Common Knowledge

Smith, Barbara Herrnstein;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622212

Advocates of literary Darwinism, cognitive cultural studies, neuroaesthetics, digital humanities, and other such hybrid fields now seek explicitly to make the aims and methods of one or another humanities discipline approximate more closely the aims and methods of science, and at their most visionary, they urge as well the overall integration of the humanities and natural sciences. This essay indicates some major considerations—historical, conceptual, and pragmatic—that may be useful for assessing these efforts and predicting their future. Arguments promoting integration often involve dubious teleological models of intellectual history and betray limited understandings of the distinctive epistemic orientations and cultural functions of the humanities vis-à-vis the sciences. Recurrent institutional difficulties encountered by scholars and/or scientists in hybrid fields reflect steep prestige differentials between the humanities and sciences, along with significant differences of training, experience, style, and temperament. Meanwhile, both the sciences and humanities are being shaken up by technological and related intellectual developments. Though worrisome, the new disciplinary configurations are thus likely to play out in surprising and, not inconceivably, positive ways. scientizing humanities interdisciplinarity hybridity literary studies

Langlitz, Nicolas;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622224

Based on anthropological fieldwork on the revival of hallucinogen research as well as on the epistemic culture of neurophilosophy, this Common Knowledge guest column examines two very different philosophical engagements with psychedelic drugs. In Thomas Metzinger's evidence-based philosophy of mind, hallucinogens help to operationalize questions about the nature of consciousness. While this project contributes to the great divide between empirically enlightened moderns and tradition-oriented premoderns, Metzinger's neurophilosophical reanimation of the ancient conception of philosophy as cultura animi can build a bridge to Aldous Huxley's perennial philosophy, which has informed the psychedelic intelligentsia like no other body of thought. In the sixteenth century, the philosophia perennis grew out of a decidedly nonmodern (but not pre- or antimodern) philosophy of religion that sought to suture the historical and cultural cracks that would come to define modernity. This essay argues that neurophilosophy and ethnographic studies of consciousness cultures could function as critical correctives in a contemporary rearticulation of perennial philosophy. psychedelics Aldous Huxley Thomas Metzinger neurophilosophy perennial philosophy

Skafish, Peter;de Castro, Eduardo Viveiros;Maniglier, Patrice;Morelle, Louis;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622236

This introduction to “Anthropological Philosophy: Symposium on an Unanticipated Conceptual Practice” comprises a brief history of attitudes among anthropologists toward the philosophical field of ontology, and attitudes among professional philosophers toward the kinds of alien and marginal thinking with which anthropology is concerned. After the narrative reaches what has been called the “ontological turn” in anthropology, which is generally assumed to represent the current moment in relations between the disciplines, the author discloses the recent emergence of an unexpected cultural practice: a hybrid of anthropology and philosophy that takes metaphysics, as distinct from ontology, as both its object and its method. The distinction between metaphysics and ontology is crucial to this new “intellectual space” because, while ontology is an unconscious possession of any people, metaphysics is a demanding speculative discipline whose becoming an object of anthropology suggests that indigenous peoples consciously deal with questions about what is real and what is not in ways so impressive and sophisticated that they can be compared with the efforts of credentialed philosophers. In this emergent conceptual practice, moreover, the work of academic philosophers is open to elaboration and correction in response to the findings of tribal and Western marginal thinkers. Among the developers of anthropological philosophy are said to be the Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (the author of Cannibal Metaphysics ), the French philosopher Patrice Maniglier (who works in an area he terms “comparative ontology”), and the other contributors to this symposium, whose articles the author goes on, in this context, to describe and assess. anthropological philosophy “ontological turn” metaphysics Eduardo Viveiros de Castro Patrice Maniglier

Skafish, Peter;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622248

In this conversation, Brazilian anthropologist, philosopher, and political activist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro offers an overview of his thinking, both past and present. After explaining why initially he argued that ontology should be a topic of anthropologists, he discusses his more recent conclusion that indigenous thought should be regarded instead as metaphysical. It is not that la pensée sauvage has an implicit ontology discoverable by the human sciences but, rather, that indigenous people themselves think about metaphysical issues as such. He explains the origins of this position in the ethnographic fieldwork that he undertook in the 1980s with the Awareté of northwestern Brazil and in his and the anthropologist Philippe Descola's parallel engagements with the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Finally, Viveiros de Castro addresses the political stakes of ascribing metaphysics to alien and marginal peoples, clarifying what he means by the “permanent decolonization of thought.” ontology metaphysics Claude Lévi-Strauss structuralism Philippe Descola

