Common Knowledge

Perl, J. M.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422890

This essay, by the editor of Common Knowledge , comprises the introduction to an issue of the journal dedicated to experiments in scholarly form and to discussion of them. He explains the choice of articles and other pieces in the issue on the basis of their contributions either as experiments themselves or as discussions of experimental principles. The introduction itself contributes to the latter by suggesting a distinction between “triumphalist” and “defeatist” calls for poets and fiction writers to do the work of scholars. In the latter variant, poets in general are challenged by dissident colleagues (for instance, Donald Davie in Purity of Diction in English Verse ) to write exclusively didactic poetry, and to write it with the logical, linear clarity and straightforward syntax of rigorous yet easily followed argumentative prose. In the triumphalist variant, professors are challenged to write like poets — more specifically, like modern lyric poets: Jan Zwicky's essays on “lyric philosophy,” analyzed by several contributors in this and the immediately preceding issue of the journal, are cited as examples. What these experiments along the frontier between poetry and philosophy share is an aspiration toward what Friedrich Schlegel described as the “poeticizing philosopher” and the “philosophizing poet.” But, unlike other advocates of experimental mixtures (such as lyric philosophy and “creative criticism”), Schlegel was chiefly interested in historical discourse. He thought that history, like poetry, could be a means of addressing in a nontheoretical way what appear to be theoretical issues — and the present essay argues that attention to the line between fiction or poetry and philosophy is of trivial consequence compared with attention to that between fiction and historiography. The essay concludes with remarks about the state of history teaching in places, notably the Middle East, where historiography is presumed to be a simple study of who did what to whom — an approach to learning that instills in students an aspiration to “even the score.” Alternative approaches, whether empirical or pluralist, are considered, but the author directs his hope, instead, toward the as-yet-unachieved possibility of an experimental historiography that in equal measure is charitable, imaginative, and irenic.

Epstein, M.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422899

The article suggests that, contrary to widespread opinions and standard encyclopedic definitions, philosophy is a domain not only of thoughts and ideas but also of feelings. Philosophy as (etymologically) love for wisdom includes emotions in both of its components. Among the many various feelings that we experience, there is a discrete group that, thanks to their involvement with universals, may be regarded as philosophical. Wonder, grief, compassion, tenderness, hope, despair, and delight are philosophical if they are experienced on behalf of humankind and addressed to the world as a whole. The vocation of philosophy is to expand the realm of feelings through the generalizing capacity of the reason, so that love, joy, and pain can be experienced in a noble way, on a maximally global scale, not reducible to private or practical situations. Emotions of philosophical cast affect the world more powerfully than metaphysical ideas and logical propositions. Revolutions are driven less by ideas than by philosophical wrath, exasperation with the existing order of things, and the feeling that the world is unjust. It is in this context that Epstein's essay defines the genre of lyric philosophy as a direct self-expression of the thinking subject in the process of attaining self-cognition — as represented, for instance, in the work of Augustine, Montaigne, Kierkegaard, Emerson, and Nietzsche. Philosophical subjecthood as a means of self-expression for the transcendental subject (in the Kantian sense) should be distinguished from the purely personal subjectivity inherent to empirical individuals, in the same way and to the same extent as philosophical feelings should be distinguished from mundane ones experienced in everyday situations. Since the subject focused on itself is essential to lyricism, we may even speak of the generic , inescapable lyricism of philosophy per se.

Hagberg, G. L.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422908

As part of a Common Knowledge colloquium on “lyric philosophy,” this essay considers (a) some of the connections between linguistic and nonlinguistic meaning (and the nature of that distinction), (b) the connection between linguistic meaning and what Wittgenstein called aspect perception or imagination-enriched perception, (c) issues in the analysis of meaning down to constituent parts and the problematic legacy of atomistic approaches to word-meaning, (d) the inflection of experience across time and across context and the role of sensibility in both perception and linguistic meaning, and (e) the larger problem of what Simone Weil called “enslavement to one's own method.” What Jan Zwicky urges, and philosophically as well as poetically works toward, is, in Wittgenstein's terms, “a changed way of seeing,” though in her work the focus is specifically on a changed way of seeing the long-established question of linguistic meaning. Hagberg's essay seeks to specify or at least to intimate the form of human mutual understanding that, while too easily missed by traditionally entrenched approaches, Zwicky's approach nicely captures.

de Sousa, R.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422917

In a colloquium on “lyric philosophy,” this contribution records the efforts of an analytic philosopher to come to grips with questions that Jan Zwicky, who is both a fine poet and a subtle philosopher, has raised about anglophone analytic philosophy. The essay situates Zwicky between the analytic and Continental traditions in philosophy: like the best analytic philosophers, it is argued, she is enamored of clarity, but, like what is best in the Continental tradition, she demands of philosophy a deeper sense of meaning than philosophical analysts tend to do. It is from this unusual position that Zwicky is said to challenge the dogmas of the analytic tradition. Notable among those treated in this article are the belief that attributing literal meaning to anything but linguistic items is futile, belief in the possibility of distinguishing literal from metaphorical meaning, belief in the supremacy of argument over aphorisms, and belief in the importance of the “reductionist” program, which seeks to understand wholes in terms of their parts.

