Common Knowledge

Havel, Vaclav; Michnik, Adam

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-012

This guest column amounts to a conversation between two of the crucial figures in the world of Soviet bloc dissidents about developments in their part of the world since the overthrow of communism there in 1989. They agree that a "creeping coup d'état" is underway, in which not only the government administrations of their countries have changed, but also their systems of governance—for the worse. "It is not," they agree, "what the democratic opposition spent twenty-five years fighting for." Their apprehension is that, under new forms, the old authoritarian impulses are returning to East-Central Europe as well as Russia.

O'Neill, Aidan

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-013

Aidan O'Neill remembers Britain as a fundamentally riven society twenty-five years ago under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher; a country divided by she who sought to rule it with certainty, but without compassion. The memories of Britain as a bitter and broken polity split asunder by a year-long strike of its coal miners were stirred again by a recent visit to the United States to attend a conference on Catholic Social Teaching where the growing social and legal acceptance of homosexuality and the continued toleration of lawful abortion were both angrily denounced by two speakers who revealed a fundamental disjunction between their vision and hope for a properly Christian America, and their experience of an America which they characterized as misgoverned by a conspiracy of liberal judges and complaisant politicians. A subsequent roundtable discussion on the prospects for a written constitution for the State of Israel also revealed a picture of a profoundly divided society with utterly irreconcilable political visions competing for its future. In the face of such radical diversity in political vision the author suggests that the better way forward is to focus not on ends but on means, and always to honor the constitutional and legal processes which result in, albeit imperfect, decision making. Although a very thin form of consensus, it is suggested that such an approach is the sine qua non for any polity aspiring to the condition and ideal of democracy to be able to function, and, ultimately, to achieve some kind of justice.

Marcus, Greil

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-014

The author, who lived in Berkeley, California during the disruptions of 1968, remembers the year as one of bad faith, though also of a sense of making history. He recalls the events of that year (and of 1964) in Berkeley, where he still lives, then moves out into related events in the rest of the world, but also into more lastingly important events in popular culture, especially popular music. He concludes by memorializing what now appears to him the most important event of all, certain records broken that year in sports.

Richmond, Colin

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-015

To commemorate the five hundreth anniversary of the accession of Henry VIII to the English throne, this guest column reviews the inventories made, upon his death, of the king's possessions at Hampton Court, the Tower, and other locations. Focusing on extensive equipment for royal-games playing, especially for "tennys," this paper is essentially a list of possessions that evidence the blend of frivolity and cruelty characteristic of Henry's self-indulgent reign.

Perl, Jeffrey M.; Price, A. W.; McDowell, John; Taylor, Matthew A.; Thompson, Caleb; Mao, Douglas

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-016

This essay is the journal editor's introduction to part 3 of an ongoing symposium on quietism. With reference to writings of James Joyce, Francis Picabia, J. M. Coetzee, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, Elaine Pagels, and Karen King—and with extended reference to Jonathan Lear's study of "cultural devastation," Radical Hope —Jeffrey Perl explores the possibility that the fear of anomie ("anomiphobia") is misplaced. He argues that, in comparison with the violence and narrowness of any given social order, anomie may well be preferable, and, in any case, may be no more than another name for quietism.

Price, A. W.

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-017

In one sense of the term current among analytical philosophers, the quietist _lacks skeptical doubts about the metaphysical or epistemological status of ethical judgments as a class of judgment. He may still have doubts about, say, the current state of morality. There are criteria of courage by which, though they are open-ended, a man may count as acting bravely. It need not follow that he has adopted the best tactics. Yet he must have responded fittingly to danger. But how is that to be identified? "Ought"-judgments are to be understood contextually, with an implicit relativity to certain ends or quasi-ends, and—when the "ought" is only pro tanto —to certain aspects of, or opportunities within, a situation. These judgments are often intuitive in that they do not derive from the application of a principle. Fittingness is an anthropocentric relation that holds within some human perspective; we should not think of it as a feature purportedly inherent in the very nature of things. It is salutary to remember cases where the "ought" is so relativized, say to an undesirable end, that it identifies no reason for action. The nature of the relation does not change when it is relativized to an end that the agent has reason to achieve. "Ought"-judgments should not be interpreted in ambitious ways that make them generally problematic.

