Introduction: "More Trouble than They Are Worth"Perl, Jeffrey M.; Griffiths, Paul J.; Evans, G. R.; Davis, Clark
2009 Common Knowledge
doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2008-038
This essay, which is the editor's introduction to part 1 of a multipart symposium on quietism, also constitutes his call for symposium papers. The symposium is meant be comprehensive. It is described as political and broadly cultural as well as religious, and in religious terms is said to cover not only the Catholic and Protestant quietisms (most properly so called) of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also the proto-quietisms of the medieval Western church and reputedly quietist aspects of the Gnostic, Eastern Orthodox, early Hasidic, Shi'ite, Jain and other Indic, Taoist, and Zen religious traditions. This introduction emphasizes the secular approaches, mostly antipolitical or postphilosophical, that wear the adjective "quietist" metaphorically, including the postmodern currents that Martha Nussbaum has named "hip quietism" and the "minimalist" philosophical version developed by Wittgenstein and some of his successors, notably Richard Rorty. This introduction concludes with attention to Rorty's late essay "Naturalism and Quietism," then with a dedication of the entire symposium to Rorty's memory.
THE QUIETUS OF POLITICAL INTERESTGriffiths, Paul J.
2009 Common Knowledge
doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2008-039
Quietists aim to bring something to rest, to move it from activity to quiescence. This essay depicts and advocates a quietism of political interest, which is to say a divorce of political action from interest in the outcome of such action. Its principal interlocutor is Pascal, whose 1657 letter to Périer argues, on theological and epistemological grounds, for exactly such a separation. The essay argues that a quietism of political interest has several advantages over ordinary consequentialist political advocacy and action, the most important among which is that the former can acknowledge that in a complex political system we are ordinarily unable to predict the results of enacting what we advocate, while the latter must occlude that fact. Quietists of political interest must replace concern with outcome by something else as a motive or cause for political advocacy and action; and while there are many possibilities here, in the West the only lively form of such quietism has been Christian-theological, in which political advocacy and action are, ideal-typically and sometimes actually, undertaken under the threefold assumption that: (1) advocacy of a political proposal assumes that justice in the political sphere is not attainable but must nonetheless be sought; (2) advocacy of a political proposal assumes that while Christian advocates can act unjustly, they cannot suffer injustice; and (3) advocacy of a political proposal proceeds always without concern for the outcome.
SANCTA INDIFFERENTIA AND ADIAPHORA: "Holy Indifference" and "Things Indifferent"Evans, G. R.
2009 Common Knowledge
doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2008-040
Quietism brought the individual to a state of "holy indifference" where nothing mattered; particularities of Christian belief and practice, pleasures of the senses, personal desires, all vanished in the utter self-abandonment of the soul in the presence of God. The "resigned" soul simply left everything to God. This was a mode of spirituality but also a challenge to the Church and the need for its sacraments. Ecclesiastical authorities of various colors, both protestant and Roman Catholic, found this unacceptable in its earlier manifestations in the later Middle Ages and again in its heydey in the late seventeenth century. Meanwhile in the sixteenth century, adiaphora had become controversial. These were matters of Christian belief and practice about which Christian opinion could legitimately vary and which were therefore "indifferent." This paper explores the ways in which both these controversies rose from the same underground stream of medieval dissidence, discussing the contributions of the leading characters in the story and seeking to describe the common ground of idea and ideology which unites the history and which suggests that Quietism represents an archetype among the great "positions" of Christendom.
"NOT LIKE ANY FORM OF ACTIVITY": Waiting in Emerson, Melville, and WeilDavis, Clark
2009 Common Knowledge
doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2008-041
In his meditation on Emerson's self-reliance, George Kateb argues that Emerson's entrance into antislavery politics, particularly his calls for collective mobilization, constitutes a "deviation from his theory of self-reliance, not its transformation." Though Emerson often imagines a self-reliance that can lead to action, his descriptions of the fundamental attitude of the self towards the world suggest passivity, attention, and waiting. Because he rules out logical or teleological sources for inspiration, his conception of self-reliance is fundamentally at odds with progressivist narratives of history. His sense of "entranced waiting" flirts with an anarchic potentiality that he must reject in order to call for social solidarity and progressive action against slavery. In "Bartleby, the Scrivener," Melville takes the radical outsidedness of self-reliance to its conclusion, transforming Emersonian waiting into Bartleby's catatonic stillness. Emerson's waiting for inspiration becomes the copyist's quiet demand that his employer wait with him rather than use charitable actions to free himself from the burden Bartleby imposes. Bartleby obstructs the lawyer's ideas of improvement as well as his conception of himself as a moral agent in a world of moral possibility. Simone Weil provides a similar version of a quietist waiting with . To an ungenerous "active searching" she opposes a fundamental generosity, a "waiting or attentive and faithful immobility" through which one is able to recognize "that the sufferer exists." For Weil, as for Melville, there is no passage from such a recognition to a conception of history as progress. The sufferer is not a problem to be solved within a narrative of social improvement but the source of an unlimited and impossible obligation.
LEBANON IIIsaacs, Alick
2009 Common Knowledge
doi: 10.1215/0961754X-2008-047
This memoir is a detailed and reflective (though highly subjective) account of the author's experiences in the summer of 2006. Starting with the outbreak of the Second Lebanese War, it moves on to describe his call-up and conscription, border service at the IDF outpost in Metulla and participation in the combat inside southern Lebanon. The narrative follows the progress of an infantry unit from its point of entry on the Israel-Lebanese border, through the villages of Raj-A-Min, Sham'a and on to the coastal position it held until the end of the war at Ras-Bayada. The memoir draws particular attention to the paradoxes and ironies of the war from the point of view of a civilian reserve foot soldier and father of five serving in a frontline infantry unit. Significant sections of this narrative are dedicated to the moral, ethical, and religious questions that he grappled with during the war and to the intuitive political and religious conclusions that he reached. It is these intuitions that he refers to at the end "as the rethinking of his religion" that ultimately develops into the suggestion that a softer and more peaceful notion of theology is essential to the acquisition of peace.