Roberts, M. F. S.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422926

The philosophy suggested by Jan Zwicky's expanded understanding of lyric and use of the fragment-as-method inspired this notebook of misunderstanding. Seeking to read Zwicky in the tradition of the aleatory genre and its basic form, the fragment, Roberts finds that her own sense of poetics and ethics (feminist, poststructural, phenomenological) accords generally with Zwicky's lyric philosophy and epistemology of imagination. Roberts's resonance with Zwicky's theory is conflicted by Zwicky's choice to isolate her fragment-method from the larger history of the aleatory genre and its complex political evolution. Misunderstandings are compounded by Zwicky's disengagement from her contemporaries in the aleatory genre, the instability of her definitions by way of gestalt, and the impossible scale of her “ontological imperative.” In the end, Roberts is disappointed by this tempting but failed affinity.

Allen, D.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422935

Jan Zwicky's fertile essays expose by contrast the aridity of much contemporary writing about the point of humanistic endeavor and intellectual life. Thinking, in her account, is importantly the work of imagination. The more common focus on critical thinking, in arguments on behalf of liberal arts pedagogy, does put a salutary emphasis on some aspects of thoughtfulness, for instance, use of evidence and argumentation, but Zwicky is right that this approach fails to articulate a standard for synthetic, imaginative discernment that meaningfully grasps the world. Zwicky usefully provides an account of just such a standard. Yet her argument that “other than pointing and hoping, there are no rules, no algorithms, by which human perception of a gestalt may be facilitated” sells the work of teachers short. An alternative case is made by Plato in his representation of Socrates-as-teacher, and most of this article is a case study of passages from the Republic .

Hobbs, A.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422944

In a response to two essays by Jan Zwicky on “lyric philosophy,” this piece questions whether there are positions that cannot be fully articulated in conventional, linear prose without contradiction and, if so, whether or in what sense they can be considered philosophical positions. Zwicky's experimental deployment of polyphonic textual structures to render her conception of a patterned and resonant whole is, Hobbs argues, part of a tradition, going back to ancient Greece, of radical philosophers struggling to express themselves without pragmatic self-refutation. In particular, Hobbs explores Zwicky's acknowledged debt to the paradoxes and aphorisms of Heraclitus, in whose thought the “backward-turning connection” of the lyre plays a central role. Hobbs suggests that, although both Heraclitus and Zwicky use language to stimulate profound changes in the reader's perception, understanding, and ethical outlook, there are important divergences in their projects: Zwicky assumes that humans have access to the resonant whole, while Heraclitus chooses to write in paradoxes partly in order to highlight the inevitable limitations of mortal knowledge of the Logos, which is known fully only to god. Zwicky's depiction of a generalized “analytic” philosopher may also be thought oversimplified: few analytic philosophers, if any, would claim that meaning can only be “linguistic in form,” and it is unclear what is meant by “technocratically acceptable prose.” Nevertheless, Zwicky's claim that the practice of philosophy is “better understood as an exercise of attention disciplined by discernment of the live, metaphorical relation between things and the resonant structure of the world” is an important one, and the challenges that it poses to our conceptions of what philosophy is and how to write it are not ones that should be ignored.

de Toledo, C.;Jefferson, A.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422953

Yang, J.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422962

Richmond, C.;

2014 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2422971

In the context of an issue of Common Knowledge dedicated to instances of experimental scholarship and to discussion of them, this contribution by a social historian of medieval England sets out to demonstrate that an empirical alternative to tendentious and interpretive historiography, despite all claims to the contrary, is possible and valuable. In this monograph-length article, the texts of selected documents in the Adair Family Collection (Suffolk Record Office, Lowestoft Branch, call number 741) are set forth, often verbatim, and, though minutely contextualized, are subjected to only the lightest analysis. Scant thematic cues organize this in-depth exploration of the wills, deeds of purchase, quitclaims, rentals, indentures, receipts, charitable bequests, and other legal and commercial transactions of John Tasburgh I (d. 1473), his wife Margery (d. 1485), John Tasburgh II (d. 1509), his wife Olive, and their families, dependents, assigns, and parishes. Peripheral attention is paid to the better-known John Hopton and to the family of John Paston I, II, and III. Richmond's own readings of texts and circumstances appear largely in the form of questions, as if he were writing marginalia for his own later use while reading. Thus, the historian does all the archival work necessary for readers to arrive at their own hypotheses about how rurality related to urbanity in fifteenth-century Suffolk and, perhaps, also about the meaning of the word urbane .