaries of Closeness to Government Fifth, the pursuit of policy influence raises ethical questions over scholars’ intellectual integrity and the possible consequences of a “customer-led” (that is, government serving) academic role (Hill 1994; Zambernardi 2016). Gaining REF-privileged access to policymakers may incentivize telling them what they want to hear. At the very least, trying to achieve impact may involve difficult deliberations over how far to temper academic findings for policy “fit”. When faced with a policy with which they disagree (not unlikely), a scholar may choose to oppose it outright, via either contentious critique or outright paradigmatic rejection. This is admirable, but unlikely to reverse a course with the power of state institutions and ministers’ personal political capital behind it (Lloyd 2016). Alternatively, they may seek only to finesse the proposed policy, suggesting small, achievable modifications within consensual acceptance. This may yield concrete improvements to policy, but may also be intellectually dishonest and even open to charges of corruption. Academic engagement with Brexit has thrust this tradeoff into stark relief for many UK-based social scientists. Neither route has an unambiguously superior impact on the sum of human welfare; each context must be judged (Nutley, Walter, and Davies 2007, 11–12). But scholars have a duty to remain true to their research findings (Preble 2017, 280). The reputational damage of being otherwise could be particularly problematic for an early-career scholar, meanwhile, whereas a senior professor may not care that colleagues have dubbed them a policy “hack.” Similarly, a scholar may choose to provide either abstract generalities or specific answers in addressing a policy consultation. The latter may be more likely to yield a policy change, and thus “impact,” but it may also (by working within terms set by the government of the day) be implicitly partisan-political, another quandary. A scholar may likewise choose to “go along” with a particular policy in the present, in the hope of becoming an “insider” capable of exerting beneficial influence in the future, but this too carries questions over integrity. A scholar may simply hope that their “big idea” percolates through to policy eventually, without purposeful steps to help it on its way, but that may reflect false optimism about the meritocracy of political decision-making. That said, political winds do change—consider the demise of COIN-centrism and return of state-based thinking in UK defense policy, for example—so sticking to one's intellectual guns may ultimately be rewarded by a more receptive climate for achieving influence. Conversely, there may be research insights that scholars do not want to have “impact,” again for ethical reasons. Identifying that the success of past COIN campaigns rested on killing a certain proportion of the local population may be a valuable scientific discovery, for example, but the scholar in question may have no desire to see it turned into policy—and the fact that it might be could itself have a chilling effect over research priorities. Involvement with policy can raise an academic's profile, but perceived closeness to government can also harm scholarly standing (Freedman 2017, 263–264), particularly if they are seen as conveniently finding the answers that policymakers want to hear or fueling/enabling otherwise-undesirable decisions. Ultimately, even when dealing with sympathetic and principled individual policymakers who begin with the intention of rigorous evidence-based policy evaluation, that process still routinely gets compromised (Hallsworth, Parker, and Rutter 2011)—and, like any of us, policymakers are most likely to be reassured by voices that agree with them (Preble 2017, 275–276). Academics should thus expect to get tactically and politically used in their dealings with government (Weiss 1979, 429), losing their ownership and voice once their evidence/advice is submitted. The same can apply to quotation/manipulation by journalists. Neither can be compelled by scholars, however well connected, to align with their presentation of the evidence (Nutley, Walter, and Davies 2007, 18–20). The question that guides whether being used in this way is worthwhile, however, is can one still achieve some good along the way? Impact “Tactics” The previous section documented five downsides to policy engagement in general and the UK Impact Agenda in particular. Accepting the overarching premise of the article, however—that policy influence remains both a socially valuable and personally rewarding aspect of international relations scholarship—this section progresses to consider the achievement of impact, building on the avenues discussed earlier. Along the way, it considers ways to minimize or guard against some of the pitfalls discussed above. Achieving policy influence—and its prerequisite, policy access—is not necessarily straightforward (Himmrich 2016, 2). Beyond UKRI/predecessor funding for “Knowledge Exchange” activities, achieving such influence is usually left to individual academics’ initiatives. As Ben Goldacre (2016) puts it, “[t]his is part of being a public servant, but it's a practice without a . . . toolkit, handbook, or diploma.” The ESRC (2017b),does attempt to provide such a “toolkit,” to be fair, but the general point stands that simply having valuable theory, data, and methodology does not guarantee that it will be heard by policymakers (Edgerton 2017). Assuming that scholars can navigate the UK government's recent ban on publicly funded lobbying (Goldacre 2016; HM Government 2016a)—a ban that government itself seemingly has no intention of abiding by, as