McDowell, John

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-018

In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein describes, and represents himself as pursuing, a way of doing philosophy without putting forward philosophical theses. I exemplify his approach with a sketch of his treatment of rule following. I focus in particular on the simple case of following a signpost, conceived as an expression of a rule for getting to a destination. Wittgenstein uncovers a threat that we will find it mysterious how one could learn from a signpost which way to go, and he dissolves the threat, not by putting forward philosophical theses, but by reminding us of things we already knew about signposts. Insofar as the point of Wittgenstein's procedure is to give philosophy peace, the label "quietism" fits. I take issue with readings of Wittgenstein's quietism that represent him as uncovering a need for positive philosophical work, but using quietism as a pretext for declining to do the work himself. Wittgensteinian quietism is not a stance of complacency or idleness. The kind of thing Wittgenstein does is difficult and laborious. It requires accurate and sympathetic engagement with frames of mind in which positive philosophy seems to be necessary.

Taylor, Matthew A.

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-019

Written exclusively in the third-person by a narrator who repeatedly refers to "Henry Adams" as "passive," "submissive," and "a helpless victim" in relation to the "forces" in the world that form him, The Education of Henry Adams attenuates both author and subject by valuing environment over eponym. The critical literature on the text has focused primarily on the formal or psychological bases of such practice in order to argue that Adams is behind, and thus exempt from, the book's paradoxical self-effacements. But for Adams the rationale for the impersonal, evacuated form of The Education is more ontological than personal, the necessary consequence of his quietistic belief in a materialist determinism so absolute as to reduce persons and history alike to "sum(s).... of the forces" of "nature." This belief, one shared by many of his contemporaries and most fully evolved in Adams's "dynamic theory of history," entails, in the context of The Education , making the distinction between auto-biography and autobiography, between a text generated by an "automaton" and one written by a person. Routed through a discussion of de Man's and Kierkegaard's conceptions of irony, this essay explores the relevance of such a distinction to both the humanism of Adams's age and the posthumanism of our own.

Thompson, Caleb

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-020

Tolstoy writes in a letter to his friend A. A. Fet that what he has written in War and Peace , "especially in the epilogue," is also said by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation . Tolstoy adds, however, that Schopenhauer approaches "it from the other side." Schopenhauer does indeed say much the same thing as Tolstoy says in his epilogue and elsewhere about history and the will. Each of these authors argues that history is not progressing and that it is not governed by the actions of individual political or military leaders alone, but by the infinitely many actions of the multitude of people. What underlies this critique of history in each case is a quietist outlook on life, a perspective from which one must abandon the assertion of the will and accept life as it is given. Tolstoy's quietism, however, is a happy quietism ; he wants his reader to joyfully embrace life for all that it has to offer. Schopenhauer's is an unhappy quietism ; he wants his reader to accept life in the face of all that it is not. Thus, Tolstoy and Schopenhauer approach quietism, and consequently their critiques of history and the will, from different "sides." These sides—to borrow Wittgenstein's way of speaking—are the sides of the happy and the unhappy. To approach quietism from one side rather than another is no small matter. In Tolstoy's case in particular, it made all the difference in the world.

Mao, Douglas

2009 Common Knowledge

doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2009-021

In a dialogue whose precedents include Oscar Wilde's "Critic as Artist," two fictional professors of English take up the relationship between aestheticism and quietism. Their conversation begins with a debate on the necessity of treating sociopolitical contexts when teaching literature then moves to connections among aesthetic experience, political disengagement, inactivity, and contemplation explored by Wilde, Miguel de Molinos, Aristotle, Hannah Arendt, Walter Pater, Arthur Schopenhauer, Johann Winckelmann, and others. Having described the influence of nineteenth-century science and determinism on Wilde's gospel of inaction, as well as Pater's adaptation of the Winckelmannian view that people and things express their nature most truly when still, one speaker wonders whether aesthetic experience gains some of its significance from its affiliation with leisure. The other resists the idea that repose might constitute one of life's key desiderata, but notes at the close how both his own view and his interlocutor's are adumbrated in the Wallace Stevens poem that furnishes the dialogue its title.