Maniglier, Patrice;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622260

Structuralism is often associated with a program, in keeping with the Durkheimian tradition, of reducing social norms to a kind of causality. On this reading, Émile Durkheim's collective representations became, in Claude Lévi-Strauss' work, cognitive or logical constraints. If so, then structuralism falls (as Vincent Descombes remarked) under Wittgenstein's objections to treating rules as causes. What this article shows, however, is that this reading of structuralism is misguided. The necessity and justification of introducing structural methods, first in linguistics and then in anthropology, as well as the general concept of the sign, were rooted in the perception of a problem too often overlooked: that of the characterization of the data in the social and cultural sciences. Just as Saussure showed that the real problem of linguistics is not, what does it mean? but what are the units of language?, so Lévi-Strauss showed that social sciences should not be concerned with the causes of human behaviors (why do we do this or that?) but instead with the categorization of actions (what is it that is being done?). In both cases, it appears that an individual action is the actualization of a common practice, habit, or custom that, itself, cannot be reduced to a set of observable features but must be defined by its differential position in a system. Structural anthropology thus leads to a truly ontological problem (what is the mode of existence of “customs”?), which resonates interestingly today, in the context of the “ontological turn.” structuralism Claude Lévi-Strauss “ontological turn” Émile Durkheim semiotic

Skafish, Peter;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622291

This article is an ethnographic account of the speculative thought of Jane Roberts, a spirit medium or “channel,” important in New Age religion for the books that she dictated at the behest of a personality named “Seth.” At first, she tried to understand her strange subjectivity in psychiatric terms, then went on to elaborate metaphysical concepts to account for it. The author argues that understanding Roberts's concepts in social historical terms risks obscuring their meaning and that comparing them with the related concepts of a credentialed philosopher, in this case Gilles Deleuze, is a more effective way of approaching them. The latter sort of interpretation entails another risk, however, which is that concepts like those of Roberts may get taken for mere illustrations of the arguments made by academic philosophers, whereas marginal thinking of Roberts's kind can form sophisticated bodies of thought on their own. Roberts developed concepts of consciousness and the person that exceed, in ways that this article specifies, anything that Deleuze's work can say about them and thus cast his own arguments in an unanticipated light. This essay's main point is that uncredentialed, marginal thinkers like Roberts should be considered proper objects of both anthropological and philosophical study and should be taken seriously for what they can teach us. Jane Roberts New Age religion spirit mediums Gilles Deleuze metaphysics

Morelle, Louis;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622316

Several recent philosophical projects, notably Bruno Latour's empirical meta-physics, Tristan Garcia's formal ontology, Graham Harman's object-oriented philosophy, and Markus Gabriel's new realism, have insisted there is a need for an “egalitarian” or “flat” ontology that would grant an equal ontological status to entities of every kind, whether actual, abstract, material, or fictional. This article groups all of these projects under the heading of “ontological liberalism” and argues that they are inherently problematic, as they sacrifice conceptual coherence and explanatory usefulness in the name of indefinite inclusion. Focusing on Gabriel's recent books Why the World Does Not Exist and Fields of Sense , and with continual reference to Peter Wolfendale's work on the topic, this essay offers a broad but detailed critique of ontological liberalism, with an eye to alternatives emerging from the discipline of anthropology. ontological liberalism Markus Gabriel Peter Wolfendale Tristan Garcia Graham Harman

Randall, Belle;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622333

Minkert, Jesse;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622345

Paksi, Daniel;

2016 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-3622357

This essay responds to an article, “Epistemic Grace: Antirelativism as Theology in Disguise,” by the philosopher and sociologist of knowledge David Bloor that was published in Common Knowledge 13, nos. 2–3 (2007): 250–80. Bloor's main argument was that there is no third way between relativism and absolutism—that all philosophical positions must fall under one or the other heading. Daniel Paksi's response is that Bloor covertly subscribes to a trichotomy of umbrella headings: idealist relativism (or irrealism), materialist relativism, and absolutism. Bloor, it is argued, connects relativism with neo-Darwinist materialism in order to differentiate his own kind of relativism from the irrealist kind, which denies scientific progress. Paksi argues as well that third ways between idealism and materialism are available—for example, the emergentism of Michael Polanyi—but his main claim is that materialism itself is an absolutist view and thus that its supposed compatibility with relativism (as a means of protecting relativism from irrealism) undermines Bloor's own aims. David Bloor relativism materialism emergentism Michael Polanyi