it continues to encourage academic input—and with the Impact Agenda only set to grow in prominence, this will remain a challenge for many academics. And it will be particularly challenging for earlier-career, lower-profile scholars who are not yet actively sought out by policymakers. Accordingly, this final section reflects on the “operational-level” tactics of achieving impact for those at “not-yet-famous” career stages. It does not claim particular expertise and certainly lacks the “impact” experience of a senior scholar (Goldacre 2016). The author benefits, however, from having assessed the consultation responses for two UK White Papers while working in government prior to securing an academic post and therefore has some insight as both a submitter and a receiver of scholarly attempts at policy engagement. What follows is at times unvarnished and pragmatic, rather than aspirational and idealistic, but that does not mean that the latter qualities should not be striven for also. It is also necessarily reflexive and skewed by personal biases, so should be taken as one perspective among many.26 Many of the points apply to influencing any government policy machinery, although some—such as the openness of Parliamentary Select Committees’ public calls for evidence—are particular features of the British system. First, simple, well-packaged, jargon-free consultation responses and evidence submissions with potentially actionable implications are essential (Byman and Kroenig 2016, 298–299; Wiers 2017, 3). Busy officials will be eager for academic input—lacking deep-specialist expertise themselves, they are grateful when it lands in their lap—but not if they have to decrypt a dozen pages of dense, jargonistic text dealing in abstract generalities (Walt 2005; Avey and Desch 2013; Talbot and Talbot 2014). Number paragraphs, keep sentences short and simple, address the policy area/consultation requirements directly, and include a bulleted executive summary if going beyond a couple of sides (depending on how complex the points being conveyed are and unless explicitly invited otherwise by a relevant official). Include some reference to how your advice follows from your research. This will enhance its credibility and—at least on REF2014 rules—is necessary for it to count toward an Impact Case Study. Second, deploy your “line” across many separate platforms: Select Committee evidence calls, departmental consultation responses, media commentary, and so forth. This increases the chances of your perspective subsequently being incorporated into policy (Nutley, Walter, and Davies 2007, 61–66; Goldgeier and Jentleson 2015). A departmental consultation response may get ignored (for example), due to deviation from the government's preferred angle or mere capacity constraints, but if your perspective is subsequently favored by a Select Committee report or receives high-profile media coverage (Freedman 2017, 266–267) then all stakeholders will subsequently be obliged to take note. The Parliamentary webpages of relevant Select Committees are good places to look for “regular” engagement opportunities, via inquiries’ calls for evidence. Departmental consultation and op-ed/media opportunities require careful tracking because they come along irregularly as a particular policy comes under review or a particular issue hits the headlines. Building long-term networks and making contacts beyond Parliament moreover can enable advance warning of forthcoming policy impact opportunities and generate more embedded influence relationships outside the mechanistic cycle of Select Committee inquiries (Oliver et al. 2014, 4; Himmrich 2016, 4–5). Being part of the policymaking process allows superior influence opportunities than merely attempting to bolt onto it at some point in the decision cycle (Rutter 2011). Third, do not attempt to achieve a wholesale reversal of government policy—or at least be aware that such an attempt is unlikely to succeed (Preble 2017, 275). Government has a democratic mandate and, unless you are a scholar with the public profile of Paul Krugman or Niall Ferguson, practically all of the institutional and personal political power. Instead, seek kernels of common ground (Goldacre 2016) with the aim of constructively changing one or two aspects of a policy. Government normally has too much political capital invested in a policy to abandon it entirely, but also wants policies to succeed. Harassed non-specialist officials are often glad of the help (Gavin 2017, 271), so academics’ efforts to improve policy in pragmatic, feasible ways have a good chance of being adopted. Of course, if you have no common ground with proposed policy, there is still value in saying so—large-scale dissent can eventually sway wavering decision-makers, and you may be well placed to claim the mantle of righteous resistance in the hope of an eventual change. But remain realistic that prospects for achieving meaningful progressive change via this latter route will come along rarely, if at all. Fourth, try to anticipate the news cycle using a combination of media indicators and your specialist expertise. One area of academic relative advantage vis-à-vis non-specialist commentators is a deep knowledge of upcoming policy decisions, reviews, debates, crises, and so forth. Following rumors of forthcoming decisions via Twitter and suchlike can augment this knowledge. Pitching an op-ed about an issue is much more effective if done the week before publication of a policy review (for example) than if you only pitch once the review has hit the headlines and been colonized by journo-pundits. Conducting policy-relevant research, and advertising it as such to decision-makers, is similarly of little use once a policy question has been settled (Byman and Kroenig 2016, 298–299; Freedman 2017, 267). Fifth, utilize the profile-raising UK impact channels that are readily available. The Royal Society, Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), and ESRC all offer Impact training, mentorship, and support, although the schemes differ in their openness, access, and format (AHRC 2015; ESRC, 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Royal Society 2016). The US Bridging the Gap Project (2015b) has a policy/media engagement program specifically to train foreign-policy scholars (Goldgeier and Jentleson 2015; see also Barma et al. 2016); it is American-centric, but open to overseas participants, as are certain other US-based initiatives (Andrews et al. 2015). Press officers and Impact Support staff at universities are often excellent yet under-utilized. Leverage political allies—think-tank colleagues, media contacts, sympathetic backbench MPs, and so forth—who may have access and profile-raising potential that you lack (Goulden 2011; Mendizabal 2011; Sebba 2011; Himmrich 2016, 4), but avoid trying to duplicate their functions (Gavin 2017, 273). Using academia-friendly media outlets, such as the Conversation, can raise your profile in a way that makes mainstream media op-eds or policymaker access more likely—though do not expect a friendly hearing in Whitehall if you have already trashed a policy in print, and neither are mainstream op-eds easily secured or necessarily noticed. Op-ed writing for a large audience requires a thick skin, moreover, and the online comments sections should be avoided on all but the sunniest days. Sixth, be prepared to be blindsided by events—and as far as possible, caveat your policy interventions to avoid misleading policymakers and/or subsequently discrediting yourself. This is a particularly significant danger when engaging in prediction/forecasting, because even with the deepest subject-matter expertise, complex contingencies can still arise that scholarship did not have sufficient prior data to incorporate yet with which policymakers must contend (Jervis 1999; Wiers 2017, 284–285; Gavin 2017, 270–271). Academics are rarely in a position to say what will work/happen; the best we can usually aspire to is to help policymakers and the public better understand complex systems (Gavin 2017, 272–273; Freedman 2017, 267), while suggesting what may work/happen based on well-informed cause/effect inferences (Bassey 2013). This nuancing is hard to do within the tight length constraints of a typical newspaper column or radio soundbite. In one op-ed, for example, this author started from the premise of further cuts to the UK defense budget (Blagden 2015a) . . . just before the then-Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, ring-fenced all national security spending in a bid to position as a statesmanlike premier-in-waiting (Winnett 2015; Dorman, Uttley, and Wilkinson 2016).27 While not fatal to the broader arguments of the piece, this gaffe could have been ameliorated with less hubristic, better-caveated analysis. Avoiding such pitfalls involves avoiding hasty, slapdash writing while thinking through potential second-order contingencies. It is also a matter of resisting editors’ demands for too-concise, excessively provocative, inadequately caveated “click-bait”: their incentive is to generate traffic and reaction, yours is to produce a piece with enduring credibility. These points apply in policy consultancy, too, as well as media commentary. That said, the carefully caveated circumspection of many academics is also what makes their input less appealing to policymakers/editors eager for decisive, deterministic advice/views (Preble 2017, 276–278). Conclusion Public impact through policy influence remains a vital and admirable aspect of a scholarly career and a particularly relevant one in the social sciences. Indeed, defined broadly enough to include the positive social consequences of teaching and core science, impact is the goal of scholarship—even conceding that the UK Impact Agenda has created distortions that sometimes hinder the attainment of this end. The pursuit of influence can be dispiriting and occasionally perilous, particularly for junior scholars. But it remains worthwhile, for both altruistic-societal and personal-instrumental reasons, and never more so than in an age of hostility to theory- and evidence-based public discourse (Hoffman 2016). The Impact Agenda is improvable, of course, and scholars/institutions are not without agency. Assessment of institutional impact has been deferred beyond REF2021 in response to universities’ lobbying over the associated labor burden and inevitable inaccuracies (Else 2017), while the move to decouple Impact Case Studies from specific “outputs”—another modification long advocated by the academic community—should reduce the contrived artificiality of the supposed link between research and wider-world effects. Greater diversification between/within academic departments could enable some institutions/individuals to focus more on policy, say, while clarity over probation/promotion criteria can reduce the dangers to scholars’ careers of getting the research-versus-impact balance wrong. All such fixes create tradeoffs and incentives, however. The deferral of “institutional impact” leaves the onus with individual scholars, atomized/weak though they are. “Impact” may be decoupled from specific “outputs,” but it will still—unavoidably, if measurement is to be meaningful—be connected to a body of work over certain time parameters, incentivizing certain forms of behavior. Diversification of departments would risk further siloing the profession between researchers, wonk-pundits, and bureaucrats, whereas the Agenda's commendable intention—and the behavior that it rewards—is for knowledge's creators (researchers) to also be those who maximize its public impact (wonk-pundits) and manage the institutions in which it is created (bureaucrats). And prescribing a specific amount of “impact” against a specific quality/quantity of “outputs” for staff advancement would risk stifling the excellence borne of flexibility; alternative incentives—such as financial bonuses—could destroy collegiality, meanwhile, in departments where different staff contribute different strengths (disproportionate teaching/administrative burdens, for example). In short, while the REF and its Impact Agenda can and should be iteratively refined, such an exercise in measurement—while defensible, given its demands on the public purse—will always produce distortions of one kind or another. To reduce the perils of early career policy engagement, therefore, two sets of questions must be answered before pursuing “impact.” First, what—if any—ethical tradeoffs between intellectual integrity and substantive influence might you be expected to make? Second, what are your ultimate expectations of reward? Fame, riches, and wholesale changes in policy are unlikely outcomes. But if you are willing to apply some aspect of your research to refining a specific element of a public debate in a way that is of concrete use to decision makers, in exchange for only diffuse and modest personal benefits, your ambitions may be more readily met. Ultimately, operational-level influence strategizing aside, the foundation of any scholar's impact profile will remain the quality of their underlying research, defined by the scale of the questions tackled, the persuasiveness of the arguments advanced, and the rigor with which they are interrogated (Flinders and John 2013). This naturally remains the responsibility of individual scholars and cannot be addressed here. This article will have served its purpose, however, if it goes some way toward building upon such foundations by promoting, demystifying, facilitating, and de-risking the process of policy translation of scholars’ underlying discoveries. Acknowledgements The author thanks Sergio Catignani, Rob Freathy, Patrick Porter, the anonymous reviewers, and especially Helena Mills for invaluable comments/discussion. He also thanks the University of Exeter for “Impact Accelerator” funding and the UK Economic and Social Research Council [Grant Number ES/H015906/1] for its support of an intra-PhD policy secondment. Footnotes 1 The other devolved British nations—Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—have separate funding settlements, although they use the same REF to assess universities’ research performance. 2 In 2015–2016, for example, the UK Research Councils dispensed £2.67bn of project-specific funding, but only £153.2mn of that went to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and a mere £98.3mn to the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) (HM Government 2014b, 10). 3 The REF—and its predecessor, the RAE—is a UK-wide assessment exercise conducted jointly by Research England, the Scottish Funding Council (SFC), the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW), and Northern Ireland's Department for the Economy (DfE-NI). It occurs once every four to seven years and is used to rank the research outputs of all UK academic departments in receipt of state financial support to determine their QR “Block Grant” public research funding for the subsequent “REF cycle.” Block Grants are linked specifically to REF-assessed research profiles—universities also receive some public financial support based on their teaching profile, which is now assessed via a complementary Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) (HEFCE 2017a; HM Government 2016c; Ashwin 2016), albeit with a fee-cap irrespective of TEF scores (BBC 2017). Note that Research England—which leads all four devolved funding bodies on REF policy/conduct—is a division of the umbrella agency UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), which also now contains the subject-specific Research Councils, subsuming RCUK. Research England replaced its standalone predecessor, the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)—a well-known organizational acronym in the field cited widely throughout this article—in April 2018. 4 Technically, universities’ REF performance is assessed at the level of discipline-specific “Units of Assessment” (UoA), not simply that institution's established academic departments. Such UoAs broadly corresponded with departmental alignment, however; REF2014 had 36 (REF 2012c), while REF2021 drops to 34 (HEFCE 2017c, 16). 5 The proportion of a department's scholars expected to submit “outputs” will also change, shifting from only a select few at REF2014 to a sample of all faculties’ publications being reviewed for REF2021, averaging 2.5 works per full-time staff member (HEFCE 2017d, 2–7). 6 These panels are not uncontentious: they form a huge labor burden, cannot conduct truly anonymous review (since they are assessing already published research), and often see only a single non-specialist review a submission (Sayer 2014). For systematic analysis of REF2014's submitted Impact Case Studies, see Dunlop (2018). 7 HEFCE funded English institutions (HEFCE 2016b), and was replaced by Research England in 2018. SFC, HEFCW, and DfE-NI similarly fund the other devolved nations. 8 For a comprehensive overview of the behaviors and incentives that Impact's inclusion engendered during the 2008-14 REF cycle based on systematic analysis of all available REF2014 Case Studies, see Dunlop (2018). 9 REF2021 will allow dual “portability” of scholars’ “REF-able” publications between institutions, allowing both the university at which an "output" was produced and the university at which the scholar works come the July 2020 "census date" to claim the publication as part of their research profile (HEFCE 2017d, 4-8). A restriction of "portability" beyond 2021—which universities have previously pushed for, to stop "star" scholars career-hopping just before a REF—could have major implications for academics’ professional mobility. This could, in turn, have implications for the relationship between claimed “impact” effects (for institution-specific Case Study purposes) and the underlying body of scholarly research. 10 Tony Blair was an ideologically committed interventionist, of course, but his Iraq impetus came despite—not from—the national-security bureaucracy. 11 The University of Exeter's Strategy and Security Institute (SSI) is a member of the Ministry of Defence's (MOD's) Niteworks consultancy grouping, for instance: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/strategy/news/newsarchive/ (accessed August 30, 2016). The Department for International Development (DfID), the MOD, and the Foreign Office and Cabinet Office all regularly consult invited academics. Of course, heavy reliance on consultants brings its own drawbacks (Provost 2012; Telegraph 2015). 12 These two organizations have both welcomed the author to present research over the last five years. 13 Lower-profile specialist outlets such as the Conversation (2016) are more readily accessible to aspiring academic contributors, of course. 14 The Royal United Services Institute's Project on Nuclear Issues stands out, for example: https://rusi.org/projects/uk-project-nuclear-issues, so did Chatham House's European Security and Defence Forum: https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/international-security-department/european-security-and-defence-forum-project (both URLs accessed November 1, 2017). 15 The author has academic colleagues who have made both of these transitions. 16 The underlying research output was permitted to predate the REF2014 cycle, provided (a) that its demonstrable “Impact” effects did take place in the REF2014 cycle and (b) that the underlying “output” had been produced at the same university now claiming the Impact Case Study. 17 Disproportionate recognition for the already senior/prominent is itself a potentially discriminatory consequence of “Impact.” 18 Some impact advocates contend the opposite: that “influence” may count as merely impressing a decision-making practitioner, but to “make a difference”—to have true “impact”—should indeed require the demonstration of positive change (Francis 2011, 5). However, this neglects the possibility for progressive outcomes to arise from the absence of observable change—positive policy stasis—achieved through scholarly influence. Accounting for positive impact only in terms of observable change holds progressive influence hostage to selection bias. 19 Such problems may be reduced with more sophisticated measurement methodologies, particularly through a move away from weighting observed change so heavily in impact assessment (Upton, Vallance, and Goddard 2014; Morton 2015; Samuel and Derrick 2015; Ní Mhurchú et al. 2016, 69–70). 20 For a basic discussion of private-sector under-provision of public goods, and an associated explanation of the case for state support to solve the market failure/collective action problem, see Varian (2003, 643–666). 21 This opportunity-cost critique similarly applies to the paying of Open Access publishing fees (RCUK 2014b). 22 For the controversial view that policymakers do indeed know best, and that scholars should align their research priorities with politically mandated questions, see Moono (2012). 23 A recent press release from a major British research university hailed one of its research projects as “celebrity-endorsed,” to the consternation of many UK academics. The project in question has clear scholarly and environmental value, and acclaim from high-profile public figures is no bad thing, but recognition by film/television personalities becoming a criterion for academic merit has potentially chilling implications. 24 Whether the scale of these professions’ private wealth concentrations can be justified—given the quantity of other people's human capital that goes into producing their earnings (Blagden 2015b)—is a different question entirely. 25 Spin-off companies and technological patents may provide a partial exception in fields such as engineering, of course. Nonetheless, the point stands for policy advice and the dissemination of core science. 26 For a similar perspective based on a junior academic's time in a policy role, making similar points, see Wood (2012). 27 It is possible, of course—though hardly likely—that the author's recommendations themselves swayed Osborne, which would make for a truly remarkable Impact Case Study if provable! That said, even this “commitment” to defense spending still relied on questionable accounting (House of Commons Defence Select Committee 2016). References Allen Ansgar . 2014 . “ Who Benefits from the Impact Agenda? ” Times Higher Education Supplement , November 6. Accessed November 1, 2017. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/opinion/who-benefits-from-the-impact-agenda/2016732.article . Andrews Lena , Lissner Rebecca Friedman , Macdonald Julia , Schneider Jacquelyn , Whitlark Rachel . 2015 . “ Getting Involved in Policy: An Overworked Grad Student's Guide .” WarOnTheRocks.com , May 6. 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